Interim report 01/2026: Collision between passenger trains near Elstow

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IR012026_261001_ElstowDownload

RAIB has today released its interim report following the collision between passenger trains near Elstow, Bedfordshire, 19 June 2026.

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IR012026_261001_Elstow

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IR012026_261001_Elstow

Report IR1/2026 October 2026 Rail Accident Investigation: Interim Report Collision between passenger trains near Elstow, Bedfordshire 19 June 2026 Report IR1/2026 2October 2026 This page is left intentionally blank Report IR1/2026 3October 2026 Note: This interim report contains information obtained as part of the Rail Accident Investigation Branch’s (RAIB) ongoing investigation. Some of the information contained in this report may be refined or changed as the investigation progresses. The purpose of an RAIB investigation is to improve safety by preventing future railway and tramway accidents or by mitigating their consequences. It is not the purpose of such an investigation to establish blame or liability. Accordingly, it is inappropriate that RAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame, or determine liability, since neither the investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose. Report IR1/2026 4October 2026 Collision between passenger trains near Elstow, Bedfordshire, 19 June 2026 Introduction 1 At around 17:13 on Friday 19 June 2026, train reporting number 1H46, the 16:40 passenger service from Corby to London St Pancras, collided with the rear of train reporting number 1B67, the 15:50 passenger service from Nottingham to London St Pancras. Train 1B67 was stationary when the accident occurred. Both trains were operated by East Midlands Railway (EMR). 2 The collision took place on Network Rail’s Midland Main Line approximately 2.5 miles (4 km) south of Bedford station (figure 1). The driver of train 1H46 suffered fatal injuries in the collision. Of the estimated 257 people on board the two trains, more than 160 were injured. Significant damage was caused to the trains, both of which derailed. 3 Train 1B67 was stationary beneath the gantry supporting signal WH152 when the accident occurred (figure 2) and had come to an unexpected stop following an automatic emergency brake application. As train 1B67 was occupying the track in the vicinity of signal WH152, the preceding signal, WH154, was displaying a red (danger) aspect to protect the train from other movements on that line. 4 Forward-facing CCTV (FFCCTV) footage from train 1H46 shows that, as it approached and passed signal WH154, the signal was correctly displaying a red aspect. Train 1H46 was travelling at approximately 58 mph (93 km/h) and accelerating when it passed this signal. 5 Having passed signal WH154, train 1H46 proceeded towards train 1B67, approaching it on a right-hand curve. Analysis of data downloaded from the on-train data recorders (OTDR, sometimes called ‘the black box’) fitted to train 1H46 shows that the driver first applied the brakes around 10 seconds before the collision, while the train was travelling at approximately 76 mph (122 km/h). OTDR data also indicates that the speed of the train had reduced to around 50 mph (80 km/h) at the point of collision. 6 RAIB investigations, like many others, start by examining the immediate events around an accident and then working outwards to determine why they occurred, and to find any underlying factors. That means that a report published at the early stages of an investigation may contain information about immediate events without necessarily providing an explanation as to why they occurred. The reasons why train 1H46 passed signal WH154 at danger continue to form part of the ongoing investigation. Report IR1/2026 5October 2026 Location of accident Contains Ordnance Survey data: @Crown Copyright and database right 2026. OS license number: AC0000833184. Source: Department for Transport, RAIB 2026 1B67 WH356 WH492 Bedford South Junction London Down Fast Up Fast Down Slow Up Slow WH358 WH154 WH152 1H46 N Figure 1: Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing location of the accident at Elstow, Bedfordshire. Figure 2: Layout of the track on the approach to signal WH152 (not to scale and not all features are shown for clarity). RAIB’s role and the context of this interim report 7 RAIB is responsible for conducting independent investigations into railway and tramway accidents in the UK. The purpose of its investigations is to improve safety, by establishing the causes of the accident, and making recommendations to reduce the likelihood of similar occurrences in the future or to mitigate their consequences. 8 RAIB does not apportion blame or liability, enforce law or carry out prosecutions. RAIB investigations are independent of those undertaken by other public bodies, such as the Office of Rail and Road, and the railway industry itself. However, we will work alongside investigations being undertaken by others and may share certain physical evidence with them, where this is appropriate and allowed by the law. Report IR1/2026 6October 2026 9 A final report will be published by RAIB on completion of its investigation. All RAIB investigation reports are available on RAIB’s website. If found necessary, during its investigation, RAIB may also issue urgent safety advice to the rail industry. 10 This interim report uses data obtained from several different recording devices which do not share the same time source. To allow a timeline of the accident events to be constructed, RAIB has synchronised all event recordings to one time source, that used by the signalling data logger. It is this corrected time which is quoted throughout this report. Due to the way some data recorders function, short delays (typically less than a second) can elapse between an event occurring and the recording device logging that change. During the collision, some data corruption occurred to both OTDR and CCTV data. Work is ongoing to establish the reliability of the stored data sources on both trains, and this report presents the data as it has been recorded and analysed at this stage of the investigation. Event timings should therefore be considered as having a small degree of inaccuracy. 11 This interim report is based on the evidence gathered and analysed to date, and RAIB’s findings should be considered within this context. RAIB’s intended future actions for this ongoing investigation are described in paragraph 85. Topics relevant to the accident will be covered in more detail within the final report. This may also result in modifications to the interim findings contained in this report. Background The train services and number of people on board 12 Train 1B67 was formed of a five-car class 810 bi-mode multiple unit, number 810015 (figure 3). From saloon and platform CCTV footage, RAIB has so far identified 100 people as being on board this train, including eight EMR staff. This included the train’s driver, who was already qualified as a driver and was undertaking additional training to drive class 810 trains, and a driver-instructor, who was with the driver in the cab at the time of the accident. 13 The programme to introduce the class 810 trains on EMR’s intercity routes began in December 2025. The train is fitted with internal and external CCTV and OTDR. The internal saloon CCTV on the leading vehicle of the train stopped working due to a fault at around 09:00 on the morning of the accident. The available CCTV footage across the rest of the train ended shortly before the accident, owing to the storage of image data being interrupted by the collision (see paragraph 54). 14 Train 1H46 was formed of a four-car class 360/1 electric multiple unit, number 360115 (figure 3). Using saloon and platform CCTV footage, RAIB has so far identified 157 people as being on board this train, including two EMR staff. These were the train’s driver and the guard. 15 Class 360/1 trains were introduced in 2002 and 2003 and have been leased to EMR since 2021. The trains are fitted with OTDR and internal and external CCTV. The onboard CCTV footage stopped recording shortly before the accident, owing to the storage of image data being i

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