Mr C Porter v ABM Technical Services Ltd: 3335015/2018
Employment Tribunal
Published on 03 November 2020, 09:22
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
age-discrimination breach-of-contract public-interest-disclosure unlawful-deduction-from-wages
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2020-07-31
Change History
-
Reconsideration judgment attached.
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No: 3335015/2018
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondent
Mr C Porter v ABM Technical Services Ltd
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Heard at: Bristol On: 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 July 2020
Before: Employment Judge Midgley
Appearances
For the Claimant: Miss J Porter, claimant’s mother
For the Respondent: Mr J Chambers, Solicitor
JUDGMENT
1. The claimant’s claims that he suffered detriments on the grounds of having
made protected disclosures are not well founded and are dismissed. The
claimant was not subjected to the detriments alleged or, where he suffered a
deteriment, it was not on the grounds that he made a protected disclosure.
2. The claimant’s claim that he was automatically unfairly dismissed on the
grounds that he made protected disclosures is not well founded and is
dismissed. The respondent did not breach the implied term of mutual trust
and confidence by subjecting the claimant to detriments on the grounds that
he had made protected disclosures.
3. The claimant’s claim for notice pay is not well founded and is dismissed. The
claimant resigned and was not dismissed for the purposes of s.95 ERA 1996.
4. The claimant’s claims of harassment related to the protected characteristic of
age are not well founded and are dismissed.
5. The claimant’s claims of direct age discrimination, with the exception of the
complaint concerning Mr Mundle’s comments on 12 January 2018, are not
well founded and are dismissed. The complaint of direct age discrimination
relating to Mr Mundle’s comments are well founded, but the Tribunal does not
have jurisdiction to hear it as it was presented out of time and it would not be
just and equitable for time to be extended. The claim is therefore dismissed.
Case No: 3335015/2018
_______________________________
Employment Judge Midgley
Dated: 31 July 2020
……………………….
Note
Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be
provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is
presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr C Porter
Respondent: ABM Technical Services Limited
Before: Employment Judge Midgley
Representation
Claimant: Miss J Porter, claimant’s mother
Respondent: Mr J Chambers, solicitor
JUDGMENT
(On application for Rule 50 Order and
reconsideration)
1. The claimant’s application for an anonymization order pursuant to Rule 50 of
Schedule 1 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of
Procedure) Regulations 2013 is dismissed.
2. The claimant’s application for reconsideration of the Judgment sent to the
parties on the 4 August 2020 pursuant to rule 71 and 72 of the Employment
Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 is
dismissed.
REASONS
3. By email dated 14 August 2020 the claimant made the following applications:
3.1. An application for an order pursuant to rule 50 of the Employment
Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 (“the
Rules”) that his name should be anonymized from the Judgment dated 4
August 2020.
3.2. An application for reconsideration of the Judgment pursuant to Rule 72
of the Rules;
3.3. An application for written reasons in respect of the Judgment.
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
4. The grounds of the application for the Rule 50 order were sparse indeed. The
application simply notes that the claimant was a whistleblower and that status
had and would continue to affect his future employment. The application
contains no explanation of how the written judgment containing his name
would have that effect nor does it set out any basis on which it is argued that
the provisions of Rule 50 would apply to his situation.
5. The basis of the application for reconsideration was more extensive. The
particular grounds of the application will be set out in the conclusions so that
the conclusion on the grounds may be easily referenced to the complaints
themselves.
6. The applications were copied to the respondent, but the respondent has not
commented on either.
The Relevant Law
Rule 50
7. It is a fundamental cornerstone of the common law that justice should be
open (see Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 and Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global
Management Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 2993).
8. ‘Open justice’ requires the public to be able to attend hearings and enables
the press to report on proceedings contemporaneously, including the
identities of the parties and witnesses. There have been many higher court
iterations of the principle, one of the most seminal of which is that of R v Legal
Aid Board (ex parte Kaim Todner) [1999] QB 966 per Lord Woolf MR:
“It is necessary because the public nature of the proceedings deters
inappropriate behaviour on the part of the court. It also maintains the
public’s confidence in the administration of justice. It enables the public to
know that justice is being administered impartially. It can result in evidence
becoming available which would not become available if the proceedings
were conducted behind closed doors or with one or more of the parties’ or
witnesses’ identity concealed. It makes uninformed and inaccurate
comment about the proceedings less likely. If secrecy is restricted to those
situations where justice would be frustrated if the cloak of anonymity is not
provided, this reduces the risk of the sanction of contempt having to be
invoked, with the expense and the interference with the administration of
justice which this can involve.”
9. However, the administration of justice is not merely subject to the common
law but also to the Convention rights contained within the European
Convention of Human Rights. The relevant rights which are engaged in the
current case are as follows: Article 6, Article 8 and Article 10.
10. Article 6 concerns the right to a fair hearing and provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations…, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in
a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of
the public life parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would
prejudice the interests of justice.”
11. Article 8 concerns the right to respect for private and family life. It is a
qualified right which provides that everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. The right is qualified
by the exception ‘except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society… For the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of rights and
freedom of others.’
12. Article 10 provides for the freedom of expression and is the article prayed in
aid by the broadcast media and written press. The right is qualified in the
same manner as the Article 8 right.
13. Those competing rights find their focus in the Tribunal process in the wording
of Rule 50. That provides:
“(1) A Tribunal may at any stage of the proceedings, on its own
motion or on application, make an order with a view to preventing or
restricting the public disclosure of any aspect of those proceedings so far
as it considers necessary in the interests of justice or in order to protect
the Convention rights of any person or in the circumstances identified in
section 10A of the Employment Tribunals Act.
(2) In considering whether to make an order under this rule, the Tribunal
shall give full weight to the principle of open justice and to the Convention
right to freedom of expression.
(3) Such orders may include –
(a) an order that a hearing that would otherwise be in public
be conducted, in whole or in part, in private;
(b) an order that the identities of specified parties, witnesses
or other persons referred to in the proceedings should not be disclosed
to the public, by the use of anonymisation or otherwise, whether in the
course of any hearing or in its listing or in any documents entered on
the Register or otherwise forming part of the public record;
(c) an order for measures preventing witnesses at a public
hearing being identifiable by members of the public;
(d) a restricted reporting order within the terms of section 11
or 12 of the Employment Tribunals Act.
(4) Any party, or other person with a legitimate interest, who has not
had a reasonable opportunity to make representations before an order
under this rule is made may apply to the Tribunal in writing for the
order to be revoked or discharged, either on the basis of written
representations or, if requested, at a hearing.
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
(5) Where an order is made under paragraph 3 (d) above –
(a) it shall specify the person whose identity is protected; and
may specify particular matters of which publication is prohibited is likely
to lead to that person’s identification;
(b) it shall specify the duration of the order;
(c) the Tribunal shall ensure that a notice of the fact that
such an order has been made in relation to those proceedings is
displayed on the noticeboard of the Tribunal with any list of the
proceedings taking place before the Tribunal, and on the door of the
room in which the proceedings affected by the order are taking place;
and
(d) the Tribunal may order that it applies also to any other
proceedings being heard as part of the same hearing.
(6) ‘Convention rights’ has the meaning given to it in section 1 of
the Human Rights Act 1998.”
14. S.10A is ostensibly limited to cases of confidential information as defined in
s.10A(1). However, it is now well recognised that a Restricted Reporting
Order (“RRO”) can be made in a broad spectrum of cases even where
sections 11 or 12 are not engaged (see Fallows v News Group Newspapers
[2016] ICR 801 and F v G UKEAT/0042/11/DA where Underhill P, reviewing X
v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2003] ICR 1031 and A v B [2010]
ICR 849, noted:
“.. In a case where anonymisation or restricted reporting orders are sought
in order to protect article 8 rights, which will in practice cover most cases
caught by rules 49 and 50, the tribunal’s powers do not have to be derived
from those rules. On the contrary, it has wide powers to take appropriate
steps, unconstrained by their specific terms.”
15. Just because a complaint of party falls into one of the categories does not
mean that an order will be justified, even if both sides consent. The question
is always whether the balance between the ss. 11 and 12 protection and the
principle of open justice actually justifies the making of such an order (see X v
Y [1998] ICR 43).
16. The balancing exercise to be conducted in a case involving these conflicting
rights was described by Lord Steyn in re S (A Child) (identification:
Restrictions on Publication) [2004] 3 WLR 1129 (at paragraph 17) as follows:
“… What does, however, emerge clearly from the opinions are four
propositions. First, neither article [8 and 10] has, as such, precedence
over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in
conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific
rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the
justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into
account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For
convenience, I will call this the ultimate balancing test. …”
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
17. Generally, the issue may be straightforwardly determined without the need for
a complex or lengthy hearing:
“I should add that Lord Steyn’s reference to ‘an intense focus’ [in
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] AC 457] does not mean that every time a
litigant waves an article 8 flag in support of an application for a private
hearing there will have to be a protracted and expensive hearing to
determine the issue. Often, indeed usually, experience suggests that the
application can be determined very quickly. It also shows that, in most
cases falling outside the area of recognised exceptional circumstances …,
the open justice principle will prevail.”
Per Kay LJ in Global Torch, supra.
18. The burden of establishing any derogation from the general principle lies on
the person seeking it. It must be established by clear and cogent evidence
(see Global Torch per Maurice Kay LJ at paragraph 13).
19. An order under Rule 50 interferes both with the principle of open justice and
the right to freedom of expression. The principle of open justice was
considered by the Supreme Court in A v British Broadcasting Corporation
[2014] 2 WLR 1243 in which Lord Reed said at [23]:
“It is a general principle of our constitutional law that justice is
administered by the courts in public, and is therefore open to public
scrutiny. The principle is an aspect of the rule of law in a democracy. As
Toulson LJ explained in R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of
Westminster Magistrates' Court (Article 19 intervening) [2012] EWCA Civ
420; [2013] QB 618 , para 1, society depends on the courts to act as
guardians of the rule of law. … In a democracy, where the exercise of
public authority depends on the consent of the people governed, the
answer must lie in the openness of the courts to public scrutiny.”
20. Where the relevant rights are not likely to be vindicated in the trial process
because they are not directly relevant the position was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Guardian News and Media Ltd (supra) - in general the
public “are more than capable of drawing the distinction between mere
suspicion and sufficient evidence to prove guilt” (para 60) and more would be
needed to justify any derogation of the principle of open justice.
21. However, a distinction may properly be drawn between a party who initiates
the proceedings and is thus to be treated as having accepted the
embarrassment and reputational damage involved in litigation and a witness
who has no interest in the proceedings, who has a stronger claim to be
protected by the courts if liable to be prejudiced by publicity (see R v Legal
Aid Board, ex parte Todner at 978F)
Reconsideration
22. Schedule 1 of The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of
Procedure) Regulations 2013 contains the Employment Tribunal Rules of
Procedure 2013 (“the Rules”). Under Rule 71 an application for
reconsideration under Rule 70 must be made within 14 days of the date on
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
which the decision (or, if later, the written reasons) were sent to the parties.
[The application was therefore received within the relevant time limit].
23. Under Rule 5 the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a
party, extend or shorten any time limit specified in the Rules or in any
decision, whether or not (in the case of an extension) it has expired.
24. The grounds for reconsideration are only those set out in Rule 70, namely that
it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
25. The grounds relied upon by the claimant are detailed in the conclusions
below.
26. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“the EAT”) in Trimble v Supertravel Ltd
[1982] ICR 440 decided that if a matter has been ventilated and argued then
any error of law falls to be corrected on appeal and not by review. In addition,
in Fforde v Black EAT 68/60 the EAT decided that the interests of justice
ground of review does not mean “that in every case where a litigant is
unsuccessful he is automatically entitled to have the tribunal review it. Every
unsuccessful litigant thinks that the interests of justice require a review. This
ground of review only applies in the even more exceptional case where
something has gone radically wrong with the procedure involving a denial of
natural justice or something of that order”.
Conclusions
Rule 50 application
27. The claimant has not identified any ground on which the overriding principle of
open justice should be set aside. In particular, the claimant has not suggested
that the act of publishing the Judgment will disclose confidential information or
information relating to his health (not that such matters of themselves provide
reasonable grounds for making a rule 50 Order without more).
28. The claimant complains that reporting his concerns to his employer has had
and will continue to have any effect on the claimant’s future employment. I
note that the complaint does not relate to the inclusion of his name in the
Judgment but rather to the disclosures which he made to his employer.
29. Even were the claimant’s argument to be that if the Judgment recording that
he made a protected disclosure were to be published the finding that he made
a protected disclosure would adversely affect his future employment
prospects, that of itself is certainly not enough to displace the principle of
open Justice.
30. I suspect that the claimant has made this application at the point at which he
has requested written reasons but not before, because of the findings made in
the Judgment which were critical of him, and which he does not want
published, although that, of course, will be the consequence of the claimant’s
request for written reasons unless a rule 50 anonymity order were made.
31. In conclusion therefore the claimant has not shown any good ground on which
an order should be made under rule 50 and I dismiss the application.
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
Conclusion on the request for reconsideration.
32. The test that I must apply is whether there is any reasonable prospect of the
original decision being varied or revoked.
33. I address each of the grounds relied upon in turn:
The Judge took into account irrelevant considerations on behalf the
respondent which were not supported by evidence
33.1. These were not particularised in the application; I have understood the
claimant to be alleging that the Judgment was predicated on findings of
fact in respect of matters which the respondent had not adduced
evidence to establish. The claimant has neither identified what those
findings of fact were, nor the basis on which it is said that there was no
evidence to support them, nor the basis on which to suggest that the
findings themselves were irrelevant to the issues which I had to address.
The Judge failed to make findings of fact on relevant supporting evidence
from the claimant
33.2. The findings of fact in question have not been not identified by the
claimant in the application, nor have the issues to which they related or
the manner in which such evidence have affected my conclusion on any
of the issues before me.
The claimant did not have the benefit of support from ELIPS during the
hearing.
33.3. It is correct that the claimant did not have the benefit of support from
ELIPS during the hearing. That is because the hearing occurred shortly
after the national lockdown was lifted, and at that stage ELIPS was only
offering support by telephone or by video with an appointment. However,
the claimant indicated that he was content to proceed with the hearing.
The claimant has not identified the basis on which the lack of support
from ELIPS had any material impact upon his ability to give evidence or
Mrs Porter’s ability to present his case.
The Judge prevented fair cross examination of the respondent’s
witnesses, without any proper explanation.
33.4. It is correct that I often had to stop and refocus Mrs Porter’s cross
examination because she consistently sought to suggest to the
respondent’s witnesses that (a) the respondent had breached the
claimant’s contract by unilaterally changing his hours of work and location
of work, or (b) that the respondent had breached the Working Time
Regulations, or (c) that the respondent had breached the National
Minimum Wage Regulations or (d) the Health and Safety at Work Act.
Employment Judge Livesey had previously refused the claimant’s
application to amend to include those claims. I painstakingly explained on
numerous occasions to the claimant and Mrs Porter the reason for my
actions by reference to the case management summary of Employment
Judge Livesey, the issues identified within it, and the decision on the
application to amend.
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
33.5. In particular, I explained that the claimant’s claim of constructive unfair
dismissal was only permitted to proceed under section 103A ERA 1996
on the basis that the detriments, said to have occurred because the
claimant made protected disclosures, also amounted to a breach of the
implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The claimant’s allegations of
breach of contract and other allegations were not relevant to the issues
that I had to decide. Consequently, it was necessary for me to refocus the
Mrs Porter’s cross examination upon the issues. I adjourned the case on
several occasions so that the Mrs Porter could review her questions to
ensure that she addressed those issues.
The Judge failed to prevent unfair and untrue questioning by the
respondent of the claimant’s witnesses
33.6. The application does not specify which questions the claimant believes
were unfair or why they were unfair. However, I assume that the
claimant’s complaint relates to questions asked in respect of the
relationship between the claimant, Mrs Porter and Mr Mark Oddy, who
was a witness for the claimant.
33.7. Those questions seemed to me to be relevant, given that Mr Oddy was
the claimant’s line manager for a significant period of time. It was he who
had allocated work and overtime to the claimant. The respondent’s case
was that Mr Oddy was in a relationship with Mrs Porter, and he had
allocated overtime work to the claimant on a preferential and unfair basis
as a consequence of that relationship, and that the work was given to the
claimant with his knowledge and consent because of the financial reward
connected to it, rather than because the claimant had made a protected
disclosure or because of his age. That was their defence to the allegation
in issue 13.6.2 (Thursday night work was overtime work which entitled the
worker to time off on the Friday). The respondent cross-examined Mr
Oddy on the basis that he was the manager who was responsible for that
allocation and each of the matters identified in issues 14.1.2 to 14.1.5 and
confirmed with him that his decisions were not influenced in any way by
the claimant’s age.
33.8. The respondent argued that these matters were relevant both to the
issue of whether the detriments had occurred as alleged, and also to the
claimant’s general credibility. The claimant denied that there was any
relationship beyond a professional working one between himself and Mr
Oddy, or that there was any relationship at all between Mr Oddy and Mrs
Porter. However, the respondent established during cross examination
that the claimant lived in an annex to Mr Oddy’s house, that Mr Oddy had
brought Mrs Porter as his ‘plus one’ to a work barbecue and the two had
stayed in a hotel provided by the respondent for that purpose, and that Mr
Oddy was shown in a photograph with the claimant on holiday in Dubai,
which the claimant sought to suggest was merely a coincidence, having
previously denied that he had been on holiday with Mr Oddy at all.
33.9. In addition, the respondent quite properly put to Mr Oddy that during
the time that he was the claimant’s line manager, he had authorised
overtime payments to the claimant for hours which the claimant had not in
fact worked, which argument was evidenced by tracker information from
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
the claimant’s work van and the worksheets in question. It was
appropriate that Mr Oddy should have the opportunity to comment upon
those very serious allegations given they were to form part of the
respondent’s closing arguments.
The Judge failed to assist the claimant when he indicated that he did not
understand the process during the hearing
33.10. I understand the claimant’s complaint to consist of two key matters.
First, the complaints about cross examination, which are addressed
above. Secondly, the claimant’s complaint in relation to his witness
statement, which is addressed below. Generally, I repeatedly and
carefully explained the nature of the issues, the arguments and evidence
that might be relevant to those issues, the nature of the decision that I
had to make and the process that would be adopted to the claimant and
his mother, on many occasions, adjourning the case so that they could
consider or review their position or approach in light of my explanations.
The Judge failed to review the time allocated for the hearing and the
orders made prior to the hearing itself. In consequence the claimant was
not on an equal footing.
33.11. The hearing had been listed at the preliminary hearing before
Employment Judge Livesey, with the parties’ consent, having regard to
the issues, the number of witnesses to be called and the length of witness
statements that were then permitted. At the outset of the hearing I
discussed the proposed timetable within the case management summary
with the parties. It was not possible for me to increase the listing of the
case nor was it appropriate having regard to the overriding objective. Mrs
Porter believed that the case was a far broader one than it was and
wished for longer to cross examine and for her son to give evidence. That
was neither necessary nor appropriate given the issues in the case.
The Judge instructed the claimant to review the statement and identify, by
reference to paragraphs in the statement, which paragraphs were relied
upon in respect of which of the issues which have been identified in the
case management hearing. The Judge did not permit the claimant
sufficient time to conclude that process, and failed to adjourn the hearing
to enable the claimant to complete it.
33.12. At the case management hearing before Employment Judge Livesey
the claimant was directed to produce a witness statement limited to 5000
words. In the event he produced a statement of approximately 17,500
words. He had not been permitted to do so. At the outset of the hearing I
explained that I had approximately three hours reading time and, on the
basis that a judge takes approximately a minute to two minutes to read a
page of A4, in the circumstances where that I had bundle of 368 pages
and five statements, there simply would be insufficient time to read the
necessary evidence and all of the claimant’s statement. The statement
was itself a mixture or evidence and argument, containing many broad
statements of unfairness and discrimination.
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
33.13. I therefore directed that the claimant should identify which paragraphs
in the statement contained the evidence he relied upon in relation to the
issues in the case management summary, and indicated that I would read
those paragraphs which would be treated as his witness statement for the
proceedings. I adjourned the case until 10 AM the following day to enable
the claimant to complete that process, for me to read the paragraphs and
for the respondent to review its cross-examination in respect of them. The
claimant had not completed the process by 3 PM on the first day, and
therefore I called the parties into court to discuss the appropriate course.
Mrs Porter stated that she would be able to complete the process of
cross-referring the paragraphs of the statement with the issues by 3:15
PM. I therefore permitted her to do so. In the event, Mrs Porter sent the
document to the tribunal at 3:30 PM. She did not suggest then or the next
morning that she had insufficient time to conclude that task.
The Judge failed to address the claimant’s complaints which he had
raised prior to the final hearing about the respondent’s actions, including
the failure to cooperate with joint bundle and to provide information
requested.
33.14. On the first day of the hearing, the bundle had been agreed, subject to
some additional documents which the claimant wish to be added. The
respondent did not object to the inclusion of those documents and
accordingly they were added by consent. The claimant did not suggest
that any historic failure to agree the content of the bundle or to provide
information had the effect that the hearing could not or should not
proceed. Accordingly, the case commenced on 27 July 2020 with the
claimant’s consent.
The Judge made a mistake in the application of the law and/or produced
a Judgment which was one which no reasonable tribunal could have
reached.
33.15. The claimant does not identify what error of law was made or the basis
on which it is said that the judgment was not one which a reasonable
tribunal could reach.
34. In my view, none of the grounds relied upon reveals any reasonable basis on
which I could conclude that there is any reasonable prospect of the Judgment
being varied or revoked. Accordingly, I dismiss the claimant’s application for
reconsideration
Request for written reasons
35. The claimant has requested written reasons for the Judgment. The
Reasons contain findings which are adverse to and, at times, critical of the
claimant. As I explained at the hearing, if the claimant requests written
reasons those comments and findings will be published to the Tribunal
Judgment website, where they will be available in perpetuity for any member
of the public, including any prospective employer, to read.
36. Accordingly, in the circumstances where I have dismissed the claimant’s
application for an anonymity Order pursuant to rule 50, the claimant must
Case No: 3335015/2018/P
write to the Tribunal within seven days of the date on which this Judgment I
sent to the parties stating whether the application is maintained or whether it
is withdrawn.
_____________________________________
Employment Judge Midgley
______________________________________
Date 14 October 2020
JUDGMENT & REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
28th October 2020
By Mr J McCormick
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
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