Mr P Bartram v Ardmore Group Ltd: 2202175/2020
Employment Tribunal
Published on 17 September 2020, 08:41
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
breach-of-contract unlawful-deduction-from-wages
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2020-09-02
Change History
-
New Judgment
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case Number 2202175/2020
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr P Bartram
Respondent: Ardmore Group Limited
At: Central London Employment Tribunal on 13 August 2020 as a Full
Merits Hearing by CVP
Before: Employment Judge Nicolle
Representation:
Claimant: Mr A Barnes, solicitor
Respondent: Mr S Mac labhrai, in-house representative.
JUDGMENT
1. The Tribunal finds that that the Respondent was entitled to terminate the Claimant’s
employment on the giving of one week’s notice and not 12 weeks as contended by the
Claimant.
2. The Claimant’s claim for breach of contract and/or an unauthorised deduction from
wages therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Employment Judge Nicolle
13 August 2020
Sent to the parties on:
13/08/2020.
For the Tribunal:
Case Number 2202175/2020
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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondent
Mr P Bartram AND Ardmore Construction Limited
Full Merits Hearing heard by CVP On: 13 August 2020
Before: Employment Judge Nicolle sitting at London Central
Representation
For the Claimant: Mr A Barnes, Solicitor
For the Respondent: Mr S Mac Labhrai, in-house representative.
JUDGMENT
1. The Tribunal finds that that the Respondent was entitled to terminate the
Claimant’s employment on the giving of one week’s notice and not 12
weeks as contended by the Claimant.
2. The Claimant’s claim for breach of contract and/or an unauthorised
deduction from wages therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.
REASONS
The Hearing
3. I heard evidence from the Claimant and Mr Pearce Byrne, a Director of the
Respondent. I was provided with a bundle of documents in advance of
the hearing comprising 133 pages. I gave judgement orally at the
conclusion of the hearing, but written reasons were requested on behalf of
the Claimant.
The Claim
Case Number 2202175/2020
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4. The claim involves a discreet issue as to the Claimant’s applicable notice
period. He was paid in lieu of one week’s notice. The Claimant says he
should have received 12 weeks, and therefore the claim is for the deficit of
11 weeks’ pay. His argument being that he had completed the threemonth
probationary period in his contract of employment.
5. The Claimant brought a claim pursuant to a Claim Form issued on 9 April
2020. He was employed by the Respondent as Communication and
Marketing Manager. His employment commenced on 27 August 2019 and
he said it was terminated on 2 December 2019 albeit there is an element
of dispute as to exactly when that termination took effect. I find that his
employment was terminated on 29 November 2019.
The Contractual Documentation
Offer Letter
6. The Claimant received an offer letter dated 9 August 2019. This letter
provides that the first three months of his employment would be a
probationary period. It says that if during the probationary period either
you or the company feels that the employment is not working out than
either party can terminate this arrangement by giving one week’s notice.
Contract of Employment
7. The Claimant was subject to a contract of employment dated 9 August
2019 (the “Contract”). The Contract was signed on behalf of the
Respondent but the version I have seen in the bundle at page 52 was not
signed by the Claimant but no point was been taken on this during the
hearing and therefore I have dealt with this solely as an issue of
contractual interpretation. Relevant provisions within the Contract are:
• clause 6.1 the Claimant would receive a basic salary of £63,000 per
annum;
• clause 13 deals with the probationary period. It repeats the position
set out in the offer letter that the first three months of his
employment would be a probationary period. It goes on to state:
“You will be informed in writing of your successful completion of the
probationary period”.
• clause 13.2 provides that the probationary period can be extended
by a further three months at the Company’s discretion in which
case the notice period referred to in Clause 13.1 above will
continue to apply; and
Case Number 2202175/2020
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• clause 14.1 provides that after successful completion of your
probationary period the prior written notice required from you or the
Company to terminate your employment will be twelve weeks
unless otherwise mutually agreed in writing.
Employee Handbook
8. The Respondent has an Employee Handbook. There is reference to
notice periods. This includes the statement that after successful
completion of your probationary period the prior written notice required
from or the Company to terminate your employment will be four weeks
unless otherwise mutually agreed in writing.
Probation Review Policy
9. The Respondent also has a probation review policy (the “Policy”). This is
relatively unusual in the level of detail provided. It is sufficient to refer to
the principal potentially relevant provisions within the Policy. It is not clear
whether the Policy was intended to be contractual and my finding is that it
would be regarded as a guidance note to be read in conjunction with the
probationary period in the contract of employment.
10. Clause 8 provides that that at least one informal review should be carried
out during the employee’s probationary period. It is accepted that no
formal review was undertaken. Clause 9 provides that during an
employee’s probation the Line Manager should provide regular feedback
to the employee about his performance and progress should there be any
problem areas, raise these with the employee as soon as possible with a
view to resolving them. Clause 11 provides that one month prior to the
employee’s end of probation date the HR Department will send a reminder
email together with a probation review form. It goes on to provide that
towards the end of the probationary period, using the probationary review
form, the Line Manager should conduct a final review of the employee’s
performance and suitability for the job and then if the employee’s
performance has not met the standards required by the Company the Line
Manager should discuss the matter with the HR Department before any
decision is made to terminate the employee’s employment. The HR
Department will then confirm the termination in writing to the employee. If
no probationary review meeting is held and/or if the HR Department is not
notified of the outcome of such a meeting within one week of the end of
the probation date then it would be assumed that the employee has
successfully completed the probation and a confirmation will be sent. It
goes on to state where a decision is taken to terminate the employee’s
employment the employee must be interviewed and informed of the
reason for the termination. There will be no right of appeal.
11. The bundle at page 117 also included a flow chart setting out the
probationary review process, albeit this was not a document I was referred
to during the hearing.
Case Number 2202175/2020
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Chronology of Events
12. The Claimant says that he did not have any perception that there were
any issues during the first three months of his employment. It was not
until an email of 19 November 2019 from Amy Wallace, HR assistant to Mr
Byrne that a formal process for the review of the probationary period
commenced. Ms Wallace notified Mr Byrne that the Claimant’s
probationary period would be ending on 27 November 2019. It set out the
options namely passed probation, probation extended, employee has not
passed probation. It attached a copy of the probationary review process
and end of probation review form.
13. Mr Byrne was on annual leave in New York between 19-25 November
2019. He says that prior to that time whilst there had been no formal
feedback performance review meetings with the Claimant that he had had
regular dialogue with him regarding objectives and day to day business
matters. He says that on 25 November 2019 he compiled handwritten
notes setting out his concerns regarding the Claimant’s performance. He
then typed these notes up on 27 November.
14. Mr Byrne sought to arrange an in-person meeting with the Claimant on 27
November 2019, but he was surprised that the Claimant was not at his
desk and there was no obvious explanation as to his whereabouts. The
Claimant says that he was working from home that day. There is a dispute
between the parties regarding flexible working, the Claimant’s position
being that he took two or three home working days and otherwise would
be frequently at client premises.
15. What then happened is that an email was sent by Mr Byrne on 27
November to the Claimant and it was agreed, at the Claimant’s instigation,
that of various possible dates for the meeting it should take place on 29
November 2019. Prior to that meeting on 27 November, Mr Byrne on his
own evidence in response to possible irritation that the Claimant was not
at his desk, had requested from HR a print out of the time log for the
duration of the Claimant’s employment. He did say though that that was
not a material factor in his decision that the Claimant had not passed the
probationary view period, so this is not a material consideration.
16. The meeting took place on 29 November. The Claimant gave evidence
that he considered that it constituted an “assassination”. He says that he
was totally taken aback to be advised that there were serious concerns,
his position being that he had no prior notice of such concerns.
17. I was referred to and end up probation review document. In that
document which was completed on 29 November, albeit that is a
manuscript amendment and it appears to have been originally typed on 27
November. Mr Byrne listed both major and minor concerns regarding the
Claimant’s performance. Some of these referred to a pre-employment
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commencement email dated 21 August 2019 from Mr Byrne to the
Claimant setting out various objectives. It is not necessary for me to set
out the performance concerns as it is outside the scope of my decision as
to whether the Claimant was or was not performing. It is simply a case of
contractual interpretation. At pages 57-59 of the bundle there was a longer
document setting out what Mr Byrne perceived to be shortcomings in the
Claimant’s performance.
18. There was an exchange of emails on 29 November between the Claimant
and Mr Byrne where The Claimant sought a further opportunity to deliver
on his role. Mr Byrne responded by saying that he had made his decision
and there was no further discussion to be had. The Claimant was then
sent a letter by Ms Wallace in HR on 2 December 2019 confirming that
subsequent to the meeting on 29 November 2019 he had not successfully
completed his probationary period and his last working day was therefore
29 November 2019 and he was paid one week in lieu of his notice.
The Law
19. Mr Mac Labhrai argued that there should be a qualitative rather than
purely quantitate interpretation of the probationary period within the
contract of employment. He placed considerable emphasis on the word
“successful” and there needing to have been a successful completion of
the probationary period. He says particular significance exists on this not
just in terms of the extension of the notice period but also it being a trigger
for a raft of employment related benefits to include sick pay, enhanced
pension contributions, eligibility for life assurance and private medical.
20. He referred to well-known and established case law principles regarding
contractual interpretation. It should be said these cases are of generic
significance rather than employment specific in particular the very wellknown
Judgment of Lord Hoffman in the Investors Compensation Scheme
v West Bromwich Building Society (No. 1) 1998 1WLR 896, HL in which
he emphasised that a contract should be interpreted not according to the
subjective view of either party but in line with the meaning it would convey
to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would
reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they
were at the time of contract.
21. He also referred to Arnold v Britain and others 2015 AC 1619, SC in which
Lord Neuberger summarised the general principles that apply to the
interpretation of express contractual terms. When interpreting a written
contract the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by
reference to what a reasonable person having all the background
knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have
understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean. He
went on to say that the meaning must be assessed in the light of:
• the actual ordinary meaning of the clause;
Case Number 2202175/2020
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• any other relevant provisions of the contractual agreement;
• the overall purpose of the clause and the agreement;
• the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at
the time the document was executed; and
• commercial common sense.
He said that subjective evidence of any parties’ intentions should be
disregarded.
22. He also referred me to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wood v
Capita 2017 UKSC 24 which held that a court’s task is to ascertain the
objective meaning of the language used in the contract. The court must
consider the contract as a whole and depending on its nature, formality
and quality of drafting give more or less weight to elements of the wider
context. Where there are rival meanings the court can reach a view as to
which construction is more consistent with business common sense.
23. Mr Barnes argued that the Respondent had not followed its own
probationary policy. There had been a failure to carry out regular reviews
and there had been a failure to provide written formal feedback. He
referred to various case law authority including White v London Transport
Executive 1981 IRLR 261¸ Post Office v Magull and Przybylska v Modus
Telecom Limited UKEAT/0566/06/CEA. These cases all in effect involve
employment tribunals finding that an implied term exists on employers not
to act unreasonably in terms of the probationary period.
24. In Przybylska v Modus Telecom Limited the EAT held that an express
contractual right to extend an employee’s probationary period was
sufficient to ensure the business efficacy of the employee’s contract. But
the tribunal had erred in law by implying a further contractual term to the
effect that the probationary period would be extended for a reasonable
time to allow the employer to provide some indication by word or deed as
to whether it had been successfully completed.
25. I considered all the above cases during an adjournment after submissions.
Conclusions
26. I find that the Respondent was entitled to terminate the Claimant’s
employment on one week’s notice. Whilst I acknowledge, and Mr Byrne
accepted, that some elements of the probationary review policy had not
been followed, I have found that the probationary review policy is not in
itself of contractual effect. I therefore do not consider that a failure to
provide more reviews or feedback during the course of the probationary
period were in themselves contractual breaches rendering the termination
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at the end, or shortly after the end of that probationary period, one which
was outside the contractual scope of the contract of employment.
27. I do consider it relevant that the Claimant in response to a question from
me acknowledged that he placed considerable reliance on the fact that
there had been what he saw as a two day delay from 27 to 29 November
2019 in notifying him that his probationary period had been unsuccessful.
It is relevant that that delay only took place as a result of the Claimant’s
absence from the office on 27 November and failure to respond to Mr
Byrne’s email until 9pm that day and then his election of the 29th rather
than the 28th for that review meeting.
28. If the Claimant’s position that any extension of notification of the end of the
probationary period were to be accepted it would render the ability to
terminate on one week’s notice subject to some bizarre circumstances, for
example, an employee on holiday or off ill, or indeed deliberately seeking
to avoid a probationary review meeting, could have the effect of extending
the notice period because they are able to say it had not been done within
that three month period. Equally that delay could have resulted from the
absence of the relevant line manager and in this context, it is relevant that
there may have been some delay because of Mr Byrne’s annual leave in
New York.
29. I accept the argument made by Mr Mac Labhrai that the natural and
objective interpretation of clause 13.1 is that there should have been a
successful completion of the probationary period of which the employee is
informed. It is self evident that at no point was the Claimant informed in
writing that he had successfully completed the probationary period.
30. It is not my role in the context of the claim to assess whether Mr Byrne
was right in his assessment that the Claimant had not fulfilled the
Respondent’s expectations it is simply my role to assess whether on the
terms of the Contract they were entitled to terminate his employment on
the basis of one week’s notice and I find that they were so entitled.
Therefore, whilst the process may not have been 100% in accordance
with the terms of the probationary review policy I am satisfied on an
objective interpretation of clause 13 of the contract of employment and the
offer letter that the Respondent was entitled to terminate on a week’s
notice.
31. It does not automatically follow that there was any contractual right for
there to be an extended probationary period, and even if it had been
extended, which is entirely at the Respondent’s discretion, it would have
remained the case that the notice period would have still been one week
during that extension. Mr Byrne’s evidence was that he simply did not
consider there was any realistic prospect of the Claimant performing to a
satisfactory standard and therefore there was no benefit by an extension.
He had made up his mind and he communicated that to the Claimant and
the Claimant therefore was not informed that he had successfully
completed the probationary period.
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32. Given my finding that there was no uncertainty or ambiguity in the relevant
contractual provisions regarding the probationary period I do not find it
necessary to imply a term regarding the basis upon which notice would be
given during, or at the end, of that probationary period.
33. Finally, Mr Barnes argued that in circumstances of contractual
inconsistency or ambiguity the contra proferentem principle should apply,
and interpretation should be given in favour of the employee. Having
reviewed the relevant contractual principles and applied the applicable
case law, in particular the guidance from Lord Hoffman in West Bromwich
and the decision of the Supreme Court in Capita I find that there is no
uncertainty in the terms which are clear and the Respondent was entitled
to act as it did and therefore the Claimant’s claim for an additional eleven
weeks’ pay in lieu of notice fails and is dismissed.
_______________________________________
Employment Judge Nicolle
Dated: … 2 September 2020
Judgment and Reasons sent to the parties on:
02/09/2020
………......................................................................
For the Tribunal Office
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