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DH82A Tiger Moth, G-AOBJ, 20 August 1997

Air Accidents (AAIB)

Published on 10 December 2014, 19:45

Summary
aircraft category
general-aviation-fixed-wing
aircraft type
DH82A TIGER MOTH
bulk published
1
date of occurrence
1997-08-20
location
Cardiff Airport
registration
G-AOBJ
report type
pre-1997-monthly-report

Report Overview

DH82A Tiger Moth, G-AOBJ

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Official Documents

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dft-avsafety-pdf-501381.pdf

DH82A Tiger Moth, G-AOBJ AAIB Bulletin No: 6/98 Ref: EW/C97/8/9Category: 1.3 Aircraft Type and Registration: DH82A Tiger Moth, G-AOBJ No & Type of Engines: 1 Gipsy Major 1C piston engine Year of Manufacture: 1942 Date & Time (UTC): 20 August 1997 at 1831 hrs Location: Cardiff Airport, Wales Type of Flight: Private Persons on Board: Crew - 1 - Passengers - 1 Injuries: Crew - 1 serious - Passengers - 1 serious (subsequently fatal) Nature of Damage: Aircraft destroyed Commander's Licence: Private Pilot's Licence Commander's Age: 54 years Commander's Flying Experience: 740 hours (the majority of which were on type) Last 90 days - 11 hours Last 28 days - 8 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation History of flight The pilots of two Tiger Moth aircraft, G-ANFI and G-AOBJ, plannedto carry out air-to-air photography with the photographer in 'FI'. The pilot of 'FI' made the radio calls for both aircraft andthey entered Runway 30 at taxiway 'H'. They were cleared to takeoff at 1829 hrs. 'FI' took off first, followed after a few secondsby 'BJ'. The pilot of 'FI' turned right onto the downwind leg;when he last saw 'BJ' flying it was climbing on the runway headingat about 150 feet agl. The ATC controller saw 'BJ' start to turn crosswind but his attentionwas momentarily drawn to an aircraft on final approach. Whenhe looked back, 'BJ' was descending in a nose down attitude, bankedto the right. It then disappeared behind a hangar to the northwest of the Control Tower, only to reappear seconds later climbingin a steep nose up attitude, tracking crosswind. It was reportedto be "twisting and yawing" as it turned to the leftand then descended into a field just outside the airfield perimeter. Aircraft accident action was initiated at 1831 hrs and the AirportFire Service (AFS) was on scene at 1832 hrs. Both occupants were seriously injured in the impact; the pilothad managed to escape from the wreckage, but the passenger wastrapped in the front seat and had to be cut free by the AFS. The pilot of 'FI' landed and went to the accident site. The pilotof 'BJ', who was conscious and a few feet from the wreckage, toldhim that he had been unable to move the ailerons to the left dueto a restriction. Both casualties received first aid treatmentand, at 1855 hrs, were transferred to hospital by ambulance. The passenger was a qualified pilot. An injury to his left anklewas of the type that is associated with the application of leftrudder at impact. He also suffered head injuries and was unableto recall any detail of the flight. The pilot subsequently diedof his injuries three months after the accident. Meteorology An accident special observation was made at 1836 hrs. It containedthe following: Surface wind 300°/7 kt Visibility 3,500 metres Weather Haze Cloud 1 octa, base 3,000 feet Temp/Dew point 22°C/18°C QNH/QFE 1016 mb/1008.4 mb Brief history of the aircraft The aircraft was built by Morris Motors Ltd in 1942 and enteredRAF service in 1943. It was eventually sold and converted forcivilian use, and registered as G-AOBJ. The registration wascancelled when it was exported to Europe. It was transportedto the USA in 1972, where it operated until 1990, when it wasre-imported into the UK. Considerable re-work on the airframeand engine was then carried out. It was re-registered as G-AOBJand issued with a Certificate of Airworthiness, in the PrivateCategory, in May 1992. The most recent maintenance was an Annualinspection, carried out in April 1997. This aircraft was notfitted with anti-spin strakes or leading edge slats, nor was itrequired to be. Engineering investigation The aircraft had crashed on a heading of 120°(M) in a steepnose-down attitude, estimated to be around 40°. It was apparentthat some left yaw had been present at impact, as the left wingshad suffered severe disruption. In contrast, the lower rightwing was only slightly damaged as a result of ground contact onits leading edge, and the upper right wing was undamaged, nothaving contacted the ground. There was no groundslide, with theaircraft having come to an immediate halt, resting on its collapsedmain landing gear, nose and lower left wing. The tail structurehad remained clear of the ground, apart from a light impact onthe left tailplane tip. A curious feature therefore was the fractureof the tail skid spring close to its attachment fitting on theunderside of the rear fuselage. The fracture was fresh in appearance,and it was concluded that it may have been caused by inertialloads at impact. There was no evidence that it had impeded operationof the rudder. The fuel tank was leaking slightly after the accident. Howeverseveral gallons of fuel were drained before the wreckage was recovered,and so it was concluded that there had been adequate fuel on boardat the time of the accident. One propeller blade had broken offand was found lying underneath the aircraft. The remaining bladewas undamaged, not having struck the ground. The broken bladesections showed no evidence of leading edge impact damage or circumferentialscuffing, thus suggesting there had been little or no power, oreven rotation, at impact. Following an on-site inspection, the aircraft was recovered tothe AAIB's facility at Farnborough for a detailed examination Detailed examination of the wreckage Flying controls In view of the pilot's reported comments immediately followingthe accident, the investigation initially focused on the flyingcontrols. The aircraft was equipped with dual controls, withmuch of the cockpit components enclosed within a wooden compartmentattached to the floor of the cockpit. The front and rear controlcolumns were attached to the aileron torque tube, which extendedalong the length of the compartment. A lever arm at the rearof the torque tube protruded downwards through a transverse slotcut in the floor of the rear cockpit. Aileron operating cableswere attached to the end of the lever and were in turn connected,via turnbuckles, to chain assemblies in the lower wings. Thechains located onto sprocket wheels which were connected to theailerons by means of adjustable rods. No disconnections had occurred in the flying control operatingsystem in the accident, although the structure in which many ofthe components were located had been damaged. The wooden compartmenton the cockpit floor had split open in the impact. The controlsin this area were examined for evidence of a jam or restriction. There was clearly scope for a loose article to cause such a problem,especially if it had become lodged in the slot in the cockpitfloor. However there was no evidence of foreign objects, jammedor restricted controls in the post accident condition. Both control columns had broken off near their bases, within thegaiters on the top of the wooden compartment. Examination ofthe fracture of the rear column indicated that it had broken offin a forwards direction, due to pilot induced loads in the impact. The front column had failed in a predominantly rearwards direction,due to the front left side of the cockpit structure and instrumentpanel having crushed inwards and rearwards onto it, suggestingthat the front seat occupant had not been holding it. The cable runs in the lower mainplanes were examined, but no problemswere found. The sprocket and chain assemblies, to which the cableswere attached, were effectively built into boxes, with the uppersurface being formed by the wing fabric, and the lower by an aluminiumalloy cover plate. The cables entered the boxes, which were otherwisesealed against foreign object ingress, through small aperturesin the inboard ends, and then joined onto the chains via the turnbuckles. Two wooden ribs within each box were protected, with alloy plates,from abrasion by the chains and turnbuckles. These also limitedthe amount of vertical movement of the chains in the event o

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