AAIB investigation to Airbus A319-131, G-EUPS

39All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: 10/2026 G-EUPS AAIB-31335 Serious Incident Aircraft Type and Registration: Airbus A319-131, G-EUPS No & Type of Engines: 2 International Aero Engine V2522-A5 turbofan engines Year of Manufacture: 2000 (Serial no: 1338) Date & Time (UTC): 30 October 2025 at 1918 hrs Location: In the climb after takeoff from Edinburgh Airport Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport Persons on Board: Crew - 6 Passengers - 132 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Air Data Inertial Reference Unit temporary shock loading Commander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 47 years Commander’s Flying Experience: 12,127 hours (of which 6,623 were on type) Last 90 days - 161 hours Last 28 days - 53 hours Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot and subsequent AAIB enquiries Synopsis Shortly after takeoff from Edinburgh Airport, the Autopilot (AP) and Autothrust (A/THR) systems disconnected during the climb, followed by a loss of positional information from the Global Positioning Inertial Reference System (GPIRS). The flight crew initially declared a PAN and the flight continued to London Heathrow Airport using radar vectors. The flight crew were able to re-engage the AP and A/THR systems, but they disconnected again during the approach and a further rudder travel limiter system error immediately prior to landing necessitated a go-around. The aircraft subsequently landed safely. The AP and A/THR disconnects and the loss of the GPIRS and rudder travel limiter systems were caused by severe drift of the aircraft’s Inertial Reference System (IRS) due to vertical shock loads encountered during the takeoff roll at Edinburgh. The exact source of the shock loading was not determined but two larger sound impulses from the nose landing gear were captured by the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). No damage or irregularity was found with the Air Data Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU) or the Nose Landing Gear (NLG). Sensitivity of the ADIRUs to shock loading outside of their certification requirements is a known issue to the aircraft manufacturer. The runway at Edinburgh has since been fully resurfaced. 40All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: 10/2026 G-EUPS AAIB-31335 History of the flight The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from Edinburgh Airport to London Heathrow Airport. Immediately prior to V R during the takeoff roll on Runway 06 at Edinburgh, the Commander (PM) and co-pilot (PF) heard a “bang” from the nosewheel. About nine minutes after takeoff, and as the aircraft was climbing through FL220, the crew observed a gps primary annunciation on the left Navigation Display (ND), followed shortly afterwards by a status message cat 3 single only, with cat 3 dual listed as inoperative. The crew checked the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU) 1 position monitor page, where the Inertial Reference System (IRS) IRS 2 deviation value 2 displayed dashes, instead of a number. IRS 1 and IRS 3 both displayed a deviation value of 5.0 nm, increasing by approximately 0.1 per second, reaching a value of 28.0 nm. AP2, which was engaged after takeoff, then disengaged, so the PF engaged AP1 but this also disengaged after a few seconds, along with the A/THR system. There were no ECAM alerts, or any fault lights on the overhead panel. The flight crew declared a PAN with ATC and levelled off the aircraft at FL320. They requested a radar heading and ATC informed that the flight was now non-RVSM 3 . Scottish Control requested the flight crew to squawk 7700 (later cancelled upon transfer to London Control) and to descend to FL290. The System Display (SD) STATUS page displayed ap 1+2, a/thr and cat 2 4 as inoperative systems. The crew attempted to troubleshoot using the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) and Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), but none of the checklists exactly matched the information presented. The ‘NAV FM/GPS POS DISAGREE’ QRH checklist was consulted and the parameter for estimated accuracy was below the required accuracy, while the Flight Management Guidance Computer (FMGC) positions matched the GPIRS position. The flight crew attempted to confirm the aircraft’s position using a GPS waypoint, but ATC informed them that it was incorrect. They were able to confirm the aircraft’s position using VOR but there was a 5 nm discrepancy between the positions shown on the left and right NDs. The flight crew changed the ND to ROSE VOR and continued the flight to Heathrow on radar vectors. During the descent, the STATUS page returned to normal and AP and A/THR became available, so the flight crew re-engaged AP2 and the ATHR. They briefed the intent to use available automation for as long as possible but planned to disengage the AP and A/THR when on the final approach, to avoid a workload increase if they disengaged again. They also briefed a go-around procedure. Footnote 1 The MCDU is the keyboard and screen used by the flight crew to interact with the flight management and guidance system. 2 The values show the difference in nautical miles of each IRS position from that computed by the flight management systems. 3 RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minima) allows aircraft to operate with reduced vertical separation. Among other requirements, the rules require a functional autopilot capable of holding altitude. 4 Indicating a degraded landing category due to loss of AP and A/THR systems. 41All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: 10/2026 G-EUPS AAIB-31335 When the aircraft reached 4,200 ft and was cleared to intercept the localiser, the AP and A/THR once again disengaged, so the flight crew continued the approach manually. At approximately 1,500 ft amsl an auto flt rud trv lim 1 5 ECAM alert triggered. The flight crew were unable to complete the required ECAM actions by 1,000 ft and initiated a go-around as briefed. After levelling off, the ECAM alert self-cleared and the aircraft landed after a second uneventful approach. After landing, whilst parking on stand, a nav ir 1 fault ECAM alert triggered, followed by a nav ir 1 + 3 fault alert after parking. Recorded information Introduction The aircraft’s FDR and CVR were removed from the aircraft shortly after landing at Heathrow and subsequently replayed by the AAIB. The entire incident flight was available, with the CVR recording commencing as the flight crew prepared the aircraft for the flight to Heathrow. Takeoff roll The taxi out to the runway and initial takeoff roll appeared normal. As the aircraft accelerated along the runway, rhythmic sound pulses were recorded on the CVR ockpit area microphone (CAM), which were consistent with one of the NLG tyres contacting the runway centreline lights. As the aircraft reached a ground speed of about 118 kt (an airspeed of 128 KCAS), the amplitude of one of the sound impulses increased (Figure 1 and Figure 2 - Point A). This coincided with the aircraft’s NLG squat switch (recorded at an update rate of four samples per second) starting to oscillate quickly back and forth between its ground and air indication. One second later (Figure 1 and Figure 2 - Point B), there was a further short duration sound impulse, which was of sufficient intensity to be captured by the CAM and the pilot’s headset hot-microphones 6 . Less than one second after this, the aircraft’s airspeed reached V r and the PF applied aft stick, rotating the aircraft into the climb. The recorded data from the FDR system’s tri-axial accelerometer appeared normal during the takeoff. However, the triaxial accelerometer is installed near the aircraft’s CG and accordingly accelerations occurring near the forward fuselage, such as those due to nosewheel contact with surface irregularities or centre line lights, may not be apparent. Footnote 5 This alert is triggered when one rudder travel limitation actuator has failed. 6 Sounds from the headset microphones are r

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AAIB investigation to Airbus A319-131, G-EUPS

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