Airbus A321, D-AIRE, 9 October 2000

Airbus A321, D-AIRE AAIB Bulletin No: 5/2001 Ref: EW/C2000/10/04 Category: 1.1 Aircraft Type and Registration: Airbus A321, D-AIRE No & Type of Engines: 2 IAE V2530-A5, turbofan engines Year of Manufacture: 1995 Date & Time (UTC): 9 October 2000 at 1545 hours Location: Runway 27 Left, London Heathrow Type of Flight: Public Transport Persons on Board: Crew - 8 - Passengers - 170 Injuries: Crew - None - Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Tailscrape between frame 64 and frame 68 in the area of the rear fuselage Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence Commander's Age: 46 years Commander's Flying Experience: 7,390 hours (of which 2,700 were on type) Last 90 days -150 hours Last 28 days - 65 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation History of the flight The flight crew were on the second day of their rostered cycle. The previous day was the first occasion on which the commander and First Officer (FO) had flown together. Prior to the first departure a normal briefing and discussion took place, which included the operating experience of the FO, who had acumulated some 1,236 hours on the A300 series operated by the company. This included the A319, A320 and A321. The FO and commander both had approximately one third of their hours on each variant of the type. On 8 October 2000, the day before the incident, the crew flew an A320 on three sectors, departing from Frankfurt for Oporto, returning to Frankfurt and then continuing to their overnight stop in Stuttgart. The FO flew the first and third sectors with the commander conducting the second. The flights were uneventful and the commander considered the FOs' handling of the aircraft to be of a good standard. On 9 October 2000 the crew flew an A320 from Stuttgart to Frankfurt with the commander handling. At Frankfurt the crew changed aircraft to the A321 for the flight to London. The flight was uneventful with the only difference from that planned was a change of cruising level due to turbulence. Prior to arrival at the Lambourne hold the commander obtained ATIS information 'India' which for Runway 27 Left was: surface wind 180°/18 gusting 27 kt, 5,000 meters in rain with cloud FEW at 1,100 feet, BKN at 1300 feet, OVC at 1,800 feet, temperature +12°C, dew point +11°C and QNH 992 runway wet. The FO briefed the approach and the crew discussed the conditions. It was agreed that the FO would fly the approach and make a positive landing given the wet runway surface. The aircraft's landing weight was 72,999 Kg. Radar vectors were provided by ATC to position the aircraft onto the final approach for Runway 27 Left. The crew used the autopilot coupled to the Flight Director in managed speed mode. At about 1,000 feet the FO de-selected the auto-throttle and, with the approach stabilised at 570 feet, the auto-pilot was disconnected. At approximately 500 feet the commander called that they were 'coming low' meaning below the glide path, to which the FO reacted by slightly increasing nose up pitch and thus reducing the rate of descent. The commander estimated the height to have been 300 feet when he saw the Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI) displaying three white lights and one red light and shortly afterwards he noticed the rate of descent was high. He looked inside the flight deck and saw a rate of descent of 1,100 feet per minute and called 'sink rate'. Almost immediately the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sounded a Mode 1 alert of 'sink rate'. Seeing the rate of descent was still high the commander applied full aft sidestick to cushion the landing. He did not depress the takeover push button on his sidestick but, as the aircraft bounced, he neutralised his sidestick and as the aircraft touched down a second time, he again applied a large amount of aft sidestick to lower the nose landing gear gently. At that point he noticed that the Primary Flight Display (PFD) showed a nose up attitude of some 10°. Neither pilot recalled hearing the normal voice height calls from 50 feet or the voice call of ' RETARD'. Believing there may have been a tail scrape the commander asked the rear cabin attendants if they had noticed anything. They described a rattling noise but thought that it had come from the galley. After shut down the commander inspected the tail area and discovered the damage caused by the tail scrape. Engineering investigation Examination of the damage to the aircraft was carried out at London Heathrow Airport whilst the aircraft was being temporarily repaired prior to an unpressurised ferry flight to a maintenance facility in Ireland. Damage was confined to severe abrasion of the aircraft's skin longitudinally from just forward of frame 64 to just aft of frame 68 and laterally over the lowermost four stringers and drain mast close to this area (see Figure 1). There was no apparent damage to the fuselage frames. The damage was biased slightly to the right side of the fuselage, indicating that the aircraft had been rolled slightly to the right at the time of contact. Also, geometrical considerations indicated that the damage had occurred over a pitch attitude range of 9.65° to 10.65° referenced to the horizontal aircraft datum. Data from the aircraft manufacturer indicated that tail scrape damage would occur over a pitch attitude range of 9.7° (with the main landing gear oleos fully compressed) to 11.4° (with the main landing gear oleos uncompressed, but with the tyres in ground contact). The aircraft's maintenance computer was read out but no defects of any significance had been recorded. However, during the inspection of the aircraft by the operator's maintenance personnel at London Heathrow after this event, slight leaks from two fuel couplings in the wing root area were noticed. This is a known problem that can occur following a firm landing. Rectification of this defect was deferred in the aircraft technical log and was carried out at the repair station. Flight Recorders Recorded information was available from the solid state Flight Data Recorder (FDR) fitted to the aircraft. The 30 minute tape based Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) had recorded over the period of the landing. Accident Landing An ILS approach was made to Runway 27L at Heathrow with both the autopilot and autothrottle engaged. The aircraft was established on the localiser at 3,200 feet agl and glideslope established at 3,000 feet agl. Landing configuration was achieved by 1,400 feet agl with full flap and gear down selected. A stable ILS approach was flown with airspeeds varying between 150 kt and 160 kt down to 1,000 feet agl at which point the autothrottle was disconnected. Glideslope and localiser stability was maintained as the aircraft descended with an approximate pitch attitude of 1.5° nose up and at a manually controlled airspeed of approximately 150 kt. During this phase of the approach the autopilot had maintained a drift angle in the order of 12° to counter the effects of a crosswind from the left. Typical wind values were recorded as being 185° / 32 kt during the latter stages. At 570 feet agl the autopilot was disconnected and movements in the right sidestick position only indicated that it was the First Officer flying the manual section of the approach. Throughout the approach and landing phase, sidestick movements resulted in corresponding changes in elevator deflection. As the aircraft descended through 500 feet agl it became low on the glideslope and reached a maximum deviation of 0.76 dots low by 320 feet agl before the nose was raised to regain the correct profile. Movement of the power levers ceased at this point with N 1 values on both engines remaining constant at 68% until just before touchdown. By 174 feet agl, airspeed had reduced to 141 kt as the aircraft flew through the glideslope neutral point and became progressively higher than the desired flightpath. By 145 feet agl the aircr

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Airbus A321, D-AIRE, 9 October 2000

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