Mr L Samuels v Solstice Ltd: 2300834/2017
Employment Tribunal
Published on 03 December 2019, 13:01
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
disability-discrimination
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2018-04-20
Change History
-
New Judgment
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No: 2300734/2017
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Between
Claimant: Mr L Samuels
Respondent: Solstice Limited
Heard at London South Employment Tribunal on 1 June 2017
Before Employment Judge Baron
Representation:
Claimant: The Claimant was present in person
Respondent: Ian Meth - Consultant
JUDGMENT AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING
It is the judgment of the Tribunal that no order be made on the applications by
the Respondent for an order under either or rule 39 or 37 of the Employment
Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013.
REASONS
1 On 17 March 2017 the Claimant presented a claim form ET1 to the
Tribunal, and on 4 April 2017 the Respondent presented a response in
which it was stated that the Respondent intended to defend the claim.
The claim is one of disability discrimination based upon the impairment
of epilepsy. In paragraphs 30 and 31 of the details of the response the
Respondent sought an order under rule 37 of the Employment Tribunals
Rules of Procedure 2013 striking out the claim on the ground that it had
no reasonable prospect of success, or in the alternative an order under
rule 39 for the payment of a deposit as a condition of being allowed to
continue with the claim. This hearing was listed to consider such
applications.
2 Mr Meth quite properly accepted that the Tribunal should be slow to
strike out any claim, especially where there is a dispute as to a material
fact or facts. He also acknowledged that is recognised that discrimination
cases are generally very fact sensitive. Mr Meth accepted that the
Claimant’s case should be taken at its highest as set out in the claim
form. Nevertheless, he submitted, this claim did have no reasonable
prospect of success, and should be struck out.
3 It is agreed that the Claimant sought employment with the Respondent
and was offered an interview on 7 February 2017. He arrived some 15
minutes early for the interview, but nevertheless he was seen by the
interviewer, Ms Chloe Cleverly. It is at this juncture that the versions of
Case No: 2300734/2017
2
events set out by the Claimant and the Respondent diverge
spectacularly.
4 In the claim form the Claimant stated that he had an epileptic seizure just
as he entered the room for the interview, and lost consciousness. When
he regained consciousness he realised colleagues in the business were
asking him to leave the building, and that they were not prepared to talk
to him. The Claimant said that he then went to Croydon University
Hospital for a check-up.
5 In the response form ET3 the Respondent said that as soon as the
Claimant sat down for the interview he started chanting and undressed
down to his boxer shorts. The Claimant was told to get dressed, upon
which he became aggressive. He eventually got dressed again and was
then accompanied from the office.
6 There is agreement between the parties that the Respondent did not
thereafter take any further steps to pursue the Claimant’s application for
employment.
7 In the claim form the Claimant said that he had received an email from
the General Manager making an allegation that he had taken his clothes
off. Mr Meth pointed out the following sentence in the details of the
claim:
These are all false allegations just because they think they can’t work with someone who will
be having epileptic seizures from time to time at their workplace.
8 Mr Meth submitted that if the Claimant had been unconscious as he
alleges then he would not be able to give a factual account of what
happened. He would not be able to say that the accusation that he was
taking his clothes off was false, as he alleges. The Respondent’s
witnesses were the only credible ones, said Mr Meth.
9 Mr Meth then addressed the legal position. He referred to the apparent
conflict between section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 which defines a
disability (supplemented by Schedule 1 to the Act) and regulation 4 of
the Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) Regulations 1996.1
That regulation provides that certain conditions are not to be treated as
impairments for the purposes of section 1, and thus cannot be a
disability.
10 Mr Meth referred me to the judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal
by HHJ Peter Clark sitting with lay members in Edmund Nuttall Ltd v.
Butterfield [2005] IRLR 751.
A claimant may have both a legitimate impairment and an excluded condition. The critical
question is one of causation: what was the reason for the less favourable treatment? If the
reason was the legitimate impairment, then that is prima facie discrimination. If the reason was
the excluded condition and not the legitimate impairment, then the claim fails. Where both the
legitimate impairment and an excluded condition form the employer's reason for the less
favourable treatment, if the legitimate impairment was a reason, and thus an effective cause of
the less favourable treatment, then prima facie discrimination is made out notwithstanding that
the excluded condition also forms part of the employer's reason for that treatment. However,
1 The regulation was set out in the ET3 and it need not be repeated here for the benefit of the
Claimant.
Case No: 2300734/2017
3
where the excluded condition is the reason for the less favourable treatment, that there is an
underlying legitimate medical impairment does not mean that disability is a reason for the less
favourable treatment. That would render the effect of the Regulations nugatory.
11 Although I was not referred to the authority, I note that Butterfield was
considered in some detail by Lloyd Jones J in the High Court in
Governing Body of X Endowed Primary School v. Special Needs and
Disability Tribunal [2009] IRLR 1007. The relevant part of the headnote
is as follows:
It follows that it is necessary in cases involving reg. 4(1) to examine whether discrimination
relates to a protected disability, or an excluded condition, or to both. If the discrimination
relates to a protected disability, or to both a protected disability and an excluded condition,
then the discrimination is unlawful under the 1995 Act.
12 Mr Meth submitted that the reason for the Respondent’s failure to
consider the Claimant’s application for employment further was because
of the taking off of his clothes, which was exhibitionism and so an
excluded condition within regulation 4, and was not because of any
disability. The Claimant was not in a position to assert that the allegation
that he had taken off his clothes was a false one, said Mr Meth, because
his assertion was that he was unconscious at the time. Therefore, he
said, the claim had no reasonable prospect of success. In the
alternative, it had little reasonable prospect of success.
13 The Claimant addressed the Tribunal. It is no criticism of him to say that
he did not address the legal issues – he is not a lawyer. He gave a
history of the onset of his epilepsy in 2007. He said that he had never
take his clothes off during a seizure.
14 My conclusion is absolutely straightforward. I take the claim at its face
value. There is a stark conflict of evidence as to what occurred. That can
only be decided by a Tribunal having heard all the evidence. Following
findings of fact then the Tribunal must decide what are the legal
consequences, and Butterfield and The Governing Body of X then
potentially become relevant.
15 The fact that the Claimant stated in the claim form that the allegation that
he took his clothes off was false cannot in my judgment have the
significance that Mr Meth sought to put upon it. As mentioned, the
Claimant told me that he had never taken clothes off during an epileptic
episode. It is not surprising therefore that he described the allegation as
a false one.
16 I decline to make either of the orders sought by the Respondent for the
above reasons. I do comment, however, that because the versions of
events given by each of the parties are so different then it is at least
possible that the Tribunal may make an order for costs against a party if
his or its version of events is found to have been concocted.
17 The matter will be listed for a preliminary hearing by telephone to
consider further case management.
Case No: 2300734/2017
4
Employment Judge Baron
05 June 2017
Case No: 2300834/2017
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr L Samuels
Respondent: Solstice Limited
JUDGMENT
The proceedings are dismissed following a withdrawal of the claim by the
Claimant.
Regional Employment Judge Hildebrand
Date 20 April 2018
Related Parties
Search the database for other cases involving these individuals or companies.