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Boeing 767-304, G-OBYB, 29 October 2002

Air Accidents (AAIB)

Published on 10 December 2014, 20:46

Summary
aircraft category
general-aviation-fixed-wing
aircraft type
BOEING 767-304
bulk published
1
date of occurrence
2002-10-29
location
Birmingham International Airport
registration
G-OBYB
report type
field-investigation

Report Overview

Boeing 767-304, G-OBYB

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Official Documents

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dft-avsafety-pdf-025503.pdf

1 Boeing 767-304, G-OBYB AAIB Bulletin No: 11/2003 Ref: EW/C2002/10/04 Category: 1.1 INCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Boeing 767-304, G-OBYB No & Type of Engines: 2 General Electric CF6- 80C2B7F turbofan engines Year of Manufacture: 1996 Date & Time (UTC): 29 October 2002 at 1715 hrs Location: Birmingham International Airport, Birmingham Type of Flight: Public Transport (Positioning) Persons on Board: Crew - 9 Passengers - Nil Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - N/A Nature of Damage: None Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence Commander's Age: Not Relevant Commander's Flying Experience: Not known Information Source: Analysis of Flight recorder information plus further enquiries Summary The aircraft landed on Runway 15 at Birmingham after a short positioning flight from Manchester with nine crew on board. After a normal touch down and initial deceleration the aircraft had reached 65 kt, using less than half of the runway distance available. It then continued at approximately 60 kt towards the turnoff, which was at the extreme end of runway. Just before the threshold of the reciprocal runway, with some 300 metres of paved surface remaining, the aircraft started gentle braking. When the speed had reduced to 40 kt, with 100 metres remaining, a left turn was commenced using rudder followed by differential braking. However the aircraft failed to complete the turn onto the taxiway and the nosewheels ran off of the paved surface by some 15 metres, but the main gears remained on the runway. There was some evidence of a reduction in runway surface friction coefficient over a small area as the turn was commenced. Runway surface friction testing after the incident indicated that the friction coefficient in that area did not fall below the value that would have required the promulgation of a NOTAM as 'liable to be slippery when wet'. The probable cause of this incident was the high speed at the start of the turn. History of Flight The aircraft was undertaking a positioning flight from Manchester to Birmingham International Airport. It took off from Manchester at 1657 hrs and during the short flight the aircraft climbed to Boeing 767-304, G-OBYB 2 11,000 feet. After obtaining descent clearance it was given a direct approach R/W 15 at Birmingham. The crew's workload was high and some concern was expressed as to whether they could successfully complete the cleared approach. However by 2,000 feet above runway level the aircraft was close to both the localiser and glideslope. From there on the aircraft was maintained very close to the localiser and glideslope, in what appeared to be a stabilised approach. The final approach from about 900 feet above R/W level was flown at a speed of between 126 and 129 kt, and autobrake 3 had been armed. At 1712 hrs the aircraft touched down firmly at a speed of 128 kt, and well within the normal touchdown zone. Spoilers were deployed and idle reverse was selected with autobrake 3 becoming active. Deceleration appeared normal and groundspeed had reduced to 65 kt by some 1,000 metres after touchdown, which was about 1,200 metres before the end of the paved surface. At this point reverse was cancelled, spoilers retracted and the brakes released. The aircraft continued along the runway with reasonably constant groundspeed of between 60 and 65 kt. The exit taxiway was on the left-hand side, at 90 degrees to the runway, right at the end of the paved surface. Just before the threshold markings for the reciprocal Runway 33, brake pressure was applied symmetrically to both main wheels. When the speed had reduced to about 40 kt the aircraft commenced a turn to the left, rudder and differential braking being used during the turn. However, the aircraft failed to complete the required turn and the nosewheels ran off the paved surface at a speed of about 12 kt. The aircraft travelled a further 15 metres before coming to rest, the main wheels remaining on the paved surface. The engines were shut down and the crew disembarked using stairs. Eventually the aircraft was towed out and, after the necessary inspections, was put back into service. Weather The ATIS Information Hotel obtained by the aircraft prior to the approach, gave the following. Runway in use 15, surface wind calm, visibility 4,000 metres with mist and slight drizzle, overcast at 900 feet, temperature +9, dew point +9, QNH 1009, runway " WET, WET, WET", with an advisory that there was bird activity on the airfield. Flight Recorders The aircraft was equipped with a solid state Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and a 2-hour duration Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Both were manufactured by Allied Signal. Because the APU had been kept running for some time after the aircraft came to rest the CVR continued to run, but as it was of two hours duration it had retained a record of all of the flight into Birmingham. The recording quality was generally good, however there was a shortcoming in the installation, in that the balance between the recording levels of the Air Traffic Control reception and the crew microphones was not ideal. On the CVR channels dedicated to crew speech, the incoming communications on occasion swamped the crew speech to such an extent that it was unintelligible at certain points during the flight, including the landing roll. This did not hamper this investigation as crew speech was intelligible on the area microphone recording. It is however a problem that has been noted before in a number of aircraft types, and for this reason is likely to be the subject of a future AAIB recommendation. The DFDR yielded good quality information and the aircraft's position along the landing runway was derived from the recorded data. A plot of relevant parameters for the entire landing are shown against runway distance at Figure 1 and an expanded view for the last phase of the landing roll at Figure 2. Figure 1 Boeing 767-304, G-OBYB 3 Figure 2 Boeing 767-304, G-OBYB 4 The approach and landing were normal with the aircraft touching down on the centreline and well within the normal zone. When the aircraft had slowed to 65 kt, thrust reverse and autobrake were cancelled and the brakes released. At this stage the aircraft was some 1,200 metres from the Runway 33 threshold end of the paved surface. The aircraft was then allowed to 'coast' with the speed slowly reducing to 61 kt until some 30 metres before Runway 33 threshold markers, where the brakes were gradually applied. Brake pressure was slowly increased with a corresponding increase in retardation. Some 120 metres beyond the 33 threshold (175 metres from the end of the paved surface) brake pressures were approximately symmetrical (660 psi left and 880 psi right), and the retardation was about -0.25 g. Over the following 50 metres mean brake pressure increased slightly (770 psi left and 825 psi right), but the retardation dropped to only -0.1 g. At this point the brake pressure increased more rapidly and over a further 20 metres of travel had reached about 1600 psi per side, but retardation only increased to -0.16 g. At this point the speed was about 40 kt and a turn to the left was commenced, using rudder and differential braking. It is not known if nosewheel steering was used as the steering tiller position was not a recorded parameter. At this point the aircraft was some 110 metres from the end of the paved surface. Left brake pressure then increased to maximum (3000 psi) and the right decreased to 400 psi as the turn continued. When the aircraft was 50 metres from the runway end, right brake pressure was increased rapidly also to maximum and the retardation then rose to a peak of -0.3 g with the aircraft continuing to turn left at a similar rate. The symmetric full brake pressure was held for two to three seconds before the nosewheel ran off the end of the paved surface, at about 12 kt, where brake pres

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