Mr M F Sarwar v Dataforce Interact Ltd: 3304815/2018
Employment Tribunal
Published on 02 September 2019, 15:09
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
public-interest-disclosure race-discrimination religion-or-belief-discrimination sex-discrimination
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2019-07-02
Change History
-
Reasons attached.
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case Number: 3304815/2018
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondent
Mr M F Sarwar v Dataforce Interact Limited
Heard at: Bury St Edmunds On: 17- 21 June 2019
Before: Employment Judge Cassel
Members: Ms L Daniels and Mr B Smith
Appearances
For the Claimant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr A MacNellan, Counsel
JUDGMENT
1. The name of the Respondent be amended to that as shown above.
2. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear complaints of breach of protected
disclosure and what is described as accusations of misconduct.
3. The remaining claims are dismissed.
_____________________________
Employment Judge Cassel
Date: 2 July 2019
Sent to the parties on: ........17.07.19..
............................................................
For the Tribunal Office
Note
Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided
unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party
within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.
Case No: 3304815/2018
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondent
Mr M F Sarwar v Dataforce Interact Limited
Heard at: Bury St Edmunds On: 17 – 21 June 2019
Before: Employment Judge Cassel
Members: Ms L Daniels and Mr B Smith
Appearances:
For the Claimant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr A MacNellan, Counsel
JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 17 July 2019 and reasons
having been requested in accordance with Rule 62(3) of the Rules of Procedure
2013, the following reasons are provided:
REASONS
1. The Claimant, Mr Mohammad Farhan Sarwar, submitted a claim form that
was received by the Tribunal on 18 March 2018. Following its submission,
the matter was listed for a Case Management discussion which took place
on 3 October 2018 at Bury St Edmunds in front of Employment Judge
Laidler.
2. During that discussion there was some clarification of the claims that are
brought. They were described in some detail in the Case Management
Summary and six sub-headings were recorded which are as follows:
(1) protected disclosures;
(2) sex discrimination;
(3) religious discrimination;
(4) working time;
(5) the Claimant being accused of coming in late when he was not, by
Afreen Babar; and
(6) accusation of mistreatment of company property by the breaking of
a monitor.
3. The hearing of the substantive claims at Bury St Edmunds took place over
Case No: 3304815/2018
2
four days for evidence to be taken and submissions and the
announcement of a decision on the fifth day. During the hearing the
Claimant represented himself and Mr MacNellan appeared for the
Respondent.
4. The Tribunal was conscious that the Claimant’s first language is not
English and we reminded ourselves of the overriding objective provided for
in the Rules of Procedure and among other things made sure that we put
the parties on an equal footing and took time to explain the procedure that
we would undertake.
5. During the hearing we heard evidence from the Claimant and we read
witness statements provided by him from Sandra Elesterio, Callum
Marlow, Owais Hussain and Syed Naqvi.
6. We heard evidence from the Respondent’s witnesses in the following
order: Mr Chris Venn, Mr David Raw, Ms Kim Morton, Ms Anne Vidler and
Ms Helen Whitworth. They gave evidence and the Claimant had the
opportunity of cross examining them.
7. We were provided with two substantial bundles of documents and made it
clear to the parties that only those documents to which reference was
made in evidence would be considered, apart from those of course
involving what are commonly called as pleadings; the claim form, the
response form and the case management summary. In addition, and it
was extremely helpful, the Respondent provided a chronology and cast list
with which broadly speaking the Claimant agreed. We explained that that
was not in itself evidence but was an indicator to us to assist in our
deliberations.
8. At the commencement of the proceedings on the first day, we explained to
both parties that the evidence we would consider during this part of the
hearing was for liability only. If the issue of remedy arose, it would be
considered separately.
9. At the end of the evidence, Mr MacNellan produced written submissions,
for which we are grateful, and the Claimant made oral submissions, which
we recorded in our notes of evidence. At the end of those submissions we
indicated that we would first deal with jurisdiction making those relevant
findings of fact that we considered appropriate and if we had jurisdiction
on any of the matters, would make further findings.
Jurisdiction
10. The first matter we considered was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to
hear the claims that were submitted and we deal with jurisdiction in the
same order as that which was disclosed in the Case Management
Discussion document.
11. Protected Disclosure
11.1 During the proceedings, it became apparent that the claim of
protected disclosure was very much bound up with the complaints
Case No: 3304815/2018
3
of bullying and harassment which were allegedly made by other
members of the workforce through entries in Facebook and
WhatsApp.
11.2 The Claimant advised the Respondent of that behaviour on or
around 30 March 2017. Enquiries were made by the Respondent
and it was concluded that the events that took place did so whilst
the Claimant was an Agency worker and that the Agency had dealt
with it. An issue as to whether all of those engaged in that
behaviour were Agency workers or permanent staff arose, but we
make no specific findings of fact as to who did what, whether they
were Agency workers or whether they were in their place of work.
That in our view is not the issue. The fact of the matter was that the
Claimant having raised the complaint, that behaviour ceased very
shortly thereafter.
11.3 There was vague evidence which amounted to a simple allegation
that in some way through “bad mouthing” and other acts in the
office, that behaviour continued. At its highest there was no
credible evidence that that could be linked to treatment raised
insofar as protected disclosure, race, sex or religious discrimination.
11.4 The Tribunal does have power to extend jurisdiction. Broadly
speaking there are two circumstances. First, if the Tribunal finds
that the acts are continuing acts, that is acts that were performed
over a period of time, the last date on which those acts occur is the
date on which jurisdiction is calculated. There is also provision
within the Employment Rights Act 1996 under s.111 (2) (b) to
extend time. Under sub-section (2) we are told,
That an Employment Tribunal shall not consider a complaint
under this section unless it is presented to the Tribunal:
(a) before the end of the period of three months
beginning with the effective date of termination; or
(b) within such further period as the Tribunal considers
reasonable in the case which it is satisfied that it was
not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be
presented before the end of that period of three
months.
11.5 We find that the acts about which complaint was made fall into two
distinct categories. Those which ended in March or April 2017; and
these we find were discrete acts. So far as we can understand the
other acts, these were also discrete acts and there was nothing to
link them in any sensible view to the earlier acts. They were of an
entirely different nature so far as we can understand them. We do
not therefore find that the acts could be considered, or should be
considered as continuing.
11.6 We then look to evidence as to whether it was reasonably
practicable, or not, to bring the complaint within the period
Case No: 3304815/2018
4
described in the statutory provision in the Employment Rights Act
1996. There was in fact no evidence whatsoever that it was not
reasonably practicable, and thus no basis in law for us to extend
time.
11.7 For the sake of completeness, we deal with what has been
described as the second series of acts; the bullying and
harassment through “bad mouthing” in the work place. So far as
we can ascertain, reminding ourselves that we must apply the
balance of probabilities throughout these proceedings, we find that
such acts did not take place and in so far as the Tribunal does have
jurisdiction, we dismiss those claims.
12. Sex Discrimination
12.1 So far as we understand it, these fall into two parts. First, there
was a single act said to have taken place on 7 November 2017
which was described loosely, and we adopt the description, as an
unpleasant conversation. Second, there were further acts on 14
November 2017 when there was an indication given by Mr. Venn
that he would put on the Claimant’s file a note which Mr. Venn
described as the most minor of disciplinary sanctions. Pausing
there, we have seen the Respondent’s disciplinary procedure and
nowhere within that procedure does it state that such a note forms
part of a disciplinary procedural sanction.
12.2 The first act was one which was a discrete act. In our judgment, the
second acts can sensibly be described as continuing acts. In
evidence, Mr Venn told us that he started the investigation which he
ceased at the time when there was some reference to putting a
note on the Claimant’s disciplinary personnel file. Thereafter, the
investigation was undertaken by Mr. Craig Allen, from whom we did
not hear, who then concluded the investigation. Any alleged faults
in Mr Venn’s investigation were addressed by Mr Allen and men
working for the Respondent were interviewed and those were men
identified by the Claimant. Mr Allen’s investigation concluded on or
around 20 November 2017.
12.3 There was no credible evidence that the approach taken by Mr
Allen to the investigation was in any way discriminatory and in any
event, we find that any alleged discrimination must have ended on
20 November 2017. There was no credible evidence of any
continuing act or acts of discrimination.
12.4 The Equality Act 2010 also allows a Tribunal to extend times in
certain circumstances. Under s.123 Time Limits are specifically
referred to the proceedings on a complaint under the Equality Act
2010. At s.123(1)(a),
“The period of three months starting with the date of the act
to which the claim relates, is the date for which the
complaints must be raised in a claim to the Tribunal”.
Case No: 3304815/2018
5
Under s.123(1)(b), the Tribunal has power to extend that period by
reference to,
“such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just
and equitable”.
12.5 Before deciding to extend time, the Tribunal reminds itself that it is
the exception rather than the rule that allows time to be extended.
The second matter to which we paid careful attention was the
evidence given by the Claimant. There was no evidence at all as to
why the Tribunal should consider it just and equitable to extend
time. For those reasons the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the
complaint.
13. Religious Discrimination
13.1 The events appear to surround 10 November 2017 and in essence
the complaint made by the Claimant is that he was unable to attend
Friday prayers, and he is a devout Muslim, by reason of the
Respondent’s behaviour and more particularly the behaviour of Mr
Venn. The complaint is of a single act. The time for which a
complaint of Religious Discrimination must be presented to the
Tribunal is determined by the statutory provision that we have
referred to above. It must be within three months, making
allowance of course for that time which is necessary to complete
the requirements of Early Conciliation. The complaint was not
presented within that specified period of time and we have no
jurisdiction to hear the complaint. We add that even if we did have
jurisdiction, we would have dismissed that claim. There was no
evidence that Mr Venn acted in a discriminatory manner.
14. Working Time
14.1 The parties are agreed that the period in relation to this complaint
runs from 6 October 2017 until 2 December 2017. On behalf of the
Respondent, Mr MacNellan accepts that part, if not all of that period
of complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal bearing in
mind the date on which the claim form was submitted. However, for
reasons that we describe later, we do not address the question
whether there were continuing acts and whether all of those acts
fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
15. The Accusation of Coming in Late
15.1 We understand that the allegation of Race Discrimination and in the
alternative, victimisation, arises from allegations that the Claimant
arrived late for work on a number of occasions. We do not make
findings of fact as to whether in fact the Claimant did arrive late for
work, for reasons that we explain below. The comparator on whom
the Claimant relies is Mr Drage. It appears the basis of the
allegation that the Claimant makes is of an unlawful difference in
treatment. The Claimant was alleged to have attended work late on
a number of occasions and faced disciplinary action whereas Mr
Case No: 3304815/2018
6
Drage did exactly the same but did not face such action. There
was no clarity as to the dates of the lateness, but it is accepted by
the parties that this must have been either during October or
November 2017. So far as we understand the complaint, the first
time any decision making was considered, or action was taken, was
12 September 2018 which is a date following the submission of
the claim form. There was no separate claim form which raised this
complaint and no evidence that this matter had been addressed in
Early Conciliation and for these reasons we do not have jurisdiction
to hear the complaint.
16. Mistreatment of Property
16.1 We can deal with this matter briefly as although it is unclear as to
precisely what it is that is being claimed, the events post dated the
submission of the claim form and for the same reason as we have
dismissed the last claim, we dismiss this claim for lack of
jurisdiction.
17. Matters on which we do have jurisdiction
17.1 These can be sumarised as:
i. bullying and harassment; and
ii. breach of the Working Time Regulations.
17.2 As far as bullying and harassment is concerned, we remind
ourselves of the provisions of s.136 of the Equality Act 2010 which
is in the following terms:
1. This section applies to any proceedings relating to a
contravention of this act;
2. If there are facts from which the Court could decide, in
the absence of any other explanation that at person
(A) contravened the provision concerned, the Court
must hold that the contravention occurred;
3. But sub-section 2 does not apply if A shows that A did
not contravene the provision.
Simply put, the Tribunal could find no facts from which we could
infer that a breach had occurred so we do not look to the
Respondent to provide any explanation.
17.3 Breach of the Working Time Regulations – as Mr MacNellan
pointed out, the relevant provision is Regulation 30(1)(a) which is in
the following terms:
1. A worker may present a complaint to an Employment
Tribunal but his employer,
a. has refused to permit him to exercise any right
that he has under sub-section 1 Regulation 12
Case No: 3304815/2018
7
and other Regulations.
17.4 Regulation 12 relates to rest periods and it is of this which the
Claimant complains. Simply put, the submission made by the
Respondent, which we accept, was that there was no evidence that
a request was made in anything approaching appropriate terms, let
alone evidence of a refusal, of that right. Looking at the matter
reasonably and sensibly, the Claimant was working long hours as a
volunteer and was being paid for that time. We do however,
express our concern at the terms of the Section 1 statement signed
by the Claimant.
17.5 We had produced to us at pages 144 – 156 a copy of the Section 1
statement. There are two signature pages. One at page 155 in
which the Claimant is asked to acknowledge the receipt of the
Statement of Terms of Employment and at page 156 where he is
asked to confirm his consent to the opt out under Regulation 4 and
Regulation 5 of the Working Time Regulations 1998. The Claimant
gave convincing evidence, which we accept, that page 155 was
signed by him and that his signature on page 156 was clearly
obliterated by him because he did not consent to the opt out and in
so doing wished to make that clear in the manner in which he
signed it. We were told that when the Section 1 statement reached
the Respondent’s Human Resource Department, it was looked at
by an administrator and was considered very briefly. However, any
reasonable inspection of that document would have raised
concerns in the mind of a reasonable employer.
17.6 We find that the Claimant, by reasonable means, did try to indicate
to the Respondent that he was opting out of the Working Time
Regulations and that opt out had not been fully appreciated or
understood by the Respondent. That, however, does not affect our
conclusion that in order to succeed under Regulation 30 that which
is necessary is missing. Simply put, what is missing is a request
and a refusal.
18. For all these reasons we dismiss the claims.
___________________________
Employment Judge Cassel
Date: 22.8.2019
Judgment sent to the parties on
..............28.08.19.........................
......................................................
For the Tribunal office
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