Accidents Database

dft-avsafety-pdf-501480.pdf

BAE ATP, G-MANJ AAIB Bulletin No: 3/2001 Ref: EW/C2000/05/02 - Category: 1.1 Aircraft Type and Registration: BAE ATP, G-MANJ No & Type of Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW-126 turboprop engines Year of Manufacture: 1987 Date & Time (UTC): 16 May 2000 at 2004 hrs Location: Liverpool Airport Type of Flight: Public Transport Persons on Board: Crew - 4 - Passengers - 44 Injuries: Crew - None - Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Damage to left propeller, engine nacelle, wingtip, flap and tailplane Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence Commander's Age: 37 years Commander's Flying Experience: 4,150 hours (of which 2,972 were on type) Last 90 days - 105 hours Last 28 days - 42 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation History of the flight The crew, consisting of 2 flight deck and 2 cabin crew members, came on duty at 1240 hrs to operate two return flights from Manchester to Belfast. The first flight to Belfast and return was flown without incident. The crew requested clearance for their second flight to Belfast, from the Manchester ground controller, at 1633 hrs and were given no delay for a 'Wallasey 1R' Standard Instrument Departure (SID) with an assigned squawk of 5127. At 1657 hrs the crew requested push back and start clearance and by 1704 hrs the aircraft was at the hold for Runway 24R awaiting take- off clearance. At 1707 hrs, the crew were cleared for take off and were given the surface wind of 200°/04 kt. As the aircraft passed 400 feet on departure, the crew made contact with Area Control Manchester West Sector on 128.050 MHz, confirming that they were on a 'Wallasey 1R' departure climbing to 5,000 feet. They added that they were going to, 'have to do an after take off check and we might need to return. There's no emergency'. The controller asked if they wished to maintain 5,000 feet. The crew replied that they would and continued with the SID to Wallasey. At 1716 hrs the crew were instructed to contact Manchester Radar on 133.050 MHz, where the controller informed them that they had been transferred to his frequency as it had 'spare capacity....and was the problem serious?'. The crew replied; ' NO IT'S THE LEFT GEAR WON'T COME UP....WE'LL KEEP YOU ADVISED'. Four minutes later the crew transmitted, 'WE'RE DECLARING A PAN PAN AT THIS STAGE. WE WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN 5,000 AND JOIN INBOUND TO WALLASEY....THERE'S NO IMMEDIATE DANGER TO THE AIRCRAFT BUT WE DO ONLY HAVE TWO UNDERCARRIAGE LOCKED DOWN HAVING HAD ONE FAIL TO INDICATE UP AFTER TAKE OFF". The crew continued, "WE'RE ONLY INDICATING TWO LOCKED DOWN THE LEFT IS UNSAFE AND WE HAVE CHECKLISTS TO WORK OUT; WE'VE GOT A LOT OF FUEL ON BOARD AND WE'D LIKE TO HOLD AT WALLASEY AND CONTACT THE COMPANY AND SORT THE CHECKLISTS OUT BEFORE WE DECIDE WHERE WE'RE GOING TO TAKE THE AIRCRAFT TO LAND". The controller confirmed that they could do as they had requested and that the frequency in use was for their sole use. After several minutes the crew asked the controller to have available the actual weather for both Manchester and Liverpool as they would be their landing airfield options. The first officer had been the pilot flying (PF) and, after the normal take off, the landing gear had been selected up but a red unsafe light indicated that the left main landing gear (MLG) was not locked up. The commander had instructed the first officer to continue the SID climbing to 5,000 feet, engage the autopilot and hold at the Wallasey VOR. He had also informed the No 1 cabin crew member (No 1) of the situation and that the cabin service should not be carried out. He also advised the passengers. The initial checklist consulted by the crew was titled, 'Unable to raise landing gear' (Checklist card 36). The commander stated however, that he considered, after discussion with the first officer, that this checklist was only for use if the landing gear selector could not be moved to the up position and therefore he considered it inappropriate to continue with that checklist. The landing gear was then selected down so that the crew could begin their analysis of the situation from a known starting point and establish the exact nature of the problem. The landing gear position lights were then confirmed as a left main red with right main and nose leg greens. The No 1 was then asked to examine the landing gear mechanical indicators, installed outside the cabin on the engine nacelles, to confirm the main landing gear positions. She confirmed that the left MLG was not locked down. The commander then consulted the checklist cards to determine which landing gear checklists were appropriate. By 1738 hrs the crew had received the weather details for both Manchester and Liverpool, which were both suitable for an approach. The crew however stated that they would hold for at least two hours in the vicinity of the Wallasey VOR, action the checklist and, if needed, burn off excess fuel before commencing, what they now believed would inevitably be, an approach for an emergency landing. The passengers were re-apprised of the situation and the cabin service was started but without the service of alcoholic beverages. After consultations with the company and paying due regard to the weather conditions and emergency capabilities of the airports, the crew had decided by 1835 hrs that they would land at Liverpool. The crew had three checklist cards to consult; cards 34, 34A and 35. Card 34 dealt with, 'abnormal and emergency lowering of landing gear'. Card 34A covered, 'emergency landing gear lowering with landing gear changeover lever ineffective', and card 35 covered, 'landing with landing gear not fully locked down'. The actions on card 34 were initiated but operation of the landing gear changeover lever caused the right MLG indicator to change from green to red. This concerned the crew somewhat so they reversed their actions to recover the right main leg green indication. After consultation with the company and examination of the ATP Flight Manual (FM) however, the crew realised that the checklist (card 34) had indeed to be completed. Card 34 checklist actions were therefore initiated for a second time. The commander took control of the aircraft, the first officer entered the passenger cabin and operated the mechanical up-lock releases. Upon his return to the flight deck, the aircraft was accelerated to 175 kt and, after a suitable passenger briefing, manoeuvred in an attempt to force-down the left main landing gear leg. During the checklist actions the No 1 had viewed the area of the left MLG from ahead of and behind the wing. She had reported that the left MLG was not visible but the forward gear bay doors were open slightly. The completion of card 34 checklist items resulted in no change to the situation. The commander now continued by actioning the checklist on card 35. The No 1 was briefed on the use of emergency exits and passengers seated adjacent to the window exits were briefed, by the No 1, on their operation. The time available to prepare the cabin and fully brief the passengers was more than adequate. At 1920 hrs the Manchester controller transferred the aircraft to Liverpool Approach for a weather update. The weather in the vicinity of the Wallasey hold by this time had deteriorated so the crew, with the assistance of the Liverpool controller, moved their manoeuvring area to the northwest of Wallasey. At 1934 hrs the commander advised ATC that he expected to make an approach in 10 minutes time. At 1944 hrs however, another aircraft from the same company, also making an approach to Liverpool, reported that it was, 'quite turbulent on the approach with heavy rain going through'. The crew of that aircraft suggested that the emergency aircraft hold for a further 10 mi