Mr D MacDonald v Mitie Technical Facilities Management Ltd: 1401639/2017
Employment Tribunal
Published on 16 October 2018, 09:04
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
breach-of-contract unfair-dismissal
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2018-09-25
Official Documents
-
Mr D MacDonald v Mitie Technical Facilities Management Ltd: 1401639/2017 - Reserved Judgment
Change History
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 March 2017
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr D MacDonald
Respondent: Mitie Technical Facilities Management Limited
Heard at: Leeds On: 25, 26 and 27 July 2018
Before: Employment Judge Licorish (sitting alone)
Representation
Claimant: in person
Respondent: Ms J Ferrario, Counsel
RESERVED JUDGMENT
1. The claimant was not unfairly dismissed by the respondent. That complaint is
dismissed.
2. The respondent did not breach the claimant’s contract of employment in respect
of the calculation of his overtime payments from 1 August 2012 until the
termination of his employment. That complaint is dismissed.
3. According to the claimant’s contract of employment applicable at the date of
termination, the respondent was not entitled to dismiss the claimant with a
payment of lieu in notice.
4. In choosing to make a payment in lieu of notice to the claimant, the respondent
accepts that it should have compensated the claimant for the loss of use of his
company vehicle during that six-week period.
5. The respondent also breached the claimant’s contract of employment by not
compensating him for overtime he would have earned during his notice period.
6. If, within 28 days of receiving this Judgment, the parties have been unable to
agree compensation in respect of the successful breach of contract complaints,
they must inform the Tribunal accordingly. They should set out the continuing
areas of dispute, and provide a time estimate and any dates of unavailability in
the following six months. A remedy hearing will thereafter be listed.
REASONS
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 March 2017
1. The claimant started to work for Norland Managed Services Limited (Norland)
as an air conditioning electrical engineer on 28 February 2011. His employment
transferred to the respondent limited company on 1 August 2012 under the
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006
(TUPE). Following a reorganisation of part of the respondent’s business, as a
result of which certain air conditioning engineering services were outsourced to
another company, the claimant was dismissed with a payment in lieu of notice
(PILON) on 18 August 2017.
2. By a claim form presented to the Tribunal on 15 December 2017, following a
period of early conciliation from 17 October to 1 December 2017, the claimant
complained that he was unfairly dismissed according to regulation 7(1) TUPE
or, in the alternative, because his role was not genuinely redundant, and/or the
process followed by the respondent was not fair or objective. The claimant also
complained of breach of contract in respect of the calculation of his overtime
pay throughout his employment by the respondent, and the calculation of his
PILON.
3. Following a preliminary hearing in April 2018, which determined that there was
no relevant TUPE transfer in respect of the outsourcing arrangement in 2017,
all claims against a named second respondent were dismissed, as well as a
claim against the respondent under regulation 7(1) TUPE for automatically
unfair dismissal based on the contended 2017 transfer.
4. The claimant’s complaints are largely denied by the respondent. Its primary
position is that the claimant was fairly dismissed by reason of redundancy. It
concedes that the claimant should have been compensated for the loss of
personal use of his company vehicle during what would have been his notice
period, but the parties are unable to agree on how any compensation should
be calculated. It denies that the claimant should also be compensated any
overtime pay because overtime was not guaranteed.
The evidence
5. During the hearing, for the respondent I first heard from Stephen Ross (Lloyds
Banking Group regional manager), Brian Lawley (project manager), Graham
Clayton (former engineering account director) and Mark Jenkins (account
manager). I then heard evidence from the claimant. All the witnesses’ written
statements were read in private by the Tribunal before the respondent called
its first witness.
6. I was also provided with an agreed bundle of documents (initially comprising
312 pages). I read the pages referred to in the witness statements, during the
witness evidence and in written submissions. Additional documents were
added to the bundle by consent or with my permission during the course of the
hearing, based on their relevance to the issues. References to page numbers
in these Reasons are references to the page numbers in the complete bundle
of documents before the Tribunal.
7. The claimant’s evidence finished sufficiently late on the last day of the hearing
with the effect that the parties agreed to provide written submissions and replies
prior to the Tribunal reaching a reserved decision.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 3 March 2017
The complaints and issues
8. This hearing was listed to determine liability only. At the beginning of the first
day of the hearing the live complaints and issues were discussed and appeared
to have been agreed, based on a draft list produced by the respondent. Among
other things, during our discussion the claimant confirmed that he pursued
complaints of “ordinary” unfair dismissal and breach of contract only. Legal
submissions contained in his written statement also appeared to confirm that
this was the case. Nevertheless, towards the end of the first day of the hearing,
and during the claimant’s cross-examination of Stephen Ross, it became
evident that the claimant also continued to pursue a complaint of unfair
dismissal under regulation 7(1) TUPE, based on the transfer from Norland to
the respondent in August 2012.
9. At the beginning of the second day, having reviewed the case file, I established
that there was indeed a such complaint pleaded by the claimant that had not
been withdrawn or otherwise disposed of by the Tribunal. However, I
determined that this would change the position only in terms of adding further
steps to the issues to be determined, and considering any further submissions
on those issues.
10. Otherwise, the respondent continued to maintain that the sole or principal
reason for the claimant’s dismissal was a genuine redundancy situation. If I
was not persuaded by that contention and concluded that the sole or main
reason for the claimant’s dismissal was the 2012 transfer, a genuine
redundancy situation or change in job function is capable of amounting to an
economic, technical or organisational (ETO) reason entailing changes in the
workforce. If the respondent was successful in any argument in this respect,
the issues already defined in the ordinary unfair dismissal complaint relating to
the fairness of the dismissal would thereafter fall to be determined.
11. In addition, the claimant’s regulation 7(1) complaint was pleaded on the basis
that since the 2012 transfer there had been “persistent and relentless attempts
to vary his terms and conditions without success”. Both parties had already
addressed in evidence discussions relating to the claimant’s Norland terms and
conditions during his employment by the respondent as part of the breach of
contract complaint. In any event, Stephen Ross in his witness statement had
also addressed the claimant’s specific contention about the reason for his
dismissal being the 2012 transfer.
12. Following a short adjournment, both parties confirmed that they were content
to carry on with the hearing based on my analysis of the issues above. Having
further taken into account the contentions made during the hearing and
submissions presented, I therefore summarise the issues to be determined as
follows:
12.1 Was the sole or main reason for the claimant’s dismissal the TUPE transfer
from Norland to the respondent on 1 August 2012?
12.2 If so, was the sole or main reason for the dismissal an ETO reason
entailing changes in the workforce?
12.3 If not, then the dismissal was automatically unfair.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 4 March 2017
12.4 If the sole or main reason for dismissal was not the 2012 transfer, what
was it? The respondent says it was for redundancy.
12.5 If the sole or main reason was redundancy, did the respondent follow a fair
procedure? That is to say, did the respondent:
12.5.1 warn and consult affected employees, including the claimant?
12.5.2 adopt a fair basis on which to select for redundancy?
12.5.3 take such steps as were reasonable in identifying suitable alternative
employment?
12.6 If so, was the decision to dismiss within the range of reasonable
responses?
12.7 If the respondent adopted an unfair procedure, was there a chance that
the claimant would have been fairly dismissed in any event (the Polkey
issue)?
12.8 Did the respondent breach the claimant’s contract by calculating his
overtime pay according to a basic 40- rather than 35-hour week from 1
August 2012 until the termination of his employment?
12.9 Did the respondent breach the claimant’s contract of employment by
dismissing him with a payment in lieu of notice?
12.10 If so, has the claimant suffered any loss? The claimant accepts that
he received a payment in lieu of 6 weeks’ basic salary, but argues that in
the circumstances he should have been compensated for the loss of use
of his company vehicle (including a fuel allowance) and the overtime hours
he would have worked during his notice period.
Factual background
13. The following background is relevant to the issues to be determined. During
the hearing, the parties were also in dispute in respect of a significant number
of matters. As a consequence, where I heard or read evidence on matters on
which I make no finding, or do not make a finding to the same level of detail as
the evidence presented to me, that reflects the extent to which I consider that
the particular matter assisted me in determining the identified issues.
14. The respondent is part of the Mitie group (Mitie). Mitie provides outsourced
services to a number of private and public sector clients. In 2012, the
respondent won a contract to provide facilities management services to the
Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) for an initial five-year period. As a result, the
claimant’s employment transferred to the respondent on 1 August 2012. The
claimant had previously been employed by Norland as a mobile air conditioning
electrical engineer.
15. The claimant started to work for Norland on 28 February 2011. His statement
of the main terms and conditions of his employment issued at the time (at pages
45 to 49) contains the following relevant information:
“5. Hours of Work
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 5 March 2017
BASIC HOURS AND DAYS
(a) Your days of work will be Monday to Friday, 5 days per week.
(b) Your contractual hours of work are 40 hours per week, either 7am
to 3pm, or 1pm to 9pm, excluding an unpaid lunch break of 1 hour
a day.
(c) The Company may seek you to work in excess of normal working
hours. Where payment is agreed in advance, it will be in
accordance with the following scale:
Hours less than full time equivalent 1 x basic pay
Additional hours Monday to Friday 1½ basic pay …
Additional hours on a Sunday … [or]
Bank Holiday … 2 x basic pay
7. Place of Work
Your normal place of work will be LBG, Trinity Road, Halifax HX1
2RG. Due to the nature of our business, you may be required to work
in any of our client’s premises, or transferred on a temporary or
permanent basis to another location within reasonable travelling time
of your home and/or existing place of employment.
14. Vehicles
… A vehicle is deemed necessary for this post. Cars are provided in
accordance with company vehicle policy …
16. Termination of Employment
NOTICE
… notice by the employer will be 1 week per full year of service …
up to a maximum of 12 weeks …
An exception to the forgoing is summary dismissal on the grounds of
gross misconduct, in which case no notice will be given and the
dismissal will be with immediate effect.”
16. The claimant signed the statement on 27 February 2011 but on his copy made
the following handwritten amendment: “vehicle personal use is covered by my
paying tax on vehicle & fuel card (PAYE) & I’m paid door to door ie home to
home. See attached email.” No contemporaneous email is contained in the
bundle. At around this time Brian Lawley, the claimant’s line manager,
completed an employee data form to the effect that he would be working an 8-
hour early shift, and late shift if required (page 44.1).
17. On 29 May 2012, prior to the transfer of his employment to the respondent, the
claimant sent an email exchange to Mr Bhatti in Norland’s HR department,
copied to Brian Lawley (page 50):
“The T&Cs that you sent me are inaccurate because they do not define a
few points.
1) I am paid door to door i.e. Home to Home.
2) My normal place of work is Trinity Road however I am a mobile engineer
& as such can be deployed at the discretion of my line manager.
3) My normal hours of work are Monday to Friday 06:00 to 14:00 with ½
hour unpaid for lunch …
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 6 March 2017
4) I have a company vehicle … I have full private use of this vehicle for
which I am taxed on the van & the fuel card …
The above were agreed with HR & Rob Cox (PRS employment agency)
prior to me joining Norland. Happily Norland have always honoured these
agreements. Please make sure that Mitie are aware of this.”
18. Brian Lawley (the claimant’s line manager) recruited the claimant and considers
that “he had gone behind [his] back” in terms of negotiating the door-to-door
payments and company vehicle arrangement. However, in evidence the
claimant confirmed that his employment agent negotiated directly with
Norland’s HR department in this respect. Mr Bhatti replied to the claimant’s
email to confirm that he had amended the claimant’s terms and conditions to
reflect the door-to-door payment and company van arrangement, but next to
point 3 of the claimant’s email restated paragraph 5(b) of the claimant’s
statement of terms and conditions as his contractual working hours. The
information passed to the respondent summarises the claimant’s work shift
pattern as “40 hours per week … excluding a paid lunch. Break of 1 hour a day.
Paid from Door to Door”, with no guaranteed overtime (page 52 to 54).
19. Contrary to what he told Mr Bhatti at the time, the claimant never suggested in
evidence that he had negotiated a half-hour rather than one-hour unpaid daily
break via his employment agent before he started to work for Norland, or
specifically travel time as overtime. In fact, in response to the Tribunal‘s
questions, the claimant explained that when he started to work for Norland he
was on site for 8 hours each day, took half an hour for lunch and submitted a
time sheet for 37.5 basic hours a week. He says that was the way in which the
other engineers appeared to work at Trinity Road and he wanted to “fit in”. In
cross-examination, however, the claimant conceded that no other electrical
engineer had the same contract as him because they had worked on the LBG
contract for years with other companies prior to the transfer of their employment
to Norland.
20. The claimant also proceeded to claim all travel time from home to his Trinity
Road base or any other location as overtime. All of his timesheets were
countersigned by his day-to-day supervisor, George Broll, and Brian Lawley.
21. During the consultation period prior to the transfer of his employment, however,
the claimant says that he started looking into his “rights”. He effectively
concluded that his contract meant that he was required to be on site for 8 hours
each day during specified times, and within those times take an hour’s unpaid
lunch break. He therefore decided that his basic hours were in fact 35 per
week, and he could claim for any time worked over and above those hours
(including travel time) as overtime. Following the transfer of his employment in
2012, the claimant proceeded to submit timesheets in this way and they
continued to be signed off by George Broll and Brian Lawley.
22. A staff consultation form completed by the claimant and given to the
respondent’s Mr Williams dated 6 July 2012, states that the claimant’s
“contracted working hours per week” are 40, overtime rates apply “after 1st 8
hours worked”, “contractual overtime” is 7.5 hours per week, and he is “paid
travel at overtime rates” (emphasis added, pages 61 to 63). The claimant says
that there was no further discussion about the information he had provided. A
subsequent confirmation letter sent to the claimant on 7 August 2012 confirms
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 7 March 2017
his hours of work as 40 per week and that he is entitled to a company van and
fuel card (pages 68 to 70). There is no mention of guaranteed overtime or of
any changes to the claimant’s right to notice.
23. Sample timesheets from July 2017 were added to the bundle during the hearing
(at pages 318 to 323). These show that the claimant was indeed recording his
contracted hours at 35 per week, and any “variance” (including travel time) as
overtime. During cross-examination, the claimant was asked why he did not
simply leave home at the beginning of his shift if his travel time counted as
working time. The claimant stated: “because I took it [his contract] to mean that
I had to be on site at the start of the shift.” However, the Tribunal later asked
the claimant why he did not begin each week recording travel time as working
time at basic rate, and claim overtime after he reached 35 hours. At that point,
the claimant stated that Brian Lawley had told him to claim all travel time as
overtime.
24. On balance, the Tribunal was not persuaded by the claimant’s allegation
regarding Brian Lawley. Not only was this inconsistent with what the claimant
had said previously (that is to say, it had been his interpretation of his contract
that all travel time was overtime), but also this was such an important area of
dispute between the parties. Nevertheless, in the contemporaneous
documentation before the Tribunal the claimant makes no reference to any
express instruction, either during his discussions with Norland HR prior to the
transfer of his employment, or with Stephen Ross and Brian Lawley when
matters came to a head in 2017. The claimant’s arguments raised during his
discussions with his managers are that:
24.1 there had been a long-standing error in this respect, but he had come to
rely on these payments (quoted in emphasis at paragraph 36 below), and
24.2 payment for travel time as overtime had become custom and practice
(quoted in emphasis at paragraph 40 below).
Moreover, the claimant did not put his allegation to Brian Lawley during the
hearing, even though he spent some time questioning Mr Lawley about the
contention that he had been underhand in negotiating additional benefits before
he started work.
25. Brian Lawley states that the claimant was difficult to work with and not a team
player, although it was accepted by the respondent that there was no fault with
the standard of his work. Both parties referred to numerous disputes which
arose about the interpretation of the claimant’s terms and conditions. The
claimant says that immediately after the transfer he was asked to sign a
standard Mitie contract, but he refused pending clarification about various
matters which were never revisited.
26. In around February 2013, the respondent underwent a restructuring exercise,
as a result of which three regional air-conditioning electrical engineers (known
as regional ACs) in Leeds and Halifax, including the claimant, were placed at
risk of redundancy. In the event, a Leeds-based engineer left voluntarily, with
the effect that compulsory redundancies among the regional ACs were deemed
no longer necessary. During the 2013 redundancy exercise, Brian Lawley
explained that electrical engineers were also placed at risk but as part of a
separate pool, and some were made redundant. From around this time the
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 8 March 2017
claimant worked mainly in Leeds, but also continued to cover LBG’s Halifax
site.
27. In around 2015 the claimant says that Brian Lawley asked him to go on call.
The claimant was willing to discuss a change to his job, but eventually refused
because the respondent tried to “discriminate against” him regarding the
payment of expenses. In cross-examination, the claimant stated that generally
during discussions with management he “didn’t fancy being the football in the
game”.
28. The claimant also raised a grievance against Brian Lawley in December 2016
for bullying and harassment. That related to complaints from another engineer
and supervisor about allocation of work to the claimant. When Mr Lawley tried
to raise the matter with the claimant, he in turn made a formal complaint against
Mr Lawley. The claimant’s grievance was not upheld.
29. The evidence before the Tribunal thereafter details events which took place
from the beginning of 2017. The respondent maintains that the claimant’s
claims for overtime based on a 35-hour week went unnoticed until Stephen
Ross began to talk to the claimant about the way in which he worked in early
2017.
30. In January and February 2017, the claimant raised an issue with his managers
following the respondent’s adoption of a paperless system to allocate and
process jobs using Samsung PDAs. In summary, the claimant’s planned airconditioning
maintenance work would peak in January and July each year.
That work was required for compliance reasons. Whilst the respondent
maintained a paper-based system, the claimant would during these peak times
complete each job as best he could, or he would do so at a later date. However,
the PDA would produce the necessary compliance certificate only when all of
the work had been completed and (as the claimant put it) boxes had been ticked
in the correct order.
31. The claimant told his managers that he did not have the capacity to do all of
the compliance work during peak times, particularly as LBG also imposed
restrictions on when most of that work could be done. For example, LBG’s
“tech rooms” could be accessed only after 10pm. In the claimant’s view, the
bulk of this maintenance work needed to be done out of hours and by the book,
otherwise the respondent would be failing to deliver on its service level
agreements and/or “committing fraud” by issuing certificates without completing
the necessary checks beforehand.
32. Following discussions, on 9 March 2017 Stephen Ross (LBG North regional
manager for engineering services) asked the claimant to start to work a later
shift. The claimant refused as he saw this as “working for no reward by altering
shift patterns to suit” (page 84). In fact, such work would have attracted an
unsociable hours payment at 1.33 x basic rate. In cross-examination the
claimant says he believed that he should be paid at time and a half, even though
he was not at that time on a Norland nightshift contract.
33. Mr Ross met with the claimant again on 5 April 2017. A meeting had been
scheduled for the following day, but Mr Ross brought forward the meeting as it
clashed with a personal appointment. By this time, Mr Ross’s preferred option
was for the claimant to work between 1pm and 10pm, incorporating an hour’s
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 9 March 2017
unpaid break and some travel time, plus an hour’s travel time paid as overtime.
At this point the claimant was claiming 3 hours’ a day travel time as overtime
(page 317). Brian Lawley and Nicola Still (the respondent’s HR business
partner) met with the claimant again on 6 April 2017. The claimant says the
meeting “collapsed” because HR could not find a copy of his original Norland
contract (page 85).
34. In an email to Nicola Still dated 7 April 2017, the claimant accused Mr Ross
and Mr Lawley of “[abusing] their authority in a crude attempt to bully me into
discussing unfavourable changes to my working conditions … I will not tolerate
such bad behaviour.” The claimant also refers to his managers “attempting to
inflict unfavourable & illegal changes to my working conditions” (page 83). Put
simply, having researched TUPE, the claimant believes that his Norland terms
and conditions were (as he put it in his submissions) “protected for life”.
35. Brian Lawley eventually set out the respondent’s position in a letter to the
claimant dated 4 May 2017 (pages 86 to 87):
“Your weekly contractual hours are 40 hours per week, excluding 1 hour’s
lunch as per your contract of employment.
To accommodate your 40 hours per week your working hours will be for the
2 shift pattern as per your contract of employment (each shift pattern is to
be agreed with your line manager) 6:30 – 3:30 or 12:30 – 9:30. (This is to
enable you to achieve 40 hours per week and to take your unpaid … lunch
break.)
You will remain entitled to be paid door to door as per your contract of
employment, there is also potential to receive an additional 1 hour’s
overtime per day (at your contract of employment rate) to assist with travel
time (to be agreed with your line manager) …
You currently claim 15 hours a week overtime for travel door to door, with
effect from 22nd May 2017, we will continue to pay door to door … however
this travel time is to be undertaken during your normal working hours unless
previously agreed with your line manager.”
36. By email on 18 May 2017, the claimant replied to Brian Lawley and Stephen
Ross (pages 88 to 90). He thought that the respondent was interpreting his
contract of employment “differently to suit” and he would continue to work as
he had been. He also copied in the respondent’s CEO, who declined to get
involved (page 92). The letter to Brian Lawley attached to the claimant’s email
stated that he would take legal action if the respondent tried to implement
changes to his working hours or arrangements for claiming travel time. The
claimant also refers to travel time booked as overtime as an “internal
accountancy error”, the payment for which he had come to rely upon financially
(emphasis added). Finally, the claimant accused Mr Lawley and Stephen Ross
of “abysmal behaviour” and “malicious bullying & harassment” (page 91). The
claimant also claimed as overtime the three hours he says he spent writing that
letter (page 93).
37. The claimant’s letter was treated as a formal grievance and passed to Patrick
Greene, regional operations manager, to deal with (page 95). The claimant
subsequently annotated the minutes of the grievance meeting which took place
on 8 June 2017. This is because the notetaker had been asked to concentrate
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 0 March 2017
on recording the claimant’s answers. He sent those notes to Mr Greene (pages
99 to 107). The claimant says he composed these notes from a recording of
the meeting, which lasted two hours. Neither set of notes shows that the
claimant obtained Mr Greene’s permission to record the meeting or otherwise
told him that he was doing so.
38. By letter on 30 June 2017 Mr Greene decided not to uphold the claimant’s
grievance, largely on the basis that the purpose of the discussions with Stephen
Ross and Brian Lawley was to realign the claimant’s working hours with those
contained in his Norland contract. In Mr Greene’s view, therefore, the
proposals were not in breach of TUPE (pages 110 to 111). Mr Greene also
checked and confirmed in the minutes of the meeting that PDAs contained a
comments section where tasks which had not been completed could be
recorded. The claimant’s subsequent notes do not contradict Mr Greene’s
finding. The claimant simply restates that he had identified an implication of
using PDAs which could be potentially embarrassing for the respondent (pages
100 and 102).
39. In the meantime, Stephen Ross asked HR what would happen if the claimant
refused to work under the new contract. By email on 22 May 2017, Nicola Still
replied (page 109):
“… we require [the claimant] to work the hours as stated in his contract …
as long as we have a good business reason to change [the travel time],
which it is no longer economic and viable for the business, then we can
change his travel time …
In order to resolve this we can serve notice on his current contract which is
6 weeks in line with statutory notice, and issue him with a new contract and
this must be done back to back.”
40. On 4 July 2017, the claimant appealed Mr Greene’s grievance decision (pages
113 to 117). In summary, the claimant’s grounds were:
40.1 There had been no fair and meaningful consultation. The respondent was
effectively seeking to impose a pay cut of more than 30% and increase the
claimant’s working hours by just over 12%.
40.2 The short timescales for the claimant to consider any proposals amounted
to bullying and harassment, and he was essentially being punished for
refusing to work overtime hours for basic pay.
40.3 The respondent’s interpretation of the meaning of the claimant’s contract
was wrong, and it was in fact seeking to impose detrimental changes to his
contractual hours.
40.4 Stephen Ross overruled an agreement with Brian Lawley and George Broll
in early 2017 that the claimant would work a 10pm to 6am shift at time and
a half to cover the after-hours work for LBG. This led to the meeting on 9
March and the claimant’s eventual grievance.
40.5 Claiming all travel time as overtime had become “‘Custom & Practice’
which is notorious & consequently now part of [his] T & Cs … [and] pretty
much set in stone (emphasis added)”.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 1 March 2017
41. Stephen Ross and Nicola Still met with the claimant on 3 July 2017. On 5 July,
by letter Mr Ross gave the claimant 6 weeks’ “statutory notice as per [his]
contract” expiring on 21 August 2017 (page 118 to 119). Mr Ross explained
that after that date, unless they could otherwise reach agreement, new terms
and conditions would apply. In summary, the respondent expected the claimant
to work a basic 40-hour week, according to his existing contract, comprising a
2-shift pattern to be agreed with his line manager. Mr Ross further confirmed
that owing to “budget constraints” the respondent was unable to pay all daily
travel as overtime, therefore travel time would become part of the claimant’s
basic working shift. The claimant explained to the Tribunal that he had no
intention of accepting the new terms.
42. In the meantime, the LBG contract was due to expire at the end of July 2017,
but the respondent was able to negotiate an extension until 2023. Stephen
Ross explained in evidence that in around April 2017 the respondent’s budgets
were set and he was faced with what he described as a “significant challenges”.
Part of the agreement was to reduce costs by £6 million overall (known as
Project Oak). Mr Ross was required cut costs in his geographical area by
£150,000.
43. Stephen Ross proposed to subcontract some of the air conditioning work,
including ad hoc reactive as well as planned preventative maintenance work,
to another company (pages 120 to 122). This proposal affected the claimant
to the extent that approximately 30% of his job would disappear. Projected
savings for the respondent included a 60% reduction in P2 overtime (funded by
money already accounted for in the contract with LBG) and an increase in P6
overtime (funded separately by LBG on a bid-by-bid basis throughout the life of
the contract).
44. Stephen Ross explained that at that time the claimant was a member of the
Central North team of engineers providing facilities maintenance services at six
LBG sites in Leeds and its Normanton data centre. That team comprised five
engineers, one regional AC (the claimant) and a fabric engineer. A Central
South team covered Halifax (page 127). Mr Ross intended to merge and create
a single Central team under one supervisor, remove both regional AC posts
and create two semi-skilled nightshift positions. The new roles would enable
costs savings on the overnight shift, the salary for which at that time attracted
an unsociable hours premium (page 129).
45. Overall there were two other regions in Stephen Ross’s geographical area:
South West in Birmingham and North West in Manchester. In total, all four
regional AC roles and a semi-skilled role would disappear, and two new building
engineer roles were to be created, based in Birmingham and Manchester. The
number of dayshift engineers would in total reduce from 28 to 25 (page 133).
Mr Ross identified the new North West role as a suitable equivalent-grade post
for the claimant and which was also near to his home, whereas the semi-skilled
nightshift roles would involve a step down. The number of fabric engineers
would also reduce under the new structure.
46. Stephen Ross presented his proposal and the reasons for it to all the affected
employees in his area at LBG’s Normanton data centre on 10 July 2017 (pages
123 to 140). The presentation included an explanation about the consultation
process, the potential for redeployment, and a proposed timetable. It also
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 2 March 2017
invited applications for voluntary redundancy. Finally, at risk employees were
referred to the respondent’s employee assistance helpline.
47. By letter on 12 July 2017, Stephen Ross advised the claimant that his role was
at risk of redundancy, summarised the reasons for the proposed restructure,
and explained the consultation process (pages 153 to 154). However, whereas
that letter suggested that selection for redundancy would be made according
to defined criteria yet to be determined, at risk employees had been told at the
Normanton meeting that because all four regional AC jobs were proposed as
redundant, the respondent would use a selection process to fill any vacancies
in the new structure. The claimant was also told that Brian Lawley would
conduct his consultation meetings.
48. Prior to the first consultation meetings, Brian Lawley asked everyone at risk to
complete a job preference form which detailed vacancies with the respondent.
By email on 13 July 2017, Mr Lawley chased the claimant for a response. The
claimant replied: “I have no particular preference … If it is essential to the
process you may draw them out of a hat & number them accordingly” (page
156). The claimant did not return the form.
49. When he received the invitation to his first meeting, the claimant also told Mr
Lawley that it was insufficient notice to be able to arrange a companion. In
response, Mr Lawley offered to rearrange the meeting to a later date. The
claimant responded: “my being accompanied is unlikely to change the outcome
of this farce. Therefore I respectfully suggest that we get on with it” (pages 159
to 160).
50. Brian Lawley followed and completed a proforma document during the first
consultation meeting with the claimant on 14 July 2017 (pages 161 to 167).
The claimant later complained during his appeal that parts of the form are
incomplete, but accepted in cross-examination that the blank spaces relate to
comments, questions and suggestions raised by employee during the meeting.
The claimant confirmed that he made no comments or suggestions during that
meeting. In summary, Mr Lawley explained the consultation process, the
business reasons for redundancy, the interview process, and asked the
claimant to suggest ways in which redundancies could be avoided. Mr Lawley
also gave the claimant an alternative employment form, explained how he
should search for and apply for any vacancies, and gave guidance on CV
writing. He also obtained the claimant’s consent for his details to be shared
amongst Mitie HR more generally. After the meeting, Mr Lawley also forwarded
a link to vacancies within the respondent (page 168).
51. The claimant also recorded this meeting without Brian Lawley’s knowledge or
consent. There was no transcript in the bundle of documents before the
Tribunal. In cross-examination, the claimant first explained that this was
because he did not consider that a transcript would have added anything to the
information contained in Mr Lawley’s proforma. Later, however, he claimed
that during the meeting he queried Mr Lawley’s involvement in the redundancy
process owing to his outstanding grievance appeal. The claimant thereafter
changed his explanation as to why the recording of the first consultation
meeting was not transcribed. The Tribunal found this change of explanation to
be wholly unconvincing.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 3 March 2017
52. Although he had not registered any interest in the proposed new building
engineer’s vacancy, Brian Lawley told the claimant later the same day that he
had been put forward for interview in any event (page 169). Mr Lawley
explained that the purpose of the interview was “to identify skills and ability
which will score for roles which may come available”. The claimant was given
a detailed job description and told that the successful applicant would be
employed on the respondent’s standard terms and conditions (pages 143 to
146).
53. On 15 July 2017, the claimant independently applied for an air conditioning
engineer’s job in Manchester with Mitie’s national mobile services (page 173).
54. On 18 July 2017, the claimant was interviewed for the building engineer role by
Mark Jenkins (account manager), Gary Morley (critical engineering manager)
and Nicola Still. Mr Jenkins also interviewed one other regional AC at risk of
redundancy. The panel were given scoring guidelines and a summary of the
six competencies to be assessed: planning and organising, collaborative work,
communication and interaction, problem solving and initiative, procedures, and
personal drive and development (pages 141 to 146). The scoring guidelines
define three bands: scores of 1 to 3, 4 to 7 and 8 to 10. Each candidate was
asked the same questions (pages 147 to 152). Mr Jenkins explained that he
knew the interviews were for an engineering role, but not specifically the
building engineer post. He also explained to the Tribunal that he had used the
same assessment guidelines to interview for a range of engineering vacancies
within Mitie. He had conducted over 20 interviews in the previous 4 years.
55. Generally, Mark Jenkins says that the claimant came across as unenthusiastic
about taking part in the interview and required heavy prompting at times. In
cross-examination, Mr Jenkins explained that when he thought the claimant
was struggling he would give him general examples to show the quality of
answers the panel were looking for to try to help him through the process.
56. More specifically, all the panel members scored the claimant poorly on the
collaborative work question. He was asked to give a recent example of “when
you have led others enabling them to go the extra mile”. The claimant replied
that he had “worked over” to repair a lighting fault even though Stephen Ross
had banned him from working overtime (as recorded by Gary Morley). In crossexamination,
the claimant suggested to Mr Jenkins that he had deliberately
misinterpreted the claimant’s answer, but objectively assessed I was not
persuaded that this was the case. The claimant was also asked how he would
deal with a faulty generator. Mr Jenkins thought that the claimant’s reply
showed a limited understanding of meeting client’s expectations and service
delivery. Gary Morley recorded the claimant’s answer in this respect as
“escalate up through food chain … keeping ringing until some idiot answers”
(pages 179 to 196). Although the claimant cross-examined Mr Jenkins on the
basis that his mark for this question was unjustifiable, the claimant in crossexamination
accepted that his language was inappropriate for a job interview.
57. Overall, the claimant scored 55 out of 100. The panel had a “sore thumbing”
discussion at the end of his interview, but their recorded marks were fairly
consistent. The other candidates scored 88, 76 and 73. One candidate
subsequently withdrew his application. As a result, the Manchester and
Birmingham jobs were offered to the other two remaining higher-scoring
regional ACs (pages 198 to 199).
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 4 March 2017
58. On 19 July 2017, the claimant completed the alternative employment form.
Among other things, he stated that he was interested in refrigeration, air
conditioning, electrical and mechanical jobs, subject to the package, and was
willing to commute “door to door nationwide” (page 200). Brian Lawley passed
the form and the claimant’s CV (pages 261 to 264) to Stephen Ross and HR.
59. On 20 July 2017, the claimant met with Graham Clayton, the respondent’s
engineering LBG account director, to discuss his grievance appeal. Mr Clayton
rejected the claimant’s appeal on 27 July 2017. Neither party said much about
this process in evidence. Mr Clayton’s unchallenged evidence was that the
claimant appeared to be accepting of what he had to say, and as far as he was
concerned the managers involved had properly taken and acted on HR advice.
60. Brian Lawley held a second consultation meeting with the claimant on 28 July
2017 and Nicola Still took notes (pages 201 to 207). Among other things, the
claimant stated that there were no suitable jobs available in Mr Lawley’s area.
However, because another regional AC had taken voluntary redundancy, he
thought that there was enough capacity for him to continue to work in Leeds
and Halifax. Mr Lawley told the claimant to put his proposal in writing to
Stephen Ross. The claimant also flagged up the issue of payment for overtime,
and his van and fuel card, if he was not required to work his notice. Mr Lawley
told the claimant that he would not be paid for any overtime, but he would check
the position regarding the company van.
61. The claimant recorded this meeting without Brain Lawley’s permission or
knowledge (pages 208 to 223). In cross-examination, the claimant accepted
that the respondent’s notes are not verbatim or comprehensive, based on the
length of his own transcript. Among other things, according to the transcript
Brian Lawley also confirmed that if the claimant was unable to secure another
job he would be made redundant on 14 August 2017. The claimant further
commented that he thought the respondent was “ripping everybody off, not just
[him]” in choosing to dismiss all those who had been made redundant with a
PILON. There was also a lengthy discussion about why the claimant thought
that his role was not redundant, and also his proposal to be retained on the
night shift.
62. On 31 July 2017, the claimant emailed a letter to Stephen Ross setting out his
proposed alternative to redundancy (pages 224 to 225 and 228). Put simply,
the claimant thought that the respondent should retain a “competent and
flexible engineer” rather than subcontract “to a third party of questionable
ability”. He therefore proposed to work a full-time night shift covering LBG’s
Leeds and Halifax sites. Most importantly, he believed that because 80% of
the air-conditioning work at these sites had to be completed out of hours, and
the remaining 20% at any time, a permanent in-house night shift position
provided the most sensible solution and would offer some savings on P2
overtime.
63. The claimant’s third consultation meeting took place in 8 August 2017 (pages
229 to 233). The claimant once again recorded the meeting without the
respondent’s consent or knowledge (pages 234 to 253). The first part of that
meeting involved a lengthy discussion between Stephen Ross and the claimant
about his proposal.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 5 March 2017
64. In summary, Mr Ross concluded that an in-house night shift position would
involve higher costs, mainly because the respondent paid unsociable hours
work at time and a third, plus the associated costs of holiday cover and pension
payments. He explained that many of the claimant’s points had been factored
into the subcontractor’s proposal. He thought that the claimant had raised
some valid issues, but the respondent would be obliged to revisit the entire
restructuring process if it were to retain only one regional AC. Essentially, Mr
Ross was able to employ semi-skilled engineers and use a contractor, and save
£139,000 per year. At the end of their discussion, according to his transcript of
the meeting the claimant commented that Mr Ross had “come up with a
reasonable discussion on each [of his points]” (page 243).
65. The redundancy-consultation part of the meeting with Brian Lawley followed on
from this discussion. The claimant confirmed that his application to work for
Mitie’s national mobile service had been unsuccessful, and he was not
interested in applying for any other job with the respondent. As a consequence,
the claimant was advised that his employment would terminate if the position
did not change. According to his transcript, the claimant stated at the end of
the meeting that there were “no hard feelings” towards Mr Lawley or Stephen
Ross on his part.
66. Prior to the meeting, Stephen Ross had also emailed Mitie’s redeployment
teams nationally to ask whether there were any opportunities elsewhere within
the wider group (page 281). In evidence, Mr Ross explained to the Tribunal that
he did this because he had decided to reject the claimant’s proposal, and at
that time the respondent had no other suitable vacancies. He was advised by
HR that it was usual to do this once it had been established that, in the absence
of identifying another role, an employee was likely to be made redundant. No
suitable vacancies were identified by Mitie’s redeployment teams.
67. As the claimant was about to go on holiday, and he saw no point in meeting
Brian Lawley again beforehand, his final meeting was held over until 16 August
2017. The claimant handed back his company van on that day and was not
required to return to work thereafter. The claimant’s employment terminated
on 18 August 2017 (page 270). He was paid 6 weeks’ basic pay in lieu of notice
(page 271).
68. By letter on 22 August 2017, the claimant appealed the decision to terminate
his employment to Graham Clayton (pages 273 to 275). The claimant cited the
following 26 grounds of appeal. They are each summarised here because the
claimant maintains that Mr Clayton failed to deal with all of the grounds:
68.1 The pool for selection should have included electrical engineers in the
Leeds area. As a result, the claimant believes he had been specifically
targeted.
68.2 He was unfairly selected as no selection criteria matrix was used.
68.3 Any selection criteria used was not fair or transparent.
68.4 He thought his role should have transferred to the subcontractor via TUPE.
68.5 The redundancy process was started and handled in order to manage him
out of the business, because he had raised a grievance against Stephen
Ross and Brian Lawley.
68.6 Mr Ross and Mr Lawley’s involvement while his grievance appeal
remained live meant that they were prejudiced against him.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 6 March 2017
68.7 The failed attempts to change his terms and conditions since the transfer
of his employment in 2012 had “contributed towards [him] being made
redundant”.
68.8 There was a deliberate failure not to offer him suitable alternative
employment.
68.9 He received no feedback in respect of his application to join Mitie’s national
mobile team.
68.10 He was required to return his company van in breach of contract.
68.11 There is no PILON clause in his contract of employment and he
suffered financial loss as a result of his dismissal without notice.
68.12 The redundancy consultation forms were not completed properly or
at all, which shows that the process was a sham.
68.13 The process was a tick-box exercise designed to manage him out.
68.14 He was made redundant within weeks of raising a grievance about
bullying and harassment.
68.15 His grievance was not dealt with properly or at all.
68.16 Numerous complaints about unlawful deductions from wages have
been ignored and contributed to the bad feeling towards him.
68.17 His managers have been persistently dishonest.
68.18 His managers tried to browbeat him into accepting new terms and
conditions.
68.19 His proposal to avoid redundancy was unreasonably dismissed.
68.20 Another factor in the decision to dismiss him was the fact that he had
raised allegations of “fraud”, namely the incompetent management of
routine and mandatory planned preventative maintenance.
68.21 His was given inadequate and insufficient time to deal with the
redundancy process.
68.22 Five working days was insufficient time to formulate his appeal.
68.23 The treatment he has received has been extremely stressful.
68.24 His redundancy documentation makes no mention of the “substantial
sums” owed to him.
68.25 It is clear that the decision to make him redundant had already been
made prior to the consultation process.
68.26 There was no genuine redundancy situation.
69. Prior to meeting with the claimant, Graham Clayton obtained Stephen Ross’s
comments on the claimant’s letter (pages 276 to 279). Mr Ross also attached
the relevant consultation documentation to this reply. Mr Clayton’s
unchallenged evidence was that the appeal meeting with the claimant, which
took place on 14 September 2017, was cordial and the claimant took no issue
with his involvement. The meeting lasted over 2 hours (pages 286 to 291). The
claimant also covertly recorded that meeting but did not transcribe it. In crossexamination
the claimant accepted that, based on his other transcripts, his
notes of this meeting would have run to over 40 pages, and that the
respondent’s notes do not capture the entire conversation. Based on the
claimant’s initial explanation for not transcribing the first consultation meeting,
the Tribunal inferred that this was because it would add very little to or even
undermine his case.
70. Graham Clayton explained to the Tribunal his understanding of his role in the
claimant’s appeal. He was to consider the claimant’s representations and
decide, following investigation, whether to uphold or reverse the decision to
dismiss. Most importantly, Mr Clayton says that he was not persuaded that the
claimant had been “victimised”. The claimant was one of a number of
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 7 March 2017
engineers whose jobs had disappeared because it was cheaper to outsource
those services rather than keep them in house.
71. During the appeal meeting, according to the respondent’s notes, Graham
Clayton appeared to shut down any conversations about the claimant’s
previous allegations of bullying and harassment, and his Norland terms and
conditions. However, Mr Clayton explained that there was indeed some
discussion, but he did try to move on the meeting because he had already
discussed those matters at length with the claimant as part of his grievance
appeal.
72. By letter on 25 September 2017, Graham Clayton upheld the decision to
dismiss the claimant (pages 292 to 294). The claimant complains that the letter
does not address his appeal points in turn. Mr Clayton explained during his
evidence (and the Tribunal accepts) that he decided to identify and summarise
a number of subject areas in the claimant’s letter because some of his points
simply repeated the same grounds.
73. In July 2018, the respondent paid the claimant the sum of £434.77 in lieu of the
loss of use of his company van during what would have been his notice period
(pages 311 to 312). This calculation was based on the claimant’s P11D
statement for 2016/2017 which valued the taxable benefit of his company van
as £3,170 and the fuel charge as £598. The claimant later returned the
payment to the respondent as he believed it to be wrongly calculated.
The relevant law
74. The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006
(TUPE), as amended, provides:
7 Dismissal of employee because of relevant transfer
(1) Where either before or after a relevant transfer, any employee of the
transferor or transferee is dismissed, that employee shall be treated for the
purposes of Part 10 of the 1996 Act (unfair dismissal) as unfairly dismissed
if the sole or principal reason for the dismissal is the transfer.
(2) This paragraph applies where the sole or principal reason for the
dismissal is an economic, technical or organisational reason entailing
changes in the workforce of either the transferor or the transferee before or
after a relevant transfer.
(3) Where paragraph (2) applies—
(a) paragraph (1) does not apply;
(b) without prejudice to the application of section 98(4) of the
1996 Act (test of fair dismissal), for the purposes of sections
98(1) and 135 of that Act (reason for dismissal)—
(i) the dismissal is regarded as having been for
redundancy where section 98(2)(c) of that Act applies,
or
(ii) in any other case, the dismissal is regarded as having
been for a substantial reason of a kind such as to justify
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 8 March 2017
the dismissal of an employee holding the position
which that employee held.
(3A) In paragraph (2), the expression “changes in the workforce” includes.
Change to the place where employees are employed by the employer to
carry on the business of the employer or to carry out work of a particular
kind for the employer (and the reference to such a place has the same
meaning as section 139 of the Act).”
75. Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) states:
“(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of
an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show—
(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the
dismissal, and
(b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other
substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an
employee holding the position which the employee held.
(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it … is that the employee was
redundant ...”
76. Section 139 of the ERA defines redundancy:
“(1) For the purposes of this Act an employee who is dismissed shall be
taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or
mainly attributable to—
…
(b) the fact that the requirements of that business—
(i) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or
(ii) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the
place where the employee was employed by the employer,
have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.”
77. The reason for dismissal in any case is the set of facts known to the employer
or may be beliefs held which cause it to dismiss the employee.
78. Whether an employee is redundant under section 139(1)(b) of the ERA,
according to Murray & Anor v Foyle Meats 1999 ICR 827, involves two
questions of fact. In this case, have the requirements of the business for
employees to carry out work of a particular kind ceased or diminished? If so,
was the employee’s dismissal wholly or mainly attributable to that state of
affairs?
79. If an employer can show that dismissal was for a potentially fair reason, section
98(4) of the ERA states:
“the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair
(having regard to the reason shown by the employer)—
(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and
administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1 9 March 2017
employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a
sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and
(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial
merits of the case.”
80. The case of Polkey v A E Dayton Services Limited [1998] ICR 142 explains
that generally employers will not have acted reasonably in treating a potentially
fair reason as a sufficient reason for dismissal unless and until they have taken
certain procedural steps which are necessary in the circumstances of that case
to justify that course of action. More specifically, in redundancy cases, Polkey
states:
“The employer will not normally act reasonably unless he warns and
consults any employees affected or their representatives, adopts a fair basis
on which to select for redundancy and takes such steps as may be
reasonable to avoid or minimise redundancy by redeployment within his
own organisation.”
81. In Langston v Cranfield University [1998] IRLR 172 the EAT explained that
requirements in respect of consultation and redeployment are so fundamental
that they will be treated as an issue in every unfair redundancy case. For this
reason, Tribunals will be expected to consider each of those requirements even
if they have not been raised specifically by the claimant. However, in applying
the test of reasonableness in section 98(4) ERA, if the Tribunal is satisfied that
the employer adopted an unfair procedure, in assessing liability and according
to Polkey it is not then permitted to ask whether it would have made any
difference to the outcome if all appropriate procedural steps had been taken.
82. In considering the issue of fairness (relating not only to the decision to dismiss
but also the procedure adopted), as explained in Williams & Others v
Compare Maxim Limited [1982] ICR 156 in relation to redundancy cases, the
Tribunal must only consider whether the employer’s actions “lay within the
range of conduct which a reasonable employer could have adopted”.
83. Usually, redundancy consultation and selection will involve the assessment of
past performance. However, if a business is to be reorganised with the result
that existing jobs will be replaced with new ones, it is accepted that the
redundancy process must be forward looking, in which case an employer may
rely on an interview process in order to assess an employee’s ability to carry
out any new role (Morgan v Welsh Rugby Union [2011] IRLR 376 EAT). In
such cases the Tribunal should consider how far the interview process was
objective, but should also bear in mind that an employer’s assessment of which
candidate will perform best in any new role is likely to involve a substantial
element of judgement. Ultimately, the Tribunal should consider how far the
employer established and followed through its procedures when making an
appointment, and whether those procedures were fair in accordance with
section 98(4) of the ERA.
84. The Polkey issue becomes relevant at the stage of assessing compensation.
That case explains that any award of compensation may be nil if the Tribunal
is satisfied that the claimant would have been dismissed in any event. However
this process does not involve an “all or nothing” decision. If the Tribunal finds
that there is any doubt as to whether or not the employee would have been
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 0 March 2017
dismissed, the Polkey element can be reflected by reducing the normal amount
of compensation accordingly.
85. Finally, the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England & Wales)
Order 1994 states that claims for breach of contract may be brought before a
Tribunal if the claim arises or is outstanding on the termination of an employee’s
employment. Under ordinary common law principles, the purpose of damages
for breach of contract will be to put the employee into the position s/he would
have been in had both parties performed their obligations under that contract.
Conclusion
86. The claimant and respondent’s representative made a number of written
submissions, and the claimant replied to the respondent’s submissions. I have
considered those documents, but do not set out them out in full. The parties
will recognise how the Tribunal has dealt with their submissions in its findings
of fact and following conclusion.
87. I would however say at this point that the claimant makes serious accusations
in his submissions. Among other things, he accuses the respondent’s
witnesses of lying under oath, collusion, misleading the Tribunal and tampering
with evidence. Many of these accusations were not put to the respondent’s
witnesses during the hearing. My findings and conclusion are based on an
objective assessment of the evidence presented to the Tribunal.
88. The first issue I must determine is whether the sole or main reason for the
claimant’s dismissal in August 2017 was the transfer from Norland to the
respondent in August 2012. The respondent maintains that the sole reason for
the claimant’s dismissal was redundancy. The claimant’s pleaded case is that
he was dismissed because the respondent had tried and failed to change his
terms and conditions many times following the transfer of his employment. His
appeal was also pursued partly on the basis that this had “contributed” to his
dismissal.
89. In addition, in February 2017, when the claimant suggested that he work a night
shift paid at overtime rates, Stephen Ross vetoed his request because the
maintenance work was part of the claimant’s normal duties. The claimant
thought that this was unfair because electrical engineers (not regional ACs)
were paid P2 overtime for night work. He says that it “pushed the wrong buttons
in me”. In his words, he was being “discriminated against” because he was
standing up for his legal rights under TUPE.
90. First, the claimant is mistaken that employees who transfer under TUPE are
effectively untouchable. Changes to their contracts of employment or any
dismissal may be void or unlawful, but only if the change or dismissal is
because of the transfer. In determining the reason for dismissal in a regulation
7(1) TUPE case, the test is not whether the dismissal would have occurred if
there had there been no transfer. It is the reason in the employer’s mind that
counts. The passage of time is not determinative. The chain of causation tends
to weaken over time because of the greater opportunity for intervening events
to break it. But if no such intervening events occur, the passage of time in itself
will not weaken or break the chain.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 1 March 2017
91. The difficulty for the claimant is that the respondent was following a separate
process to deal with the ongoing issue of his terms and conditions, so much so
that it had served notice on the claimant’s existing contract to break the
deadlock they had reached as a result of their meetings. Furthermore, as at
2017 the respondent was effectively trying to persuade the claimant to work to
his original Norland contract. The dispute between the parties was about the
meaning of his transferred terms relating to working hours and travel time. The
respondent otherwise considered that the travel time as overtime arrangement
(if one could be established) was no longer financially sustainable in 2017 in
the context of Project Oak.
92. I am satisfied (for the reasons stated at paragraph 97 below) that the principal
reason for the claimant dismissal was the respondent’s need to make financial
savings following the 2017 retendering exercise as a condition of retaining the
LBG contract. This was a supervening event that took place some five years
after the original transfer. Any discussion about the claimant’s Norland contract
was being dealt with separately. On balance, I therefore accept that the
claimant’s dismissal was not by reason of the 2012 transfer within the terms of
regulation 7(1) TUPE.
93. Further and separately, if I had been persuaded that the sole or main reason
was the transfer, I would have then considered whether the dismissal was for
an ETO reason entailing changes in the workforce. The claimant submits that
TUPE protected his employment for life, and the only way in which he could be
fairly dismissed was if LBG “went bust”. He does not accept that saving labour
costs is capable of being a valid ETO reason.
94. An economic reason for dismissal must relate to the conduct of the business
concerned. Broader economic reasons are not relevant. There must be also
an intention to change the workforce and to continue to conduct the business.
In the respondent’s case, it was a condition of the ongoing relationship with
LBG that it cut costs across the board. It was not the case that the respondent,
for example, intended to cut labour costs purely in order to make the business
more attractive to a potential purchaser.
95. An employer must also show that the ETO reason for dismissal entailed (i.e.,
necessitated) either a change in the numbers of the workforce overall, or a
change in the functions of members of the workforce. In Manchester College
v Hazel and anor 2014 ICR 989, CA, Lord Justice Underhill suggested that the
phrase “entailing changes in the workforce” effectively requires that dismissals
be for “redundancy or redeployment”. In the claimant’s case, for the reasons
stated below, I would have been satisfied that the claimant’s dismissal was for
redundancy and hence an ETO reason entailing changes in the respondent’s
workforce.
96. Turning to the next issue, what was the sole or main reason for the claimant’s
dismissal? The respondent says it was for redundancy. The claimant contends
that there was no genuine redundancy situation, and the ensuing process was
designed to manage him out of the respondent’s business.
97. The Tribunal accepts that the claimant was dismissed for redundancy. There
was no longer any requirement for employees to do work of a particular kind.
A decision was taken to delete all regional AC roles from the respondent’s
structure in Stephen Ross’s region, and outsource the ad hoc reactive and
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 2 March 2017
planned maintenance work in order to save money. That is a redundancy
situation. The Tribunal is further satisfied that the claimant’s dismissal was
wholly or mainly attributable to that state of affairs.
98. The claimant stated in evidence that he understood from Stephen Ross’s
presentation in July 2017 that the respondent “wanted to get rid of more guys
… to save money” but believes that the work was still there to do. However,
the Tribunal must consider the business requirement for employees to do work
of a particular kind. In other words, there will be a redundancy situation if an
employer decides that it needs fewer employees, even if the level of work
remains the same or even increases.
99. During cross-examination, the Tribunal also asked the claimant to clarify why
he felt he had been specifically targeted for dismissal. This was because in his
witness statement he said that the respondent’s motive was to “hide historical
and future fraud”. The claimant replied that it was because he had brought to
his managers’ attention an unintended consequence of using PDAs. In his
view, it was impossible to complete the level of planned maintenance work at
peak times and remain compliant, as required by LBG. He thought that he was
being penalised because he was being encouraged to sign off work which had
not been done. The claimant sees this as fraudulent behaviour on the
respondent’s behalf.
100. The claimant further maintains that subcontracting the air-conditioning work
was not in LBG’s best interests. There was some dispute during the hearing
about the requirements for the certification of maintenance work. The claimant
says that the work is not in fact being completed properly by the subcontractor.
In evidence, Stephen Ross suggested that his projected costs savings at the
time of the restructure were borne out by the following 12 months.
101. In reply to the respondent’s submissions, the claimant also claims that the
respondent is fraudulently charging its client twice in terms of its budget for P2
and P6 overtime. I attach little weight to that allegation, most importantly
because it was never raised by the claimant during his evidence or put to any
of the respondent’s witnesses. In any event, on an objective assessment, the
claimant misses the point. As the Tribunal understands it, Stephen Ross
concluded that he could save money from the P2 overtime budget by using
subcontractors and bid for more money from LBG by increasing P6 overtime.
That is a commercial decision which the respondent was entitled to make.
102. In cross-examination, the claimant further stated that he thought the
redundancy situation was a sham because he did not agree with Stephen
Ross’s proposal. He accepted this did not necessarily mean that the
redundancy situation was not genuine. As the respondent submits, the function
of the Tribunal is not to investigate the commercial and economic reasons
which prompt a decision, or to investigate the rights and wrongs of that decision
to decide whether it agrees or disagrees with the respondent’s actions.
103. The Tribunal recognises that is of course possible that an employer, faced
with a redundancy situation, may seize upon the chance to dismiss an
individual with whom it has a difficult relationship. It does not, however,
automatically follow that the principal reason in such a case will be the poor
employment relationship rather than redundancy. What matters in such
circumstances is whether the employer can show (absent any ill feeling) a
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 3 March 2017
potentially fair reason for dismissal. I am satisfied on balance that even though
the claimant’s managers admitted that they considered the claimant to be
confrontational and difficult to work with, the respondent has done so in this
case.
104. Most importantly, Project Oak called for costs savings. A number of
engineers and supervisors were placed at risk across Stephen Ross’s region,
and some were dismissed. It was not only the claimant’s role that was identified
as at risk and removed. The Tribunal also questions why the respondent would
effectively manufacture a redundancy process if it had already given notice to
the claimant under his existing contract. That in fact suggests to the Tribunal
that the claimant’s dismissal for redundancy was not a forgone conclusion, and
the respondent recognised that it also had to deal with the dispute about the
claimant’s contractual hours and entitlement to overtime in any event.
105. The next issue is whether the respondent followed a fair procedure. The
claimant was warned about redundancy and was invited to participate in a
process that lasted for more than 30 days. He complained about short notice
for the first consultation meeting, but declined Brian Lawley’s offer of a
postponement. The claimant attended a number of meetings during the
process, but contends that consultation was not meaningful. In effect, he
believes that the respondent had already taken a decision that he would be
made redundant, and his managers were biased against him.
106. According to the Williams case, employers should give as much warning
as possible of impending redundancies to enable affected employees to
consider possible alternative solutions and, if necessary, find alternative
employment. General guidance on the issue of consultation was set out by the
EAT in Mugford v Midland Bank [1997] IRLR 2008:
“It will be question of fact and degree for the … tribunal to consider whether
consultation with the individual … was so inadequate as to render the
dismissal unfair. A lack of consultation in any particular respect will not
automatically lead to that result. The overall picture must be viewed by the
tribunal up to the date of termination to ascertain whether the employer has
or has not acted reasonably in dismissing the employee on the grounds of
redundancy.”
107. Essentially, fair consultation involves the provision of adequate information,
following which the employee should be given a fair and proper opportunity to
respond and express their views. In response, the employer should then
consider the employee’s views properly and genuinely (see, for example, King
and others v Eaton Ltd [1996] IRLR 199).
108. The Tribunal is satisfied that the claimant was given adequate information.
Among other things, during his presentation Stephen Ross’s went into some
detail about his proposals and the reason for the restructure. Brian Lawley also
gave the claimant information about vacancies within the respondent (including
a detailed job description for the building engineer role) as well as access to
redeployment opportunities within Mitie. The respondent also gave its
employees placed at risk the option to volunteer for redundancy.
109. As part of the consultation process, the Tribunal is also satisfied that the
respondent considered the claimant’s views properly and genuinely. At the
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 4 March 2017
start, the claimant was uncooperative. He described the consultation process
as a farce and refused to register an interest in any of the vacancies in the
respondent’s proposed new structure. Brian Lawley did his best and put the
claimant forward for interview in any event. The claimant also continues to
maintain in submissions that he was told he was going to be made redundant
during the first consultation meeting, but accepted during cross-examination
that this was not in fact the case.
110. The claimant also suggests that the managers he dealt with during the
redundancy process were biased because of his previous grievance. The
Tribunal is not persuaded that this was the case. In evidence the claimant
stated that at the first meeting he accepted that Brian Lawley’s role regarding
his individual consultation was purely procedural, and that he was merely
presenting documentation to him as part of his job. In cross-examination, the
claimant also said that he did not object to Mr Ross’s involvement because
Graham Clayton had assured him that the reason for Mr Ross’s previous
discussions with the claimant were “purely financial”. The claimant further
accepted that he would not have sent his proposal to Mr Ross if he had thought
that there was “no hope”.
111. As the consultation process progressed, the claimant appeared to take it
more seriously in that he came up with the nightshift proposal. The claimant’s
own record of the consultation meetings shows that neither Brian Lawley or
Stephen Ross rejected that proposal out of hand, and he had lengthy
discussions about it with both of them. The respondent submits (and the
Tribunal accepts) that the claimant’s own transcript shows that the discussions
were “open, free-flowing and explorative in nature”. Indeed, the claimant told
Mr Ross at the time that he had presented reasonable answers to the points he
had raised and there were “no hard feelings”.
112. Furthermore, what will affect fairness at an appeal stage to render it
defective is whether that process should or could have found a flaw in the
original decision to dismiss. In considering the claimant’s appeal, Graham
Clayton was also aware that negotiating the extension to the LBG contract
involved “drastic [cost savings] … amounting to many millions over the life of
the contract”. However, he explained to the Tribunal that if the claimant had
presented an alternative suggestion which could achieve the same outcome
with minimal impact on other individuals, he would have taken that proposal
seriously.
113. The next question is whether the respondent adopted a fair basis on which
to select for redundancy. The respondent placed three classes of employee at
risk across Stephen Ross’s area: regional ACs, supervisors and fabric
engineers. The regional ACs and two out of three fabric engineers were to
disappear entirely under the new structure. The claimant believes that the
regional ACs should have been considered together with electrical engineers,
and that the outcome of the interview he attended for the building engineer’s
vacancy was predetermined.
114. Employers have a great deal of flexibility in choosing a pool from which to
select employees for redundancy, as long as they apply their minds to the
decision and act from genuine motives. However, it may fall outside the band
of reasonable responses to restrict the pool artificially by, for example, not
including those doing similar work.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 5 March 2017
115. Stephen Ross explained the respondent’s rationale to Graham Clayton in
response to the claimant’s appeal (page 276):
“Initially consideration was given to extending and placing all Engineers at
risk of redundancy, however in consultation with HR, it was decided that as
the proposal only affected those identified within the process there was no
further requirement to extend to include positions and sites not identified –
this was to reduce the impact upon the Engineering team, and not to place
additional strain on those Engineers not directly affected by the proposal.”
Mr Ross and Brian Lawley also explained in evidence that the regional ACs
and electrical engineers had been considered separately in the 2013
restructure, a decision which had operated to the benefit of the claimant at that
time. By comparison, some electrical engineers lost their jobs in 2013.
116. In cross-examination the claimant also accepted that even though 30% of
his job was to disappear as a result of the outsourcing arrangement, it did not
follow that the remaining 70% of his work was electrical. He did provide holiday
cover for electrical engineers on occasion, but otherwise carried out a range of
other daily tasks including routine plumbing.
117. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent properly
applied its mind to the question as to who should be placed at risk of
redundancy, and acted from genuine motives. Although there were other ways
in which the respondent could have dealt with the issue, Stephen Ross
provided a reasonable rationale for his decision.
118. I next considered the respondent’s selection process. First, it was generally
accepted that the building engineer’s role was not an exact replica of a regional
AC’s job. Secondly, there were more regional ACs than vacancies. For these
reasons the respondent’s decision to assess suitability for the new roles by way
of interview was not unreasonable and was necessarily forward looking.
119. Within the new structure the claimant was encouraged to apply for vacant
positions. He did not take that encouragement seriously and invited Brian
Lawley to draw the vacancies out of a hat. He was put forward for interview in
any event, told what the respondent was looking for in the form of a detailed
job description, and told that the purpose of the interview was to assess his
suitability according to his skills and experience.
120. It was also reasonable for the respondent to assess individuals via identified
competencies using a detailed marking scheme. Each panel member scored
individually and their scores were averaged. There may have some room for
argument about the interpretation of a candidate’s answers. Indeed, the
claimant contends that his answers were deliberately misinterpreted. The
Tribunal is not permitted to carry out its own assessment of the claimant’s
performance. However, considering the questions, the answers that were
recorded by the panel and Mark Jenkins’ explanation of the scores, there
appears to have taken place a genuine assessment of the claimant’s
performance at interview and a reasonable explanation for his scores. There
was no evidence of “collusion” as submitted by the claimant.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 6 March 2017
121. The Tribunal is further satisfied that the claimant was not disadvantaged or
targeted in this respect. Although, he had suggested in evidence that Mark
Jenkins was unsure about the exact role that the interview was for, the claimant
accepted in cross-examination that he knew that the interview was for the
building engineer’s role. He said that he prepared for the interview by brushing
up his CV and arriving on time with an open mind. He did not do any further
research because the role included work he was already doing. He says he
therefore felt confident.
122. The claimant also accepted that his interview panel was independent, he
was assessed along with other applicants (albeit with different panel members),
and he appreciated that the interview provided him with the opportunity to
“show off” his skills. Although the claimant explained that he was not familiar
with competency-based assessment, Mark Jenkins also gave him examples of
the quality of answers the panel was looking for. The claimant also accepted
that his scores were based on how he had reacted to the questions during the
interview, rather than his experience generally. The Tribunal is also satisfied
that because the claimant did not register any interest in the role, it is likely that
Mark Jenkins was right and the claimant did not treat the interview process
particularly seriously.
123. The next question is whether a reasonable employer would have thereafter
concluded that it was justified in dismissing the claimant. Regarding the
building engineer role, this was a competitive process. There were more
candidates than available roles. As a result, one or more candidates were
bound to be disappointed if they were not selected. There were sufficient
successful “at risk” candidates who accepted the building engineer roles. In
which case, did the respondent otherwise make reasonable attempts to look
for alternative employment for the claimant?
124. As part of his appeal, the claimant contends that there was a deliberate
failure on the respondent’s part. However, the Tribunal is satisfied that the
respondent acted reasonably in looking for alternative employment for the
claimant. Most importantly, the claimant had access to and was aware of other
vacancies within the respondent, but did not consider any of those vacancies
to be suitable. Before he left the respondent’s employment, the claimant also
had access to vacancies within Mitie and made one application to work on a
different contract. He complained that he received no feedback in this regard,
although did not ask for it and this matter was outside the respondent’s control.
125. The respondent’s HR department also circulated the claimant’s CV and
alternative employment preferences form within Mitie. It did not make
assumptions about what the claimant was prepared to accept. Stephen Ross
also contacted Mitie redeployment teams nationally once it became clear that
there were no viable alternatives to redundancy within the respondent. It was
reasonable for the respondent to assume that the claimant could decide for
himself which if any vacancies could be suitable rather than being more
proactive in identifying vacancies within its organisation or Mitie.
126. In the circumstances, as the respondent had considered and rejected the
claimant’s nightshift proposal and the claimant had confirmed that there were
no other suitable vacancies within its organisation, the Tribunal accepts that the
respondent reasonably concluded that the claimant’s employment should
terminate by reason of redundancy. As a consequence, the Tribunal is satisfied
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 7 March 2017
that the claimant’s dismissal was fair, in which case that complaint should be
dismissed. Accordingly, the Polkey issue also falls away.
127. Turning to the breach of contract complaint, the first question is whether the
respondent breached the claimant’s contract by calculating his overtime pay
according to a basic 40- rather than 35-hour week from 1 August 2012 until the
termination of his employment.
128. The relevant express term is contained at paragraph 5(b) of the claimant’s
contract. The question is: what did the parties agree? The proper approach in
determining what an express term means is to identify the intention of the
parties by reference to “what a reasonable person having all the background
knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have
understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean” at the time
that the contract was made (quoted in Arnold v Britton [2015] 1 AC 1619). A
Tribunal must examine all the relevant evidence, including how the parties
conducted themselves in practice. However, the relevance of how the parties
subsequently conducted themselves is simply one of the factors that may throw
light upon what legal obligations were agreed at the time the contract was
made.
129. The Tribunal is satisfied that the relevant term in the claimant’s contract is
unambiguous. He agreed to work 40 hours per week excluding an unpaid lunch
break of one hour each day. If the claimant’s working hours were 35 per week,
his contract would have stated that his shift times included the unpaid break.
In terms of the defined shifts, a reasonable person would conclude that they
would have to fit in an unpaid break during each day. The respondent
explained that, in practice, employees would add on time at the beginning
and/or the end of the day to accommodate any breaks they took. Even if the
Tribunal had been persuaded the defined shift patterns did introduce an
element of ambiguity, it is obvious that this is how the claimant would have
needed to work in practice in order to meet his basic hours.
130. It is also notable that at the time of the 2012 transfer, the claimant told the
respondent that overtime rates applied after the first 8 hours worked each day
(quoted in emphasis at paragraph 17 below), rather than 7.5 or 7 hours, and
that his working hours were 40 per week.
131. In practice, however, the claimant chose to work different hours for different
reasons. First, he says that he worked the same hours as other Norland
engineers to fit in, even though those engineers were on different contracts
inherited by Norland. Prior to the transfer of his employment to the respondent,
when he brought to Norland’s attention the way in which he had been working,
he was referred back to the relevant contractual term. He thereafter appears
to provide correct information to the respondent during consultation prior to the
transfer (that is, his basic hours are 8 per day), but also states that he is entitled
to contractual overtime.
132. When the claimant’s employment transferred, he unilaterally decided that
he had been taken advantage of and was in fact only required to work 35 hours
each week. The claimant’s timesheets were signed off in any event. The
question, therefore, is whether any subsequent variation of the claimant’s
contract can be implied from the respondent’s conduct.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 8 March 2017
133. This question usually arises in the context of an employer imposing new
terms. In such cases, the issue is whether the employee by continuing to work
has effectively agreed to a variation. The relevant principles were recently
identified in Abrahall and others v Nottingham City Council [2018] EWCA
Civ 396:
133.1 An offer to vary a contract can be accepted by conduct.
133.2 There is no reason in principle why an employee’s conduct in
continuing to perform the contract after the employer had made it clear that
they wish to modify it may not be reasonably understood as indicating the
acceptance of change, but that does not mean that it will always be so.
133.3 The inferences to be drawn depend on the circumstances.
133.4 The inference must arise unequivocally. The employee’s conduct by
continuing to work must “only be referable” to his or her having accepted
the new terms. If the employee’s conduct is reasonably capable of some
other explanation, it cannot be treated as constituting acceptance of the
new terms.
133.5 The nature of the contractual change is therefore relevant. For
example, if the employer varies the rate of pay and the employee goes
along with that without protest, it may be possible to infer after a period of
time by their conduct that they have accepted the change.
133.6 However, protest or objection will prevent such an inference being
drawn.
133.7 The reference to drawing an inference “after a period of time” is not
without difficulty. The Tribunal will need to arrive at a decision on the
evidence in the particular case.
134. First, the claimant did not explicitly communicate an offer to Norland or the
respondent. He simply completed timesheets which were signed off and paid.
The arguments he employed when the dispute arose were about contractual
interpretation and that he had been working in that way for so long it had
become “set in stone”. When matters came to a head in May 2017, the claimant
further referred to an “accountancy error” in terms of payment of his travel time
as overtime, which suggests to the Tribunal that there had been some
discussion about mistakes being made in payroll.
135. Each time the way in which the claimant had been working was explicitly
brought to the attention of Norland or the respondent, the claimant was
effectively told that he was wrong. The relevant contractual term was confirmed
to him before at the point of the transfer of his employment in August 2012. In
cross-examination, the claimant said he did not raise this issue with his line
manager at or after that time but “just carried on what [he] had been doing”.
When the Tribunal reminded him of his previous evidence, the claimant
corrected himself to confirm he in fact “went to 35-hour basic from there”.
136. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that no inference arises
unequivocally. The way in which the claimant decided to claim his wages was
not picked up on by his immediate managers or the respondent’s payroll
administrators. The respondent had assumed that the claimant had been
working a 40-hour week, he was paid on that basis and overtime calculated at
that rate. When Stephen Ross realised what had in fact been happening in
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2 9 March 2017
early 2017, the respondent clearly took issue with the claimant’s actions and
the dispute continued from there. As a consequence, the Tribunal is satisfied
on balance that there was no implied variation of the express term in the
claimant’s contract relating to his working hours.
137. On that basis, the Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent did not breach
the claimant’s contract by calculating his overtime pay according to a basic 40-
rather than 35-hour week from 1 August 2012 until the termination of his
employment. That complaint should therefore be dismissed.
138. The next question is whether the respondent breached the claimant’s
contract of employment by dismissing him with a payment in lieu of notice. The
only documentary evidence placed before the Tribunal in this respect is the
claimant’s Norland contract, which does not allow for termination on payment
of a sum in lieu of the notice period. That complaint should therefore succeed.
139. Turning to the question of compensation, the purpose of damages is to, as
far as possible, put the claimant in the position he would have been in if he had
worked his notice period. The claimant accepts that he received a payment in
lieu of 6 weeks’ basic salary, but argues that in the circumstances he should
have been compensated for the loss of use of his company vehicle and fuel
allowance, and the overtime hours he would have worked. (In is submissions,
the claimant also mentions loss of the chance to claim interim relief but has not
brought a qualifying claim.)
140. The respondent accepted during the hearing that assessing compensation
for loss of personal use of the claimant’s company van and fuel allowance by
reference to the value of those taxable benefits is not the correct starting point,
but in its submissions says it is willing to enhance the figure previously paid (but
returned) by paying it gross of VAT.
141. The claimant has produced receipts to the effect that he spent almost £800
on fuel from 16 August until 29 September 2017 inclusive. He also claims bus,
train and taxi fares, plus a nominal amount of £20 per day from the time he
bought a new vehicle. The Tribunal cannot award any sum for the
inconvenience he says he was put to, in which case the claimant’s contended
losses run to over £1,600. The Tribunal may award compensation for
consequential loss, but only if it is directly consequential and not too “remote”
– that is to say, not simply as a result of choices made by employee to incur
expense during the relevant period.
142. The difficulty with the claimant’s approach is that compensation should be
valued according to loss of personal use of the company van and fuel card. If
he had continued to work, for example, is it the case that he would have spent
over £800 on fuel in respect of personal mileage over a 6 week period?
143. The most common method of establishing the value of being provided with
a company vehicle is to estimate the weekly costs of running a particular type
of vehicle based on published RAC or AA estimates (including petrol costs
and/or servicing costs) based on estimated personal mileage. The respondent
may have its own mileage allowances, and adjustments may need to be made
if the employee contributed in any way to the running costs of the vehicle.
Case No: 1401639/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 3 0 March 2017
144. Turning to the question of overtime during the notice period, the claimant
was not guaranteed any overtime under his original Norland contract, but he
had been claiming and was being paid for 3 hours per day travel time as
overtime. However, the Tribunal accepts that Stephen Ross had served the
claimant with notice on that contract which was due to expire on 21 August
2017. Although the claimant says that he did not fully appreciate the
implications of Mr Ross’s letter, although he did not intend to accept the new
terms it is likely that he would have turned up for work thinking that the matter
was still in dispute.
145. The effect in law of being served notice is that previous Norland contract
would have come to an end, and the working arrangement as defined by the
respondent would have applied thereafter. The claimant is likely to have
continued to argue that the respondent was acting unlawfully, but the
respondent would not acted in breach in applying the new terms because it had
given lawful notice under the previous contract.
146. During the hearing, the respondent had conceded that payment for some
overtime in respect of the notice period would be due, but unfortunately
departed from the position in its written submissions on the basis that the
claimant’s overtime was not guaranteed. The Tribunal is satisfied that, in
accordance with Stephen Ross’s notice letter, the respondent would have
continued to pay the claimant’s 3 hours’ per day travel time on 16, 17 and 20
August 2017. During previous discussions, the respondent had suggested that
the claimant could claim up to an hour’s overtime each day to assist with his
travel, to be agreed with his line manager. It is assumed from the respondent’s
submissions that the respondent intended this arrangement to apply from 21
August 2017.
147. In the circumstances, the parties should try to agree a figure for losses
during the claimant’s notice period, based on the guidance provided above.
The Tribunal can go no further without further evidence and submissions from
the parties. If they cannot agree settlement, they have been ordered to inform
the Tribunal and provide further information, following which a further hearing
will be listed to determine remedy.
Employment Judge Licorish
Date: 25 September 2018
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