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Airbus A320-200, C-FTDF, 3 August 2003

Air Accidents (AAIB)

Published on 10 December 2014, 20:55

Summary
aircraft category
commercial-fixed-wing
aircraft type
Airbus A320-200
bulk published
1
date of occurrence
2003-08-03
location
Cardiff International Airport, South Glamorgan
registration
C-FTDF
report type
field-investigation

Report Overview

Airbus A320-200, C-FTDF

Summary:

The aircraft was returning to Cardiff with 162 passengers for an ILS approach to Runway 30. On finals the ECAM showed a STEERING caption and the crew cycled the (A/SKID & N/W STRG) switch. After landing the aircraft did not decelerating normally and the FO announced ‘Manual Braking’. The commander pressed the brakes without effect. The crew then selected maximum reverse thrust and cycled the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch. The commander again attempted pedal braking, without effect, and the crew selected the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch OFF. The commander braked to bring the aircraft to a halt about 40 metres from the end of the runway, bursting three mainwheel tyres. There was no fire and the aircraft was later evacuated. Analysis showed that it took ten to thirteen seconds for the commander to recognise the lack of pedal braking and there was no overt warning from the ECAM of the malfunction of the BSCU. Two Recommendations were made by the AAIB to the aircraft manufacturer, concerning improvement of warning to the crew of BSCU malfunction and the earlier application of maximum reverse thrust in the FCOM ‘Loss of Braking’ procedure.

This overview has been truncated. Please refer to the official documents below for the complete canonical report.

Official Documents

Document Content Preview

Extracted text from the first few pages of the official documents.

C-FTDF.pdf

13 AAIB Bulletin No: 2/2005 Ref: EW/C2003/08/11 Category: 1.1 INCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Airbus A320-200, C-FTDF No & Type of Engines: 2 IAE V2500-A1 turbofan engines Year of Manufacture: 1993 Date & Time (UTC): 3 August 2003 at 2325 hrs Location: Cardiff International Airport, South Glamorgan Type of Flight: Public Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 7 Passengers - 162 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Rupture of three main landing gear tyres and damage to a landing gear light Commander's Licence: Air Transport Pilot's Licence Commander's Age: 28 years Commander's Flying Experience: 7,500 hours (of which 1,700 were on type) Last 90 days - 140 hours Last 28 days - 50 hours Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot plus additional inquiries and data analysis by the AAIB and the aircraft operator Synopsis The aircraft was landing on Cardiff's Runway 30. On finals, the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) display showed a STEERING caption and the crew cycled the A/SKID & N/W STRNG switch in an attempt to reset the Brake and Steering Control Unit (BSCU). The indications were that it was successfully reset but after touchdown the aircraft did not decelerate normally. The commander pressed the brake pedals to full deflection without effect. He then selected maximum reverse thrust and the co-pilot cycled the A/SKID & N/W STRNG switch. The commander again attempted pedal braking, without effect, and the crew selected the A/SKID & N/W STRNG switch to OFF. The commander then braked to bring the aircraft to a halt about 40 metres from the end of the runway, bursting three mainwheel tyres. There was no fire and the passengers were deplaned on the runway through the normal exit doors. 14 Analysis showed that it took 10 to 13 seconds for the commander to recognise the lack of pedal braking and there was no overt warning from the ECAM of the malfunction of the BSCU. Two safety recommendations were made to the aircraft manufacturer regarding improved warnings and crew procedures. History of the flight The aircraft was returning to Cardiff from Tenerife. The winds at Cardiff Airport were light, there was no cloud and the visibility was good. The air temperature was 15°C and the runway was dry. At the time of the occurrence the crew had been on duty for approximately 10 hours. Before the descent, the commander had briefed for an ILS approach to Runway 30 and, to comply with local noise abatement procedures, to use only idle reverse thrust after landing. The published landing distance available for this runway is 2,201 metres and the crew selected LOW autobrake. The descent and initial approach were uneventful and, after interception of the localiser and the glideslope at 2,000 feet, the expected 'CAT III DUAL' caption illuminated and the landing gear was selected DOWN at approximately 1,700 feet. At about 1,000 feet on the final approach to Runway 30, the aircraft's approach status changed to the downgraded 'CAT III SINGLE' (where a single system failure will terminate the automatic approach) and the crew noted that the WHEEL page on the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring) display showed the 'STEERING' caption in amber. The crew cycled the 'anti-skid & nosewheel steering' switch ( A/SKID & N/W STRNG) whereupon the WHEEL page indications returned to normal, with the approach status returning to 'CAT III DUAL'. The commander could not later recall whether or not the crew reselected autobrake after the cycling the switch. The aircraft landed normally and idle reverse thrust was selected. However, the aircraft did not appear to be decelerating normally and the first officer announced "Manual Braking" because the autobrake panel showed that autobrake was not functioning. The commander pressed the brake pedals progressively "all the way to the floor" but sensed no braking response and so he then selected maximum reverse thrust. Next he instructed the co-pilot to cycle the A/SKID & N/W STRNG switch. Once this had been done, the commander tried the brake pedals again and, with no retardation response, he ordered the co-pilot to turn the A/SKID & N/W STRNG switch to OFF, in order "to get alternate braking pressure from the hydraulic accumulator". He then applied sufficient wheel braking to stop the aircraft on the paved surface, coming to a halt about 40 metres from the end of the runway. In achieving this braking, however, three tyres of the main landing gear burst and the fourth was badly scuffed. 15 After the aircraft stopped the commander advised the cabin crew to remain seated and contacted the control tower for the emergency crews to check for smoke around the main wheels. The emergency personnel confirmed that there was no need for an emergency evacuation and the crew and passengers left the aircraft 15 minutes later, without further incident. The aircraft remained on the runway for about 3 hours after the incident as wheels and tyres needed replacement before the aircraft could be safely moved. Systems description In the A320 the wheel brakes operate on two separate and independent systems. The 'normal' system uses 'green' hydraulic pressure and the 'alternate' system uses 'yellow' hydraulic pressure, backed by a hydraulic accumulator. Anti-skid and autobrake functions are controlled by a two-channel Brake and Steering Control Unit (BSCU), a computer which transmits brake commands either from the pilots' brake pedal positions or from the autobrake system. Autobrake is armed by the crew through a push-button panel on the flight deck and operated in MAX (maximum, for rejected takeoffs), MED and LOW (medium and low, for landings). In LOW setting, autobrake applies brake pressure four seconds after spoiler deployment on landing and has a target deceleration rate of 5.6 ft/sec/sec (0.17g). There is an 'anti-skid & nosewheel steering' switch ( A/SKID & N/W STRNG) with simple 'ON' and 'OFF' selections. With this switch OFF there is no anti-skid protection to the brakes and pilots should refer to the triple pressure indicator (showing left, right and accumulator), keeping brake pressures at the wheels to below 1,000 psi to prevent the tyres from skidding and bursting. The wheel braking system can operate in four modes: 1) Normal braking - with autobrake available and anti-skid operating (Green hydraulic system). 2) Alternate braking with anti-skid - pedal braking by crew with anti-skid operating (Yellow hydraulic system). 3) Alternate braking without anti-skid - pedal braking by crew with no anti-skid, either due to BSCU failure and/or A/SKID & N/W STRNG switch OFF. Crew maintain brake pressures below 1,000 psi to avoid locking a wheel. 4) Parking brake - primarily used for aircraft parking but this may be used as an emergency brake in short and successive applications. 16 Note: The triple brake pressure gauge does not indicate wheel brake pressure when the brakes are operating in 'normal' mode, hence the operation of the wheel brakes cannot always be determined by inspecting the gauge. Technical examination After the incident at Cardiff the BSCU from C-FTDF was returned to the manufacturer of the brake system and subjected to an extensive investigation, including tests to reproduce the fault codes triggered during this event. The investigation included repetitive flight cycle simulations, hot and cold soaking and the application of a range of conditions designed to induce BSCU faults. In spite of this testing, the manufacturer was unable to repeat the fault conditions which were recorded in flight by the BSCU built-in test equipment (BITE), the Central Fault and Di

Change History

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