AAIB investigation to Boeing 737-800, 9H-QBD

1All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: 9H-QBD AAIB-31283 Serious Incident Aircraft Type and Registration: Boeing 737-800, 9H-QBD No & Type of Engines: 2 CFM56-7B turbofan engines Year of Manufacture: 2015 Date & Time (UTC): 3 October 2025 at 1913 hrs Location: Manchester Airport Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 6 Passengers - 171 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: None reported Commander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 33 years Commander’s Flying Experience: 6,272 hours (of which 5,889 were on type) Last 90 days - 154 hours Last 28 days - 52 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis 9H-QBD was on a scheduled flight from Pisa International Airport to Glasgow Prestwick Airport on a day when significant winds had been forecast. The crew took extra fuel to allow for possible delays and diversions due to the weather. Following two windshear escape manoeuvres that transitioned into go-arounds at Prestwick, the crew requested a diversion to Manchester Airport, but the request was not accepted and the aircraft diverted to Edinburgh Airport. Following a further windshear escape manoeuvre at Edinburgh, the crew declared an emergency and diverted to Manchester where they landed with a fuel quantity significantly below the final reserve fuel. Following this serious incident, Manchester Airport reiterated to stakeholders its policy of accepting diversion requests if the airport has the capacity to receive the aircraft and that the decision on accepting the diversion does not rest with the handling agent. History of the flight 9H-QBD was scheduled for a flight from Pisa International Airport in Italy, to Prestwick Airport near Glasgow in the United Kingdom. Over the scheduled arrival time, Storm Amy was due to pass through Scotland and Northern England, bringing strong to gale force winds, several weather fronts and prolonged rainfall. The previous day the operator had issued a storm pack including four safety bulletins to remind pilots about the potential impact of the forecast weather. This was followed up on the day with an additional email reminder of guidance on weather disruption and conservative fuel planning including uplifting fuel for the furthest alternate and adding commander’s discretionary fuel. 2All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: 9H-QBD AAIB-31283 The crew reported 45 minutes before departure and were aware of the potential for weather disruption in Scotland and Northern England. They conducted their own flight planning at home individually, prior to reporting for duty. On arrival at Pisa, both pilots compared their individual planning and they broadly agreed. The amount of additional fuel taken was influenced by the anticipated need to use the shorter of the two runways at Prestwick because the crosswind forecast for the longer runway was outside the aircraft’s limits. The pilots stated that they agreed on using Manchester Airport as their alternate because it had more favourable weather conditions than the operator-planned alternate of Glasgow Airport. The flight was due to depart at 1415 hrs but was delayed until 1528 hrs, with the commander as the pilot flying for this outbound sector, and the flight to Prestwick was initially uneventful. Weather data for Manchester, Prestwick, Glasgow and Edinburgh airports were collected in ample time, and the pilots discussed the weather conditions and the windshear escape procedure as part of their arrival briefing. There were no delays at Prestwick, and the aircraft was vectored for the approach to Runway 20. The surface wind conditions were passed as 240° at 29 kt gusting 45 kt with both pilots commenting on the turbulence as they began the approach. At 1,200 ft aal the autopilot and autothrottle were disconnected due to the fluctuating airspeed. On passing 300 ft aal the airspeed was beginning to decay and the commander increased thrust to compensate. The rate of airspeed decay continued and on approaching 264 ft aal a windshear warning was triggered with two-tone siren and a “windshear, windshear, windshear” voice message. The windshear escape manoeuvre 1 was executed and, on passing between 600 and 700 ft aal, the aircraft exited the conditions. The commander transitioned to a standard go-around, followed the missed approach procedure, and joined the hold at Turnberry (TRN) VOR at 6,000 ft. The pilots reviewed their fuel situation and decided to wait in the hold to see if an aircraft of the same type currently on approach experienced any windshear. The pilots discussed the windshear event, obtained the updated weather for Manchester and noted that another windshear escape manoeuvre would necessitate a diversion in accordance with company policy. The other aircraft landed and reported a loss in airspeed on short finals of 25 kt at 500 ft. Another approach to Prestwick was requested and ATC were informed that “in case of missed approach again, we go straightforward to manchester”. During the second approach, the pilots reported that the conditions felt less turbulent than before. The autopilot and autothrottle were again disconnected at approximately 1,200 ft aal, and airspeed fluctuations were reported as being less than the previous approach. The instant wind at this time was passed as 230° at 34 kt gusting 46 kt. Around 50 ft aal, another windshear warning was triggered, and the commander executed the windshear escape manoeuvre. When out of windshear conditions they transitioned to a standard go-around, completed the ‘After Take-off ’ checklist, climbed to 6,000 ft and were instructed to go back to TRN to hold. Footnote 1 See section, Windshear escape manoeuvre. 3All times are UTC� Crown copyright 2026 AAIB Bulletin: 9H-QBD AAIB-31283 During the routing to the hold, ATC stated that Manchester was unable to accept their diversion request, but no explanation was given as to why the request had been refused. The pilots obtained the weather for Edinburgh Airport via ATC which reported strong winds but no windshear, although there had been some aircraft go-arounds earlier. The nearest alternative airport was Glasgow Airport, which was reporting in the ATIS that aircraft had experienced windshear on finals. Based on this information the pilots requested a diversion to Edinburgh, this request was made six minutes after they were told by ATC that Manchester had refused to accept the diversion. It took a further five minutes for their request to divert to Edinburgh to be accepted. During that time the pilots discussed declaring a “fuel minimum ” or a “mayday” to go to Manchester. However, they agreed that their current fuel state did not meet the criteria written in the company operations manual to declare an emergency 2 . They discussed their concern that they might receive a windshear warning at Edinburgh, and they also discussed the windshear warnings, wondering whether they had been spurious. They departed the hold, climbed to FL150 and routed toward Edinburgh. During this transit the pilots were becoming more concerned about the fuel, but there was no discussion of a plan should they have to go around at Edinburgh, and they did not inform ATC of their fuel situation (there was no requirement to do so). They reported that due to the high workload they decided not to tell the company about the diversion until they were on the ground. The Edinburgh ATIS gave a surface wind of 240° at 34 kt gusting 46 kt and the aircraft was set-up for an approach to Runway 24. On transfer to Edinburgh Approach, they asked if any landing aircraft had experienced windshear and were told that nothing had been reported. The pilots commenced their third approach. Again, the autopilot and autothrottle were disconnected at approximately 1,200 ft aal and on passing 745 ft aal another windshear warning was triggered. The crew performed the windshear esca

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AAIB investigation to Boeing 737-800, 9H-QBD

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