Mr J Priday v Elemental Digest Ltd: 1400583/2020
Employment Tribunal
Published on 08 June 2021, 08:03
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
unfair-dismissal unlawful-deduction-from-wages working-time-regulations
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2020-10-06
Change History
-
New Judgment
-
Reasons
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No: 1400583/2020
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr J Priday
Respondent: Elemental Digest Ltd
Heard at: Southampton by Cloud Video On: 5-6 October 2020
Before: Employment Judge Reed
Representation
Claimant: Mr J Bromige, counsel
Respondent: Mr N Siddall QC, counsel
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the tribunal is that
1 The claimant was not an employee or a worker of the respondent.
2 The claimant is directed to pay the costs of the respondent of
defending the claim, from 8 May 2020, to be determined at detailed
assessment.
Employment Judge Reed
Dated: 6 October 2020
Judgement sent to Parties: 22 October 2020
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Note
Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be
provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is
presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.
Case No: 1400583/2020
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr J Priday
Respondent: Elemental Digest Ltd
Heard at: Southampton by Cloud Video On: 5-6 October 2020
Before: Employment Judge Reed
Representation
Claimant: Mr J Bromige, counsel
Respondent: Mr N Siddall QC, counsel
JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 22 October 2020 and written
reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 62(3) of the
Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013, the following reasons are
provided:
REASONS
1 In this case the claimant Mr Priday said he had been unfairly dismissed and that
he was owed certain moneys by the respondent, Elemental Digest Ltd (“EDL”).
For EDL it was denied that Mr Priday had been either an employee or a worker of
theirs, such that he could not take forward his claims. This was a preliminary
hearing held by Cloud Video in order to determine Mr Priday’s employment
status.
2 I heard evidence from Mr Priday and, on behalf of EDL, from Mr Ash and Mr
Palmer. All three were at the relevant time directors of EDL. In addition, my
attention was directed to certain documents and I reached the following findings
of fact.
3 EDL was incorporated in 2012. It was set up to exploit a process for recovering
and recycling abattoir and industrial by-products. Mr Priday became a director in
2013. Thereafter until his removal in 2019 he essentially had two relationships
with EDL. In his role as director, it was agreed among the parties that he would
undertake his duties unpaid, as did his fellow directors. The expectation, or at
least the hope, was that if the business took off they would reap the rewards via
their shareholdings. This was acceptable to all of the directors because they all
had other business interests that could provide them with an income.
Case No: 1400583/2020
4 As distinct from Mr Priday’s directorship he undertook extensive paid work for
EDL. Mr Priday is a commercial finance professional and a tax accountant. He is
also legally qualified. He is a director of several companies in his family’s group
of companies, the Pridis group. It was via companies in that group, and
particularly Pridis Consulting Ltd (“PCL”), that he worked for EDL. Throughout the
period of his involvement with EDL he supplied invoices for the professional work
he was undertaking for the company and those invoices, in the name of
companies in the Pridis group, and especially PCL, were paid by EDL. The work
undertaken by the Pridis companies was the accounting, insurance, legal and
other services required by a company such as EDL. Mr Priday also undertook
work for other companies in the Pridis group and PCL undertook work for other
clients.
5 At first, payment to the Pridis companies was made by standing order but Mr Ash
felt this was too expensive and in 2016 it was replaced by what was called a
good faith fee principle agreement. In order to keep fees down, the
understanding was that Mr Priday would do his best to undertake duties for EDL,
via the Pridis companies, before 9am and after 4pm. The terms of the
arrangement clearly indicated an expectation on the part of both parties that Mr
Priday would be carrying out the work himself.
6 On 1 December 2016 Mr Ash wrote to Mr Priday about the fees being charged
and stated “we definitely need to employ you direct – it would be a much less
complex management of fees and time!”. On the face of it, such a statement was
incompatible with Mr Priday being an employee but Mr Priday did not reply to
suggest that he was an employee.
7 From late 2016 EDL was in discussions with potential funders. Draft director
service agreements were drawn up which it was intended would be executed if
funding was put in place. Such documents were produced for Mr Priday and
clearly had any of them been signed he would have become an employee (albeit
of another company in the EDL group). However, at least while Mr Priday was a
director, the service agreements were not signed or put in place.
8 In October 2019 a dispute arose between Mr Priday and his fellow directors in
connection with the fees invoiced by the Pridis companies and as a consequence
he was removed as a director.
9 Under s230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 an employee means an
individual who has entered into or works under a contract of employment ie a
contract of service. A worker means an individual who has entered into or works
under either a contract of employment or any other contract whereby the
individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for
another party to the contract whose status is not that of a client or customer of
any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.
10 For Mr Priday I was urged to conclude that he was an employee of EDL,
alternatively a worker, from the inception of his work for EDL, or if not, from 2016
when the good faith fee principle agreement came into effect.
Case No: 1400583/2020
11 For him to succeed, I would have to be satisfied that there was a contract of
some sort direct between himself and EDL. I concluded there was not.
12 At no stage was Mr Priday “on the books” of EDL. He was not treated as an
employee. Payment was made on invoices rendered by various companies in the
Pridis group. Those invoices might be in respect of work carried out by other
employees in the Pridis group, not just Mr Priday. VAT was being charged on the
fees. Mr Priday was not on the payroll of EDL and nor was there any involvement
of PAYE. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the tasks undertaken by the Pridis
group for EDL included tax and payroll. Mr Priday could simply have added
himself to the payroll if he genuinely considered himself an employee.
13 Mr Priday indicated in his tax returns that he was an employee of various Pridis
companies but not EDL. As he pointed out in evidence, his tax return would be
populated by figures produced by PAYE returns, which clearly would not indicate
he was employed by EDL. However, the result was that if he was an employee of
EDL, he was making returns that he knew were untrue. He could have taken
steps to address and rectify that situation but chose not to. That indicated to me
that he did not believe EDL was his employer.
14 Mr Priday certainly did the bulk of the work invoiced. However, he was also
undertaking other work, for other companies in the Pridis group.
15 In 2014 he was granted generous share options and it was suggested that this
was some sort of reward for and recognition of the work he was doing “over and
above” that of an ordinary director. That did not seem to make sense. I was
satisfied that it was fully understood by him that work qua director would be
carried out without charge. The share option was “delayed gratification”, in the
same way as the expectation that the share value would rise.
16 On the face of it, this was a perfectly ordinary commercial arrangement between
corporate entities. There was no question of EDL forcing Mr Priday (or more
accurately his company) to contract in this way. Mr Priday at no time suggested
that he needed to go on EDL’s books and be paid via PAYE. He said that the
reason for that was that EDL could not manage the cash flow. That did not seem
to make sense. Whether described as fees or salary, EDL would incur
indebtedness as a result of the work he was undertaking.
17 Mr Priday placed much reliance on the draft service agreements produced in
connection with the efforts to find funding. In my view they largely undermined his
case. These were documents that would regulate the relations of the parties if
funding was put in place. In other words, they reflected a situation that, as it
happens, never came about. Mr Priday would become an employee if the
contracts were concluded: unless and until they were, he was not.
18 To put the matter another way, a director’s service agreement is precisely the
sort of document one would have expected the parties to have concluded when
Mr Priday became an employee. None ever was.
19 Mr Priday was in a position to point to certain aspects of the relationship that
were consistent with his being an employee. He wore a uniform. He referred to
himself as having been an employee in an email of 23 December 2013.
Case No: 1400583/2020
20 There was also certainly a personal aspect to the good faith fee principle
agreement – the reference to the hours to be worked clearly indicated an
expectation that Mr Priday would be carrying out duties personally. However, that
was simply a reflection of what the parties knew, namely that although the
contract would be with companies in the Pridis group, he had the expertise
required and the likelihood was that he would be doing the bulk if not all of the
work. He still continued to submit invoices as before.
21 New articles of association were adopted by EDL in October 2019 shortly before
the departure of Mr Priday. It was suggested that they contained a quasi
disciplinary procedure for directors and as such should be taken to support the
suggestion that he was an employee. However, it was perfectly clear that Mr
Priday’s fellow directors did not consider him an employee. I could hardly infer
that they had decided to implement this procedure in order to recognise that he
was. In any event, I did not believe the new articles had any impact upon the
legal relationship between the parties.
22 On a straightforward analysis, what the arrangement between the Pridis
companies and EDL appeared to be was an agreement between companies. If
that was right then there was no obligation upon Mr Priday to perform any work
personally and no contract direct between him and EDL. There will be
circumstances in which it is right to pierce the corporate veil and perhaps imply
the existence of a contract. That will particularly be so where the apparent,
commercial arrangement does not reflect reality. There was no reason to do so
here. Mr Priday was and is an experienced businessman. He knew full well what
sort of arrangement he was entering into. This was an arm’s length agreement
between corporate entities. There was no contract direct between Mr Priday and
EDL so it followed that he could not have been either an employee or a worker. It
followed that his claims fell to be dismissed.
23 The respondent sought its costs. The power to award costs is contained in rule
76 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013. That rule obliges me to
consider whether to make an order where I consider, inter alia, that a party has
acted unreasonably in bringing proceedings or the claim had no reasonable
prospect of success.
24 I was satisfied that Mr Priday had indeed acted unreasonably in taking
proceedings and that his claims had no reasonable prospect of success. As I
have mentioned, what he would have had me conclude was that I should ignore
the appearance of the corporate arrangement but I could not see how he could
ever have expected that I would do so. It was obvious in my view that he had no
personal contract with EDL and therefore that his claim would fail.
25 That is the first stage of the process and effectively gives me a discretion whether
to award costs. I must still decide how to exercise that discretion and I must bear
in mind that an order for costs is very much the exception in the employment
tribunal.
26 However, I concluded that it would be appropriate to award costs. I believed Mr
Priday was fully aware how weak his case was. He was an experienced man of
commerce who went into his dealings with EDL with his eyes open. The evidence
of his tax returns made it clear what he believed. This claim was, in my view, a
“try on”.
Case No: 1400583/2020
27 The weakness of his case was brought to his attention in the very response from
the respondent, whose solicitors followed up with two “Calderbank” letters to the
same effect.
28 There was certainly an argument that costs should be awarded from the
commencement of proceedings. I could not see how at any stage Mr Priday
could sensibly have thought his claims had merit. However, I was prepared to
approach the matter in this way. He was entitled to “cast his bread upon the
water” and see what position the respondent might take. The respondent pointed
out the weakness in his case and it was appropriate to allow him some time to
consider his position. For that reason, I felt it was more appropriate to consider
that he should be permitted to commence the proceedings “risk free” and to
award costs only from the effluxion of the warning in the respondent’s solicitors’
letter of 1 May 2020. Accordingly, the claimant was directed to pay the
respondent’s costs from 8 May.
29 I was informed that those costs were likely to exceed £20,000 and accordingly I
directed that they be determined at detailed assessment.
_____________________________
Employment Judge Reed
_____________________________
Date: 22 November 2020
REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
.......26 November 2020.................
.............
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Case No: 1400583/2020
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr J Priday
Respondent: Elemental Digest Ltd
Heard at: Southampton by Cloud Video On: 5-6 October 2020
Before: Employment Judge Reed
Representation
Claimant: Mr J Bromige, counsel
Respondent: Mr N Siddall QC, counsel
JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 22 October 2020 and written
reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 62(3) of the
Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013, the following reasons are
provided:
REASONS
1 In this case the claimant Mr Priday said he had been unfairly dismissed and that
he was owed certain moneys by the respondent, Elemental Digest Ltd (“EDL”).
For EDL it was denied that Mr Priday had been either an employee or a worker of
theirs, such that he could not take forward his claims. This was a preliminary
hearing held by Cloud Video in order to determine Mr Priday’s employment
status.
2 I heard evidence from Mr Priday and, on behalf of EDL, from Mr Ash and Mr
Palmer. All three were at the relevant time directors of EDL. In addition, my
attention was directed to certain documents and I reached the following findings
of fact.
3 EDL was incorporated in 2012. It was set up to exploit a process for recovering
and recycling abattoir and industrial by-products. Mr Priday became a director in
2013. Thereafter until his removal in 2019 he essentially had two relationships
with EDL. In his role as director, it was agreed among the parties that he would
undertake his duties unpaid, as did his fellow directors. The expectation, or at
least the hope, was that if the business took off they would reap the rewards via
their shareholdings. This was acceptable to all of the directors because they all
had other business interests that could provide them with an income.
Case No: 1400583/2020
4 As distinct from Mr Priday’s directorship he undertook extensive paid work for
EDL. Mr Priday is a commercial finance professional and a tax accountant. He is
also legally qualified. He is a director of several companies in his family’s group
of companies, the Pridis group. It was via companies in that group, and
particularly Pridis Consulting Ltd (“PCL”), that he worked for EDL. Throughout the
period of his involvement with EDL he supplied invoices for the professional work
he was undertaking for the company and those invoices, in the name of
companies in the Pridis group, and especially PCL, were paid by EDL. The work
undertaken by the Pridis companies was the accounting, insurance, legal and
other services required by a company such as EDL. Mr Priday also undertook
work for other companies in the Pridis group and PCL undertook work for other
clients.
5 At first, payment to the Pridis companies was made by standing order but Mr Ash
felt this was too expensive and in 2016 it was replaced by what was called a
good faith fee principle agreement. In order to keep fees down, the
understanding was that Mr Priday would do his best to undertake duties for EDL,
via the Pridis companies, before 9am and after 4pm. The terms of the
arrangement clearly indicated an expectation on the part of both parties that Mr
Priday would be carrying out the work himself.
6 On 1 December 2016 Mr Ash wrote to Mr Priday about the fees being charged
and stated “we definitely need to employ you direct – it would be a much less
complex management of fees and time!”. On the face of it, such a statement was
incompatible with Mr Priday being an employee but Mr Priday did not reply to
suggest that he was an employee.
7 From late 2016 EDL was in discussions with potential funders. Draft director
service agreements were drawn up which it was intended would be executed if
funding was put in place. Such documents were produced for Mr Priday and
clearly had any of them been signed he would have become an employee (albeit
of another company in the EDL group). However, at least while Mr Priday was a
director, the service agreements were not signed or put in place.
8 In October 2019 a dispute arose between Mr Priday and his fellow directors in
connection with the fees invoiced by the Pridis companies and as a consequence
he was removed as a director.
9 Under s230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 an employee means an
individual who has entered into or works under a contract of employment ie a
contract of service. A worker means an individual who has entered into or works
under either a contract of employment or any other contract whereby the
individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for
another party to the contract whose status is not that of a client or customer of
any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.
10 For Mr Priday I was urged to conclude that he was an employee of EDL,
alternatively a worker, from the inception of his work for EDL, or if not, from 2016
when the good faith fee principle agreement came into effect.
Case No: 1400583/2020
11 For him to succeed, I would have to be satisfied that there was a contract of
some sort direct between himself and EDL. I concluded there was not.
12 At no stage was Mr Priday “on the books” of EDL. He was not treated as an
employee. Payment was made on invoices rendered by various companies in the
Pridis group. Those invoices might be in respect of work carried out by other
employees in the Pridis group, not just Mr Priday. VAT was being charged on the
fees. Mr Priday was not on the payroll of EDL and nor was there any involvement
of PAYE. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the tasks undertaken by the Pridis
group for EDL included tax and payroll. Mr Priday could simply have added
himself to the payroll if he genuinely considered himself an employee.
13 Mr Priday indicated in his tax returns that he was an employee of various Pridis
companies but not EDL. As he pointed out in evidence, his tax return would be
populated by figures produced by PAYE returns, which clearly would not indicate
he was employed by EDL. However, the result was that if he was an employee of
EDL, he was making returns that he knew were untrue. He could have taken
steps to address and rectify that situation but chose not to. That indicated to me
that he did not believe EDL was his employer.
14 Mr Priday certainly did the bulk of the work invoiced. However, he was also
undertaking other work, for other companies in the Pridis group.
15 In 2014 he was granted generous share options and it was suggested that this
was some sort of reward for and recognition of the work he was doing “over and
above” that of an ordinary director. That did not seem to make sense. I was
satisfied that it was fully understood by him that work qua director would be
carried out without charge. The share option was “delayed gratification”, in the
same way as the expectation that the share value would rise.
16 On the face of it, this was a perfectly ordinary commercial arrangement between
corporate entities. There was no question of EDL forcing Mr Priday (or more
accurately his company) to contract in this way. Mr Priday at no time suggested
that he needed to go on EDL’s books and be paid via PAYE. He said that the
reason for that was that EDL could not manage the cash flow. That did not seem
to make sense. Whether described as fees or salary, EDL would incur
indebtedness as a result of the work he was undertaking.
17 Mr Priday placed much reliance on the draft service agreements produced in
connection with the efforts to find funding. In my view they largely undermined his
case. These were documents that would regulate the relations of the parties if
funding was put in place. In other words, they reflected a situation that, as it
happens, never came about. Mr Priday would become an employee if the
contracts were concluded: unless and until they were, he was not.
18 To put the matter another way, a director’s service agreement is precisely the
sort of document one would have expected the parties to have concluded when
Mr Priday became an employee. None ever was.
19 Mr Priday was in a position to point to certain aspects of the relationship that
were consistent with his being an employee. He wore a uniform. He referred to
himself as having been an employee in an email of 23 December 2013.
Case No: 1400583/2020
20 There was also certainly a personal aspect to the good faith fee principle
agreement – the reference to the hours to be worked clearly indicated an
expectation that Mr Priday would be carrying out duties personally. However, that
was simply a reflection of what the parties knew, namely that although the
contract would be with companies in the Pridis group, he had the expertise
required and the likelihood was that he would be doing the bulk if not all of the
work. He still continued to submit invoices as before.
21 New articles of association were adopted by EDL in October 2019 shortly before
the departure of Mr Priday. It was suggested that they contained a quasi
disciplinary procedure for directors and as such should be taken to support the
suggestion that he was an employee. However, it was perfectly clear that Mr
Priday’s fellow directors did not consider him an employee. I could hardly infer
that they had decided to implement this procedure in order to recognise that he
was. In any event, I did not believe the new articles had any impact upon the
legal relationship between the parties.
22 On a straightforward analysis, what the arrangement between the Pridis
companies and EDL appeared to be was an agreement between companies. If
that was right then there was no obligation upon Mr Priday to perform any work
personally and no contract direct between him and EDL. There will be
circumstances in which it is right to pierce the corporate veil and perhaps imply
the existence of a contract. That will particularly be so where the apparent,
commercial arrangement does not reflect reality. There was no reason to do so
here. Mr Priday was and is an experienced businessman. He knew full well what
sort of arrangement he was entering into. This was an arm’s length agreement
between corporate entities. There was no contract direct between Mr Priday and
EDL so it followed that he could not have been either an employee or a worker. It
followed that his claims fell to be dismissed.
23 The respondent sought its costs. The power to award costs is contained in rule
76 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013. That rule obliges me to
consider whether to make an order where I consider, inter alia, that a party has
acted unreasonably in bringing proceedings or the claim had no reasonable
prospect of success.
24 I was satisfied that Mr Priday had indeed acted unreasonably in taking
proceedings and that his claims had no reasonable prospect of success. As I
have mentioned, what he would have had me conclude was that I should ignore
the appearance of the corporate arrangement but I could not see how he could
ever have expected that I would do so. It was obvious in my view that he had no
personal contract with EDL and therefore that his claim would fail.
25 That is the first stage of the process and effectively gives me a discretion whether
to award costs. I must still decide how to exercise that discretion and I must bear
in mind that an order for costs is very much the exception in the employment
tribunal.
26 However, I concluded that it would be appropriate to award costs. I believed Mr
Priday was fully aware how weak his case was. He was an experienced man of
commerce who went into his dealings with EDL with his eyes open. The evidence
of his tax returns made it clear what he believed. This claim was, in my view, a
“try on”.
Case No: 1400583/2020
27 The weakness of his case was brought to his attention in the very response from
the respondent, whose solicitors followed up with two “Calderbank” letters to the
same effect.
28 There was certainly an argument that costs should be awarded from the
commencement of proceedings. I could not see how at any stage Mr Priday
could sensibly have thought his claims had merit. However, I was prepared to
approach the matter in this way. He was entitled to “cast his bread upon the
water” and see what position the respondent might take. The respondent pointed
out the weakness in his case and it was appropriate to allow him some time to
consider his position. For that reason, I felt it was more appropriate to consider
that he should be permitted to commence the proceedings “risk free” and to
award costs only from the effluxion of the warning in the respondent’s solicitors’
letter of 1 May 2020. Accordingly, the claimant was directed to pay the
respondent’s costs from 8 May.
29 I was informed that those costs were likely to exceed £20,000 and accordingly I
directed that they be determined at detailed assessment.
_____________________________
Employment Judge Reed
_____________________________
Date: 22 November 2020
REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
.......26 November 2020.................
.............
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Case Number: 1400583/2020
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
BETWEEN
Claimant Respondent
Mr J Priday AND Elemental Digest Limited
JUDGMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL
HELD REMOTELY AT Plymouth ON 20 May 2021
By Cloud Video Platform
EMPLOYMENT JUDGE N J Roper
Representation
For the Claimant: Mr M Blitz of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr A Nicol of Counsel
ORDER
Following an assessment of costs pursuant to Rule 78(1)(a):
1. BY CONSENT and pursuant to Rule 78(1)(e) the claimant is ordered to
pay the respondent’s costs in the agreed sum of £37,000.00 inclusive of
interest within 14 days; and
2. The claimant is ordered to pay the respondent the further sum of
£7,000.00 inclusive of interest within 14 days being the costs payable on
the above assessment.
Employment Judge N J Roper
Date: 20 May 2021
Judgment sent to the Parties: 27 May 2021
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
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