AAIB investigation to ATR 72-212 A, G-OASB

1All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: G-OASB AAIB-31376 Accident Aircraft Type and Registration: ATR 72-212 A, G-OASB No & Type of Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW127M turboprop engines Year of Manufacture: 2001 (Serial no: 679) Date & Time (UTC): 14 November 2025 at 2055 hrs Location: East Midlands Airport Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Cargo) Persons on Board: Crew - 2 Passengers - None Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - N/A Nature of Damage: Damage to nose and main landing gear Commander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 58 years Commander’s Flying Experience: 5,554 hours (of which 5,152 were on type) Last 90 days - 80 hours Last 28 days - 33 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis The aircraft was operating a scheduled cargo service from Guernsey Airport (GCI) to East Midlands Airport (EMA). The flight was uneventful until the late stages of final approach. As the commander retarded the thrust levers to prepare for touchdown, the aircraft floated and then rapidly pitched down. The aircraft touched down on the nose landing gear and then bounced twice before finally landing. The nose landing gear was extensively damaged. The two pilots were the only occupants and neither was injured. History of the flight The aircraft was loaded with 3,300 kg of fuel and 3,858 kg of freight for a scheduled cargo flight from GCI to EMA. All loading was carried out in accordance with standard procedures and the aircraft mass and balance was within limits. Start up, departure, climb, cruise and the descent to final approach were all uneventful. The crew obtained the EMA ATIS report in the cruise and the commander, who was PF, carried out the approach brief. The commander described the conditions as “far from ideal, but well within safe operating limits”, and stated that he had operated in much worse conditions. The ATIS was updated as the aircraft approached EMA and the weather for the approach was reported as broken cloud with a base at 700 ft aal, rain, and with the wind from 050° at 11 kt gusting 23 kt. From these figures and the aircraft mass the crew calculated and set an approach speed (V APP ) of 123 kt. The approach was normal and all the routine checklists were completed. 2All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: G-OASB AAIB-31376 On approach, EMA ATC advised the crew that the wind was 060° at 20 kt with no gust. The crew decided to reduce the V APP to 120 kt. The co-pilot, who was PM, called “stable” in accordance with company procedures at 1,000 ft aal. Then, as the aircraft neared the ground, the co-pilot gave radio altitude callouts at 80, 50, 20 and 10 ft agl. The 10 ft call from the PM is a cue for the PF to retard the power levers to flight idle. The commander did so and initiated the flare. Both pilots subsequently described the aircraft as “floating in the ground effect”. The commander recalled the aircraft then dropping suddenly onto the runway although the IAS was still above V APP. He recalled this event as lasting only one or two seconds and that he was taken completely by surprise and was unable to execute a go-around to prevent a touchdown. The aircraft landed heavily and then bounced back into the air. The commander recalled raising the nose, but the aircraft bounced again. Again, the commander felt taken by surprise. After the second bounce he did not want to apply power as he considered that, with the nose-down attitude, power would accelerate the aircraft into the ground. As the aircraft touched down a third time, the commander stated it was apparent that the nose landing gear had been damaged. The PM took control of the yoke while the commander focused on keeping the aircraft on the centreline using the nosewheel tiller. The commander exited the runway at Taxiway S (Figure 1). Once clear of the runway, EMA ATC asked if the commander could continue to taxi to Parking Stand 71. Due to the difficulties in manoeuvring the aircraft, the commander informed ATC that he would have to shut down on the taxiway. An airfield operations vehicle approached and confirmed that both nose landing gear tyres were deflated. Neither pilot was injured. Airfield information EMA has one primary runway, designated Runway 09/27, which is 2,893 m long and 45 m wide. The airport layout is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 EMA layout diagram 3All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: G-OASB AAIB-31376 Meteorology The briefing pack given to the crew before flight contained a TAF for EMA which forecast the weather as: For the period 1200 hrs on 14 November until 1200 hrs on 15 November 2025. ●Wind: 060° at 15 kt, gusting to 25 kt. ●Visibility: 10 km or more. ●Cloud: broken cloud at 1,500 ft agl. Temporary Conditions from 1200 hrs until 0000 hrs on 15 November 2025. ●Visibility: 6 km. ●Weather: light rain and drizzle. ●Cloud: broken at 600 ft agl. Another temporary period from 1200 hrs on 14 November until 0300 hrs on 15 November 2025. ●Wind: from 060° at 20 kt, gusting to 36 kt. 40% probability between 1200 hrs on 14 November and 0000 hrs on 15 November 2025. ●Visibility: 4 km. ●Weather: heavy rain and heavy drizzle. The METAR at 2050 hrs was wind from 050° at 13 kt, visibility 6,000 m in rain, cloud broken at 700 ft aal, temperature and dewpoint both 8°C and QNH 1005 hPa. Recorded information The aircraft was fitted with an FDR and CVR, both of which recorded the approach and landing at EMA. In addition, the airport provided CCTV recordings that captured the event. The FDR recorded a number of parameters including pitch attitude, engine data and the position of the left elevator. Control column position and force was not recorded. A ‘pitch effort discrete’ parameter was available which was triggered whenever the control column pitch force exceeded 10 daN in either the pitch-up or pitch-down axis. This was recorded for both control columns independently. Prior to the flight, a ‘full and free’ control check was performed which showed the left elevator range of +12.7° to -21.8°, where positive elevator deflection would be a control input in the aircraft nose-down sense. 4All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: G-OASB AAIB-31376 As the aircraft descended through a radio altitude of 50 ft, the recorded power lever position was 50° 1 , engine torque was 37% on both engines and indicated airspeed was 120 kt. Over the next five seconds, the recorded power lever position began to reduce to 44°, engine torque gradually reduced to 30% and the aircraft began to pitch up (Figure 2, Point A). Figure 2 G-OASB flight data parameters The power levers were reduced further and engine torque reduced but the aircraft floated at approximately 10 ft radio altitude for the next three seconds (Point B). After this, nose-down elevator was recorded (Point C) and the aircraft pitched down from +0.4° 2 to -4.4°, consistent with that elevator deflection, over the next two seconds. Footnote 1 During takeoff when full power was demanded, the power levers reached 75°. When idling, power lever position was 19°. 2 Positive pitch is pitch up, negative pitch is pitch down. 5All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: G-OASB AAIB-31376 The first touchdown was at a pitch attitude of -4.4° and a vertical acceleration of 2.04 g. The aircraft bounced and pitched up during which the main landing gear was momentarily recorded as being on ground (Point D). During this time, continued pitch-down elevator was applied, before reversing to pitch-up. At the same time, the power levers were advanced and the engine torque increased (Point E). The recorded ‘pitch force discrete’ indicated that just prior to the second bounce, the commander was applying a pitch-down effort and the co-pilot pitch-up (Point F). The aircraft bounced a second time at 2.6 g, a third at 1.5 g before settling on the runway with a 1.

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AAIB investigation to ATR 72-212 A, G-OASB

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