Mr M Harding v Amalgamated Construction Ltd: 2501023/2018
Employment Tribunal
Published on 12 June 2019, 12:12
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
breach-of-contract unfair-dismissal
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2018-10-16
Change History
-
New Judgment
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No: 2501023/2018
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr M Harding
Respondent: Amalgamated Construction Limited
Heard at: Teesside On: 26 & 27 September 2018
Before: Employment Judge Beever
Representation:
Claimant: Mr Owen – Gateshead Citizens Advice)
Respondent: Mr S Healey of Counsel
JUDGMENT
1 The claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is
dismissed.
2 The claimant’s claim for breach of contract is not well-founded and is
dismissed.
_____________________________
Employment Judge Beever
Date______5 October 2018 _____________
JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
9 October 2018
G Palmer
FOR THE TRIBUNAL
Note
Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not
be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request
is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the
decision.
Public access to employment tribunal decisions
Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at
www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s)
and respondent(s) in a case.
Case 2501023/18
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THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr Michael Harding
Respondent: Amalgamated Construction Limited
Heard at: Teesside
On: 26 and 27 September 2018
Before: Employment Judge Beever (sitting alone)
Representation:
Claimant: Mr Owen, Gateshead Citizens Advice
Respondent: Mr S. Healy, Counsel
REASONS
1. The tribunal gave an oral judgement with reasons at the conclusion of the hearing
on 27 September 2018 and the judgment was sent out to the parties. The tribunal
found that the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal is not well founded and is
dismissed and the claimant’s claim for breach of contract is not well founded and
is dismissed. The claimant’s representative has since requested full written
reasons.
Introduction
2. By a claim form dated 4 May 2018, the claimant brings a claim following the
termination of his employment with the respondent. The respondent accepts that
there was a dismissal and contends that the claimant’s employment came to an
end by reason of redundancy.
Case 2501023/18
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Issues and Preliminaries
3. The parties helpfully agreed a list of issues. The list reflected a claim of unfair
dismissal and identified the following:
3.1. Can the respondent show a potentially fair reason namely redundancy, and if
so,
3.2. Was dismissal fair within the meaning of s. 98(4) ERA having regard in
particular to
(a) the pool from which redundancies were made,
(b) consultation the claimant,
(c) efforts made to secure alternative employment for the claimant and
(d) procedure followed by the respondent.
3.3. If the dismissal was unfair within the meaning of section 98(4), is it likely that
a fair dismissal would have occurred in any event and if so how should that
be reflected in remedy (Polkey principles)
3.4. What amount if any is the claimant entitled to recover as a compensatory
award given he has received the equivalent of a basic award in the form of a
redundancy payment.
4. I will deal with Polkey therefore as part of this judgement but otherwise remedy
issues and evidence as to his remedy will be addressed immediately after this
judgement if appropriate.
5. As part my pre-reading I noted in paragraph 26 of the ET1 a complaint by the
claimant that because of being placed on gardening leave he had lost the
opportunity for Christmas on-call weekend payments and on-call payments. The
Schedule of Loss also particularises this loss in the order of £4500. This being a
pre-termination loss seemed to me difficult to see how it can be a claim for
compensation which could flow from any unfair dismissal.
6. Mr Owen confirmed to me that this was a live issue for compensation, so I
queried the basis on which this aspect was being put. In the event the hearing
commenced, and I dealt with this point following the lunchtime adjournment on
the first day thereby allowing Mr Owen to clarify his position.
7. Mr Owen put it forward as a breach of contract claim. He confirmed that it was
not pursued as a deduction of wages claim but rather put by him on the basis that
the respondent should not have placed the claimant on gardening leave and
because it did, the claimant then lost the payments in question. In response Mr
Healey said it was too late and it was not properly part of the ET claim before the
tribunal, i.e. that an amendment was required which was just not justified at this
late stage; it was any event out of time, and he also rightly reminded me that the
parties had agreed a list of issues.
Case 2501023/18
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8. Bearing all that in mind, I gave an oral ruling. I had regard in my ruling to the
Overriding Objective (Rule 2) of dealing with cases justly whilst trying to be fair to
both sides and complying with objectives of informality and proportionality. I
noted that the form ET1 box dealing with “contract or other claims” had not been
ticked. I also identified, as set out above, that the facts bare though they may be
were set out in the ET1, at paragraph 26. With regard to Mr Healey's point that as
a result the ET1 didn't expressly state a breach of contract claim in any shape, I
considered that a tick against the box was not a prerequisite for the creation of a
cause of action provided that the basis of the claim might be said to be capable of
being read across from the ET1.
9. I found that the facts in paragraph 26 were just sufficient to establish a basis of a
claim and the failure to plead out the legal framework whilst inadequate did not
prevent me from finding that Mr Owen was able to proceed not as an amendment
to the claim but rather as a much needed clarification of the claim. I was as a
result sympathetic to the claimant’s request. A persuasive factor for me was also
that both the claimant and Mr Esterhuyse’s witness statements broadly dealt with
the facts underlying the claim. I also took account of the fact that recent case law
suggests that I should not too readily depart from an agreed list of issues but in
reality the effect of that was somewhat mitigated by the fact that the list in
question was agreed almost at the door of court.
10. I therefore permitted what was in fact further particulars of the claim. As a result,
the breach of contract claim was then clarified and I gave a short judgement to
that effect. It followed that issues for determination in this case were expanded to
include a breach of contract claim identifying the following issues:
10.1. Was there a contractual obligation provide work
10.2. Was there a breach of that obligation with the claimant being placed on
gardening leave
10.3. What loss if any arises from breach, this latter of course going to
remedy rather than a liability issue.
Findings of Fact
11. I was provided with a well-prepared bundle paginated to page 334 although in the
final analysis there were very few key documents in this case that were relied on
by the parties.
12. The respondent provided 2 witness statements: (i) Mr Esterhuyse, who was put
forward as the respondent's decision maker, and (ii) Mr Ahmed, who was the
appeal decision maker. The claimant provided a witness statement and was
cross-examined on his statement. I also heard from Mr Bowman. A third witness
was Mr McDermott, who did not attend. By agreement, I have read his witness
statement and applied such weight as I consider appropriate.
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13. I therefore turn to make the following findings of fact based on all the evidence
received by me and upon the balance of probabilities.
14. The respondent is a specialist engineering construction contractor in a number of
sectors. This case concerns the railway sector which is a core sector for the
respondent because it is a principal contractor to Network Rail. The relevant
structure of this part of the respondent is contained in extremely helpful chart at
[62], which shows a broad division of work between “project work” and what has
been called “minor works” otherwise known as day-to-day or “D2D” works. The
distinction that has been drawn out in the evidence suggests that project works
broadly speaking account for complex engineering tasks possibly in excess of £1
million and might be said to amount to an average of £80-£150,000 per project
and are managed by site managers who often have engineering qualifications,
some to degree level. The chart shows a number of project managers in this
division.
15. Separately the minor works or D2D division is of a routine maintenance/
emergency/reactive on-call type, sometimes referred to as “business as usual”,
and although not always it is typically of the less complex and smaller variety. I
am told with an average £10,000 per job albeit potentially as Mr Esterhuyse
accepted exceeding £100,000. The focus of this case is on the minor works or
D2D aspect of the respondent’s business.
16. Network Rail operated contracts whereby in this case the respondent had set up
the Network Rail Minor Works Framework. Network Rail had its own examiners
who went on site and determined what needed to be done by way of works. It is
important to note at this early stage that the respondent had little or no control
over incoming work. It was perhaps in one sense a kind of zero-hours contract.
The word “target” has been used in this case but I find that its meaning in the
present case is somewhat different to how it is more commonly used. Here,
“target” is not and should not be regarded as a measure of the performance of
the claimant (or any other individual) because the claimant could not affect the
amount of work coming in.
17. What came in were tasks set by Network Rail. Each task is known as a “remit”.
The remits were received into a central IT system called Monitor, and were
allocated on a geographical basis. In this case, I am concerned with the London
and North-East area (LNE) which extends from London up to the border with
Scotland. LNE is subdivided further into regions: (i) the Northern region, (ii) the
Central region and (iii) the Southern region. Together, the three regions required
a total of four managers: the Central region had 2 managers allocated in the light
of the correspondingly higher amount of work requirement.
18. The structure was essentially geographical. The manager(s) in each region was
in charge of overseeing the scoping/estimating of each remit and for organising
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gangs of operatives to carry out the works. Each region operated largely
autonomously and almost as if a separate business unit. There were crossovers
for example given the good working relationship that existed between these units
so that there would be occasions of helping out with each other on job
requirements, covering sickness absence and the like. Mr Esterhuyse said that
this was something he would not have planned to do but as necessary each
region might exchange or send operatives to different regions of the business.
19. Within this structure, the claimant is clearly identifiable as the manager of the
North region of the LNE area, and under the Network Rail Minor Works
Framework. He is described as a construction manager. He was an experienced
tradesman and manager within the rail sector even when he first joined the
respondent in April 2000. By the time of his dismissal, he had achieved 17 years’
service. There has been no question of his competence and ability. Mr
Esterhuyse recognised and accepted that the claimant was good at managing
minor works tasks. The fact that they were not complex was the reason why
minor works were separate from project work.
20. The Network Rail Minor Works Framework was a five-year contract which
commenced in 2013. The respondent had allocated resources accordingly, and I
find that it operated a business model whereby in broad terms a certain level of
work had to be achieved so as to be sufficient to justify the costs of the
management structure. In this case, the respondent from the outset had
concluded that a £1.2 million value or income threshold in any region would be
needed in order to justify the presence of a manager.
21. An analysis at [218] shows the contract framework from the beginning of the fiveyear
contract back in 2013 in happier days: the amount of work value generated
in the North on any view had justified a manager in those early years. I am told
that the Central region justified 2 managers in large measure because the central
region was based around Barnsley in which there was a high track mileage. The
farther north one goes, the more sparse the mileage of track and hence the lower
the value of remit work that is generated in the region. Thus it is said that the
North region was particularly affected: this has led the claimant to complain that it
seems unfair on him that a turnover of £1.2 million was required in order for him
to justify his job. I sympathise with that because it was evidently more difficult for
the claimant in those circumstances not least because he had no control over the
work coming in. As the figures on [218] show, it became practically impossible to
achieve the threshold. I find that this model of a threshold of £1.2 million was a
genuine business model adopted by the respondent. It was not an attack on the
claimant's work ethic or his capabilities
22. I take a step back to 2011 to consider an event which forms an important part of
the claimant's case albeit that the respondent denies its relevance entirely.
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23. It concerns a request to the claimant to work in Scotland and assist in the setting
up of a Framework. The claimant was asked to go by Mr Ahmed. Mr Ahmed
himself had done a similar task in another area. Mr Ahmed recounted that the
claimant was not willing or able to go. The claimant ultimately spoke directly to
Andries Liebenburg, the respondent’s managing director, by telephone. The
conversation seemed to have brought the matter to a head. I am not in a position
to make a finding as to exactly what was said during that conversation but I do
find that as a result of that conversation the claimant was aggrieved about what
had been said to him and the way it was said; and that the issue was
“unresolved” albeit that he was not compelled to work in Scotland. The
conversation with Mr Liebenburg has left the claimant with a lingering
unhappiness about how Mr Liebenberg treated him.
24. Why is that important? The claimant said in evidence that the experience left him
“wary”; specifically, that he was wary of the intentions of senior management in
subsequent events involving the claimant and the claimant’s colleagues. This
was a repeated sentiment in his evidence and in my judgment this has continued
to have a significant impact because it has deeply affected the claimant’s views
about how he looked at the respondent’s actions in subsequent years. It is
therefore a key feature of the claimant’s case that he perceives his opposition to
his moving to Scotland as somehow marking him out and establishing a
somewhat unfavourable view of him by management. The claimant senses that a
“grudge” existed and that perhaps his time in the organisation was always going
to be limited. The respondent contends that whatever happened in connection
with the Scotland matter, it is clear on the facts that there was no subsequent
interaction of any meaningful nature between the claimant and Mr Liebenberg, a
point which the claimant accepts. It is contended that Mr Liebenberg was not in
any event involved in the decision-making in 2017.
25. Mr Ahmed said that the Board of the respondent was constantly challenging him
to be efficient in order to be competitive and to get tenders. In order to maintain
contracts, he needed to keep looking at efficiencies. Mr Culley was the claimant's
deputy manager in 2012. The respondent concluded that it could not justify
having in effect 2 managers in the North region and in the end Mr Culley’s
employment was terminated. The claimant said that it made no sense because
Mr Cully was always very busy and he didn't accept the respondent’s
explanation. The claimant said in answer to questions posed to him in cross
examination that the termination of Mr Culley’s employment “didn't signal any
desire to save money” but was in fact “part of a wider campaign”. This belief was
again demonstrative of the gulf that existed in perspective: the respondent's
perspective was that the business was too expensive and redundancy was
necessary to cut costs; the claimant in contrast said that the redundancy made
no sense because “we were all still so busy on the ground”. The statistics at
[218] are a graphic illustration that the value of the work plainly fell. There is a
slight increase in numbers for 2017 but the trend is downwards and it supports
the respondent’s closer scrutiny of value from 2016 onwards.
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26. Another example of its attention to cost-cutting measures was the closure of
Ferryhill in July 2017. Again, the claimant didn't agree, and believed it to be
unjustified. I also had regard to fact that the size of the gangs that operated
under the claimant had reduced steadily over the years from an early high of 10
operatives down to 3. The claimant accepted in evidence that there came a point
in time when only 3 operatives were dedicated to minor works but in addition, it
appeared that there were times when no operative was dedicated to the minor
works contracts. In the course of appeal hearing, the claimant acknowledged that
there were times when all of his operatives were working at Seymours however
temporary the arrangement. The claimant agreed that given this kind of reduction
in demand that there were times when he had to be “creative” to ensure that his
operatives were kept busy.
27. The Network Rail contract was due for renewal in early 2018. Mr Ahmed was
optimistic by December 2017 and I accept that the message that may have been
given was that the contract renewal had been successful. In fact, the renewal
was not actually awarded until sometime even after the claimant’s appeal hearing
taken place in January. I find that the respondent would have had every reason to
believe it was likely to obtain the renewal but that if it did, the pipeline work was
likely to be similar in value and was not going to improve in the foreseeable
future. I find that the value of the work undertaken by the Northern region was a
measure scrutinised by the respondent: it was a measure of its profitability. It
exemplifies the conflict in this case which is as I have found is the result of
competing legitimate points of view: the claimant says that the respondent is
applying these measures in in the face of the fact that his team was always busy
and he himself was never actually without work to do. In that regard, I accept his
evidence that if the number of remits increased then that will serve to make him
proportionately busier as each remit has a paperwork task associated with it even
if the value is reducing. This placed him at odds with what the respondent was
seeking to do, namely, to focus on the value and react to the fact that over the
course of the five-year Rail Network contract there had been a significant
reduction in both numbers and value to the extent of approximately two thirds;
that this was reflected in a cutting-back of premises and staff; that there was no
immediate prospect of a reversal to that trend.
28. I find that respondent had a closer scrutiny on its resources. For example, there
were monthly progress meetings attended amongst others by the claimant at
Barnsley. The question of how to address this trend must inevitably have been
discussed. This included potential cost-cutting measures. This occurred over a
period of 18 months to 2 years. I find that this established a foreseeable potential
redundancy of the claimant on the horizon. However, I do not find that the
claimant’s redundancy was expressly the topic of any communication with him
until November 2017.
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29. In early November 2017, there was a discussion on site in Hartlepool. It was
recollected by all because it was an occasion when Paul Moyes the transport
manager was also visiting on the same day. On the day, the claimant was told by
Mr Esterhuyse for the first time - at this point informally and verbally - that the
prospect of his redundancy might arise. The effect of this was to confirm in the
claimant's own mind that there was a wider issue, whether it be political or
personal against him, because it continued to make no sense to him given that
he remained busy and indeed I accept that the claimant was still working
overtime, working three out of four weekends.
30. The redundancy process commenced on 20 November 2017. The claimant was
invited to a meeting which took place on 23 November 2017. There are minutes
of the meeting. It was in effect an at-risk meeting where the prospect of
redundancy and consideration of alternative employment was discussed. The
same day, HR had sent out a jobs alert and were seeking vacancies within the
organisation. I find that there was a period of time between 20 November and the
second meeting on 8 December 2017 which confirmed redundancy where there
were attempts to consider alternative opportunities.
31. The focus of the claimant at the 23 November meeting was to look at alternative
ways to try to avoid losing his job. I have identified seven ways in which the
respondent sought to look at alternative opportunities. Put briefly: (i) Alan Boyle in
Scotland, a vacancy for which the claimant was not considered suitable, (ii) Chris
Redfern from HR had undertaken a search himself which had not uncovered
vacancies , (iii) an EA role which turned out to be a dead-end, given that it was in
the South of England, very short term and that it had been filled anyway, (iv) work
in Barnsley, at least as a temporary provision, until things “picked up", but which
did not overcome the main issue of the cost to the business of employing the
claimant nor did it create extra income, (v) the option of being demoted and
working back on the gangs: I find that this was considered but rejected as the
claimant had inevitably deskilled over the past 20 years as a manager and more
crucially because there were in fact no vacancies, many being temporarily laid off
it and it was a struggle to keep existing teams busy. It was thus not possible to
offer the claimant the opportunity to be back on the gangs. I did reflect on Mr
William Pringle who, put briefly, was an existing employer who had been laid off
so the fact that he was brought back into work may raise questions but I do not
find it particularly relevant and helpful in my analysis, (vi) a job opportunity within
Seymours: the respondent had encouraged the claimant to apply for this job
opportunity, but it transpired that the claimant did not have the skill set for the
non-rail working environment that job opportunity presented. It did reinforce my
understanding the claimant was at all times keen and willing to try all
opportunities to avoid his dismissal, (vii) an opportunity for site agent out of
Barnsley even as late as 17th January [160]. The claimant however was turned
down for this opportunity because senior management involved had expressed
the view that what was needed for that role was somebody with a technical skills
background as opposed to the claimant’s experience in trade skills.
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32. These are all examples of efforts undertaken to see if redundancy could have
been avoided. The claimant had said in evidence that he would have been willing
to move to Barnsley permanently given the opportunity. I find that during the
process he expressed the view that he would go willingly go there until the work
picked up which suggested on his part a willingness to be there on a temporary
basis. On the other hand I also find that he was not asked by the respondent
specifically whether he would consider a permanent move. The claimant
presented as someone who was a keen to keep his job even to the extent of
taking other work such as working back on the gangs and even at significantly
lower pay.
33. The second meeting was set up and took place on 8 December 2017 when the
claimant’s redundancy was confirmed. I have had regard to the minutes of the
meeting and the letter of outcome. There was a brief diversion in the evidence
because the claimant complained about jobs having been withheld on the Monitor
system apparently deliberately so as presumably to improve the respondent’s
prospects of ensuring his redundancy. On closer analysis, this issue was of 3
remits that had a 26 week operation period. These would not have applied until
2018, and I find did not any impact upon the process or the outcome. There is
insufficient evidence to conclude that there was deliberate underhand conduct. I
reflected on whether Mr Esterhuyse had told Robbie Barron, the TU
representative, that the redundancy “made no sense” to him. Mr Esterhuyse gave
evidence on this. I find that he believes now he did believe then that he was
making a decision that made sense from the respondent’s perspective. It is
inconsistent that he would have said to the TU representative that it made no
sense to make the claimant redundant. I find that he did not do so.
34. On 11 December 2017, the claimant’s redundancy was announced by Mr Ahmed
in a communication meeting with staff. As regards the announcement of the
renewal of the Network Rail contract, I find that he was sufficiently optimistic to
convey that the respondent was likely to obtain the contract. At the same time,
however, it was clear that the contract was not going to provide significant
improvement in income.
35. On 13 December 2017, the claimant received his letter of redundancy and was
placed on gardening leave. Mr Esterhuyse decided upon this course of action to
assist the claimant for example to allow him to have extra opportunity to look for
other work. The claimant did not agree to go on gardening leave: but it was not a
matter of choice for him.
36. His appeal eventually took place on 16 January 2018. He raised three grounds of
appeal, in summary: (i) that there was no redundancy situation i.e. that there was
still work to do, (ii) that job remits had been deliberately withheld, (iii) that
insufficient attention had been paid to alternative employment. These were
discussed with Mr Ahmed the appeal officer. The minutes of the Appeal meeting
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are in the bundle and I have taken account of those. The outcome was that the
claimant’s redundancy was confirmed.
Legal Principles
37. The law in relation to unfair dismissal is section 98 of the Employment Rights Act
1996 (ERA). It requires the tribunal ask itself two questions: (i) the reason for
dismissal, per s.98 (1), and (ii) whether the employer acted reasonably, per s.98
(4) ERA.
38. For the purpose of section 98(1) the burden of proof is on the respondent to
establish the reason. What matters is whether the respondent has established
the operative reason for the dismissal as operating in the mind of the decision
maker. Abernethy v Mott [1974] IRLR 213.
39. Redundancy is potentially fair reason. For a dismissal to be by reason of
redundancy, a redundancy situation must exist. S.139 ERA states that there is a
redundancy situation where the requirements of the business for employees to
carry out work of a particular kind, or for employees to carry out work of a
particular kind in the place where they are employed, have ceased or diminished.
This covers a number of separate situations including where work of a particular
kind has diminished, so that employees have become surplus to requirements
and also where work has not diminished, but fewer employees are needed to do
it.
40. The tribunal has followed the guidance in Murray v Foyle Meats [1999] ICR 827
which identified that s.139 ERA asks two questions of fact: (i) whether there
exists one or other of the various states of economic affairs mentioned in the
section, and (ii) a question of causation, whether the dismissal is wholly or mainly
attributable to that state of affairs.
41. As regards whether there is a redundancy situation, it is not for tribunals to
investigate the reasons behind such situations. So, a tribunal’s concern is
whether the reason for the dismissal was redundancy not with the economic or
commercial reasons for the redundancy.
42. Turning to the second question, section 98(4) then sets out what needs to be
considered in order to determine whether or not the decision is fair. It states
“termination of the question whether dismissal is fair or unfair…. (a) depends on
whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of
the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in
treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee and (b) shall be
determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case”.
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43. For the purpose of section 98(4) the burden of proof is neutral in applying section
98(4). The tribunal reminds itself that it does not stand in the shoes of the employer
and decide what it would have done if it were the employer. Rather the tribunal
has to ask whether the decision to dismiss fell within the range of reasonable
responses open to the employer judged against the objective standards of a
hypothetical and reasonable employer.
44. The case of Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd v Hitt [2002] EW CA Civ 1588 makes it
clear that the range of reasonable responses that applies to all aspects of the
dismissal decision. This includes decisions as to the correct pool:
45. See Capita Hartshead v Byard [2012] IRLR 814 where it was held that the question
of how the pool should be defined was primarily a matter for the employer to
determine. It would be difficult for the employee to challenge it where the employer
had genuinely applied his mind to the problem
46. The tribunal is required to consider whether dismissal fell within the range of
reasonable responses see Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones [1983] ICR. What does
that mean in practical terms? Here the question of whether an employer has acted
reasonably in dismissing will depend upon the range of responses of reasonable
employers. Some might dismiss others might not.
47. These cases have general application but “the touchstone would need to be
section 98(4); the tribunal would keep in mind the need not to fall into the error of
substitution, but would still need to review the decisions made and the process
followed and determine whether each stage fell within the range of reasonable
responses”. See Green v LB Barking UKEAT/0157/16, para 32-35 and 42. The
tribunal has also expressly reminded itself of the cautionary words in TNS v
Swainson UKEAT/0603/12 to similar effect. Finally, also the dicta in Williams v
Compare Maxim [1982] ICR 156, setting out extremely useful guidance which the
tribunal has no hesitation in adopting and in reflecting on the further guidance
provided by HHJ Eady QC in Green.
48. Turning to deductions from compensation, the Polkey principle established that if
a dismissal is found unfair by reason of procedural defects then the fact that the
employer would or might have dismissed the employee anyway goes to the
question of remedy and compensation reduced to reflect that fact. Thornett v
Scope [2007] ICR 236 affirmed the obligation on an employment tribunal to
consider what the future may hold regarding an employee’s ongoing employment.
Contract Bottling v Cave UKEAT/0100/14 described the Polkey principle as an
“assessment to produce a figure that as accurately as possible represented the
point of balance between the chance of employment continuing and the risk that it
would not”.
49. Turning to the breach of contract claim, the issues have been framed around the
case of William Hill v Tucker [1999] ICR 291, Court of Appeal. Where there is no
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express term for garden leave and an employer places an employee on garden
leave, the material legal question which arises is whether that employee has a
contractual right to work and not just a right to be paid.
50. The proper approach is to look at the contract is actually required of the employer
and what the employee agreed to do. An implied obligation on an employer actually
to provide work does not arise in every case but only in certain limited cases. Those
limited cases are reflected in the individual circumstances whereby it might be said
for example that there is a particular need for frequent and continued exercise of
the features of the job such that without that continued and frequent exercise there
would be a deterioration in skills or a loss of the underlying purpose of the contract
(e.g. an actor’s need for publicity). On one view, it might be said that “de-skilling”
could apply to every single job, but the case law focuses on specific and individual
situations, e.g. a surgeon who if he is not in theatre will very quickly become
unskilled.
Discussion and conclusion
What was the reason for dismissal?
51. The burden is on the respondent to establish the reason. There are two questions
which arise: (i) was there a redundancy situation? and, if so, (ii) was the
redundancy the main cause of the dismissal?
52. The respondent's senior team was tasked with looking at the productivity of the
Network Rail Framework. Its business model maintained a £1.2 million threshold
for a management structure. This was not a criticism of the claimant and I accept
the increasing difficulty that he was thereby under as a result of the application
that model. However, the facts bear out that there was less work; values went
down; redundancy was on the horizon, with all the corroborating events of cost
saving and reduction in gang operative numbers, even to the point where the
claimant agreed that, “there were times for a couple of weeks when I had no
operative”.
53. With this background, Mr Esterhuyse was tasked with implementing a proposal
for redundancy. He was the decision-maker, having put the Framework under
scrutiny for as much as 18months to 2years prior. The respondent’s conclusion
was that the Northern region stood out. This is not a case about the cause of that,
but about whether the respondent is entitled to take steps to respond to it.
Looked at in that context, these features are relevant: (i) the backdrop was a
downwards trend in values, (ii) Mr Culley’s termination of employment had the
hallmarks of a redundancy, (iii) even though the claimant disagreed with the
move out of Ferryhill in 2017, it was a cost-cutting measure, (iv) the dramatic
reduction in gang operative numbers, (v) the figures at [218].
54. Mr Esterhuyse’s decision to remove the role held by the claimant and to subsume
its responsibilities into the roles of existing staff meant that a redundancy
Case 2501023/18
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situation arose. There was an obvious diminution in the requirements of the
respondent for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, that of a
construction manager. I am satisfied there was a diminution in work
requirements. Even if there was not, taking account of the claimant’s complaint
that he remained always busy, the respondent nevertheless concluded that fewer
employees were now required and needed to do the job. That amounts to
paradigm redundancy situation.
55. Turning to the second question: what is the cause/the real reason for the
dismissal? The claimant contended that the real reason was a wider campaign
against him; action taken against him personally. He described a sense of
wariness that he felt towards the actions of senior management, which was
compounded by what he regarded as decisions that made no sense to him.
56. I take account the series of events set out above, commencing with the instance
in 2011 when the claimant was required to work in Scotland. I note that it was not
imposed on him because in the event he was not required to go. In my judgment,
that single incident and any conversation ensuing would be unlikely to have
produced a lingering animosity such that a decision was likely to be made by
senior managers that would otherwise be contrary to the interests of its business.
There was no subsequent meaningful interaction between Mr Liebenberg and the
claimant and on all the evidence before me Mr Liebenberg had no involvement in
the subsequent redundancy process. The claimant’s interpretation of events
faces two challenges: (i) it relies upon no actual evidence of hostility shown
towards him, aside from his recollection of the 2011 conversation, to enable me
to find that there is a sound basis for making a finding of fact that senior
managers were making decisions affecting him personally and subsuming the
interests of the respondent as a result, and (ii) Mr Esterhuyse is himself a senior
manager. It was his decision to make the claimant redundant, and I take the view
that he showed both during the process and in evidence no animosity toward the
claimant. In fact it was arguably the reverse because I accept his evidence that
he did not find the process at all enjoyable and that he recognised the impact of
the claimant losing his livelihood; that it was an uncomfortable but necessary part
of his task.
57. Thus, in order to uphold the claimant's perspective, I would have to conclude that
the decision-making of Mr Esterhuyse was itself impaired and I have considered
what findings of fact would be required in order for me to reach a conclusion that
he was impaired or infected by a sense of animosity, or “grudge”, towards the
claimant. Mr Esterhuyse gave evidence that he was not aware of the 2011
events, save that “it is possible the claimant mentioned to me but I had no
communication with Mr Liebenberg at all”. It is an uphill task to argue that
whatever feelings Mr Leibenberg perhaps expressed or felt about the claimant
back in 2011 somehow filtered through to Mr Esterhuyse’s decision-making in
2017.
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58. I find that Mr Esterhuyse's decision was one that he genuinely regarded as being
in the best interests of the respondent and that it was not a personal attack on the
claimant in any way. He had managerial responsibility for the Framework. I find
that the facts and beliefs operating on Mr Esterhuyse’s mind when he made the
decision to dismiss arose as a result of the decision of the respondent after a
period of close scrutiny to make the role of construction manager in the North
region a redundant role. I find it was a genuine business decision. I accept the
claimant genuinely feels that it made no sense, but I would be overstepping my
role if I were simply to second-guess the economics of that decision. I have
investigated whether there had been any ulterior or different motivation but I in
the final analysis I have concluded that it was a genuine business decision and it
is not the role of the tribunal to second-guess the economics of the decision.
59. I conclude the respondent has discharged its burden of showing that there was a
potentially fair reason for dismissal, namely redundancy, and that this was the
reason in this case for the claimant’s dismissal.
Did the respondent act reasonably in treating that reason as sufficient to dismiss the
claimant?
60. As in any dismissal claim no less a redundancy dismissal, it is the tribunal’s task
is to look at the fairness of dismissal. This depends upon asking whether the
decision itself and the process fell within the range of reasonable responses that
a reasonable employer might adopt.
61. I have considered each of the points in the list of issues and as raised by both
representatives as part of my deliberation. As to the relevant at-risk pool, the
respondent adopted a pool of one. The claimant says that the other minor works
managers should have been in the pool, although in evidence and in submissions
the claimant was content to exclude the South manager; but certainly there was a
pool the claimant says that ought to have included him along with the two Central
managers, i.e., a pool of three. It might also have been argued that the pool
should have included a much wider management trawl so as to include project
managers of the specialist teams. However, the evidence established a sufficient
difference in size and complexity and skill sets that the decision not to include a
pool wider than minor works, or day-to-day, managers was justified.
62. As to the specific question of the make-up of the pool, Mr Esterhuyse stated that
the essential reason for there being no other manager in the pool was
geographical. His evidence was in part that was “unfair on the others” since the
issue was that this was just a North supply problem and it was not a problem that
the other managers should have to share. In isolation, I would have found this
explanation insufficient: all day-to-day managers were working equally and
discharging competently any remits they were receiving. The evidence, however,
goes much further than that. For example, Mr Ahmed corroborated the picture of
the need for a geographical focus. There is a clear sense of autonomous
Case 2501023/18
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business units, where the managers were identifiably responsible for each of their
regions; that there was to a greater or lesser extent a need for practical
integration into the region; one’s own regional knowledge; and that sense of
autonomy. It is no better painted than by the claimant's own words in the context
of the move to Hartlepool where he was, I find, offered the opportunity of an office
in what might be described as the main block on site, but he rejected that in
favour of being part of the Portakabin setup which left him literally working
alongside with his operatives on a day to day basis. In all, a very clear sense that
his job is done most effectively only when he had the actual physical day-to-day
interaction with operatives. This reinforces the geographical structure of the
regions.
63. I find that Mr Esterhuyse genuinely considered the make-up of the pool and
concluded that there was a distinction to be drawn between the North and Central
region managers, albeit that the roles were essentially the same. He genuinely
applied his mind. Having reached that conclusion, unless there is something
patently unrealistic or patently not genuine about his decision, this is sufficient to
discharge the obligation on the employer as expressed in the Capita Hartshead
decision.
64. As to the issue of alternative employment, I have asked myself whether this
employer took reasonable steps. Having regard to my findings, this respondent
has approached this issue in an open-minded way; its job enquiries were
genuine. I have identified at least 7 ways in which those enquiries were
undertaken. The respondent reached a conclusion that it genuinely held that such
vacancies as there were, were not suitable; that was conclusion was as a result
of several enquiries and, at least in the case of Seymours, an interview, and in
other respects there were no vacancies. It was for example challenging even to
keep existing workforce busy. I accept the submission of Mr Healy that even by
the end of the hearing (and this is no criticism) the claimant does not identify a
specific job that was vacant and was available and that should have been offered
to him. Having identified the pool as it did and, as I find genuinely so, the
respondent was entitled to conclude there was no suitable vacancy. The
respondent did not permit lodging on a planned or permanent basis and the
relocation of the claimant on such a basis would not have produced the costcutting
that was required.
65. Turning to the question of consultation, I conclude that there is little to this aspect
of the complaint. The process in my view was exemplary in its implementation,
record-keeping and open-minded examination of the claimant's concerns and the
steps that might be taken to avoid a redundancy. There are not procedures
which are bound to be followed in every case as the fairness of each dismissal
for redundancy depends on all the circumstances of each case, including the
need to give as much warning as possible, the obligation to consult being a
fundamental part of the process. On my findings, this obligation was discharged
by the respondent.
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66. Taking all that into account I turn back to the central question which is that posed
by s. 98(4), namely, has the respondent acted reasonably in treating the
redundancy of the claimant as sufficient to dismiss the claimant. On my findings I
have concluded that it did. I therefore find that the dismissal of the claimant was
fair.
67. Stepping back, it appears that there remains a fundamental gap between the
parties, which arises from the claimant's frustrations that on the ground he was as
busy as ever. The claimant’s competence or for that matter his experience and
skills are not in question. However, an employer is entitled to make hard financial
decisions which it genuinely thinks are in its interests and in this case the
decision was taken by Mr Esterhuyse who was uncomfortably well aware of the
impact that it would have on the claimant.
68. In those circumstances, it does not fall to me to consider Polkey principles. I
nevertheless went on briefly to consider the point, namely, whether the
respondent would or might have fairly dismissed the claimant in the absence of
any unfairness. Such an exercise always involves speculation and tribunals are
encouraged not to be deterred from considering the point despite the element of
speculation.
69. I find that if the defects had been rectified and, in this case most likely that the
claimant would have been pooled with the other Framework Managers in the
Central region, it was more likely than not that he would in any event have been
made redundant. On the other hand, I accept that it might have created an
opportunity to review and then possibly to look at alternative ways for more
flexible ways of working. Applying the principles of Polkey, I conclude that that
there was at least a 50% chance of the claimant being fairly dismissed within a
further two months of his actual dismissal in any event. I should re-state for the
reasons already given that the Polkey question does not in fact arise on the facts
of this case as it is my conclusion that the claim for unfair dismissal fails
70. I turn to deal with the breach of contract point. There was no express term
entitling the respondent to place the claimant on garden leave. I turned therefore
to consider whether the claimant had a contractual entitlement, that is, a right to
work. I reflected on the limited circumstances in which such a right to work exists:
it revolves around those whose job is specifically of a type where frequent and
continued experience of the job in the particular market-place was necessary.
The claimant’s tasks did not fit at all into that category. I conclude that no term
can be implied into his contract that he had a contractual right to work. It follows
inevitably that the claimant cannot succeed on his breach of contract claim.
71. I make no findings as to what loss might or might not flow from any breach that
presumably would otherwise have arisen once he was put on garden leave. Had
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there been such a breach, the matter of loss would then need to be dealt with at
the remedy stage.
72. The claimant’s claims are dismissed.
________________________________
EMPLOYMENT JUDGE BEEVER
JUDGMENT SIGNED BY EMPLOYMENT
JUDGE ON
16 October 2018
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