Mr G Asonitis v Tower Transit Operations Ltd: 2208152/2017
Employment Tribunal
Published on 04 March 2020, 11:27
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
unfair-dismissal
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2020-02-14
Official Documents
-
Mr G Asonitis v Tower Transit Operations Ltd: 2208152/2017 - Judgment with Reasons
Change History
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
BETWEEN
Claimant AND Respondent
Mr G Asonitis Tower Transit Operations Limited
Heard at: London Central
On: 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 January 2020
Before: Employment Judge Adkin
Mr R Pell
Mr J Carroll
Representations
For the Claimant: Mr J Neckles, Union representative
For the Respondent: Mr C Ludlow (Counsel)
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Tribunal is that the Respondent did:
(a) Wrongfully dismiss the Claimant.
The following claims do not succeed and are dismissed
(b) Claim of unfair dismissal pursuant to section 98(4) Employment
Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”).
(c) Claim of automatic unfair dismissal pursuant to section 103A of ERA.
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REASONS
1. By a claim presented on 20 December 2017 the claimant brings claims (as
amended following an order of Employment Judge Snelson 2 May 2018 of unfair
dismissal, automatic unfair dismissal (protected disclosures) and wrongful
dismissal arising from his dismissal dated 15 September 2017.
The Issues
2. The issues as they relate to liability are as follows:
Unfair dismissal
1. What was the reason for dismissal? R maintains that the
reason for dismissal was misconduct and was a reason that could
be found to be fair pursuant to s.98 ERA 1996.
2. Has a fair procedure been followed?
3. Did R have a genuine belief in the misconduct of C?
4. Has there been a reasonable investigation?
5. Following that investigation, was R’s belief that C committed
the acts complained of based on reasonable grounds?
6. Was the dismissal within the reasonable range of responses
open to R?
7. Was dismissal reasonable in all the circumstances of the
case?
8. Did R act consistently in summarily dismissing C? C relies
on Mr Qadeer Siddique as his comparator.
Wrongful dismissal
9. Did C commit an act of gross misconduct?
10. If so, was R entitled to terminate C's contract without notice?
Automatic unfair dismissal – s.103A ERA 1996
11. Did C make qualifying disclosures to R on the dates as set
out in the parties' table of alleged protected disclosures?
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12. If so, and in C's reasonable belief, did the disclosures tend
to show that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to
comply with any legal obligation (s.47B(1)(b) ERA 1996) and/or
that the health and safety of any individual has been or was likely
to be endangered (s.47B(1)(d) ERA 1996)?
13. If so, and in C's reasonable belief, were the disclosures
made in the public interest?
14. Was the reason or principal reason for C's dismissal on 29
March 2017 the making of any of the protected disclosures?
The Evidence
3. For the Claimant the Tribunal heard live evidence from:
3.1. The Claimant himself;
3.2. Mr A S Hanafi, who attended under a witness order;
3.3. Mr A Jakupi, who attended under a witness order.
4. For the Respondent the Tribunal heard evidence from:
4.1. Mr N Mason;
4.2. Ms S Bates, dismissing manager;
4.3. Mr V Dalzell, appeal manager.
5. The Tribunal was supplied with CCTV footage in a format that allowed review of
the events of 8 August 2017 on the Claimant’s bus from cameras in a variety of
different positions. There is no audio. We spent some time watching various
different angles and utilised a facility which enabled us to watch footage from
various different cameras simultaneously.
Procedural matters
6. On the first day of this six day hearing, the parties expressed surprise that there
was a single judge sitting alone, when both parties were expecting a panel of three,
a point which had apparently been discussed during case management at a
hearing with Employment Judge Snelson. Accordingly, after some housekeeping
matters were dealt with the matter was adjourned overnight so that two non-legal
members could be found. Despite the loss of a day and the parties concerns that
in fact the matter required a seven day hearing, with the cooperation of the parties’
representatives, we were able to conclude submissions by the morning of the sixth
day.
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Submissions
7. Both representatives produced written submissions, which they briefly
supplemented orally. We have considered these submissions carefully. It has not
been necessary to deal with every argument advanced. We have generally only
dealt with those arguments which have a direct bearing on the agreed list of issues.
The Facts
8. On 9 October 2006 the Claimant commenced employment driving buses for
CentreWest London Buses Ltd based at its Westbourne Park garage.
9. On 22 June 2013 the Claimant’s contract transferred to the Respondent under
TUPE from CentreWest London Buses.
10. The Claimant has raised numerous a variety of different incidents, complaints and
grievances over his employment with the Respondent, which he contends are
protected disclosures. These were presented by the parties in the form of a table
which with references and the Respondent’s comments. These alleged protected
disclosures are referred to below as (e.g. Disclosure 1), etc for ease of references
in our conclusions below.
11. (Disclosure 1) On 2 April 2014 the Claimant wrote to Paul Young (Depot General
Manager) providing explanation as to why he was unable to drive a bus. He
claimed it was unfit for service and believed it is his responsibility to report buses
when they are unfit for service. It also contained a complaint about ‘Jim’ the
engineer’s attitude.
12. (Disclosure 2) On 15 January 2015 the Claimant wrote to Neil Mason (Route
Performance Manager) raising a complaint against ‘iBus Controller Davis’ for
bullying, harassment, intimidation and victimisation. He claimed that the Controller
forced him to break Highway Code and Health & Safety by encouraging him to
speed up.
13. On 12/13 March 2015 the Claimant submitted a grievance against ibus Controller
Adem Jakupi alleging victimisation and harassment.
14. On 3 April 2015 Mr Jakupi submitted a grievance about Claimant.
15. (Disclosure 3) On 4 May 2015 the Claimant submitted an Incident report regarding
a passenger seat near the wheelchair area being damaged. The Tribunal
accepted the Claimant’s oral evidence that this related to movement of the lower
part of the seat which passengers would sit on.
16. (Disclosure 4) On 6 May 2015 the Claimant submitted an Incident report regarding
a crack found on the nearside middle of a windscreen.
17. (Disclosure 5) On 22 May 2015 the Claimant wrote to Neil Mason raising
grievance against Controller Okai regarding his behaviour on the Claimant
reporting issue with fuel gauge. The circumstances were that a fuel gauge was
flashing on the dashboard indicating that there was no fuel in the vehicle. A
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subsequent vehicle would not start since the battery was drained. Claimant
complains that the Controller took 17 minutes to respond to his call.
18. (Disclosure 6) On 29 May 2015 the Claimant wrote to Neil Mason raising
grievance against Controller Okai – the allegation being that the Claimant had
reported defects and claims Controller refused to give him a curtailment as he liked
to punish him for following the Respondent's procedures.
19. On 19 June 2015 Neil Mason responded to the Claimant’s grievance against
Controller Okai.
20. On 21 June 2015 the Claimant wrote to Sonia Gentles seeking to appeal against
grievance outcome letter of 19 June 2015.
21. (Disclosure 7) On 7 July 2015 the Claimant wrote to Christine Gayle (Operations
Manager) complaining about Controller Okai. He reported problems with radio and
his concerns about the Controller's behaviour.
22. On 7 July 2015 Hassan Raza (Staff Manager) wrote to the Claimant confirming he
would be investigating grievance dated 7 July 2015 and meeting arranged for 14
July 2015.
23. (Disclosure 8) On 11 July 2015 the Claimant submitted an Incident report
regarding a passenger shouting at him using foul language with the result that he
contacted the iBus controller.
24. On 28 July 2015 Christine Gayle wrote to the Claimant regarding his appeal
against grievance decision of 19 June 2015.
25. On 5 August 2015 Neil Mason wrote to the Claimant regarding grievance dated 22
May 2015 confirming that health and safety issues had been investigated and
addressed.
26. (Disclosure 9) On 5 August 2015 the Claimant submitted an incident report
regarding blocking vehicle and informed CentreComm and iBus.
27. On 6 August 2015 Hassan Raza wrote to the Claimant regarding grievance made
on 7 July 2015.
28. (Disclosure 10) On 13 August 2015 the Claimant stated that he needed a toilet
break to Ismail Khalid.
29. (Disclosure 11) On 13 August 2015 the Claimant reported a red light on the bus
dashboard to iBus.
30. (Disclosure 12) On 13 August 2015 the Claimant reported a red light on
dashboard to Rosa Pardo.
31. On 21 August 2015 the Claimant was instructed to attend fact finding interview on
1 September 2015 regarding the four official reports made on 13 August 2015.
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32. On 2 October 2015 Transport for London wrote an email to the Respondent and
bus operating companies confirming that there is no legal rule that prevents bus
drivers letting passengers off between stops provided it is safe to do so.
33. (Disclosure 13) On 29 October 2015 the Claimant wrote to Christine Gayle
complaining about harassment from iBus Controller Jason.
34. On 30 November 2015 a grievance hearing took place at which Ms Bates heard
the Claimant’s grievance dated 29 October 2015.
35. On 26 January 2016 Christine Gayle responded to the Claimant’s appeal against
grievance outcome letter of 6 August 2015.
36. On 9 February 2016 Ms Bates gave an outcome following the Claimant’s grievance
hearing on 30 November 2015 relating to his grievance of 29 October 2016. As
part of that outcome letter she wrote as follows:
“In addition I have agreed, in the interim, to be your first point of
contact for any future matters arising. As discussed I would prefer
a brief face to face meeting to relay your concerns rather than
taking the trouble to compile lengthy emails and letters, which is
something that I noted was discussed with you and the Operations
Manager at Atlas Road last year, after you advised her how
stressful this process was to you. I will then try to respond verbally
at the soonest opportunity. I am aware you have tried to telephone
me on two separate occasions and were unable to contact me.
Please take advantage of my voicemail facility.”
37. (Disclosure 14) on 15 April 2016 the Claimant emailed Neil Mason regarding
issues with metal frame on protective panel around driver's cab not being securely
installed. He stated that the area behind windscreen was dirty from previous
installations and there were metal shavings, metal powder, and dust.
38. (Disclosure 15) on 14 May 2016 the Claimant was suspended for refusing to drive
a bus. On this day there was suspension review meeting at which the Claimant’s
suspension lifted. During the course of that meeting he raised that the buses were
not being cleaned and the dashboard was full of dust. This appeared to relate to
matters raised on 15 April 2016.
39. (Disclosure 15) On 16 May 2016 the Claimant wrote to Helen Aska, Operating
again raising the matter of metal debris, metal shavings and dust.
40. (Disclosure 16) Also on 16 May 2016 the Claimant wrote to Ms Aska in a separate
letter alleging bullying by engineer Jim.
41. (Disclosure 17) On 24 May 2016 the Health & Safety Executive (“HSE”) emailed
the Claimant regarding his recent contact about health & safety issues and
cleaning.
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42. (Disclosure 18) On 24 May 2016 the Claimant stated verbally to Mr Faton Saiti:
“please sub it or have it cleaned before I start my driving duties”. Again he was
complaining about the state of the bus.
43. (Disclosure 19) 26 May 2016 the Claimant emailed HSE regarding 'same H&S
issues' regarding cleaning & sends photos.
44. On 28 May 2016 the Claimant was again suspended for refusing to drive bus.
45. (Disclosure 20) 31 May 2016 the Claimant emailed HSE regarding 'I saw one
more vehicle with metal shavings at the area behind the windscreen'.
46. On 2 June 2016 the Claimant failed to attend a suspension review meeting.
47. On 2 June 2016 the Claimant was instructed to attend a fact finding interview
regarding his refusals to drive busses on 14 May and 28 May 2016.
48. (Disclosure 21) On 6 June 16 the Claimant sent a grievance by letter to Ms Aska
alleging that he was been 'bullied by same Controller'.
49. On 8 June 2016 the Claimant’s suspension was lifted.
50. (Disclosure 22) 12 June 2016 the Claimant submitted Incident report regarding
seeing male passenger shouting and abusing another passenger and the Claimant
called police.
51. (Disclosure 23) On 29 June 2016 the Claimant raised a grievance by letter with
Ms Aska alleging he was being bullied, victimised and ‘profiled’ by Controller
‘Peter’ and Engineer 'John'.
52. (Disclosure 24) On 14 July 2016 the Claimant informed Scott O’Neill verbally that
he was having problems with his seat belt and alleged that it was compromising
his health and safety. On 15 July 2016 Mr O’Neill responded to the Claimant’s
seat belt problem referring to an inspection that he and the Claimant had carried
out the previous day and providing some recommendations for the safe use of the
seat belt.
53. (Disclosure 25) On 19 July 2016 the Claimant submitted an incident report
regarding the panel on bottom of staircase found smashed / vandalised with sharp
edges and informed iBus that it was out of service.
54. (Disclosure 26) On 7 October 2016 the Claimant submitted an incident report
regarding sharp edge in driver’s cab and his torn trousers.
55. On 30.January 2017 the Claimant emailed Ms Aska with a grievance dated 25
January 2017 against Controller ‘Peter’.
56. On 30 January 2017 Ms Aska emailed the Claimant acknowledging grievance,
informing him will commence investigation and will arrange meeting when he is fit
to resume work.
57. On 2 May 2016 the Claimant resumed his work after long-term sickness.
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58. On 20 June 2017 the Claimant sent a letter to Tayo Fanibi regarding his grievance
against Helen Aska.
59. On 22 June 2017 the Claimant submitted another grievance, this time against Ibus
Controller ‘Peter’.
60. On 23 June 2017 Ms Aleksandra Prawucka wrote to the Claimant confirming
receipt of grievances dated 6 June 16, 30 January 17, and 22 June 2017 and
inviting the Claimant to meet with her on 29 June 2017.
61. (Disclosure 27) 13 July 2017 the Claimant submitted an incident report regarding
finding damage / vandalism on the rear near side top deck internal panel and
informed iBus.
62. (Disclosure 28) On 4 August 2017 the Claimant submitted an incident report
regarding finding crack on top deck window screen and informed iBus and took the
bus out of service.
Alleged conspiracy to get rid of the Claimant
63. Both of the Claimant’s witnesses, Mr Hanafi and Mr Japuti, gave evidence to the
effect that there was a conspiracy within the Respondent to get rid of the Claimant
due to the financial cost of him raising so many problems. They alleged that the
Claimant’s complaints lead to ‘lost mileage’ which caused Transport for London
(“TfL”) to financially penalise the Respondent.
64. Mr Japuti's witness statement stated that Mr Dalzell, the Head of Operations was
asking subordinates to keep an eye on the Claimant and find anything that could
be reported on. This suggested that senior managers were actively looking for a
way of getting rid of the Claimant. It became clear during his oral evidence
however that the concerns about the Claimant were held by team of operational
controllers who had to deal with him, including Mr Japuti himself. This is also
substantiated by various incidents documented in the agreed bundle which
controllers demonstrated a scepticism about the Claimant's repeated reports of
technical problems.
65. The Respondent’s witnesses, in particular Mr Mason and Mr Dalzell denied that
there was any sort of conspiracy at all. In respect of the cost of ‘lost mileage’, they
explained that the Claimant’s witnesses were overstating the importance of this for
three reasons. First, the Respondent inevitably lost mileage every year and
budgeted for this. Second, the Claimant was not the only driver to raise technical
problems with buses. Thirdly, not all of the problems raised by the Claimant would
lead to a financial penalty. We considered the ‘iBus Mileage Cause Code
Summary for Mileage Performance Reporting’ document effective from 28.7.14
(added to page 206A of the agreed bundle). This assigns 30 separate codes for
reasons for loss mileage. Nineteen of these codes are “deductible” leading to a
financial penalty, e.g. absence, sickness, no serviceable bus, defective wheelchair
ramp, staff error. Eleven of these codes are “non-deductible” and do not lead to a
penalty, e.g. traffic congestion, incident, disaster, anti-social behaviour, road
closed.
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66. The Tribunal formed the impression from Mr Japuti's oral evidence that the most
that senior managers had done was to suggest that such concerns about the
Claimant as were being raised by the controllers needed to be documented before
action could be taken. We did not find that Mr Dalzell or other senior managers
were actively looking for matters that could be reported in relation to the Claimant.
8 August 2017 incident & investigation
67. On 8 August 2017 there was an incident between a passenger (the “Complainant”)
and the Claimant at around 23:30 in an otherwise empty bus.
68. On 10 August 2017 the Complainant passenger attended the Respondent’s
garage to make complaint regarding the incident on 8 August 2017. Specifically
he alleged that:
68.1. He informed the driver when he got on the bus that he would only be
going one stop but he carried on past.
68.2. When the driver said “excuse me I told you I wanted to get of[f] there”
the driver verbally abused him.
68.3. As the driver got off the bus the Claimant called him a “Muslim cunt”
repeatedly.
68.4. The Claimant was identified by the Complainant’s description of the
route and a physical description of the Claimant. It was never in dispute
that the Complainant was talking about the Claimant, since it was possible
to view the whole incident on CCTV footage, albeit without any audio.
69. On 15 August 2017 the Claimant was suspended.
70. On 17 August 2017 the Claimant attended a suspension review with Igone
Ugaldebere, accompanied by a union representative Mark Harding (RMT), at
which suspension was confirmed and continued.
71. On 24 August 2017 the Respondent’s investigating manager Aleksandra
Prawucka tried to contact the Complainant by telephone about the incident, but
was unable to speak to him.
72. On 25 August 2017 the Claimant attended a fact finding interview with Mr
Prawucka. This was postponed until 1 September 2017 due to query by Mark
Harding regarding the Respondent’s CCTV policy. In short Mr Harding disputed
on the Claimant’s behalf that the Respondent had the power under its policies to
consider CCTV footage.
73. Also on 25 August 2017 the Complainant passenger returned Mr Prawucka’s
telephone call. Further details obtained from him were set out:
73.1. “As I was crossing the road, I heard the shouting: fucking
Muslim/bloody Muslim. I saw the bus driver shouting toward me those
words through the open window. He stuck his body through the window.”
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73.2. “When I got on the bus I noticed that he had a beard and I thought that
he was a Muslim and I said to him salah malkim. I may have offended him
when I think about it now but at the time he never said anything.”
74. On 1 September 2017 the Claimant attended a reconvened fact finding interview
with Mr Prawucka, accompanied by Mr Harding. The Claimant, apparently on
advice, refused to watched the CCTV footage. With the benefit of hindsight at a
later stage the Claimant came to the view that this was not good advice. During
the course of this meeting the Claimant said:
74.1. The Complainant did not talk to the Claimant when he got on the bus.
74.2. At the second stop the Complainant started ringing the bell.
74.3. The Claimant told the Complainant “I can’t stop here for safety
reasons”.
74.4. The Complainant said “I hope you die of heart attack you fat cunt”.
74.5. He had not informed the ibus controllers, not had he called code red
[MEANING], not had he filled in a VIR form (vehicle incident report).
74.6. He had however put notes in a VDC card and put this in his bag. He
was unable to produce this note at any stage.
74.7. He had put the assault alarm on as he felt threatened and he didn’t
know how the Complainant was going to react.
74.8. He claimed that he shouted out of the window that the Police was [sic]
on its way.
75. When the Claimant was questioned about the fact that he had not put in a report
given that he usually reports all incidents, his union representative contended on
his behalf that a lot of the things he reports are ignored, which he nodded his
agreement to.
76. On 1 September 2017 a letter was sent to the Claimant set out charges:
76.1. “1. Alleged abusive behaviour – making inappropriate comments
towards a member of the public on 8th August 2017, amounting to
religious/racist discrimination.
76.2. 2. Unsatisfactory conduct – failing to stop resulting in a customer
complaint dated 10th August 2017”
77. The letter informed him of potential outcomes and instructing him to attend
disciplinary hearing on 11 September 2017.
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Disciplinary officer’s knowledge of protected disclosures
78. Miss Sue Bates was appointed to hear the Claimant’s disciplinary. She
commenced working as a Staff Manager in March 2015 and became Operations
Manager in June 2016
79. We accepted her evidence that she not aware of all of the disclosures relied upon
by the Claimant. She had been aware of disclosure 27 in 15 July 2016 relating to
a smashed panel caused by vandalism and she had been aware of the the
Claimant raising the shavings on the upper deck, which was raised several times
in the period April-June 2016.
80. We also accepted Ms Bates’ evidence that she communicated well with the
Claimant prior to the disciplinary matters and that she had been a sympathetic ear
to his concerns, not all of which were health and safety related. She felt that most
of the health and safety concerns he raised were justified.
Disciplinary hearing
81. On 14 September 2017 the Claimant attended disciplinary hearing chaired by Miss
Sue Bates and accompanied by Alan Jeyes (RMT).
82. At start of hearing the Claimant handed Ms Bates a subject access request letter.
83. The Claimant again declined the opportunity to view the CCTV footage.
84. At the conclusion of this meeting a decision was made to summarily dismiss the
Claimant for making inappropriate comments to a passenger amounting to racial /
religious discrimination.
85. The decision to dismiss the Claimant was confirmed by a letter dated 15
September 2017. The grounds for dismissal contained in this letter were:
85.1. The Complainant took the time two days after the incident to come into
the depot in person to make a statement of complaint.
85.2. The Complainant returned the investigator’s phone call to give a
detailed interview.
85.3. The Complainant was apparently prepared to attend the disciplinary
hearing but in fact did not as he was on holiday in Morocco.
85.4. The Claimant had shouted something at the Complainant when he
could have driven off and it made little sense to tell him that the Police were
coming given that the latter was walking away.
85.5. The Claimant had failed to report the incident which made Ms Bates
suspicious that he did not want the CCTV footage retrieved.
85.6. Ultimately she accepted the Complainant’s version of events that a
remark was made about his religion.
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86. Ms Bates acknowledged that the complainant did not appear in the CCTV footage
to talk to the Claimant when he got on the bus, although suggests that he might
have said something as he walked down the bus aisle.
Appeal
87. In an email dated 17 September 2017 the Claimant appealed the decision to
dismiss him on the grounds (i) severity of sentence; (ii) breach of procedures and
(iii) any new evidence he may have.
88. On 18 September 2017 Acas received Early Conciliation notification.
89. On 3 October 2017 an Acas EC Certificate was issued.
90. On 16 October 2017 an appeal hearing was convened before Mr Vince Dalzell and
Mr Kieran McDonnell. This hearing was reconvened on 17 October. The Claimant
accompanied by his RMT representative Mr Harding. He watched the CCTV
footage for the first time.
91. During the appeal hearing the Claimant raised for the first time that the reason he
had looked out of the window what that he had heard something punched against
the bus which sounded metal.
92. The Claimant’s third ground of appeal was in reality an attack on the credibility of
the Complainant. It was said on behalf of the Claimant that:
92.1. The CCTV footage showed that there was no initial conversation when
the Complainant got on the bus.
92.2. How would the Claimant know that the Complainant was Muslim?
93. A document was presented with colleagues’ signatures indicating that they did not
consider that the Claimant was racist.
94. On 25 October 2017 the Claimant was informed by letter that his appeal had been
dismissed.
95. On 20 December 2017 the claim presented his ET1 claim to the Tribunal.
The Law
96. The law on dismissal for misconduct is set out in the well-known case of Burchell
v BHS [1978] ICR 303 in which the following guidance was given:
“What the tribunal have to decide every time is, broadly
expressed, whether the employer who discharged the employee
on the grounds of misconduct in question (usually, though not
necessarily, dishonest conduct) entertained a reasonable
suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the employee of that
misconduct at that time. That is really stating shortly and
compendiously what is in fact more than one element. First of all,
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there must be established by the employer the fact of that belief;
that the employer did believe it. Secondly, that the employer had
in his mind reasonable grounds upon which to sustain that belief.
And thirdly, we think, that the employer, at the stage at which he
formed that belief on those grounds, at any rate at the final stage
at which he formed that belief on those grounds, had carried out
as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in the
circumstances of the case.”
97. In the Court of Appeal decision in the case of British Leyland (UK) Ltd v Swift [1981]
IRLR 91, CA Lord Denning MR stated in relation to the sanction of dismissal:
“The correct test is: Was it reasonable for the employers to dismiss
him? If no reasonable employer would have dismissed him, then
the dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might
reasonably have dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair. It
must be remembered that in all these cases there is a band of
reasonableness, within which one employer might reasonably
take one view: another quite reasonably take a different view”.
98. Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones [1982] IRLR 439 confirmed that a Tribunal should
not substitute its own view as to the right course of action and that the test for
unfair dismissal is a ‘band of reasonable responses’. Sainbury’s v Hitt [2003] IRLR
23 confirmed that the ‘band of reasonable responses’ test applies to the procedure
followed by an employer as well as the substantive decision to dismiss.
99. ACAS Guidance stresses that employers should keep an open mind when carrying
out an investigation: their task is to look for evidence that supports as well as
weakens the employee’s case.
100. In respect of the claim of wrongful dismissal, the following principles apply:
100.1. A claim of wrongful dismissal requires the Tribunal to consider whether
a claimant was guilty of conduct so serious as to amount to a repudiatory
breach of the contract of employment entitling the employer to summarily
terminate the contract.
100.2. The underlying legal test to be applied by courts and tribunals is not
whether the employee’s negligence or misconduct is worthy of the epithet
‘gross’, but whether it amounts to repudiation of the whole contract.
100.3. A court or tribunal must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities,
that there was an actual repudiation of the contract by the employee. It is
not enough for an employer to prove that it had a reasonable belief that the
employee was guilty of gross misconduct (IDS Brief).
101. Of relevance to the claim of automatically unfair dismissal due to protected
disclosures section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provides
“43B Disclosures qualifying for protection.
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(1) In this Part a “ qualifying disclosure ” means any disclosure of
information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making
the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show
one or more of the following—
(a) …
(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply
with any legal obligation to which he is subject,
(c) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or
is likely to be endangered
102. The threshold for establishing reasonable belief in ‘public interest’ is not particularly
difficult to satisfy in view of authority on this point (e.g. Chesterton Global Ltd (t/a
Chestertons) and anor v Nurmohamed (Public Concern at Work intervening) 2018
ICR 731, CA). In that case the ‘public interest’ was engaged by N’s concern about
other employees employed by CGL rather than the public more broadly.
103. Section 103A ERA provides:
103A Protected disclosure.
An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes
of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than
one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee
made a protected disclosure
104. In Royal Mail Group Ltd v Jhuti [2019] UKSC 55, SC the Supreme Court dealt with
a situation in which an dismissing manager dismissed J in good faith, when
unaware of the fact that J’s line manager had invented performance concerns,
motivated by J’s earlier protected disclosure. Lord Reid’s judgment was that the
Tribunal should penetrate the invention when considering whether the sole or
principal reason for the dismissal was the disclosure.
CONCLUSIONS
105. Mr Neckles drew our attention to the The Vehicle Drivers (Certificates of
Professional Competence) Regulations 2007 and European Directive 2003/59/EC
in support of his submission that the distinction between bus driver and bus
operator was important. His contention was that the designation ‘bus operator’
lead to a greater likelihood of personal liability on the part of the Claimant and this
had a bearing on the way that the question of whether the Claimant failed to stop
should be treated.
106. The Tribunal did not consider find that these points had bearing on the case for
two reasons. First, the failure to stop charge was a minor misconduct matter and
was not the reason for dismissal, as Ms Bates confirmed in her oral evidence.
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Second, the relevant legal authorities are those set on in the section of our reasons
dealing with law above.
1. What was the reason for dismissal? R maintains that the reason for dismissal
was misconduct and was a reason that could be found to be fair pursuant to s.98
ERA 1996.
107. The Tribunal finds that the reason for dismissal was the Claimant’s conduct,
specifically his conduct on 8 August 2017.
2. Has a fair procedure been followed?
108. Mr Neckles submitted on behalf of the Claimant that Ms Prawucka the investigating
manager was “judge in her own cause”. He explained that he meant that she was
both an allegation maker and investigator. We have considered the notes of the
fact finding interview on 25 August 2017 and the investigation. We do not consider
that Ms Prawucka was a witness in this case. We do not consider that there is a
good argument that she could not be the investigator.
109. Mr Neckles submits that the charge of making inappropriate comments amounting
to ‘religious/racist discrimination’ was improperly framed. In this respect he relies
on Strouthos v London Underground Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 402; [2004] IRLR 636
in which the Court of Appeal held that a charge against an employee should be
precisely framed and that the circumstances in which it is permissible to go beyond
that charge in a decision to take disciplinary action are very limited. In that case a
finding of dishonesty went outside of the charge. The Court of Appeal found that
an Employment Tribunal was entitled to find that this made the dismissal unfair.
110. We agree that the language which was alleged to have been used by the Claimant
only amounted to religious discrimination. It does not contain a racial element.
This is not a situation analogous to Strouthos, however. The finding of religious
discrimination falls within the parameters of the charge.
111. We do not consider however that this made any difference to the procedure, nor
to the substantive conclusions reached in this case. The actual words alleged to
have been used by the Claimant were clear at the material stages during the
disciplinary process. It was clear that this was the allegation that he needed to
answer. We do not see that the use of a catch all phrase ‘religious/racist
discrimination’ caused any unfairness to the Claimant during the investigation nor
to the outcome. Religious discrimination was in itself potentially a gross
misconduct matter.
112. We consider that a fair procedure was followed.
3. Did R have a genuine belief in the misconduct of C?
113. We accepted the evidence of Ms Bates that she believed in the Claimant’s
misconduct.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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4. Has there been a reasonable investigation?
114. We have considered the fact finding process, the interviews of the Claimant and
Complainant, the review of the CCTV footage offered to the Claimant
(notwithstanding that he declined this) and the disciplinary hearing held by a
separate manager. The Claimant was represented by union representatives at
both the fact finding interview and the disciplinary hearing.
115. We consider this was a reasonable investigation.
5. Following that investigation, was R’s belief that C committed the acts complained
of based on reasonable grounds?
116. The Tribunal queried with Ms Bates how she dealt with the CCTV footage which
appears to undermine the evidence of the Complainant that he requested only one
stop and gave a Muslim greeting when he got on the bus. This for us was a
somewhat troubling aspect of the case. She explained that based on her personal
experience as a driver, passengers do continue talking to a driver as they walk up
the bus. It is fair to say that there is a period after the Complainant passes the cab
where it is more difficult to see him on the CCTV footage.
117. The grounds for dismissal are set out above, contained in the letter dated 15
September 2017.
118. We accept that it was open to Ms Bates to draw an inference from the failure of
the Claimant to file an incident report following the events on 8 August that there
was something about the incident he wished to hide. It is quite clear from the other
evidence in the case that it had hitherto been the practice of the Claimant to
document assiduously even minor incidents and problems which had occurred
when he was driving a bus. She was entitled to find that it was significant that he
did not report an allegation that the Complainant said “I hope you die from a heart
attack you fat cunt”. The contention that his report and grievances were not taken
seriously was unsustainable. The bundle contains a whole series of documented
responses to the Claimant’s concerns.
119. Ultimately, we consider that it was open to Ms Bates to prefer the evidence of the
Complainant to that of the Claimant.
6. Was the dismissal within the reasonable range of responses open to R?
120. We consider that it did fall within the range of reasonable responses to dismiss
based on the Respondent’s finding that abusive language had been directed at a
passenger relating to his religion. This is a serious matter.
7. Was dismissal reasonable in all the circumstances of the case?
121. We consider that dismissal was reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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8. Did R act consistently in summarily dismissing C? C relies on Mr Qadeer Siddique
as his comparator.
122. We have considered the authorities of Post Office v Fennell [1981] IRLR 221 and
Hadjioannou v Coral Casinos Ltd [1981] IRLR 352, together with other legal
authorities relevant to the question of inconsistency referred to the Respondent’s
closing written argument.
123. Mr Neckles realistically accepted during his closing submission that the
circumstances of the comparators are different to the Claimant’s.
124. Mr Siddique was given a verbal warning for telling a passenger, who was a fellow
Muslim, of the need to be honest as a Muslim when stating the age of her child
when boarding a bus. He apologised to the passenger. The circumstances are
not comparable.
125. Mr Iqbal received a final written warning for making a remark about the work ethics
of a particular group of people. He did not deny making the statement. He stated
did not realise that it was racist in nature. When this was explained he was
extremely remorseful. The circumstances are not comparable.
126. Mr Anter received a final written warning when he raised his hand to prevent a
youth spitting through the assault screen at him, slightly injuring the youth’s lip.
The circumstances are not comparable.
Wrongful dismissal
9. Did C commit an act of gross misconduct?
127. Was the Claimant guilty of conduct so serious as to amount to a repudiatory breach
of the contract of employment entitling the employer to summarily terminate the
contract? This is different test to considering whether the dismissing manager had
reasonable grounds, which we have dealt with above.
128. The Tribunal has not found, on the balance of probabilities that the Claimant did
use language which amounted to religious discrimination or abuse, for the
following reasons:
128.1. We have not heard live evidence from the Complainant.
128.2. The Claimant has given evidence to the Tribunal in which he denied
making reference to the Complainant being Muslim.
128.3. There is no audio on the CCTV footage.
128.4. At the point that the Claimant is alleged to have made remarks out of
the window his face is facing away from the camera. It is not possible to
see his lips moving or the expression on his face.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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128.5. We find on the balance of probabilities that the Complainant did not
make any comment to the Claimant when he boarded the bus. We find
that he did not tell the Claimant that he was only going one stop when he
boarded and that he did not give a Muslim greeting. These are both
important aspects of the Complainant’s story and we consider that his
evidence these points is unreliable.
129. We find that although the Claimant and Complainant had a testy exchange of
words, which we infer from the Complainant’s expression and body language just
after he disembarked the bus we are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities
that this contained religious abuse.
130. We are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Claimant committed a
repudiatory breach of contract.
10. If so, was R entitled to terminate C's contract without notice?
131. In view of our finding, the Respondent was not entitled to terminate the Claimant’s
contract without notice.
Automatic unfair dismissal – s.103A ERA 1996
132. We have dealt with issues 11, 12 and 13 together.
11. Did C make qualifying disclosures to R on the dates as set out in the parties'
table of alleged protected disclosures?
12. If so, and in C's reasonable belief, did the disclosures tend to show that a person
has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation (s.47B(1)(b)
ERA 1996) and/or that the health and safety of any individual has been or was likely
to be endangered (s.47B(1)(d) ERA 1996)?
13. If so, and in C's reasonable belief, were the disclosures made in the public
interest?
133. The Tribunal examined each of the alleged protected disclosures carefully, in the
light of the Claimant’s oral evidence on each.
134. In the case of quite a number of the alleged protected disclosures the Respondent
offered no submissions at all through Counsel. While we did not treat this as an
an admission, in the view of the Tribunal this was a realistic position given that a
number of the disclosures plainly fell within section 43B.
135. In summary we found that some of these disclosures were protected disclosures
falling within section 43B ERA and others were not.
136. We found that the following were protected disclosures:
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136.1. (Disclosure 3) 4 May 2015 – we considered that raising the matter of
a passenger seat, the lower part of which could move was a protected
disclosure. We found that the Claimant had a reasonable belief that this
disclosure related to health and safety and was raised in the public interest,
since this potentially affected the safety of members of the public who were
passengers.
136.2. (Disclosure 4) 6 May 2015 – crack in windscreen. While at the lower
end of the scale of ‘endangerment’, we found that the Claimant had a
reasonable belief that this disclosure related to health and safety and it was
raised in the public interest.
136.3. (Disclosure 7) 7 July 2015 – while this is a continuation of the
Claimant’s dispute with Controller Okie (disclosure 6, discussed below),
there are also references to the microphone not working and Mr Okie not
wearing hi viz whilst walking around the yard. We find that these are
realistically at the lower end of “endangerment”, nevertheless they are
expressly raised as being breaches of health and safety regulations.
Having considered the Claimant’s evidence on these points we find that he
had a reasonable belief in the health and safety aspect to these concerns,
and they were raised in the public interest albeit that there may also have
been ulterior motivation at play.
136.4. (Disclosure 14) 15 April 2016 the content of this complaint related to
screws being loose and metal “shavings” or “swarf” left over from drilling,
metal powder and dust. This was clearly, as acknowledged by one of the
Respondent’s witnesses Mr Mason, a potential health and safety concern.
We find that this was raised in the public interest. The Claimant had
concerns about other drivers other than himself.
136.5. (Disclosure 15) 16 May 2016 this was a continuation of the matters
raised in disclosure 14, this time being raised in a suspension review
meeting. This was a protected disclosure.
136.6. (Disclosure 16) 16 May 2016 this was a continuation of the matters
raised in disclosure 14 and 15, this time being raised in a grievance letter.
This was a protected disclosure.
136.7. (Disclosure 17) 24 May 2016 this was a continuation of the matters
raised in disclosure 14, 15 and 16, this time being raised with the Health &
Safety Executive. This was a protected disclosure falling into section 43F.
136.8. (Disclosure 20) 31 May 2016 this was a continuation of the matters
raised in disclosure 14, 15 and 16, this time being raised with the Health &
Safety Executive. This was a protected disclosure falling into section 43F.
136.9. (Disclosure 21) 6 June 2016 this was a continuation of the matters
raised in disclosure 14 and 15, this time being raised in a grievance letter.
This was a protected disclosure.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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136.10. (Disclosure 23A) 29 June 2016 while this was in part the Claimant
raising a grievance about the way he had been treated, we accept that the
Claimant had a reasonable belief that the bus mirror’s arm was bent
inwards and that he couldn’t shut the window was a health and safety
matter. He explained in his oral evidence that he couldn’t see the off-side
of his vehicle. We consider that it was in the public interest as this would
potentially affect the safety of others.
136.11. (Disclosure 26) 7 October 2016 we found that the Claimant had a
reasonable belief that this disclosure about a sharp edge in the driver’s cab
related to health and safety and it was raised in the public interest given
that it would potentially affect other drivers.
136.12. (Disclosure 28) 4 August 2017 we found that the Claimant had a
reasonable belief that this disclosure about a sharp edge related to health
and safety and it was raised in the public interest given that it would
potentially affect passengers.
137. We found that the following were not protected disclosures:
137.1. (Disclosure 1) 2 April 2014 – the Claimant conceded in cross
examination that the “blinds” (i.e. the displays showing the destination of
the bus) were not health and safety related. The reference to a fault on the
driver’s seat is not one that identifiably related to health and safety but in
any event this is merely background to the central thrust of the complaint
which is about engineer Jim’s sarcasm. We do not consider that the health
and safety nor the public interest requirements are satisfied.
137.2. (Disclosure 2) 15 January 2015 – notwithstanding the content of this
complaint that Gary Davis the controller was pushing him to drive faster,
the Claimant admitted during cross examination that he did not believe that
Mr Davis was pushing him to driver faster. Accordingly we are not satisfied
that the Claimant had a reasonable belief in the health and safety element.
137.3. (Disclosure 5) 22 May 2015 – we considered that running out of fuel
or a dead battery might in a different context, such as a remote area in very
cold weather, amount to a health and safety concern given the risk of
passengers being stranded. Given the actual context of urban bus routes,
however, in our assessment Mr Asonitis did not reasonably believe that
anyone’s health and safety would be endangered as a result of these
matters.
137.4. (Disclosure 6) 29 May 2015 this three page grievance was in our
assessment about the poor relationship between the Claimant and
Controller Ismail Okie. It is clear from the content of the grievance that the
Claimant recognised that Mr Okie was frustrated with the Claimant’s
approach of seeking to have buses taken out of service (i.e. curtailment)
for minor problems which other drivers would simply note in the log but
continue driving. We do not find that the Claimant had a reasonable belief
that the health and safety of the public was being endangered, nor that this
was being raised in the public interest.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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137.5. (Disclosure 8) 11 July 2015 – while the Tribunal acknowledges that
being subject to the abusive language by a customer was plainly
unpleasant experience for the Claimant we do not consider that this had
the necessary elements of being raised in the public interest and tending
to show that the health and safety of a person was or had been (or was
likely to be) endangered. This is a routine documentation of an unpleasant
occurrence, as required by the Respondent’s ordinary processes.
137.6. (Disclosure 9) 5 August 2015 – report regarding vehicle blocking - we
do not consider that this had the necessary elements of being raised in the
public interest and tending to show that the health and safety of a person
was or had been endangered. This is a routine documentation of an
incident that seems of little consequence.
137.7. (Disclosure 10) 13 August 2015 – the Claimant sending a text to
request a toilet break we accept was correctly characterised by Mr Ludlow
for the Respondent in cross examination as “normal self care”. We do not
consider that this had the necessary elements of being raised in the public
interest and tending to show that the health and safety of a person was or
had been endangered.
137.8. (Disclosures 11 & 12) 13 August 2015 – this was merely a routine call
to a controller. We do not consider that this had the necessary elements of
being raised in the public interest and tending to show that the health and
safety of a person was or had been (or was likely to be) endangered.
137.9. (Disclosure 13) 29 October 2015 this complaint was about the alleged
poor attitude of Controller Jason and destination blinds which the Claimant
accepted are not safety critical. We do not find that the Claimant had a
reasonable belief that the health and safety of the public was being
endangered, nor that this was being raised in the public interest.
137.10. (Disclosure 19) 26 May 2016 the email we have considered appears
to be a general complaint about a reduction in the number of cleaners. We
are not satisfied based on the evidence that we received that the Claimant
had a reasonable belief that the health and safety of the public was being
endangered, nor that this was being raised in the public interest.
137.11. (Disclosure 22) 12 June 2016 we do not consider that this had the
necessary element of the Claimant reasonably believing that it was being
raised in the public interest. This was a case of the Claimant documenting
an incident of an abusive passenger. The incident may have been
unpleasant, but this was routine documentation of an one-off incident.
137.12. (Disclosure 23A) (undated, page 115A-B of the agreed bundle) while
we consider that the Claimant had a reasonable belief that this disclosure
related to his own health and safety, we do not find that this had the
necessary element of him believing that it was being raised in the public
interest. This was a matter that was personal to him.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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137.13. (Disclosure 24) 15 July 2016 this alleged protected disclosure
appears to relate to the comfort of the Claimant’s seat belt. While we found
that there is a (somewhat tenuous) health and safety element here we do
not consider that the Claimant can have had a reasonable belief that this
was raised in the public interest.
137.14. (Disclosure 27) 13 July 2017 there is a lack of specific information
about the nature of the damage from which we could find that the Claimant
had a reasonable belief in the health and safety and public interest
elements.
138. Finally, (Disclosure 18) 24 May 2016 we have not received evidence on this
alleged protected disclosure. The Claimant has not satisfied the burden on him to
establish this as a protected disclosure.
14. Was the reason or principal reason for C's dismissal on 29 March 2017 the
making of any of the protected disclosures?
139. Some of the controllers who had to interact with the Claimant during the course of
their duties thought that he was a nuisance for raising a serious of comparatively
minor technical problems with buses that other drivers might have ignored. One
of the Claimant’s own witnesses Mr Japuti was candid that he personally had
thought that the Claimant was lazy and deliberately raising problems to achieve a
‘curtailment’ i.e. to avoid having to drive the whole of a route. We infer that other
Controllers felt that the Claimant raised too many concerns.
140. The Tribunal did not consider that the instant case was analogous to Jhuti,
however. There has been no suggestion that the passenger complaint about the
incident on 8 August 2017 was as a result of a contrivance of managers or other
employees with an agenda to get rid of the Claimant. On the contrary, it is clear
that this was an exogenous event which arose entirely independently of employees
of the Respondent. The substance of the complaint was on the face of it serious
enough to require investigation and was, if true, potentially gross misconduct.
141. The evidence of Ms Bates was that she was personally only aware of two of the
disclosures relied upon by the Claimant. This evidence was not challenged by the
Claimant’s representative. It seems that one of the two ‘disclosures’ she was
aware of, namely metal shavings, was the subject of several separate disclosures
during the period April-June 2016. We conclude that she was aware of these and
the grievance raised on 30 November 2015 as well as the disclosure raised 15
July 2016. It seems likely that she had formed the impression that the Claimant
raised more concerns and complaints than a typical driver. Nevertheless they did
appear to have a good relationship of sorts. She was a sympathetic ear. We found
no evidence of antipathy on the part of Ms Bates toward the Claimant, nor of any
pressure brought to bear on her by anyone leading to her decision to dismiss.
142. We accept Ms Bates’ evidence that she was not aware of any conspiracy by the
Respondent to get rid of the Claimant. We accept her evidence that she was not
aware of instructions to keep an eye on the Claimant.
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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143. We find that Ms Bates was not influenced by the disclosures she was aware of in
her decision to dismiss.
144. We find that the principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal was conduct on 8
August 2017. Based on the findings that we find Ms Bates reasonably made, it
was entirely unsurprisingly that she found that the Claimant was guilty of gross
misconduct.
Remedy
145. The only element of the Claimant’s claim that succeeds is the claim for wrongful
dismissal.
146. The Tribunal has not heard submissions on remedy.
147. We make the following observations. The Claimant had worked for 10 full years
at the date of dismissal. His contract provides for one week’s notice for each full
year of service. Calculation of damages therefore ought to be a straightforward
matter. The Tribunal would be very surprised indeed if a remedy hearing is
necessary.
Order
148. The Tribunal makes the following order:
148.1. The parties are to write in jointly within 14 days of the date that these
written reasons are sent out confirming whether or not a remedy hearing is
required.
148.2. In the event that the parties are requesting a remedy hearing, the
parties should provide a short statement explaining why a remedy hearing
is necessary, a time estimate for the hearing and a jointly agreed list of
dates to avoid.
_____________________________
Employment Judge Adkin
Date14 Feb 2020
WRITTEN REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
18/02/2020
......................................................................................
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Case Number: 2208152/2017
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Notes
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