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Jetstream 31, G-EEST, 17 September 2003

Air Accidents (AAIB)

Published on 10 December 2014, 20:57

Summary
aircraft category
commercial-fixed-wing
aircraft type
Jetstream 31,
bulk published
1
date of occurrence
2003-09-17
location
Wick Airport, Scotland
registration
G-EEST
report type
field-investigation

Report Overview

Jetstream 31, G-EEST

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Official Documents

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dft-avsafety-pdf-033317.pdf

Jetstream 31, G-EEST AAIB Bulletin No: 12/2004 Ref: EW/C2003/09/04 Category: 1.1 Aircraft Type and Registration: Jetstream 31, G-EEST No & Type of Powerplants: 2 Garrett AiResearch TPE331- 10UGR-516H turboprop engines driving McCauley propellers Year of Manufacture: 1987 Date & Time (UTC): 17 September 2003 at 1447 hrs Location: Wick Airport, Scotland Type of Flight: Public Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 3 Passengers - 4 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Right propeller, right main landing gear, right rear wingspar, left wing and fuselage Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence Commander's Age: 54 years Commander's Flying Experience: 7,885 hours (1,195 on type) Last 90 days - 160 hours Last 28 days - 23 hours Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation Synopsis The aircraft was landing on Runway 31 at Wick Airport. It crossed the threshold at 130 kt which was 21 kt faster than the correct threshold speed. After the co-pilot closed the power levers the aircraft floated about six feet above the runway surface. The aircraft touched down and bounced before touching down a second time more heavily, cracking a wing spar and flexing the aircraft structure sufficient to allow the right propeller to contact the runway. The aircraft bounced again before touching down for the third and final time. The investigation determined that just before the first touchdown, one or both power levers were moved aft of the flight idle position. It was concluded that both the commander and co-pilot were making inputs on the flying controls from that moment onwards until after the second, heavy touchdown. There was no evidence of any technical fault on the aircraft and the weather conditions were well within the limitations set for the aircraft. No safety recommendations were made. 1 Jetstream 31, G-EEST History of the Flight The crew reported at their Aberdeen base at 0950 hr for a six sector duty. The duty was scheduled to take them to Belfast and back, Wick and back and, finally, Humberside and back. By coincidence, the commander and co-pilot had operated the last four sectors of this duty, together, the previous day. Since completing that duty they had had 14 hours and 25 minutes rest. The first two sectors of the duty (on the day of the accident) were completed in a Jetstream 32, registration G-BYRM. The commander was designated the pilot flying (PF) on the initial sector to Belfast and the co-pilot was PF for the return to Aberdeen. Both sectors were completed without incident. On the return sector the surface wind at Aberdeen was reported as being 220°/20 kt with gusts to 30 kt. There was moderate turbulence reported during the final approach and a strong crosswind component on landing. The landing was uneventful and, having shut the aircraft down and disembarked the passengers, the crew transferred to a Jetstream 31, registration G-EEST, for the remaining four sectors of the duty. Another crew had already operated this aircraft for three sectors earlier in the day, from Humberside to Aberdeen, Aberdeen to Wick and back to Aberdeen and they had not reported any problems. Similarly, the oncoming crew did not observe any faults during their pre-flight inspection. G-EEST departed for Wick at 1414 hrs with four adult passengers. Two passengers were sat in Row 6, and the other two were sat in Rows 3 and 5, respectively. The co-pilot was PF and immediately after takeoff the crew experienced much the same turbulence as they recalled from the preceding approach. The aircraft climbed into smoother air and was established in the cruise at Flight Level (FL) 125. On the basis of the actual meteorological conditions at Wick, as transmitted on the Wick Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS), the flight crew briefed for an approach to Runway 13. However, during the early stages of the descent, Wick ATC informed them that the surface wind had veered and Runway 31 had become the runway in use. The crew re-briefed for a VOR/DME approach to Runway 31 and at about 20 nm range they informed Wick ATC that they were visual with the airfield. G-EEST was cleared for a visual approach and the aircraft was established on final approach, fully configured with 35° of flap selected, at approximately 4 nm. The commander gave a reassuring commentary during the approach encouraging the co-pilot to make positive control inputs and to avoid a tendency to stray to the right of the centreline. Wick ATC gave three surface wind reports during the final stages of the aircraft's approach. The first was 210°/17 kt, then 230°/19 kt and, finally, 230°/17 kt. All these wind velocities would have caused the aircraft to fly with a certain amount of drift to the right but they were within the aircraft's maximum allowable crosswind component of 35 kt. The commander recalled there being some turbulence as the aircraft was descending through about 1,500 feet QNH (1,400 feet aal) and the co-pilot stated that there was a negative windshear of about 15 kt at approximately 900 feet QNH (800 feet aal). Following the loss of airspeed, the co-pilot was aware of an updraft which resulted in the aircraft becoming high on the glidepath, as indicated by three white lights on the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI). Concerned that there might be a further windshear, the co-pilot did not reduce the power as much as she normally would have done while attempting to regain the correct glide path. The commander stated that at about 400 feet agl the airspeed was 130 kt and reducing. The bugs on the airspeed indicators had been set at a VREF of 103 kt and a V2 of 111 kt. However, the loadsheet gave the landing weight as 12,575 lb and, for that, the operations manual gave a VREF of 102 kt. The co-pilot remembered G-EEST crossing the displaced threshold a little higher and somewhat faster than normal but recalled that the aircraft's speed was 120 KIAS and reducing just before reaching that point. The commander observed that the aircraft was slightly to the right of the centreline but correcting. Witnesses on the airfield who observed G-EEST stated that the aircraft approached the runway more rapidly than they would have expected for a Jetstream 31. While the commander continued to make reassuring comments, the co-pilot flared the aircraft to a level landing attitude, reduced the power to flight idle and then placed both hands on the control column. G-EEST floated an estimated six feet above the runway surface while the speed decayed and, just before touchdown, the commander noticed the aircraft pitch down a small amount but too quickly for him to intervene. 2 Jetstream 31, G-EEST At much the same time, the cabin attendant, who was sitting in the rearmost seat on the left side of the cabin, felt the aircraft suddenly move to the left and roll to the right. The aircraft touched down, bounced 10 to 15 feet in the air, as observed from the control tower building, touched down again, bounced once more and landed for the final time. One witness described seeing the aircraft touch down nose wheel first each time before pitching up and then down during each of the bounces. A second witness recalled G-EEST landing left wing low initially before bouncing and landing heavily right wing low but in a nose-down attitude. One of the personnel on duty in the Visual Control Platform (VCP) of the control tower thought that the aircraft might go around after the first bounce. The commander's recollection was that the nose wheel touched down first, with a substantial noise, followed immediately by the main wheels. The aircraft bounced, pitched 'dramatically' nose up, then pitched down and descended. The commander stated that at this point he took control but did not advise the co-pilot that he had done so. However, the co-pilot reported being aware that the commander was assisting her. The commander estimated th

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