Mr D Da Costa v Interpub Ltd: 2204285/2021
Employment Tribunal
Published on 02 September 2022, 13:02
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
unfair-dismissal
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2022-03-03
Change History
-
Reasons Added
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
2204285 2021
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
London Central Region
Heard by CVP on 3/3/2022
Claimant: Mr D Da Costa
Respondent: Interpub Ltd
Before: Employment Judge Mr J S Burns
Representation
Claimant: Mr A Gloag (Counsel)
Respondent: Ms D Gilbert (Counsel)
JUDGMENT
The constructive unfair dismissal claim is struck out.
REASONS
1. The judgment followed an OPH to consider an application to strike out or deposit the Claimant’s
constructive unfair dismissal claim (but not his claim for unfair dismissal by way of a dismissal
under section 95(1)(a) ERA 1996).
2. I received written and oral submissions and was referred to legal authorities.
3. The Claimant was employed from 28/5/2013 and his employment terminated on 30/6/21. He
issued a claim for unfair dismissal on 15/7/21. In his home-made particulars of claim he stated
that he had been constructively dismissed but also accused the Respondent of “falsely
claiming that he resigned voluntarily”. He set out a narrative in which he had from 23/3/21
threatened to leave (his employment) if certain conditions were not met, then been asked by
the Respondent for a resignation letter which he had refused to provide, and then before
termination denied orally and in writing to the Respondent that he had in fact resigned. The
Respondent entered its ET3 contending in its Grounds of Resistance that the Claimant had
not been dismissed but that he had resigned.
4. The real dispute between the parties over the termination is whether the Claimant did resign
(which the Claimant denies) or whether the Respondent is to be taken as having dismissed
the Claimant because it wrongly treated his threats to resign and other related conduct as an
unconditional resignation (the Claimant’s case).
5. For purposes of a trial listed for 3 and 4 March on 23/3/22, on 7/2/22 the Claimant served a
witness statement, which contains a signed statement of truth, an in which he maintains that
whilst he expressed an intention to leave if working conditions did not change, he did not
ultimately resign from his employment, and in fact his employment was terminated by R. There
are numerous and repeated references to this effect. One example of many is as follows
Para73: “my contract was terminated on the basis of expressing an intention to leave...I was
only asking for my working conditions to change alongside the long hours...”
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6. Mr Gloag submitted in his skeleton argument that the Claimant “has set out, in his witness
statement and attached exhibits, the conduct of R. C’s position is that he was dismissed and
if not dismissed, he was constructively dismissed. …The question is; Who really terminated
the contract of employment? .The task for the Tribunal in a factual dispute, is to hear the
evidence (at a final hearing) and to make findings of fact. It is not unusual to have a lack of
clarity about whether the employee was dismissed and/or was constructively dismissed (as a
result of R’s action). Such matters are resolved after hearing evidence. One only has to
consider C’s witness statement and contemporaneous documents to appreciate that there is
clearly merit in C’s claim. No strike out and/or Deposit Order should be made.” In oral
submissions Mr Gloag suggested that the Respondent’s application was a “construct”, based
on a pure technicality and intended to prevent the tribunal being able at the trial to deal with
the case on its facts, and that “if I was concerned about the state of the pleadings then the
Claimant could amend to plead that he resigned”
7. However, I note that even while his employment continued, and in the run up to the termination
date, the Claimant denied in writing several times (for example in a grievance on 18/6/21 and
in an email to the Respondent dated 29/6/21) that he had resigned. His evidence is completely
inconsistent with any suggestion now to be made, with the benefit of legal advice, that after all
he had resigned with the intention of accepting the Respondent’s claimed repudiatory
breaches. Secondly, the Claimant has not in fact made any application to amend to plead that
he did resign with such an intention or at all. If such an application to amend had been made,
I would not have allowed it, not only because it would far too late, but because it would fly in
the face of the Claimant’s own repeated and clear evidence to the contrary. One can plead in
the alternative but not give evidence in the alternative, and the Claimant had given a solemn
statement that he did not intend to resign and did not resign.
8. The question is whether, despite the Claimants denial of resignation, it would be open to the
Tribunal to find on the Respondent’s evidence that in fact he had resigned, and so complete
the Claimants case for him, so allowing his claim for unfair constructive dismissal. It would
seem not. The main reason for this appears to be that it that it is wrong in such a case to impute
to a Claimant an intention and a motivation which he denies he ever had.
9. The case Logabox Ltd v Titherley [1977] ICR 369 is directly on point. Following the employer’s
refusal to honour commission agreements the employee opted to obtain employment
elsewhere. He wrote to his employers stating explicitly that he had not resigned, and that his
employment contract had expired. At first instance the tribunal found that his contract had not
expired, and that in fact he had been constructively dismissed as a result of the employer’s
conduct in refusing to honour the commission agreements, which amounted to a repudiatory
breach of the employment contract. The EAT overturned this decision. Having found that the
employee’s denial of any question resignation was “significant”, at 374 Kilner Brown J said:
“...the tribunal overlooked the fact that under the common law the other party has to accept
and act upon the repudiatory breach.” And at 375: “The industrial tribunal in our view correctly
found that there was not an expiry of the contract, but they were not justified in themselves
finding another basis for a claim for unfair dismissal, namely, that he was constructively
dismissed. As has been pointed out, they skated over the essential difficulty in the employee's
way, namely, that he was not saying that he was entitled to regard an existing contract as
repudiated and therefore regarded himself as dismissed. In fact he said exactly the opposite.
It seems to us that under common law the employee is not entitled to claim benefit from an
alleged repudiation when he did not treat the contract as repudiated. …We next turn to the
wider aspect which we believe paragraph 5 (2) (c) of Schedule 1 to the Act of 1974 entitles a
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tribunal to consider. But even there it seems to us that an employee must signify his attitude
in clear unambiguous fashion. Although it may be argued that an employee does not have to
go so far as to demonstrate a fundamental breach as the common law requires, nevertheless
the words of the sub-paragraph seem to us to imply that the employee must indicate that he is
exercising his entitlement to claim a constructive dismissal.”.
10. A further necessary ingredient in any constructive dismissal claim is that the employee
resigned in response to the breach. In Walker v Josiah Wedgwood & Sons [1978] ICR 744 the
EAT held at 751: “We think for our part that it is at least requisite that the employee should
leave because of the breach of the employer's relevant duty to him, and that this should
demonstrably be the case. It is not sufficient, we think, if he merely leaves — at any rate in any
circumstances at all similar to the present. And secondly, we think it is not sufficient if he leaves
in circumstances which indicate some ground for his leaving other than the breach of the
employer's obligations to him.”
11. Further, the employee’s acceptance of the breach must be clear and unequivocal. Conduct
which is equivocal and is as consistent with the contract being kept alive as it is with an
acceptance of the repudiatory breach will not constitute the clear acceptance necessary
(Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392) .
12. Therefore, in order to succeed in a claim of constructive dismissal an employee himself must
prove not only that his employer committed a breach of the employment contract but that he
accepted and acted upon that breach, by terminating the contract himself, i.e. by resigning.
Those latter requirements relate to the employee’s subjective intentions and cannot be proved
for an employee by the employer, or imputed to him by the tribunal in the face of the employee’s
own evidence to the contrary.
13. In this case C has repeatedly insisted that he did not resign. He contends that he indicated
only a conditional and equivocal intention to resign if his working conditions did not change.
He contends that R took the decision to terminate his employment. His witness statement
confirms this position. In light of his evidence, there is no basis upon which a reasonable
tribunal could conclude that C unequivocally accepted and acted upon any alleged breach by
R, by terminating his own employment. On the contrary, his case is that he did not.
14. Even if C’s case is taken at its highest, and his evidence accepted as correct for the purposes
of the application, he cannot succeed in establishing the essential requirements. In these
circumstances I find that the claim of constructive dismissal is hopeless and has no prospect
of success and hence I strike it out under rule 37(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal
(Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013
15. It has already been decided on a previous occasion that no strike out or deposit order should
be made on the claim brought for ordinary (not constructive) unfair dismissal. That claim will
proceed to trial.
J S Burns Employment Judge
London Central
3/3/2022
For Secretary of the Tribunals
Date sent to parties: 3/3/22
Case No: 2204285/2021
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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr D Da Costa
Respondent: Interpub Limited
Heard at: London Central Employment Tribunal (by video)
On: 15 and 16 August 2022
Before: Employment Judge Palca (sitting alone)
Appearances
For the claimant: Ms R Hodgkin (Counsel)
For the respondent: Ms D Gilbert (Counsel)
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s claim that he was unfairly dismissed is dismissed.
EXTENDED REASONS
Conduct of this hearing
(1) This has been a remote hearing. The parties did not object to the case being
heard remotely. The form of remote hearing was V – video, conducted using
Cloud Video Platform (CVP).
(2) In accordance with Rule 46, the tribunal ensured that members of the public
could attended and observe the hearing. This was done via a notice
published on Courtserve.net No members of the public attended.
(3) No requests were made by any members of the public to inspect any
witness statements or any other written materials before the tribunal.
(4) The parties were able to contribute to the discussion and to hear all
comments made and see and hear all those giving evidence.
(5) The participants were told that it is an offence to record the proceedings.
(6) Each of the witnesses, who were all in different locations, had access to the
relevant written materials. I was satisfied that none of the witnesses was
being coached or assisted by any unseen third party while giving their
evidence.
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The claim
(7) The Claimant was employed by the respondent, as UK Operations Manager,
from 27 May 2013 until his employment was terminated with effect from 30 June
2021. By a claim form presented on 15 July 2021, following a period of early
conciliation from 6-13 July 2021, the claimant brought complaints of unfair
dismissal. On 3 March 2022 an employment tribunal struck out the claimant’s
claim that he had been constructively dismissed on the basis that it had no
reasonable prospect of success – the main reason for this being that the
claimant’s position before the tribunal was that he had not resigned.
The issues
(8) The claims and issues for determination at this hearing were set out by
Employment Judge JS Burns at the preliminary Hearing held on 3 March 2022,
and were as follows:
Liability
(i) Did R dismiss C employment within the meaning of section 95(1)(a) of
ERA 1996? C contends his employment was terminated by R. R
contends C resigned with notice.
(ii) If yes, was the dismissal unfair within the meaning of section 98 of
ERA 1996?
(iii) If yes, would C’s employment have terminated in circumstances which
did not amount to an unfair dismissal in any event, and if so when
would have occurred? (Polkey)
Remedy
(iv) To what compensation is C entitled by way of basic and compensatory
awards and interest?
(v) If C’s employment would have terminated fairly in any event, to what
extent if any should C’s compensation be reduced to reflect that?
(vi) Did C by his conduct contribute to his dismissal? (vii) If so, to what
extent if any should his compensation be reduced to reflect that?
(vii) Should there be an uplift for breach of the ACAS code?
(9) The respondent confirmed that it is bringing no case that any dismissal of the
claimant might have been fair. Therefore the issues for this tribunal to determine
are simply whether the claimant resigned or was dismissed, and, if he was
dismissed, what the remedy should be.
Evidence
(10) There was an agreed file of general documents, as well as a remedy bundle of
documents. The claimant gave evidence, as did Mr C Lambert, Mr M Roberts
and Mr L Knowles on behalf of the respondent, respectively the Respondent’s
Group Operations Director, its Managing Director and its Strategy and
Development Director. Each witness had produced a witness statement which
set out their evidence in chief. The tribunal also had before it a short statement
from the respondent’s People Director, Mr M Vaughan. Although he was present
at the video hearing, he was in Australia and had not received the necessary
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permissions to give evidence from a foreign country. He did not therefore give
evidence, nor was he cross- examined. I accepted the statement, but have given
it little weight given that Mr Vaughan was not available for cross-examination.
Facts
(11) I determined that the relevant facts were as set out below. There was
considerable difference between the evidence given by the claimant and that
given by the respondent’s witnesses, in particular over the crucial fact of whether
the claimant resigned on 23 March and 7 April 2021, or whether he merely stated
his intention to resign if concerns he had expressed about his employment were
not addressed. I prefer the account of the respondent’s witnesses on this point to
the evidence given by the claimant. This is because, while there was little
contemporaneous documentation on the subject, the evidence that there was
supported the respondent’s position for the following reasons, set out in
chronological order:
(i) By way of background, it is the respondent’s case that the claimant
resigned to his line manager, Mr Lambert on 23 March 2021 and
confirmed his resignation on 7 April 2021, and that Mr Lambert
informed his superiors within the company, including Mr K Knowles
(the Chief Executive of the company and Mr L Knowles’ father) and
Mr Roberts on 7 April 2021 that the claimant had resigned. It is the
claimant’s case that he did not resign, but told Mr Lambert that he
would resign if concerns he had raised, in particular about pay and
management style, were not dealt with.
(ii) Mr Roberts spoke to the claimant on 8 April 2021. The file of
documents contained an account of that conversation written by Mr
Roberts on 24 June 2021, based on his contemporary handwritten
notes, so it can therefore be presumed to be reasonably accurate. Mr
Roberts records that he called the claimant and asked if he would
reconsider his decision to resign but that the claimant confirmed that
his mind was made up. The note does not record that the claimant had
merely threatened to resign.
(iii) On 8 April Mr K Knowles telephoned the claimant and asked him to
speak to his son, Mr L Knowles, because they were from the same
generation. That day the claimant texted Mr L Knowles as follows: “I
guess you have heard about me leaving. Would you be free next week
Monday to go for a drink at the Inn or elsewhere and have a private
conversation? I really would like to explain you the reasons of why this
decision in person.” This note does not talk about an intention to
resign, but talks of someone leaving the company and of it being a
decision. I do not accept the claimant’s explanation that this was just
a text to a friend, so the wording is immaterial. It was a text to the son
of the chief executive of the company, whom the chief executive had
asked him to contact. It would have been much more likely, had the
claimant merely expressed an intention of resigning to Mr Lambert,
that he would have texted something like “I guess you have heard
about me thinking about leaving”. I infer from this that the claimant had
definitely resigned, and believed he had done so.
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(iv) The claimant found out, via LinkedIn, on 15 April 2021 that the
respondent had instructed a recruitment company to recruit for his job.
He describes this as a humiliation. However, there was no evidence
before the tribunal that the claimant promptly complained about this,
nor promptly told anyone at the respondent that they should not be
recruiting for a replacement for him as he had not resigned.
(v) On 11 May 2021 Mr Lambert emailed the claimant, copying in
amongst others the respondent’s Managing Director and People
Director, stating that he would like to “respond formally accepting your
resignation” and, in typical terms that are written when a good
employee has resigned, wishing him “all the success in the future and
hope that you keep in touch”. The claimant does not write any written
response, until 18 June 2021, denying that he had resigned. On the
claimant’s case, he told Mr Lambert orally on 19 May 2021 that he had
not resigned (Mr Lambert denies this), but this was still over a week
later. Again, it is implausible that the claimant would not immediately
have responded to the 11 May letter stating that he had not resigned.
(vi) The claimant’s replacement began work with the company on 10 June
2021, and was receiving communications from the management team
from which the claimant was excluded. The claimant does not
immediately complain about this, until his email of 18 June 2021.
(vii) The claimant’s evidence is that he told people that he intended to
resign unless his working conditions changed. However he was never
given any hope that this might happen – on the contrary he was told
that the behaviour of the two senior managers would not change. It
seems most unlikely in these circumstances that the claimant would
not then have resigned, if he had not already done so, which therefore
makes it much more likely that he had in fact on 7 April 2021 confirmed
his earlier resignation.
(viii) The respondent’s oral evidence was clear, and consistent at all times
with the written documentation.
(12) The claimant’s employment with the respondent group began on 27 May 2013.
His final employment contract, dated 11 June 2018, is with a company named
Beds and Bars Limited, but the present respondent has accepted in its ET3 that
it is the proper company to be the respondent in this claim. On 2 July 2018 the
claimant was promoted to UK Operations Manager. He was responsible for 11
bars and pubs and 10 hostels. Paragraph 37 of the claimant’s contract of
employment states that the claimant was “expected to give” his employer one
month’s written notice to terminate his employment, and required the employer
to give the claimant three months’ notice. That clause also contained provisions
allowing the employer to place the claimant on garden leave during any period of
notice.
(13) The hospitality business was badly affected by Covid. The respondent had to
close a number of its venues. A number of staff were furloughed. Others were
asked to reduce their pay to the hours they were actually working. The claimant
agreed to reduce his pay by 50%.
(14) In about March 2021 the respondent needed to recruit a new manager to be
Senior General Manager at one of its high profile venues, The Village, a venue
within the claimant’s remit. The claimant interviewed candidates and chose a Mr
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H McNeil. Mr Roberts wanted to give the candidate a second interview. The
claimant saw this as undermining him. In the event, Mr Roberts, believing that it
was his prerogative to satisfy himself that candidates for important roles were
suitable, did interview Mr McNeil and confirmed the appointment.
(15) On 22 March 2021 the claimant sent an email headed March Pay to his line
manager, Mr Lambert in which he expressed concerns about not being paid full
pay even though he was working pretty much full time throughout the period, and
that other people were being better paid. He also said he had thought that Mr
Lambert had earlier agreed he would be paid in full for March, but that his March
salary had not in fact been revised.
(16) The following day the claimant and Mr Lambert met informally on a walk in
Newquay. The claimant says that he told Mr Lambert it was his intention to leave
if his humiliating and bullying treatment from senior management would not
change, and that he wanted an explanation for his pay levels. Mr Lambert was
clear in evidence that the claimant told him he was resigning, and was happy to
work his notice to the best of his ability. He said that the claimant complained
about his treatment from the senior team and his pay, said that he was stressed
and resigned. Both agree that Mr Lambert told the claimant that the senior team
would not change its behaviours. The claimant was a valued employee, and Mr
Lambert’s evidence is that he gave the claimant strategies to deal with the senior
team, and asked the claimant to take time to reconsider his decision. The two
agreed to meet following Mr Lambert’s return from holiday. Mr Lambert did not
tell any senior manager about the conversation, as he says he hoped the claimant
would change his mind. For the reasons set out above, I prefer Mr Lambert’s
evidence. It would obviously have been helpful if the notice had been given in
writing, but the fact that it was not does not dispose of the issue because the
contract of employment merely expected written notice from the employee rather
than requiring it. The fact that Mr Lambert professes to remember the specific
words used by the claimant does also not indicate that the claimant never
resigned.
(17) The claimant and Mr Lambert met again at the Flying Horse Pub in Moorgate on
7 April 2021. The claimant states that he asked Mr Lambert if he had had time to
consider his request for better conditions at work, and that Mr Lambert had said
that the two senior individuals would never change, and then asked him what it
would take for the claimant to leave quietly. The claimant also states he told Mr
Lambert that his intention to leave would not be official until an agreement was
reached. Mr Lambert denies the claimant’s account. He told the tribunal that at
the meeting the claimant had repeated his decision to resign. I accept Mr
Lambert’s account for the reasons set out above, and also because it seems
unlikely that a significant aim the claimant hoped to achieve from the meeting
was a change in management style towards him given that, in the claimant’s own
written evidence, Mr Lambert had told him on 23 March that they would not
change their behaviour. While it is not implausible that Mr Lambert proposed
some form of financial settlement, this is just as consistent with a resignation
having occurred as with a threat of a resignation, if not more so.
(18) Mr Lambert spoke to Mr K Knowles and Mr Roberts and told them that the
claimant had resigned. Each telephoned the claimant on 8 April. Mr Knowles in
essence said he would not change how he managed people and asked the
claimant to talk to his son Luke. The claimant’s evidence is that he still hoped that
Mr Knowles and Mr Roberts would change their behaviours towards him. Given
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Mr Knowles’ statement, and the two firm statements from Mr Lambert that the
two would not change their management style, this seems implausible. Mr
Roberts’ account, based on a note prepared from handwritten contemporary
notes, is that he asked the claimant to reconsider his resignation but the claimant
declined, saying that he was stressed and wanted a change. For the reasons set
out above, I prefer Mr Roberts’ account.
(19) That day the claimant sent Mr L Knowles a WhatsApp message ‘Hey Luke, How
are you doing? I guess you have heard about me leaving. Would you be free next
week Monday to go for a drink at the Inn or elsewhere and have a private
conversation? I really would like to explain you the reasons of why this decision
in person. Let me know if it’s fine for you’. The wording of the text was clear, and
not to my mind ambiguous: it stated, the day after the second meeting with Mr
Lambert, that the claimant was leaving, and that he had made a decision. While
not a resignation letter in itself, the text is clear confirmation that the claimant
believed that, following the conversations he had had with Mr Lambert, he had
resigned from the company. The two men were friends. They met at a couple of
pubs on 14 April 2021. The evidence Mr L Knowles very clearly gave to the
tribunal, again based on a note prepared from contemporary handwritten notes,
is that the claimant told Mr Knowles that he was leaving because of lack of
respect from senior management, inability to take decisions without senior
management intervention and stress. The claimant’s evidence is that he told Mr
Knowles of his intent to leave for these reasons, and that Mr Knowles told him
that he could not change the senior managers’ behaviours. For the reasons set
out above, I prefer Mr Knowles’ evidence.
(20) On 15 April 2021 the claimant was contacted by a Ms Adams through Linkedin
who told him that she had been approached by a recruitment agency for an
Operations Manager job at the respondent. The claimant understood that it was
his job being advertised. He states that this was a humiliation. However he did
not for a significant period complain to Mr Lambert or other senior managers that
it was inappropriate for the respondent to advertise his job because he had not
resigned. One would have expected him to complain if he did not in fact think that
he had resigned. The first time he complained in writing was 18 June 2021.
(21) Also on 15 April 2021 the claimant and Mr Lambert spoke by telephone. The
claimant put forward proposals for what he termed his settlement package,
namely paying him tax free in full for all hours worked during the coronavirus
period, plus 3 months’ notice pay in full, plus being paid for all untaken holiday,
including untaken holiday from previous years that had now lapsed.
(22) On 21 April the claimant emailed Mr Lambert “as per our conversation last
Tuesday” asking him if he’d had time to think and review his proposal to pay the
verbally agreed 3 months of salary and his remaining holidays, and concluding
“As you can imagine, I would like to put this matter away and focus fully on my
job during my remaining time within the company if we get to an agreement”. This
statement was relied on by the claimant as showing that he still only had an
intention to resign, and had not actually resigned. The reference to “if we get to
an agreement” is ambiguous and could refer also to the claimant’s desire to
resolve financial issues and focus on his job, rather than to whether or not he
would leave. I do not regard the inference the claimant wishes me to put on this
sentence as sufficiently strong to override the other indicators that he had actually
already resigned.
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(23) The claimant and Mr Lambert had a further meeting at the respondent’s head
office. They dispute when the meeting took place. Mr Lambert states that it took
place on 19 April 2021. The claimant originally stated it took place on 19 May
2021, but following Mr Lambert’s assertion that he was not in the office that day,
said that the meeting had occurred around 19 May, feeling sure about this
because it preceded a management meeting attended by, among others, a Mr
Rival who had only re-joined the respondent company in May. However, it
appears from an email sent by the claimant to Mr Rival that Mr Rival had in fact
joined the respondent by 18 April 2021, therefore meaning that he could have
joined a management meeting on 19 April. I suspect neither date is strictly
accurate. The email on 21 April is likely to have referred to a meeting on a
Monday only two days earlier, had it happened, whereas it in fact only refers to a
meeting “last Thursday” (15 April). It makes more sense, given the context of the
meeting and the surrounding communications, for the meeting to have taken
place in late April/early May, before the WhatsApp chain beginning 10 May 2021
about the calculation of holiday pay.
(24) At the meeting, the claimant says he was told that his replacement had been
recruited. Mr Lambert’s account is that he asked the claimant for a resignation
letter, and to confirm his last day in employment. Mr Lambert says that the
claimant told him he’d email his resignation, and that his last day would be 30
June. The claimant says that at the meeting he told Mr Lambert that he had not
resigned. I prefer Mr Lambert’s account. The claimant did not state in evidence
that he objected strongly to the recruitment of his replacement at that meeting.
(25) On 10 May 2021 the claimant sent Mr Lambert a WhatsApp message setting out
how much holiday he believed he was due by 30 June 2021. The claimant states
that he used this date because he was asked to by Mr Lambert. However, it is
much more plausible that this was the date applied because it was the date he
proposed to leave the company.
(26) On 11 May 2021, Mr Lambert emailed the claimant referring to his email of 22
March 2021 and stating that he would like to address some of the claimant’s
concerns and to “respond formally accepting your resignation.” He sets out
payments that will be made for all outstanding holiday pay and for top up of salary
accumulated to 30 June 2021. In other words, arguably all of the claimant’s
financial demands were met, except for the one that the payments be free of tax,
which would not have been legal. The claimant in evidence disputed that all
demands were met as he says that he had not resigned, so would therefore have
been looking for a further three months’ salary from the date of resignation, rather
than to be paid until 30 June 2021. The letter concluded “I would like to thank you
for your time at Beds and Board and I have enjoyed working with you over the
past 4 years….I wish you all the success in the future and hope that you keep in
touch”. This wording is typical of the sort of wording a manager would send to a
valued employee who has resigned, rather than to one contemplating resigning.
This letter was written some 50 days after the 23 March conversation. The delay
however to my mind does not indicate that the claimant had not resigned earlier
in the year. The claimant does not respond in writing to this letter until 18 June
2021. The money referred to by Mr Lambert was paid to the claimant. There was
no evidence before me that the claimant complained about finances after the
letter of 11 May 2021. At that stage, he had been told he would be paid the
additional sums he requested, assuming a leaving date of 30 June, and had no
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reason to believe that management behaviours would change. It is logical that by
this time he would have resigned, had he not already done so.
(27) By 10 June 2021 the claimant’s replacement as Operations Director, Mr
Taylorson had arrived and was being copied in on emails. The claimant was
aware of this fact at least on 10 June 2021, since he copied to himself an email
sent by Mr Lambert that day inviting the recipients, including Mr Taylorson, to edit
some Team Tips.
(28) On 18 June 2021 the claimant emailed Mr Lambert. He refers (for the first time)
in writing to an intent to leave his job, rather than to a resignation, and sets out
his disappointment that his complaints about management behaviours and their
affect on his mental health had not been addressed. He refers to his shock that
his position was advertised on 5 June 2021 (presumably not the correct date
since his successor was in place by 10 June) and queries whether this was
constructive dismissal.
(29) The respondent decided to treat this email as a grievance. The claimant’s
representative questioned whether it was a cynical move to protect the
respondent from litigation. The respondent denies this, and refers to the fact that
it is an Investor in People, and was following company protocol. I believe that it
was appropriate to treat the letter as a grievance, whatever the motive.
(30) Mr Lambert conducted the grievance on 25 June 2021. It was recorded, and the
claimant ultimately commented on the draft notes, made changes and approved
it. The claimant raised seven grievances, all centred in essence on his pay and
his treatment from senior managers who he said were undermining, humiliating
and bullying him and others. In the notes of the meeting several of the changes
implemented by the claimant were to stress that he talked of an intention to
resign, rather than a resignation. The notes record that Mr Lambert referred to
the claimant as having resigned, and that the claimant did not deny that. At the
end of the meeting, the claimant was placed on garden leave. After discussing
the matter with lawyers, the claimant asked why he had been placed on garden
leave. The respondent replied that it in order to reduce his stress, and as allowed
for in his contract of employment, he was being put on garden leave until the end
of his notice period, 30 June. The claimant immediately replied stating that he
had not resigned so that any termination must be a dismissal. Mr Lambert replied
stating that the claimant had restated his resignation to him, Mr Roberts, Mr K
Knowles and Mr L Knowles when all had tried to persuade him to stay.
(31) The claimant ceased working for the respondent on 30 June 2021.
Law
(32) S94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) gives employees the right not
to be unfairly dismissed by their employer. The dismissal can be direct, in that
the contract of employment is terminated by the employer, with or without notice,
or because a fixed term contract comes to an end, or “constructive” in that the
employee terminates the contract of employment, with or without notice because
the employer’s conduct has been such fundamentally to breach that contract. In
the present case we are now only looking at whether the respondent dismissed
the claimant, and if it did so whether that dismissal was fair, given that his
complaint that he was constructively dismissed has been struck out.
Submissions
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(33) The representatives of both parties set out their submissions in skeleton
arguments. I do not propose in this judgment to reproduce them in full.
(34) The respondent’s representative argued that the burden of proof for showing that
he had been dismissed was on the claimant (relying on Sandle v Adecco
Limited [2016] IRLR 941 EAT), and that the body of the evidence pointed to the
fact that he had indeed resigned. Having resigned, he could not unilaterally
retract or withdraw it, (relying on Willoughby v CF Capital plc [2011] IRLR 985
CA), save perhaps in circumstances in which the claimant was given time to “cool
off” and reflect on his position - circumstances which could not apply here as the
claimant had been given a period to reflect and had repeated his decision to
resign.
(35) The claimant’s representative argued that any notice given by the claimant
should be clear and unambiguous, and should specify a termination date. The
lack of a resignation letter meant that the tribunal needed to examine the oral
evidence. Mr Lambert’s evidence as to the words used was too formal to be
convincing. The matter should be looked at in the context of the state of the
claimant’s mental health, which on Mr Roberts’ evidence was not good on 8 April
2021, which could constitute special circumstances which would make it
unreasonable for the claimant’s words to be construed at face value (relying on
Kwik Fit (GB) Ltd v Lineham [1992] ICR 183 EAT). The claimant’s WhatsApp
message to Mr L Knowles was ambiguous. It was implausible that the claimant
would have written the email of 22 March 2021, which complained about pay but
did not mention resignation, and would then have resigned the next day. In
addition, if the claimant had resigned on 23 March the respondent would surely
have asked for this in writing before 11 May 2021. Dealing with the grievance
hurriedly on 25 June 2021 paid lipservice to protocol, and was only implemented
to improve the respondent’s position in relation to any litigation from the claimant.
The claimant was not suggesting that he had resigned in the heat of the moment,
but if the words he used were unclear and ambiguous, it was open to the tribunal
to find that in fact no resignation occurred.
Conclusion
(36) The claimant’s representative submitted that the state of the claimant’s mental
health should be taken into account when deciding whether he had actually
resigned. I acknowledge that there were concerns, expressed by the
respondent and the claimant, about his mental health. We have no evidence
as to the extent of any mental health disorder, and on the written and oral
evidence before me I do not consider that any manifestations of the claimant’s
understandable stress in the circumstances is sufficient to make it
unreasonable for the words that the claimant used to be considered at face
value. In addition, as I have found, the claimant subsequently confirmed his
resignation to at least three senior managers in the company. The claimant
also failed to react with any speed at all to a number of indicators that the
respondent believed he had resigned, in particular the advertisement of his
job and the respondent’s email of 11 May 2021. I have therefore concluded
that the evidence before me was insufficient to require me to expect the
respondent not to accept the claimant’s resignation at face value.
(37) The claimant’s representative also pointed to the fact that the email of 22
March 2021 did not refer to resignation, so it was unlikely that the claimant
would in fact have resigned the next day. I do not accept this. The email also
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does not refer to management behaviours, and it is the claimant’s own case
that he threatened to resign the following day, so it is clear that the email did
not contain the entirety of the claimant’s thinking.
(38) The claimant’s representative relied on the case of East Kent Hospitals
Foundation Trust v Levy in support of her argument that ambiguous words
of resignation should be construed in favour of the employee. However I did
not find the case helpful: in that case, the employee gave “notice” which could
have been construed as giving notice either to her department or to her
employer. This is not the case here. More importantly, it is not the claimant’s
case that he used an ambiguous phrase: his argument is that he never
resigned, merely expressed a conditional intention to do so.
(39) The claimant’s representative also questioned why the claimant would
continue to pursue his grievances if he felt that nothing could possibly improve
his lot. However the claimant talks of in essence doing things for the greater
good, for the benefit of remaining employees – an honourable and not unusual
stance.
(40) Both parties looked at the issue whether the claimant resigned in the heat of
the moment, and should therefore have been allowed time to reflect and, if
wished, reverse his resignation. However the claimant did not put forward the
argument that he had resigned in the heat of the moment - his argument is
that he had never resigned, and even if that had been the case he was given
over two weeks’ to reconsider his decision, which is in my view sufficient. The
fact that it seems that by the middle of June the claimant regretted his
resignation does not allow him unilaterally to withdraw it.
(41) For the reasons set out above, I have concluded that the claimant resigned
on 23 March 2021, and, having been asked to reconsider, confirmed his
resignation on 7 April 2021. His claim that he was unfairly dismissed therefore
fails.
__________________________
Employment Judge Palca
16th August 2022
Sent to the parties on:
16/08/2022
For the Tribunal:
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