Falcon 2000, CS-DFE, 11 November 2009

16 © Crown copyright 2010 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2010 CS-DFE EW/C2009/11/03 INCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Falcon 2000, CS-DFE No & Type of Engines: 2 CFE 738-1-1B turbofan engines Year of Manufacture: 2003 Date & Time (UTC): 11 November 2009 at 1259 hrs Location: Biggin Hill Airport, Kent Type of Flight: Maintenance Persons on Board: Crew - 3 Passengers - 3 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Fire damage to tyres, fuselage, landing gear and wing Commander’s Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 37 years Commander’s Flying Experience: 4,152 hours (of which 575 were on type) Last 90 days - 30 hours Last 28 days - 5 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis The aircraft had been undergoing a technical investigation to identify the cause of a braking defect. A flight crew were requested by the on-site maintenance team to carry out high-speed taxi trials as part of the troubleshooting process. The crew conducted a series of seven accelerate/stop runs along the main runway, at gradually increasing reject speeds. At the commencement of the eighth run, the crew felt that a tyre had deflated and brought the aircraft to a stop. They were informed by ATC that there was a fire under the left wing; the crew and passengers then abandoned the aircraft safely. The fire was caused by damage to the brakes from excessive temperature, this released hydraulic fluid under pressure, which then ignited. Four Safety Recommendations have been made as a result of the investigation. History of the flight General The crew of the aircraft, which comprised a commander, co-pilot and cabin attendant, travelled to the UK on 9 November 2009. They had been tasked to be available to collect CS-DFE from Biggin Hill Airport where it was undergoing maintenance. They would then crew the aircraft on whatever flight it was allocated. At this stage the crew members were unaware of the nature of the maintenance. In the evening 10 November 2009, the commander received a text message from the operator notifying her to be at Biggin Hill Airport at 1130 hrs for a “miscellaneous activity” to include “high-speed taxi requested by maintenance department”. The intended 17 © Crown copyright 2010 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2010 CS-DFE EW/C2009/11/03 activity was not designated as an Operational Check Flight (OCF) or Test Flight (TF), which have specific meanings and requirements. Incident manoeuvres The crew arrived at Biggin Hill Airport at about 1100 hrs and the commander contacted the operator’s Maintenance Control to establish the whereabouts of the aircraft and what was required. She was told that the aircraft was still at the maintenance organisation on the south side of the airport and that the maintenance team would brief her there. On arrival at the maintenance organisation, the maintenance team were with the aircraft on the parking area ready for the test. The flight crew were briefed that the aircraft was reported as pulling to the left when the toe brakes were applied. The maintenance team had carried out low speed taxi tests and another flight crew had conducted tests up to 50 kt, as a result of which the left brake units had been changed with the right brake units to see if the problem still occurred. The maintenance team requested high-speed tests, which the crew agreed to but advised they would adopt an incremental approach starting at 50 kt and increasing to 80 kt. The crew carried out performance calculations to ensure the runway length was adequate for the task to be performed. The main runway at Biggin Hill is orientated 03/21 and is 5910 ft long by 147 ft wide (Figure 1) and has a tarmac surface which was dry. They estimated that the balance field length required for an abandoned takeoff at V 1 for the weight and ambient conditions was 3,000 ft. The crew decided that it would be possible to carry out two low-speed runs, one after the other, in the full runway length available. The commander then carried out a full crew briefing for the conduct of the trials which included the maintenance team. The three crew members boarded the aircraft, along with the maintenance supervisor and two technicians. The maintenance supervisor occupied the jump seat between the two pilots and the two technicians were seated in the rear of the passenger cabin. The cabin attendant gave a passenger brief to remind them of the main exits and wearing of seat belts. Having completed the normal external and internal checks, the engines were started at 1226 hrs and the aircraft was cleared to taxi for Runway 21 at 1231 hrs, entering the runway at 1239 hrs. The crew commenced a series of accelerate/stop runs along the runway by selecting takeoff thrust, accelerating to the target IAS, then retarding the thrust levers and applying the brakes positively, bringing the aircraft to a stop. The first two runs were up to 50 kt IAS using Runway 21 before turning around and performing two 60 kt runs along Runway 03. The aircraft cleared the runway at holding point A3, in order to allow another aircraft to depart, and then taxied back to the threshold of Runway 21. The aircraft was cleared to enter Runway 21 to commence the next taxi test at 1248 hrs. The aircraft was accelerated to 80 kt and the commander had to apply full left brake in order to keep the aircraft straight. A second run was carried out to 50 kt and this was normal in maintaining runway alignment, but as with the other runs, the anti-skid system was activating at the lower speeds. The aircraft was turned around and another 80 kt run was carried out along Runway 03, but this time the aircraft veered to the left. The maintenance supervisor on the jump seat and the flight crew discussed the findings and it was agreed to carry out one more run 18 © Crown copyright 2010 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2010 CS-DFE EW/C2009/11/03 Figure 1 Biggin Hill airport layout 19 © Crown copyright 2010 AAIB Bulletin: 12/2010 CS-DFE EW/C2009/11/03 along Runway 21. The aircraft was taxied to the end of Runway 03 and turned around onto Runway 21 in order to perform another 80 kt test. The commander accelerated the aircraft, but before 30 kt, the test was abandoned as the crew believed they had a flat tyre on the left Main Landing Gear (MLG). They informed ATC and requested a tug, but shortly after, the pilot of another aircraft holding at D2 informed ATC that there was a fire on the left MLG of CS-DFE. ATC confirmed this visually and at 1257 hrs advised CS-DFE that there was a fire and to evacuate the aircraft. The crew carried out the evacuation drills and all those on board left the aircraft without difficulty through the normal airstair door. The Airport Fire and Rescue Service (AFRS) responded immediately and extinguished the fire. Flight Recorders The aircraft was fitted with a 25-hour Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a 2-hour Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). These were both removed from the aircraft following the incident to be downloaded and then analysed by the AAIB. The parameters recorded on the FDR were of limited value to the investigation; however, it was possible to determine the timing and maximum speed of each high‑speed taxi run. The regulations at the time the aircraft type was first certified did not require brake pressures and temperatures to be recorded. The salient FDR parameters are presented at Figure 2 and show that in total, eight high-speed taxi runs were completed over a period of just under 16 minutes. The first seven runs achieved speeds of between 60 kt and 90 kt. The final run was aborted at just over 35 kt 1 when Footnote 1 Airspeed is normally unreliable below 30-40 kt; however, a calculation of groundspeed, based on the acceleration of the aircraft, showed this figure of 35 kt to be accurate. the crew (verified on the CVR recording) realised that the aircraft had a flat tyre. The duration of each of the runs was between 20 and 25 seconds. A number of runs w

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Falcon 2000, CS-DFE, 11 November 2009

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