Employment Tribunals

Case No: 6022957/2025 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Eneojo Richard Amobeda Respondent: Dynamic Support Limited Heard at: Bristol On: 29 September 2025 Before: Employment Judge Barton Representation Claimant: Mr Anoom counsel Respondent: Ms Omotosho solicitor JUDGMENT The Claimant’s application for interim relief brought under section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) is not well founded and is dismissed. Employment Judge Barton 30 September 2025 JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 14 October 2025 FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE 6022957 2025 1 OFFICIAL EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Mr E R Amobeda Respondent Dynamic Support Limited Heard at Bristol (by CVP) On: 1/9/2026 Before: Employment Judge Mr J S Burns Representation Claimant: Mr J Anoom (Counsel) Respondent: Ms B Omotosho (Solicitor) JUDGMENT 1. The complaint of automatic unfair dismissal under section 103A Employment Rights Act 1996 fails and is dismissed. 2. The Respondent must pay the Claimant via Mr Anoom £850 costs by 16/9/2026 3. The Claimant’s application for an anonymity order is refused. REASONS Introduction 1. The claim is for automatic unfair dismissal contrary to section 103A Employment Rights Act 1996. The issues were identified at paragraph 73 of the Case Management Order following the preliminary hearing on 5 February 2026. 2. I heard evidence from the Claimant and from the Respondent's witnesses, Ms J Freeman (Service Manager) and Ms E Davies (Registered Manager). The documents comprised a Claimant's bundle of 37 pages and a Respondent's bundle of 166 pages. During the hearing the Respondent also disclosed a voice recording and transcript of a telephone conversation on 17 May 2025, an email from the CQC dated 20 May 2025, and various records relating to the curtain rail incident. 3. The Tribunal issued directions requiring general disclosure by 13 March 2026. During the hearing it became apparent that the Respondent had failed to provide proper disclosure of a number of plainly relevant documents. Several important documents, including the CQC email of 20 May 2025, the audio recording and transcript of the telephone conversation of 17 May 2025, and documents relating to the curtain rail incident, were only produced during the hearing. Numerous other documents potentially relevant to the issues were sent in after nearly all the live evidence was complete on the first day. I decided not to admit much of this. 6022957 2025 2 OFFICIAL 4. The Respondent’s witness statements and in particular Ms Davies statement were wholly inadequate being short and uninformative about much relevant material which then had to be explained orally. 5. I have considered whether those procedural failures adversely affect the credibility or reliability of the Respondent's witnesses. I have concluded that they do not. In my judgment, the failures resulted from incompetence and inadequate late preparation of the case rather than any deliberate attempt to conceal relevant material. 6. Significantly, some of the material disclosed late strongly supported the Respondent's own case, most notably the audio recording of the telephone conversation of 17 May 2025. That recording was consistent with Ms Davies' evidence that, before any complaint was made to the CQC, she had already formed a strongly adverse view of the Claimant's conduct, suspended him and decided that disciplinary proceedings should follow. 7. Although I regard the failures of disclosure and late disclosure as amounting to unreasonable conduct in the defence of these proceedings, I have not found that they assist in determining the substantive issues before me. Nor do they justify drawing any adverse inference against the Respondent or its witnesses. My findings are based on an assessment of all the evidence before me, including the material disclosed during the hearing. The Law 8. Section 103A ERA provides that an employee is automatically unfairly dismissed if the reason, or principal reason, for dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure. 9. The burden rests upon the Claimant to establish facts from which the Tribunal can conclude that the protected disclosure materially influenced the decision to dismiss. The Tribunal must identify the reason operating in the mind of the decision-maker at the time of dismissal. Findings of Fact 10. The Respondent provides supported living and behavioural management services to vulnerable adults. The Claimant worked as a support worker, principally at Eastbury House in Swindon. 11. One of the service users supported by the Respondent, whom I shall refer to as CA, ordinarily required two-to-one support in the community. The Claimant was familiar with CA's care arrangements and had signed the relevant risk assessment documentation. In February 2025 staff were informed of an amendment to the care arrangements permitting CA to travel to and from UET on Wednesdays with only one member of staff because that journey was short and had been specifically risk assessed. 12. On 6 May 2025 Ms Davies conducted a recorded staff discussion with the Claimant following an incident in which a curtain rail had fallen from a wall at Eastbury House and staff had failed to report the matter to management. The Claimant apologised and signed a memorandum recording the discussion. Another manager conducted similar discussions with other employees on 9 and 14 May 2025. Around the same period she also had informal discussions with the Claimant reminding him of the need to adhere to service users' care plans and to report matters appropriately. 13. On 17 May 2025 the Claimant was working at Eastbury House. CA was scheduled to go swimming, an activity which required two members of staff under the care plan. Due to an 6022957 2025 3 OFFICIAL unexpected staffing shortage only three staff attended work when four were required. Following discussions between staff, the other two employees left the property with other service users, leaving the Claimant with CA while awaiting the arrival of a fourth member of staff. When that person failed to arrive, the Claimant did not contact the on-call manager or office. 14. Instead, he drove CA on a lengthy journey through the Wootton Bassett and Calne areas before returning to Swindon. This was not the permitted short UET journey and was contrary to the care plan because only one member of staff accompanied CA in the community. During the return journey the Claimant's vehicle was involved in a road traffic accident. Fortunately, no injury was sustained. 15. Following the accident, the Claimant had a telephone conversation with Ms Davies on 17 May 2025. The recording of that discussion is important evidence. Ms Davies expressed serious concern not simply about the accident itself but about the fact that CA had missed his planned activity and that the Claimant had failed to contact the office when staffing difficulties arose. She referred to previous concerns regarding transparency and reporting and informed the Claimant that he was suspended and that disciplinary proceedings would commence. By the end of that conversation Ms Davies had formed a strongly adverse view of the Claimant's conduct and had already concluded that formal disciplinary action was necessary. 16. On 19 May 2025 the Claimant telephoned the Care Quality Commission and made a complaint anonymously. By then he had already been suspended and knew that disciplinary proceedings were pending. 17. The complaint included two matters. First, it referred to the curtain rail incident and the handling of staff involved in that matter. I do not regard that complaint as tending to show any of the matters identified in section 43B ERA. Secondly, the Claimant complained that a service user who ordinarily required two-to-one support had been driven by a single member of staff due to inadequate staffing and that an accident had occurred. That complaint was capable of engaging sections 43B(1)(b) and (d) ERA, namely breach of a legal obligation and health and safety concerns. The disclosure was made to the CQC, which is a prescribed person. 18. However, I am not satisfied that the Claimant reasonably believed that the disclosure was made in the public interest. The Respondent already had a care plan and risk assessment in place which prohibited CA being taken into the community with fewer than two members of staff, save for the specific exception relating to UET. The difficulty arose because that care plan was not followed. I am unable to see how complaining to the CQC about a failure to follow an existing safeguarding measure advanced a wider public interest concern. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the complaint to the CQC constituted a protected disclosure for the purposes of sections 43B and 43F ERA. 19. On 19 May 2025 the Respondent commenced a formal investigation into the events of 17 May 2025 and took statements from staff members. 20. On 20 May 2025 the CQC emailed Ms Davies regarding concerns that had been raised. The email expressly stated that no names had been provided and did not identify the complainant. It also referred to a third issue concerning a policy of charging staff £5 for unnecessary out-of-hours telephone calls, a complaint which the Claimant denied making. 21. I accept Ms Davies' evidence that complaints from staff to the CQC were not unusual and that she did not know that the Claimant was the person who had made the complaint. Given 6022957 2025 4 OFFICIAL the number of employees involved in the matters described in the CQC email, she considered it entirely possible that another member of staff had been responsible. 22. The Claimant participated in the investigation and disciplinary process. During those proceedings there was no reference to the CQC complaint. I do not find proved the Claimant's allegation that Ms Davies asked him at the disciplinary hearing, “And who made you angry to do what you did?”. The contemporaneous notes do not record any such question and I do not accept that it was asked. 23. Ms Davies' evidence, which I accept, was that the Claimant maintained throughout the disciplinary process that he had done nothing wrong because he had acted in a manner he had adopted previously. Ms Davies concluded that she could no longer rely upon him to comply with care plans and safeguarding requirements. 24. On 18 June 2025 Ms Davies dismissed the Claimant for gross misconduct. The dismissal letter records findings that he knew the required staffing levels, failed to report the staffing shortfall, undertook an unauthorised activity with CA without an appropriate risk assessment, failed to follow the activity plan and thereby committed serious breaches of safeguarding, duty of care and health and safety requirements. 25. The Claimant appealed. His appeal grounds made no reference to the CQC complaint. The first occasion on which he alleged that the dismissal was caused by the report to the CQC was in his ET1. 26. The Claimant relied upon a number of matters said to support an inference that the CQC complaint caused or influenced the dismissal, including the fact that the formal suspension letter was sent shortly after the CQC email of 20 May 2025. I do not accept that submission. The evidence establishes that on 17 May 2025, before any disclosure to the CQC had been made, Ms Davies had already expressed serious concerns about the Claimant's conduct, informed him that he was suspended and told him that disciplinary proceedings would follow. The allegations which ultimately led to dismissal arose entirely from the events of 17 May 2025 and were already under investigation before the CQC complaint was made. 27. The Claimant also complained of selective disciplinary treatment, asserting that other employees who worked on 17 May 2025 were not disciplined. However, they were not appropriate comparators. The Respondent's case was that it was the Claimant who had responsibility for CA, who failed to contact the office when staffing difficulties arose and who undertook the unauthorised journey contrary to the care plan. Their circumstances were materially different. 28. The Claimant also referred to information received from an unnamed individual identified only as “PI”. As that individual neither provided a witness statement nor gave evidence, I attach little weight to those allegations. Conclusions 29. The Claimant bears the burden of establishing that he made a protected disclosure and that the disclosure was the reason, or principal reason, for his dismissal. 30. I am not satisfied that the complaint made to the CQC on 19 May 2025 constituted a protected disclosure. Although part of the complaint was capable of engaging section 43B ERA, I am not persuaded that the Claimant reasonably believed that making it was in the public interest. Accordingly, the claim fails at that stage. 6022957 2025 5 OFFICIAL 31. Even if I am wrong about that conclusion, the claim would fail on causation. The evidence does not satisfy me that Ms Davies knew, when making the decision to dismiss, that the Claimant was the individual who had contacted the CQC. The CQC email did not identify any complainant, and the concerns it raised could have originated from several members of staff. I accept Ms Davies' evidence that she did not know who had made the complaint. 32. The chronology strongly supports the Respondent's case. Before the complaint was made, the Claimant had already been criticised for his conduct, suspended and informed that disciplinary proceedings would commence. The disciplinary process was therefore already underway before the CQC became involved. 33. I find that the reason operating in Ms Davies' mind when she dismissed the Claimant was her belief that he had committed serious misconduct by failing to comply with the care plan, failing to report staffing difficulties, taking a vulnerable service user into the community without the required support and thereby creating serious safeguarding and health and safety concerns. 34. Any disclosure to the CQC played no material part in the dismissal decision. It was neither the reason nor the principal reason for dismissal. The complaint of automatic unfair dismissal under section 103A Employment Rights Act 1996 is therefore dismissed. Costs 35. Costs can be awarded under the Tribunal rules if a party conducts the claim or defence unreasonably. The Respondent without reasonable excuse failed to disclose many relevant and disclosable documents until during the hearing, and its witness statements were inadequate, as described in the Reasons above. The main point on which it succeeded namely chronology/causation was won on the basis of a document disclosed after the hearing had started. Had this document been disclosed at the proper time it is possible that the Claimant would have dropped the case months ago. 36. At an early stage the Claimant provided a full and clear statement cross referenced to material documents. He also did not produce an audio recording of 17/5/25 which he claimed he had and he was late with his schedule of loss but is not shown to have breached directions in the conspicuous manner in which the Respondent has done. 37. I have a discretion as to whether or not costs should be awarded. 38. Mr Anoom who is a barrister, entered into a direct access agreement with the Claimant for payment of £850 in March 2025. The Claimant accepted that agreement and paid £850 to Mr Anoon under it. Mr Anoom told me that he expects to bill the Claimant another £2000 for his more recent services including preparation and representation during a 2 day trial. No VAT is chargeable on Mr Anoom’s fees. These appear to be reasonable low charges for the work done, but as Mr Anoom currently does not have a written agreement in place for more than £850, I am uncertain whether the Claimant is legally liable to pay Mr Anoom any more than the £850 he has already paid. 39. In all the circumstances I deem it appropriate to order the Respondent to pay the Claimant £850 costs by way of a cheque or bank transfer payment to Mr Anoom. It will be a matter between Mr Anoom and his client to sort out any outstanding costs issues between them 6022957 2025 6 OFFICIAL directly. Rule 49 40. The Claimant applied for an order to anonymise or delete his name from the Judgment/Reasons in order to protect himself against blacklisting by future potential employers. 41. Rule 49 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 confirms the following: The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, make an order with a view to preventing or restricting the public disclosure of any aspect of proceedings so far as it considers it necessary in the interests of justice or in order to protect the Convention rights of any person. 42. The Tribunal must give full weight to the principle of open justice and to the Convention right to freedom of expression. 43. The basic principle in court proceedings is one of open justice – justice must be done and be seen to be done - R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1KB 256. 44. In British Broadcasting Corporation v Roden [2015] IRLR 627, the EAT, Simler J, considered that 'withholding a party's name is an obvious derogation from [open justice], requiring cogent justification for its restriction' 45. Although it is an unfortunate fact that publication of claimants’ names on the Register can potentially prejudice job-prospects, this is simply a feature of the process common to all or nearly all ET claimants and it falls far short of the type of material which is likely to cause significant interference with his Article 8 rights. 46. The Claimant has not discharged the burden of showing that any derogation from open justice is justified in this case. J S Burns Employment Judge 2/9/2026 Date sent to parties 05 October 2026