Gemini Flash IIA, G-MVSV, 12 April 2012

22© Crown copyright 2012 11/2012 AAIB Bulletin: G-MVSV EW/C2012/04/01 ACCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Gemini Flash IIA, G-MVSV No & Type of Engines: 1 Rotax 503 piston engine Year of Manufacture: 1989 (Serial no: 757-589-5-W550) Date & Time (UTC): 12 April 2012 at 1305 hrs Location: Near Clackmannan, Scotland Type of Flight: Private Persons on Board: Crew - 1 Passengers - None Injuries: Crew - 1 (Fatal) Passengers - N/A Nature of Damage: Aircraft destroyed Commander’s Licence: None Commander’s Age: 49 Commander’s Flying Experience: Not known Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis Immediately after takeoff, the weight-shift microlight entered a steep climb. The nose then dropped (probably as a result of a stall) and the aircraft struck the ground in a steep nose-down altitude. The owner piloting the aircraft was fatally injured. This was the owner’s first flight in the aircraft and also his first solo flight. There was no evidence that the pilot had received any formal training prior to this attempt. History of the flight The owner mentioned to some friends that he would be flying his microlight from a field near Alloa, Scotland on 12 April 2012 and invited them to attend. Two of them arrived at the field. One of them had limited knowledge of aviation and the other was an experienced microlight pilot. The aircraft was nearing the completion of the rigging process, with the wing already attached to the trike. The experienced pilot assisted the owner to complete the rigging and the owner then carried out an inspection of the aircraft using the pre-flight checklist contained in the operating manual. Having prepared the aircraft, the experienced pilot taxied it from the small paddock, where it had been rigged, into the large field from which it was intended to operate. The pilot climbed out of the trike and discussed with the owner aspects of the flight to be performed. The engine, which had been idling, stopped, but the owner indicated that this was not unusual when it was not properly warmed up. The owner donned a one piece suit, a protective helmet and secured himself into the trike seat. The experienced pilot pulled the 23© Crown copyright 2012 11/2012 AAIB Bulletin: G-MVSV EW/C2012/04/01 starting handle for the owner and the engine started. The owner taxied the aircraft around the edge of the field, and lined up facing the south-east diagonal of the field, which was the takeoff run proposed by the experienced pilot. Power was increased but not sufficiently to take off, and the aircraft accelerated to a fast taxi speed. After it stopped the experienced pilot explained to the owner that he would need full power to become airborne. The owner responded that he was just carrying out a fast taxi and then taxied back to the downwind end of the field. The weather was good with a light, 5 kt wind from the south east. The owner increased the power to a high power setting and the microlight accelerated across the field but veered slightly left of the intended takeoff path. It became airborne and pitched nose-up; this attitude increased rapidly to a very steep climb. The power was then heard to reduce and the nose dropped rapidly. The power then increased and the aircraft struck the ground, nose first. The owner was fatally injured. Owner’s background and flying experience The owner had not joined a microlight club and no record was found of his having attended any formal flying training course. He did not have a medical declaration, which is required prior to flying solo in a microlight. A pilot stated that he had flown with the owner on one occasion, but the owner was a passenger and did not operate the aircraft. This was prior to the owner purchasing G-MVSV. There was some anecdotal evidence that the owner had taken lessons, but theprovider was not traced and it is not known how many lessons were undertaken or if the person delivering them was aqualified instructor. Documentation belonging to the owner was subsequently found that contained the aircraft manuals, together with ground school course notes, including sections on performance and meteorology. Takeoff technique The Aircraft Manual provides the following information regarding takeoff: ‘Take Off Take offs are straight forward and the wing will lift the weight and hence fly when the correct airspeed is reached. The correct technique is to hold the wing back slightly during the initial stages of the take off run so as to reduce the drag and increase the acceleration. At around 20 mph, allow the bar to move forward, and as the aircraft accelerates push forwards slightly until the aircraft un-sticks. The trike unit will swing forward under the wing, and a wise pilot will hold the aircraft climb rate down until a safe climb out speed is reached. Never, ever, push the bar full out holding it there as the aircraft claws its way skywards. Climbing on the propeller this way is inefficient, indicative of poor-piloting technique and very dangerous in the event of turbulence or engine failure’ The Aircraft Manual gives the stall speed as 22–24 kt depending on aircraft all-up weight with a height loss of 80-90 ft during recovery. Pathological and medical information A post-mortem examination was carried out which established that the pilot had died of multiple injuries sustained as a result of the accident. The pathologist reported that there was no evidence of drugs or alcohol having been consumed or natural disease which could have contributed to the accident. 24© Crown copyright 2012 11/2012 AAIB Bulletin: G-MVSV EW/C2012/04/01 Accident site details The field that was being used as an airstrip consisted of an area of pasture bordered by a post and wire fence, giving an essentially rectangular layout. The length of the rectangle was approximately 225 m, with the southeast-facing diagonal providing some additional distance available for use as a runway. The ground was firm, with short grass, although there was a small, poorly drained area in the centre of the field in which standing water was visible. The trailer on which the aircraft had been transported was found in the adjacent paddock. Additional items were found nearby, including cleaning equipment, a full fuel can and the aircraft manufacturer’s instruction manual, which was open at the ‘aircraft rigging’ and ‘pre-flight inspection’ pages. On site investigation A number of tyre tracks were visible, where the aircraft had been taxied around prior to the flight. In addition there was a straight set of tracks that was considered most likely to have been made on the takeoff run. These originated in the northern corner of the field and curved onto a track of approximately 128ºM, which would have been predominantly into wind. The tracks became increasingly difficult to discern, with the nosewheel being the first to disappear completely. No tracks were visible after approximately 110 m from the estimated start of the takeoff roll; this was before the area of standing water in the centre of the field had been reached. The aircraft had come to rest approximately 100 m beyond the estimated lift-off point. It was apparent that the aircraft had struck the ground in a steep, nose-down attitude, banked to the right. The main impact had been borne by the nose of the trike, shattering the fibreglass nose of the fairing and causing extensive disruption to all the structural members of the trike. This had allowed the propeller to contact parts of the landing gear struts, causing substantial damage to the propeller blades, with one of the tips becoming detached and thrown several metres beyond the main wreckage. The degree of damage suggested that the engine was developing power at impact. The right wing leading edge spar had bowed such that the right wing had partially inverted after it had struck the ground, with part of the trike, including the engine, having come to rest on its underside. After the accid

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Gemini Flash IIA, G-MVSV, 12 April 2012

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