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Agusta A109A, G-DNHI, 9 October 2006

Air Accidents (AAIB)

Published on 10 December 2014, 21:36

Summary
aircraft category
commercial-rotorcraft
aircraft type
Agusta A109A
bulk published
1
date of occurrence
2006-10-09
location
2 nm west of Biggin Hill Airport, Kent
registration
G-DNHI
report type
field-investigation

Report Overview

Agusta A109A, G-DNHI

Summary:

During cruise flight, an engine exhaust duct separated from the helicopter and struck the tail rotor assembly, causing the tail rotor gearbox to also separate. After an initial yaw to the right, the pilot regained limited control. However, a further sudden yaw, possibly associated with a partial structural failure of the upper vertical stabiliser, prompted an immediate autorotative descent, which culminated in a successful forced landing. The investigation established that a clamp attaching an exhaust duct to the left engine had failed, due to stress corrosion cracking, allowing the duct to disconnect from the engine. Two safety recommendations are made.

This overview has been truncated. Please refer to the official documents below for the complete canonical report.

Official Documents

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Agusta A109A, G-DNHI 12-07.pdf

17 © Crown copyright 2007 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2007 G-DNHI EW/C2006/10/04 ACCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Agusta A109A, G-DNHI No & Type of Engines: 2 Allison 250-C20B turboshaft engines Year of Manufacture: 1979 Date & Time (UTC): 9 October 2006 at 1431 hrs Location: 2 nm west of Biggin Hill Airport, Kent Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 1 Passengers - None Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - N/A Nature of Damage: Tail rotor assembly separated from helicopter, severe damage to both vertical stabilisers and aft tailboom Commander’s Licence: Commercial Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 52 years Commander’s Flying Experience: 8,465 hours (of which 1,836 were on type) Last 90 days - 68 hours Last 28 days - 16 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis During cruise flight, an engine exhaust duct separated from the helicopter and struck the tail rotor assembly, causing the tail rotor gearbox to separate. After an initial yaw to the right, the pilot regained limited control. However, a further sudden yaw, possibly associated with a partial structural failure of the upper vertical stabiliser, prompted an immediate autorotative descent, which culminated in a successful forced landing. The investigation established that a clamp attaching an exhaust duct to the left engine had failed, due to stress corrosion cracking, allowing the duct to disconnect from the engine. Two Safety Recommendations are made. History of the flight The helicopter was being flown by the operating company’s Chief Pilot from Redhill Aerodrome to Biggin Hill Airport to collect two passengers and fly them to Battersea Heliport. Prior to the flight, he carried out a pre-flight check of G-DNHI which revealed no anomalies or defects; there were no outstanding defects recorded in the technical log. The helicopter was fuelled to full main tanks and was within centre of gravity (CG) and overall mass limits for the proposed flight. After a refreshment break, the pilot departed for the short flight to Biggin Hill, 10 nm away. The weather there was fine, with a surface wind from 210º at 8 kt, good visibility and scattered cloud cover at 1,600 ft aal. 18 © Crown copyright 2007 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2007 G-DNHI EW/C2006/10/04 The surface temperature was +18ºC. He made contact with Biggin Hill ATC and was instructed to fly to a right-hand downwind position for Runway 21. At this time the helicopter was flying at 1,500 ft amsl and with a cruise power setting of approximately 90% torque, giving an airspeed of 120 kt to 140 kt. Without warning, the helicopter suddenly yawed to the right, and the pilot thought later that this may have been accompanied by a “bang”. He instinctively applied full left anti-torque pedal and left cyclic control, and the helicopter appeared to stabilise with about a 30º angle of bank to the right. Although the pilot was visual with Biggin Hill, he was unable to stop the helicopter from turning away from the airport. Aware that there had been a serious malfunction of the tail rotor, the pilot attempted to regain directional control of the helicopter by reducing the collective setting, and thus the torque being applied to the main rotor. A person on the ground in the area heard the helicopter approaching and then heard two “pops”, before seeing the helicopter pass overhead in the direction of Biggin Hill, with what sounded like an altered engine note. The pilot was aware of a reducing airspeed, possibly to around 100 kt. He reported that having flown the helicopter through about 360º of turn, he was able to fly toward Biggin Hill for a mile or so with crossed controls. There was then was a violent yawing and pitching motion which he described as “wrenching” which he sensed as a significant pitch-up and yaw to the right. It was probably this event that was seen by another witness on the ground who described seeing the helicopter yaw a full 180º (although described as a yaw to the left) before pitching nose-down and yawing back in the direction of flight. The pilot immediately lowered the collective lever to remove all torque from the main rotor system. He then reduced engine power to idle, lowered the landing gear and the helicopter settled into an autorotative attitude. The pilot sensed that it still wanted to turn to the right and recalled that he was concentrating on maintaining a satisfactory airspeed and main rotor speed, but that he had limited influence on the helicopter’s direction of travel. He saw a field ahead of the helicopter which appeared suitable for landing. Being reluctant to flare too harshly, the pilot made a shallow flare before ‘cushioning’ the touchdown with increasing collective. Consequently, the landing was faster than it would otherwise have been. The pilot lowered the collective lever gently, and the helicopter decelerated satisfactorily without the need to use wheel brakes, and remained upright. The pilot shut down the engines and attempted to call Biggin Hill or another aircraft on the radio. This was unsuccessful, so the pilot made an ‘all-stations’ broadcast to inform anyone who might receive his transmission of the situation and his safe landing; this transmission was not acknowledged. The pilot switched off electrical power and vacated the helicopter. He then alerted the emergency services by telephone and ensured that ATC at Biggin Hill were informed of his safe landing. Subsequently, the pilot could neither recall any vibration at any stage of the emergency, nor recall seeing any warning lights or abnormal cockpit indications. CG determination The manufacturer made a conservative estimate of the effect on the helicopter’s CG position after the tail rotor assembly departed. Making the assumption that only 25 kg of fuel was on-board (although it had been refuelled to full tanks prior to flight, fuel weight has a small effect on CG position), that the pilot weighed 80 kg and that the tail rotor assembly weighed 19 kg, 19 © Crown copyright 2007 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2007 G-DNHI EW/C2006/10/04 they calculated that the CG position remained well inside normal limits. Recorded information The majority of the helicopter’s flight was captured by radar heads at London Heathrow Airport and Pease Pottage in Sussex. Radio communications between G-DNHI and Biggin Hill ATC were also recorded and available for analysis. A plot showing the helicopter’s radar-derived track and other relevant information is at Figure 1. Radio telephony The pilot contacted Biggin Hill Approach Control (129.400 MHz) and reported that he was over the M23/ M25 motorway junction at 1,400 ft amsl. Two minutes later he transmitted “ MAYDAY MAYDAY (CALLSIGN TWICE) TAIL ROTOR FAILURE JUST WEST OF BIGGIN”, and this was acknowledged by the approach controller. The pilot then said “… IN A RIGHT TURN AT FIFTEEN HUNDRED FEET, FIELD IN SIGHT, UNABLE TO MAKE LEFT TURN AT THE MOMENT, AM TRYING TO GET TOWARDS YOUR AIRFIELD”. In response the controller cleared the pilot for a landing on any available surface at 2nm A v 1 3 0 k t I A S 1 , 5 0 0 f t a m s l IASstartstoshow reducingtrend 110ktIAS 107ktIAS 108ktIAS 118ktIAS 110ktIAS Altitudeclimbs100ft andstabilises Suddenaltitude gainof200ft Autorotationentered 100ktIAS 78ktIAS X Tailrotor Approx500ftamsl X ‘Ear’Witness1 X EyeWitness2 X Finalposition: 260º/2.1nmfrom BigginHill IASvaluesaveraged over5sweeps (4secsweeprate) 1412:02hrs Directionofattention OrdnanceSurvey Figure 1 Diagram illustrating G-DNHI’s track for the last part of the flight, and the location of witnesses 20 © Crown copyright 2007 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2007 G-DNHI EW/C2006/10/04 the airport. Seventy seconds after his first ‘Mayday’ call, the pilot transmitted that that he was carrying out a forced landing into a field three miles west of the airport. There were further weak and brok

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