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Report 08/2020: Collision between mobile elevating work platforms at Rochford

Rail Accidents (RAIB)

Published on 28 September 2020, 10:06

Summary
Collision between mobile elevating work platforms, Rochford, Essex, 25 January 2020.
date of occurrence
2020-01-25
railway type
heavy-rail
report type
investigation-report

Report Overview

R082020_200928_RochfordDownload

Summary

At around 10:57 hrs on Saturday 25 January 2020, a mobile elevating work platform (MEWP) collided with a stationary machine of the same type on which two people were installing overhead line equipment. They both suffered minor injuries. The machine operator in charge of the MEWP had lost focus while driving the machine, and was alerted by other members of staff shouting at him to stop. At that point the machine was travelling too fast to stop before striking the stationary MEWP. The machine operator had driven away from the machine controller, who was responsible for the MEWP’s movements, without permission, and drove the machine at around 10 mph (16 km/h), while using the on-board CCTV screen to view the route ahead. These actions were contrary to the applicable operating rules.

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Official Documents

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R082020_200928_Rochford

Report 08/2020 September 2020 Rail Accident Report Collision between mobile elevating work platforms at Rochford, Essex 25 January 2020 This investigation was carried out in accordance with: z the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC z the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 z the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005. � Crown copyright 2020 You may re-use this document/publication (not including departmental or agency logos) free of charge in any format or medium. You must re-use it accurately and not in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and you must give the title of the source publication. :KHUHZHKDYHLGHQWL�HGDQ\WKLUGSDUW\FRS\ULJKWPDWHULDO\RXZLOOQHHGWRREWDLQSHUPLVVLRQIURPWKH copyright holders concerned. This document/publication is also available at www.gov.uk/raib. Any enquiries about this publication should be sent to: RAIB Email: enquiries@raib.gov.uk The Wharf Telephone: 01332 253300 Stores Road Website: www.gov.uk/raib Derby UK DE21 4BA This report is published by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Department for Transport. Report 08/2020 Rochford September 2020 Preface The purpose of a Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) investigation is to improve railway safety by preventing future railway accidents or by mitigating their consequences. It is not the purpose of such an investigation to establish blame or liability. Accordingly, it is inappropriate that RAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame, or determine liability, since neither the investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose. RAIB’s findings are based on its own evaluation of the evidence that was available at the time of the investigation and are intended to explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased manner. Where RAIB has described a factor as being linked to cause and the term is unqualified, this means that RAIB has satisfied itself that the evidence supports both the presence of the factor and its direct relevance to the causation of the accident or incident that is being investigated. However, where RAIB is less confident about the existence of a factor, or its role in the causation of the accident or incident, RAIB will qualify its findings by use of words such as ‘probable’ or ‘possible’, as appropriate. Where there is more than one potential explanation RAIB may describe one factor as being ‘more’ or ‘less’ likely than the other. In some cases factors are described as ‘underlying’. Such factors are also relevant to the causation of the accident or incident but are associated with the underlying management arrangements or organisational issues (such as working culture). Where necessary, words such as ‘probable’ or ‘possible’ can also be used to qualify ‘underlying factor’. Use of the word ‘probable’ means that, although it is considered highly likely that the factor applied, some small element of uncertainty remains. Use of the word ‘possible’ means that, although there is some evidence that supports this factor, there remains a more significant degree of uncertainty. An ‘observation’ is a safety issue discovered as part of the investigation that is not considered to be causal or underlying to the accident or incident being investigated, but does deserve scrutiny because of a perceived potential for safety learning. The above terms are intended to assist readers’ interpretation of the report, and to provide suitable explanations where uncertainty remains. The report should therefore be interpreted as the view of RAIB, expressed with the sole purpose of improving railway safety. Any information about casualties is based on figures provided to RAIB from various sources. Considerations of personal privacy may mean that not all of the actual effects of the event are recorded in the report. RAIB recognises that sudden unexpected events can have both short- and long-term consequences for the physical and/or mental health of people who were involved, both directly and indirectly, in what happened. RAIB’s investigation (including its scope, methods, conclusions and recommendations) is independent of any inquest or fatal accident inquiry, and all other investigations, including those carried out by the safety authority, police or railway industry. Preface Report 08/2020 Rochford 4September 2020 This page is intentionally left blank Report 08/2020 Rochford September 2020 Report 08/2020 Rochford 5September 2020 Collision between mobile elevating work platforms at Rochford, Essex, 25 January 2020 Contents Preface  3 Summary 7 Introduction 8 Definitions 8 The accident 9 Summary of the accident  9 Context 10 The sequence of events 15 Events preceding the accident 15 Background information 20 Analysis 24 Identification of the immediate cause  24 Identification of causal factors  24 Identification of underlying factors  36 Factors associated with the response to the accident  38 Observations  39 Other occurrences of a similar character  41 Summary of conclusions  48 Immediate cause  48 Causal factors  48 Underlying factors  48 Factors associated with the response 49 Additional observations  49 Previous RAIB recommendations relevant to this investigation  50 Actions reported as already taken or in progress relevant to this report  52 Recommendations and learning points 53 Recommendations 53 Learning points 55 Report 08/2020 Rochford 6September 2020 Appendices 56 Appendix A - Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms 56 Appendix B - Investigation details 57 Report 08/2020 Rochford 7September 2020 Summary At around 10:57 hrs on Saturday 25 January 2020, a mobile elevating work platform (MEWP) collided with a stationary machine of the same type on which two people were installing overhead line equipment. They both suffered minor injuries. The machine operator in charge of the MEWP had lost focus while driving the machine, and was alerted by other members of staff shouting at him to stop. At that point the machine was travelling too fast to stop before striking the stationary MEWP. The machine operator had driven away from the machine controller, who was responsible for the MEWP’s movements, without permission, and drove the machine at around 10 mph (16 km/h), while using the on-board CCTV screen to view the route ahead. These actions were contrary to the applicable operating rules. Other causal factors were ineffective supervision of the machine operator and confusion among staff about who was in charge of the safe movement of on-track plant on the site. Cultural factors on the site led to poor working relationships between machine operators and controllers and an excessive focus on ‘getting the job done’, rather than compliance with rules and operating standards. Network Rail’s assurance processes had not identified these issues. RAIB has made five recommendations, each addressed to Network Rail. The first is to review and clarify the roles and responsibilities of staff working in possessions and work sites to avoid duplication of responsibilities and confusion arising between roles. The second recommendation is that Network Rail should undertake a review of the way that the Sentinel scheme is managed, in respect of incident investigations and how training providers and primary sponsors assess the English language skills of staff who undertake safety critical duties. The third recommendation is addressed to Network Rail (Anglia), to review its reporting and response process for accidents and incidents, and the fourth recommendation seeks a review of the equipment currently used to alert staff to a dangerous situation within a possession or work site. The fifth recommendation is to commission an independent review of the internal culture and working practices of Network Rai

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