BAE Systems Jetstream 31, G-CCPW, 8 March 2012

20© Crown copyright 2012 10/2012 AAIB Bulletin: G-CCPW EW/C2012/03/03 ACCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: BAE Systems Jetstream 31, G-CCPW No & Type of Engines: 2 Garrett Airesearch TPE 331-10UGR-5164 turboprop engines Year of Manufacture: 1987 (Serial no: 785) Date & Time (UTC): 8 March 2012 at 1757 hrs Location: Runway 26, Isle of Man Airport Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 2 Passengers - 12 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Right main landing gear yoke pintle fractured, right engine and propeller blades damaged Commander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 58 years Commander’s Flying Experience: 6,000 hours (of which 2,300 were on type) Last 90 days - 140 hours Last 28 days - 48 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis The aircraft’s right main landing gear failed as it landed on Runway 26 at Isle of Man Airport. The right main landing gear detached, the aircraft slid along the runway on its remaining landing gear, right wingtip and luggage pannier before coming to rest on the grass adjacent to the runway. The passengers and crew vacated the aircraft without injury. The right landing gear failed as a result of intergranular corrosion / stress corrosion cracking of the forward yoke pintle. Four Safety Recommendations are made. History of the flight The aircraft and crew were operating a passenger service from Leeds Bradford International Airport to Isle of Man Airport. The flight had been routine and the crew were flying a day, visual approach to Runway 26, in good weather, with the surface wind reported as 210° at 14 kt. The commander was the pilot flying (PF) and the co‑pilot, who had recently joined the company, was nearing the end of his line training on type. The approach was flown with full flap and the landing gear locked and confirmed down by the three green gear indicators. The landing weight was estimated to be 13,448 lb (6,099 kg) and the crew recalled that the V r e f was about 105 kt. 21© Crown copyright 2012 10/2012 AAIB Bulletin: G-CCPW EW/C2012/03/03 The aircraft touched down and almost immediately leaned to the right accompanied by an unusual noise. The commander levelled the aircraft with a left roll input. However, as the speed decayed the lean increased and it became apparent that there was a problem with the right landing gear. The commander continued to apply left aileron and rudder. Both pilots recognised that the aircraft was likely to leave the paved surface and so the co-pilot held the control wheel and rudder to allow the commander to apply nosewheel steering and operate the feather levers 1 . The left engine was shut down and feathered as the aircraft departed the runway. The right engine was also shut down but its propeller did not feather. The aircraft left the paved surface, yawed to the right and slid sideways before it came to a stop 90° to the runway heading. After the aircraft stopped the commander instructed the co-pilot to “get them out” and, as all three landing gear green lights were still illuminated, he transmitted on the tower radio frequency that he thought the aircraft had burst a tyre. The commander then shut down the aircraft. He confirmed that both feather levers were pulled, their respective fuel valve lights on the overhead panel showed shut, and selected both hydraulic shut off switches to shut. He then electrically isolated the aircraft by pulling the battery circuit breakers before leaving the cockpit to assist in the cabin. The Air Traffic Control Officer (ATCO), located in the visual control room of the tower to the north of the runway, saw the right propeller strike the runway as the gear collapsed. This was also seen by the airport fire- fighter on duty at the Airport Fire and Rescue Service (AFRS) watch office, located to the south of the runway. Both pressed their respective crash alarms while the Footnote 1 The feather lever shuts off fuel to its engine and feathers the propeller. aircraft was still moving and the AFRS arrived at the aircraft less than two minutes after it had come to a stop. While the commander shut down the aircraft the co-pilot entered the passenger cabin. He instructed the passengers to remain seated while he ascertained that there were no significant injuries and that the cabin situation was stable. He visually checked the right wing area before opening the passenger door located on the left side of the fuselage at the rear of the cabin. The passengers seated near the single overwing exit, located on the right side of the aircraft, had considered opening it. However, they could see the damage to the right engine and steam or thin smoke rising from the engine area and elected not to do so. The co-pilot assisted other passengers off the aircraft before he returned to the cabin and, along with the AFRS, assisted two passengers of reduced mobility from the aircraft. Post-accident actions by ATC After the controller on duty pressed the crash alarm there was no confirmation in the tower that the alarm had functioned and the controller attempted to call the AFRS by direct line telephone to confirm they were aware of the accident. The AFRS did not answer this call as they were in the process of deploying and the controller terminated the call when he saw, on the opposite side of the aerodrome, the fire station doors open. The air traffic assistant called the Emergency Services Joint Control Room (ESJCR) located in Douglas to initiate the deployment of off-site rescue services. The ATCO had categorised the accident as an Aircraft Ground Incident (AGI) and this message was relayed to the ESJCR. At the time of the accident the pre-planned deployment of off-site assets was identical for both AGI and Aircraft Accident, and consisted of deploying five 22© Crown copyright 2012 10/2012 AAIB Bulletin: G-CCPW EW/C2012/03/03 appliances from a variety of fire stations. The AAIB has been informed that future planning is to have a varied level of response to different incident categories. The AFRS deployed three appliances and were in position to commence fire fighting 100 seconds after the aircraft stopped moving. While the Watch Commander was driving towards the aircraft he could see passengers disembarking and, using UHF radio, asked the ATCO to have the airport bus deployed to the runway to act as a shelter and transport. He was also in direct radio communications with the ESJCR. The ESJCR had attempted to initiate its automated pre‑planned deployment but a computer failure resulted in a delay of about two minutes while a manual override was initiated. This delay was sufficient for the Watch Commander to establish two-way communications with the ESJCR and confirm to them the level of assistance that he required. As a result the ESJCR stood down the majority of their response, leading some observers to comment on the apparently limited off-site response of a single fire vehicle. The AFRS conducted visual and thermal imaging surveys of the aircraft, which revealed no signs of fire or fuel leaks. A small area of foam was laid around the right wing and engine as a precaution. Runway marks and debris The aircraft left a number of marks on the runway surface starting approximately 90 m from the start of the threshold markings. The first marks were made by the right engine propeller blades cutting into the runway surface. Sections of the right landing gear yoke pintle were found at 150 m and 180 m from the runway threshold, near the right landing gear door. Recorded information The aircraft was equipped with a 30-minute Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and a continuous loop Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR). The DFDR recorded just over 26 hours of operation with five parameters which were time, pressure altitude, indicated airspeed, normal acceleration and heading. Additionally, a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) insta

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BAE Systems Jetstream 31, G-CCPW, 8 March 2012

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