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AAIB investigation to Boeing 737-377, G-CELF

Air Accidents (AAIB)

Published on 10 December 2014, 22:57

Summary
Electrical failure, on departure from Leeds Bradford Airport, 2 August 2013.
aircraft category
commercial-fixed-wing
aircraft type
Boeing 737-377
bulk published
1
date of occurrence
2013-08-02
location
On departure from Leeds Bradford Airport
registration
G-CELF
report type
field-investigation

Report Overview

Summary:

The aircraft suffered an electrical failure after departure, which led to the loss of the commander’s primary flight instruments, navigation equipment and other electrical services. There was also a smell of electrical burning in the passenger cabin, so an immediate return to the airport was carried out.

The loss of power was caused by a fatigue failure of the terminal lug on the end of the No 1 generator phase ‘A’ ground cable. An inspection revealed a number of other lugs which had cracked in the same location, two of which were close to failing in the same manner. The lugs had probably cracked as a result of a combination of engine vibration, a rough surface finish and bending of the lug during installation.

This overview has been truncated. Please refer to the official documents below for the complete canonical report.

Official Documents

Document Content Preview

Extracted text from the first few pages of the official documents.

Boeing 737-377 G-CELF 08-14.pdf

23� Crown copyright 2014 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2014 G-CELF EW/C2013/08/01 INCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Boeing 737-377, G-CELF No & Type of Engines: 2 CFM56-3B1 turbofan engines Year of Manufacture: 1988 (Serial no: 24302) Date & Time (UTC): 2 August 2013 at 0617 hrs Location: On departure from Leeds Bradford Airport Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 5 Passengers - 119 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Broken generator harness and over-heated battery charger Commander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 56 Commander’s Flying Experience: 8,130 hours (of which 3,300 were on type) Last 90 days - 66 hours Last 28 days - 34 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis The aircraft suffered an electrical failure after departure, which led to the loss of the commander’s primary flight instruments, navigation equipment and other electrical services. There was also a smell of electrical burning in the passenger cabin, so an immediate return to the airport was carried out. The loss of power was caused by a fatigue failure of the terminal lug on the end of the No 1 generator phase ‘A’ ground cable. An inspection revealed a number of other lugs which had cracked in the same location, two of which were close to failing in the same manner. The lugs had probably cracked as a result of a combination of engine vibration, a rough surface finish and bending of the lug during installation. History of the flight The flight crew reported for duty at Leeds Bradford Airport at 0500 hrs, for a 0600 hrs departure to Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam. Pre-flight preparations and engine starting proceeded normally and the aircraft taxied for a departure from Runway 14. The co-pilot was the Pilot Flying (PF), with the commander as the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The commander was the fleet training manager and was experienced in carrying out abnormal checklist procedures in the simulator. A reduced-thrust takeoff was carried out with the auto-throttle (AT) engaged. Shortly after 24� Crown copyright 2014 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2014 G-CELF EW/C2013/08/01 lift off, the commander heard a click and noticed that the AT had disengaged. During the initial climb, the master caution and amber FLT CONT caption illuminated, indicating a failure of the Mach trim. At about the same time, the commander’s electronic attitude director indicator (EADI) and electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) went blank and his altimeter, vertical speed indicator, Mach ASI and radio altimeter failed, with off flags showing. The No 1 Transformer Rectifier Unit circuit breaker tripped and the commander attempted to reset it, but it tripped again. The flight management computer (FMC) failed and both control display units (CDUs) locked up and could not be programmed. The PF’s flight instruments and displays still functioned but he was unable to display the departure track on his EHSI. The commander briefly confirmed that the standby instruments were operating correctly by comparing them with the PF’s instruments. After the aircraft’s landing gear and flaps had been retracted, the after-takeoff checks were completed. The climb was stopped and the aircraft levelled at 4,000 ft. The commander used the DC and AC meter rotary selectors to check the condition of the electrical power system, which appeared normal other than a slightly higher indication on the No 2 generator. The flight crew discussed the situation and decided to return to Leeds Bradford Airport. They also identified that the yaw damper, left forward window overheat, a fuel pump and normal exhaust fan were also inoperative. In addition, the flight crew noted that the battery charger, electric hydraulic pump ‘B’ and normal exhaust fan circuit breakers had tripped. The commander started the APU and called the Senior Cabin Crew (SCC) member to the flight deck and gave her a NITS 1 briefing, after which she left the flight deck and walked to the rear galley to brief her colleagues. On the way, she noticed a distinct smell of electrical burning but with no signs of smoke. When she arrived at the rear galley, her colleagues both mentioned the electrical burning smell. The SCC alerted the flight deck to the smell and pulled the circuit breakers, isolating the galley electrical systems. The commander transmitted a PAN call and requested an immediate return to the airport. He also selected the flight deck galley electrical power switch off. ATC provided radar vectors for a visual approach to Runway 14, and the ILS was set on the co-pilot’s instruments as a backup. The weather was good with the 0620 hrs METAR indicating: surface wind 210º/05 kt, varying between 160º and 250º, visibility 20 km, scattered cloud at 1,600 ft, OAT 18ºC, dew point 16ºC and a QNH of 1005 hPa. The commander re-briefed the SCC that they would be landing sooner than previously stated and, whilst at that stage there was no intention to carry out an emergency evacuation, the cabin crew were briefed to be at their stations after landing, in case the situation deteriorated. Without the use of the FMC, the commander elected to use flap 40º and a V APP of 140 kt, as he knew from his training role that this was a safe speed and was not runway limiting. When the aircraft was established on the final approach, the No 1 generator tripped offline. The cabin emergency lighting illuminated and then extinguished. The commander selected the APU generator to generator bus 1 and his EADI, EHSI, analogue instruments and the FMC, with the associated CDUs, were all reinstated. The commander used the FMC to establish Footnote 1 Nature, Intentions, Timings and any Special instructions. 25� Crown copyright 2014 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2014 G-CELF EW/C2013/08/01 the V APP speed, which was calculated as 127 kt. After an uneventful landing, the aircraft was taxied clear of the runway, on to Taxiway D, and brought to a stop at holding point D2. The aircraft engines were shut down and the AFRS carried out an external inspection, before the passengers were disembarked onto coaches and the aircraft was towed back to a stand. Recorded data The aircraft was fitted with a 25-hour FDR and a 30-minute CVR. The FDR recording stopped 4 seconds after the aircraft lifted off the ground and re-started 3 minutes and 25 seconds before touchdown. The FDR installation is powered by phase ‘A’ from the 115V AC generator bus 1, which was lost after takeoff and restored 12 minutes and 41 seconds later, during the approach. There are no parameters relating to the electrical power system status or crew selections. Limited sets of flight parameters were transmitted to ATC’s radar, throughout the flight, via Mode S transponder returns. These covered a period of 26 minutes and 30 seconds. Figure 1 shows the recorded aircraft track. Figure 1 Aircraft track from Mode S transponder data, with approximate positions of events from crew recollections The CVR is powered from phase ‘B’ of the No 1 generator and it continued to operate during the period when FDR power was lost. However, it also continued recording after the aircraft had landed and the pertinent evidence from the incident was not preserved. Aircraft examination Examination of the aircraft’s electrical system revealed that the red phase ‘A’ ground cable from the No 1 generator had separated from the T191 stud on the side of the No 1 engine (Figure 2). This cable had separated due to a failure of its terminal lug (Figure 3). Further 26� Crown copyright 2014 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2014 G-CELF EW/C2013/08/01 examination of the generator harness revealed a cracked terminal lug on the blue phase ‘C’ ground cable at the T191 stud (also shown in Figure 2) and a further cracked terminal lug at the firewall end of the grey ground cable (opposite end of grey cable shown in Figure  2). The crack on the blue phase ‘C’ lug was o

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