Mr J Czermak v British Engineering Services Ltd: 3201548/2017
Employment Tribunal
Published on 03 May 2018, 14:42
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
unfair-dismissal
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2018-04-30
Official Documents
-
Mr J Czermak v British Engineering Services Ltd: 3201548/2017 - Full
Change History
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
The judgment of the Tribunal is:
1. The claim of unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed.
2. The claim of wrongful dismissal fails and is dismissed.
REASONS
Claims and Issues
1. The Claimant was employed by the Respondent from 31 July 1989 until
he was summarily dismissed with effect from 24 July 2017. By Claim
Form presented on 20 November 2017, he brought a claim of unfair
dismissal against the Respondent.
2. The Claimant had applied to amend his claim by letter dated 21 February
2018 to include a claim for wrongful dismissal and at the outset of the
hearing, after hearing submissions from both parties, applying the
Selkent principles and noting the relevant Presidential Guidance, I
permitted that amendment for the following reasons which were given
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orally at the time:
a. The Respondent’s ET3 Grounds of Resistance at paragraph 2
specifically refer to the Claimant having been summarily dismissed;
b. The Respondent was aware that the Claimant did not have a copy
of his original contract of employment (there is a file note to the
Claimant from the Respondent in the bundle dated 19 May 2017
responding to his request for a copy of his contract by telling him
that the contract isn’t in his employee file);
c. The Claimant was acting in person until 13 February 2017. He
pleaded the ET1 himself with some assistance from the CAB.
Given that he did not have his contract, I accepted that he was
unaware that he may have been entitled to notice ( which would
have been substantial, given that he had been employed for over 2
decades);
d. This is a new type of claim under a different jurisdiction and if
presented today, it would be out of time. Those are relevant,
although not determinative, considerations. I was not told by the
Respondent that the witnesses present today could not give
relevant evidence on wrongful dismissal as well as unfair dismissal;
e. The Respondent suggested that they might have made a
counterclaim if they had been aware of a wrongful dismissal claim.
However the Respondent did not articulate what that counterclaim
might have been;
f. The Respondent is not prejudiced if the proposed amendment is
allowed. The wrongful dismissal claim is based on the same facts
as outlined in the ET1 and will largely refer to the same evidence. I
permitted the Respondent to ask additional questions in chief of its
witnesses if relevant to this issue.
3. The disputes in the claims were identified at the outset of the hearing as
follows:
Unfair dismissal
a. What was the reason for dismissal? (The Respondent says
misconduct)
b. Did the Respondent believe that the Claimant was guilty of
misconduct?
c. If so, were there reasonable grounds for such a belief
d. When the decision to dismiss was made, had a reasonable
investigation taken place?
e. Was dismissal within the band of reasonable sanctions?
f. If the Claimant was unfairly dismissed, what if any reduction to
compensation would be appropriate given the principles in Polkey
and / or conduct / contribution?
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Wrongful dismissal
g. Did the Claimant breach his contract of employment in a manner
that entitled the Respondent to dismiss him summarily?
4. I indicated at the outset of the hearing that detailed questions of
calculation of remedy including mitigation would be dealt with at a
subsequent remedy hearing, if the Claimant was successful.
The Hearing
5. I heard evidence from the Claimant and, on behalf of the Respondent,
from Nick Owen, Unit Leader, who made the decision to dismiss and
Peter Thorpe, Territory Manager who dealt with the appeal.
6. I was directed to specific pages in an agreed bundle of documents.
7. I had the benefit of oral and written submissions from both parties.
Findings of Fact
8. The Claimant (date of birth 25 May 1954) started working at the
Respondent on 31 July 1989. At the time of his summary dismissal, he
was an engineer surveyor and his job was to inspect lifting machinery
around East London and Essex. He managed his own time and had to
submit reports on the inspections that had taken place using a tablet
computer with a 4G internet connection. He would usually conduct the
inspections on Monday to Thursday and file reports on a Friday.
9. On 18 May 2017 his Unit Leader, George Morrow, told him that
management wanted to speak to him regarding ‘reporting times’. He was
invited to a disciplinary meeting on 26 May 2017 by letter dated 19 May
2017 which stated “Following recent discussions during which you have
been made aware about concerns relating to your conduct, I am writing
to inform you that you are required to attend a disciplinary hearing . . . to
discuss several concerns relating to your conduct which has called into
question your suitability for the role of Engineer Surveyor . . . .
Specifically it is alleged several discrepancies have been identified
relating to your whereabouts and reporting times v actual reporting times
claimed.” The letter went on to warn that dismissal could be an outcome
of the meeting and explained to the Claimant that he had the right to be
accompanied to the meeting.
10. The letter of 19 May 2017 was accompanied by a 14 page spreadsheet
setting out reporting times over a four month period.
11. At the disciplinary meeting on 26 May 2017 the Claimant was questioned
about discrepancies between the times that the tablet had logged him as
working on each case and the times that he had submitted online. The
Claimant explained that he wrote out the reports and then went online
and typed them up, which could take up to three hours and that the 4G
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signal where he lives is very weak and he had to make repeated
attempts to submit reports and sometimes submitted the reports from the
client’s site if there was a better connection.
12. Steven Haigh, Unit Leader heard the disciplinary and by letter dated 1
June 2017 issued the Claimant with a final written warning live for 12
months and told the Claimant that a Performance Improvement Plan was
to be put in place. The letter warned the Claimant that “any further
disciplinary acts of any kind within the [12 months] is likely to result in
further disciplinary action under the Disciplinary Procedure which could
lead to your dismissal.” The Claimant was given a right of appeal which
he did not exercise.
13. On that same day, Thursday 1 June 2017, the Claimant was visiting a
client site to inspect some machinery on a farm. He sprained his left
ankle on alighting from a tractor. The claimant informed the Respondent
by email that day, blaming stress placed on surveyors by the
Respondent. On Friday 2 June 2017, he was due to be writing up
reports. The Claimant called his GP to book an appointment. The earliest
appointment he was offered was 9 June 2017.
14. On Monday 5 June 2017 the Claimant called the office to say that
because of his ankle he was unable to drive long distances or attend site
visits.
15. On Friday 9 June 2017 the Claimant visited his GP who issued him with
a 28 day medical certificate stating “severe left ankle injury 01/06/17 in
course of work”.
16. The Claimant said that in light of this injury and advice from his union
representative not to appeal, he did not appeal the final written warning.
17. On 15 June 2017 the Claimant attended hospital for an X-Ray. The
report notes that “Soft tissue swelling is noted over the mid malleolus,
however no bony injuries are seen. A small joint effusion is present.” The
Claimant says that he did not feel able to return to work at this point.
18. On Monday 19 June 2017, although still not attending work due to his
ankle injury, the Claimant went to his golf club (Maylands Golf Club). He
says that he was intending to do some putting practice but that he saw
two men that he knew from the golf club, Brian Critchell and Mick Savill
and that they informed him that there was a minor competition on at the
club, the Waterloo Cup, which was being held largely to enable club
members the opportunity to keep their golf handicaps active (which
requires participation in at least 3 competitions per year).
19. I am not familiar with the rules or culture of the game of golf. The
Claimant explained to me that it is normal at his golf club to ‘put a card in’
meaning that a player will enter a minor competition and enter a made-up
score card in order to keep a handicap active, the player having been
credited with having played a game, even if they have not in fact played
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it. The Claimant said in his witness statement that “it looks dishonest”.
That is because it is dishonest. The Claimant eventually (somewhat
reluctantly) admitted this in oral evidence. However cheating at the rules
or regulations of a game (if that is what the Claimant did) is not directly
relevant to a person’s employment. I noted that there was no burning
need for the Claimant to have ‘put a card in’ at that competition on that
date.
20. On 19 June 2017 the Claimant says that he attempted to play in the
competition with his friends but at the first hole, he realised that his ankle
hurt too much and then he just sat in the golf buggy (which he told me
was driven around by one of his friends) and watched his friends play but
‘put a card in’ at the end of the game. After that date, the Claimant says
that he did return to the golf course a few times to practise putting and
chipping but did not enter any other competitions. The results of the
competition on 19 June 2017 were posted on the Maylands Golf Club
website recording that the Claimant was the overall runner up out of 7
participants.
21. On 26 June 2017, a Canada Life report recorded a conversation with the
Claimant on 22 June 2017 and suggested that the Respondent consider
alternative duties for a period of recuperation.
22. On 7 July 2017 the Claimant submitted a new medical certificate for 30
days which merely stated “Other ankle injury”. Having been contacted by
Mr Morrow from the Respondent, he agreed to meet on 13 July 2017.
23. At the meeting on 13 July 2017, Mr Morrow asked the Claimant if he
could undertake light duties and the Claimant said that this wasn’t
possible as he had been advised to keep his foot elevated and follow
‘RICE’ guidelines (rest, ice, compression and elevation). Mr Morrow
asked the Claimant if he could undertake home based duties (potentially
planning and scheduling) but the Claimant said that this was also not
possible as he did not feel that there was any suitable home based work
for him to do. The Claimant told me that other surveyors who have
recently been off sick were not asked to do light duties. Mr Morrow then
asked the Claimant if he had been playing golf and the Claimant said no.
This was untrue. The Claimant told me that he was defensive and
guarded because of his previous disciplinary – which he had considered
unfair; and that he considered that the Respondent was looking for a
reason to get rid of him. Mr Morrow then told the Claimant that they had
evidence in the form of a scorecard, at which point the Claimant again
denied it, then said that it might have been him and then said that he had
‘put a card in’. Later that afternoon, Mr Morrow called the Claimant to ask
him to attend a disciplinary meeting on Monday 17 July 2017 and a
formal invitation letter was then sent stating “We have reason to doubt
the integrity of your recent sickness absence from work (01/06/17 to
present day). Specifically, evidence has come to light that you have
engaged in golfing activities during this time.” The invitation letter told the
Claimant that an outcome of the hearing could be dismissal and he was
advised of his right to be accompanied and he was told that if he failed to
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attend the meeting it may go ahead and a decision made in his absence.
24. The meeting was rescheduled at the Claimant’s request for 21 July 2017.
The Respondent sent to the Claimant a screen shot of a website showing
that he had signed up for a golf competition in August. In fact the
information on that website was from 2015 and the Respondent had
misunderstood the date.
25. The Claimant supplied a supportive handwritten letter from his friends,
Brian Critchell and Mick Savill stating that on 19 June 2017, the Claimant
had played the first hole only and the “He drove around in a buggie for
the next 17 holes” but that they had completed his score card for him
anyway.
26. The disciplinary hearing took place on 21 July 2017. The Claimant did
not attend. He told me that he felt very stressed and that his psoriatic
arthritis was flaring up. His union representative, Douglas Gilligan,
attended on his behalf and the Claimant emailed the Respondent at 8am
on the morning of the hearing to say that he would not be attending. He
did not expressly ask for a postponement but stated “I will attend this
meeting when I am mentally and physically fit to.” The Respondent’s note
of the hearing records that Mr Gilligan told the hearing that he had
spoken to the Claimant on the telephone and advised him that it was in
his best interests to attend and that he could attend by telephone – which
the Claimant refused. Mr Gilligan is also reported to have said that the
Claimant could not indicate when he would be fit to attend and to have
told the Claimant that the company could proceed in his absence.
27. After taking advice from HR and hearing what Mr Gilligan had to say, the
Respondent held the meeting in the Claimant’s absence. Mr Morrow
attended to present the case against the Claimant and the decision
maker was Nick Owen, a different unit leader. Mr Morrow went through
the questions that he would have asked the Claimant if he had been
present and Mr Gilligan did his best to answer them. Mr Gilligan is
reported as saying that on 19 June 2017 the Claimant’s “intention was to
dupe the golf club by submitting a scorecard to keep his handicap” and
that it was a “façade to submit a scorecard to keep his handicap”. Mr
Morrow said that the Respondent intended to contact the golf club to ask
for confirmation of the account given by the Claimant’s friends. The
incorrect website screen shot for the August 2015 competition was
discussed and Mr Gilligan having pointed out the error, Mr Morrow
agreed that this was not relevant.
28. The Claimant was summarily dismissed by letter dated 24 July 2017
which set out the respondent’s reasons for proceeding in the Claimant’s
absence and stated Mr Owen’s conclusions that the Claimant had played
in the Waterloo Cup game on 19 June 2017 and that he had initially
denied this – his story changing over time. Mr Owen found it implausible
that the Claimant only entered the competition to maintain his handicap
and that he would have chosen to cheat to such a degree that he came
2nd overall in the competition. Therefore he found that the Claimant had
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been dishonest, including dishonest about the extent of his ankle injury.
The timing of the injury so soon after the final written warning also
aroused suspicions. He cited the Respondent’s absence policy which
stated “Refrain from undertaking activities when off sick that may delay
your recovery or return to work” and he referred to the Claimant having
said on 13 July 2017 that he could not do light duties or home duties –
but that he still felt able to go to the golf course when off sick on 19 June
2017.
29. Mr Owen concluded that the Claimant was guilty of gross misconduct
given the dishonesty about the events of 19 June 2017 and during the
attempt to conceal the matter during the disciplinary process. He stated
that he considered alternative sanctions but considered that the
Claimant’s actions had resulted in a complete breakdown of trust and
confidence which was particularly important given that his role involved
working remotely and with little direct supervision. He went on to state
that if he had not summarily dismissed the Claimant, he would have
dismissed him (presumably on notice) given the final written warning on
his record.
30. The Claimant was offered a right of appeal which he exercised. Mr
Thorpe, Territory Manager, conducted the appeal hearing on 3 August
2017. The Claimant attended. The Claimant set out his account of what
had happened on 19 June 2017 (as set out to me and summarised
above). Mr Thorpe explored the Claimant’s activity in putting in a false
card after the game. When asked about driving the buggy, the Claimant
is recorded as saying initially that he didn’t drive the buggy – then when
challenged on the basis of the handwritten letter from his friends, he said
that “Well I might have drove the buggy for a few holes”.
31. In Mr Thorpe’s outcome letter dated 8 August 2017 he told the Claimant
that he was not upholding the appeal. His reasons were that the
Claimant had not sought immediate medical attention (e.g. by going to
A&E rather than waiting for a GP appointment) (Mr Thorpe accepted
under cross examination that he had incorrectly expressed the number of
days in his appeal outcome letter); the Claimant had told Mr Morrow on
13 July 2017 that he could not undertake light duties but yet the Golf
Club website recorded that he had come 2nd in the Waterloo Cup
competition on 19 June 2017 which called into question the extent of the
injury; that this did not indicate that the Claimant was acting in line with
the Respondent’s policy to “avoid undertaking activities to delay your
recovery”; that different accounts of the Claimant’s activities on 19 June
2017 had been given during the disciplinary process, including an initial
denial to Mr Morrow on 13 July 2017; that the explanation given about
‘putting a card in’ was “highly improbable”. Mr Thorpe found that the
Claimant had been dishonest about his activities on 19 June 2017 and
dishonest about the extent of his ankle injury and that he was guilty of
gross misconduct. Mr Thorpe also made reference to the final written
warning given on 1 June 2017 which would have led to dismissal even if
this hadn’t been regarded as gross misconduct. He stated that he
considered whether any alternatives to dismissal were possible but in
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view of the Claimant being a remote worker and the breakdown in trust
and confidence, he considered that dismissal was appropriate.
32. It was clear from Mr Thorpe’s appeal outcome letter, from the note of the
appeal hearing and from his witness statement and oral evidence that Mr
Thorpe took a dim view of the Claimant’s explanation (that he had ‘put a
card in’) and that Mr Thorpe viewed that as a dishonest act (if it had
happened) and that Mr Thorpe viewed the Claimant’s assertion that he
had done this previously as an indication of dishonesty.
The Law
Unfair Dismissal
33. The following sections of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996)
are relevant:
94 The right
(1) An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.
98 General
(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee
is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show— (a) the reason (or, if more than
one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason
falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to
justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee
held.
(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it—
. . .
(b) relates to the conduct of the employee,
. . .
(4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the
determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having
regard to the reason shown by the employer)—
(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative
resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or
unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and
(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of
the case.
122 Basic award: reductions
…
(2) Where the tribunal considers that any conduct of the complainant before the
dismissal (or, where the dismissal was with notice, before the notice was given)
was such that it would be just and equitable to reduce or further reduce the
amount of the basic award to any extent, the tribunal shall reduce or further
reduce that amount accordingly.
123 Compensatory award
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and sections 124[, 124A and 126], the
amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the tribunal
considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss
sustained by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal in so far as that
loss is attributable to action taken by the employer.
Case Number: 3201548/2017
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…
(6) Where the tribunal finds that the dismissal was to any extent caused or
contributed to by any action of the complainant, it shall reduce the amount of the
compensatory award by such proportion as it considers just and equitable having
regard to that finding.
34. Both counsel supplied me with helpful oral and written submissions for
which I am grateful.
35. Misconduct is one of the potentially fair reasons for dismissal listed
in s98(2)(b) ERA 1996.
36. My primary guide to the question of fairness was the wording of s98(4)
ERA 1996. I am reminded that it is not for me to substitute my judgment
for that of the Respondent.
Conclusions
Unfair Dismissal
Reason for Dismissal
37. The reason for dismissal was clearly misconduct. The Respondent put
the Claimant through a disciplinary process and arrived at a conclusion
that he was guilty of gross misconduct based upon the information
gathered during that process.
Fairness
38. I accepted the evidence of Mr Owen (and Mr Thorpe) which is consistent
with the documentary evidence, that the decision makers believed that
the Claimant was guilty of dishonesty in relation to playing a round of golf
on 19 June 2017; and as to the extent of his injury.
39. The Respondent had reasonable grounds for coming to this conclusion in
that the Golf Club website indicated that the Claimant had come 2nd in
the Waterloo Cup – played on 19 June 2017 and that it reasonably
considered that the Claimant’s answers had been initially untruthful (in
that he initially denied playing golf to Mr Morrow on 13 June 2017) and
then that his story developed over time. The Respondent had reasonable
grounds for rejecting the Claimant’s alternative explanation – which in its
ultimate form was that he initially went to the golf club to practise putting,
then attempted to play a round of golf, abandoning that attempt at the
first hole due to his ankle injury and then ‘put a card in’ falsely stating that
he had played when he had not. This account could be true and the
handwritten letter from the Claimant’s friends leant it some weight, but it
was not unreasonable for the Respondent to consider the Claimant’s
account implausible and in any event, even on the Claimant’s account,
he had gone to the golf club (and ultimately attempted to play a round of
golf) at a time when he was asserting that he could not work, even on
light duties or home duties. In light of the Respondent’s initial finding that
he had played the round of golf, as the club website suggested, it was
reasonable to conclude that he was exaggerating the extent of his injury
in saying that he could not work as a result of the injury. I did not
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consider it unreasonable for the Respondent not to have asked for
further medical evidence before coming to this conclusion and the GP
certificates would not have prevented such a conclusion.
40. I considered whether a reasonable investigation had taken place. I
considered that it was reasonable for Mr Morrow to conduct the
investigation and I reject the Claimant’s contention that he should not
have done so because of his involvement in the separate earlier
disciplinary matter. I considered that it was reasonable for Mr Morrow to
have raised the golfing query at the meeting on 13 July 2017. There is no
need to flag such matters up in advance at an investigation stage of the
process. I accepted the Respondent’s evidence that the 2015 matter was
not ultimately relevant to the decision to dismiss. Three matters did give
me a reason to pause:
a. The first was the Claimant’s absence from the disciplinary hearing.
However the Claimant had been warned that the hearing could go
ahead in his absence; he was represented at the hearing; and the
appeal hearing conducted by Mr Thorpe did permit him to set out
his account in full.
b. The second was that Mr Morrow said at the disciplinary hearing that
the respondent was going to contact the Golf Club – although this
did not ultimately happen. The assistance that might have been
provided by the Golf Club was not immediately obvious. Its position
was clearly as displayed on its website, i.e. that the Claimant had at
least purported to play a round of golf on 19 June 2017. The Golf
Club could have issued a statement which would have assisted
with how plausible it was that the Claimant had ‘put a card in’
without playing a round – but even this would have only got the
Claimant so far given that he still went to the golf club, still
attempted to play and had still lied about this when initially
confronted by Mr Morrow.
c. The third was the emphasis placed (primarily by Mr Thorpe) on the
dishonesty of ‘putting a card in’ – which although disreputable is an
offence against the rules and regulations of golf and not relevant to
the Claimant’s employment. Although Mr Thorpe placed greater
emphasis on this than I would have done (albeit that that is not the
relevant test in any event) – it did not infect his core decision which
was that the Claimant had played a round of golf that day and that
he had been dishonest about it when asked by the Respondent.
41. On balance and taking into account the investigation as a whole, I did not
consider that these factors placed the Respondent’s investigation outside
the band of reasonable responses.
42. Dismissal was within the band of reasonable sanctions, even taking into
account the Claimant’s considerable 27 years of service. The
Respondent had found that the Claimant had been dishonest in relation
to playing in a golf competition when off sick due to his ankle injury and
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therefore that he had been dishonest about the extent of that injury. That
dishonesty was directed to his employer. It was reasonable to place a
considerable emphasis on the breakdown of trust and confidence that
resulted from these findings.
43. Having considered those various elements of fairness individually before
I then took an overview and asking myself whether in all the
circumstances the Respondent acted reasonably in dismissing the
Claimant. I concluded that it had acted reasonably.
44. It is also clear that the Claimant would have been dismissed in any event,
given the final written warning on his record, which he had not appealed.
Even on the Claimant’s account, he had initially been dishonest when
asked about golf by Mr Morrow. Such a dismissal would have been on
notice.
45. I did not consider that it was necessary for me to investigate the
appropriateness of the earlier final written warning, which the Claimant
hadn’t appealed, given that the Claimant was fairly summarily dismissed
by Mr Owen for gross misconduct (dishonesty). Mr Owen did not take it
into account as a reason for dismissal – referring only to the timing of the
absence as having started on the day when the final written warning was
issued; and at the end of his dismissal letter mentioning that it would
have led to the Claimant’s dismissal in any event. The sanction issued on
1 June 2017 did not in any event appear to me to be one which ‘plainly
ought not to be imposed’.
Polkey, Conduct and Contribution
46. It is not necessary for me to address these matters in detail given my
findings as to unfair dismissal above, however if the dismissal had been
unfair, I would have reduced both the Claimant’s basic award and
compensatory award by 100% given that on balance of probabilities, he
had clearly committed misconduct by playing golf when he was off work
due to an ankle injury, and then lied about it - thereby contributing to his
dismissal.
Wrongful Dismissal
47. On balance, I find that the Claimant did play a round of golf on 17 June
2017, as recorded on the Golf Club website and that he was dishonest
about having done so and that therefore he was dishonestly
exaggerating the extent of his injuries when he asserted that he could not
work in any capacity. I read and listened to the Claimant’s account and I
could not be sure hat he was not telling the truth, but on balance, taking
into account his suspicious initial denial to Mr Morrow, which the
Claimant admitted to the tribunal (and had admitted to the Respondent
during the disciplinary process), and taking in to account that it was
unnecessary for the Claimant to have ‘put a card in’ on that particular
day, I did not accept his evidence on this point. Dishonesty to one’s
employer is a breach of contract which entitles the employer to terminate
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the contract of employment summarily. The Claimant was not entitled to
notice pay.
Summary Conclusion
48. Therefore the Claimant’s claims for unfair dismissal and wrongful
dismissal fail and are dismissed.
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