Mr R Etheridge v Royal Mail Group Ltd: 3334196/2018
Employment Tribunal
Published on 05 November 2019, 12:42
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
unlawful-deduction-from-wages
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2019-09-26
Official Documents
-
Mr R Etheridge v Royal Mail Group Ltd: 3334196/2018 - Judgment with Reasons
Change History
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case Number: 3334196/2018
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondent
Mr R Etheridge v Royal Mail Group Limited
Heard at: Watford On: 17 September 2019
Before: Employment Judge Henry
Appearances
For the Claimant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms N Anaman, Solicitor
JUDGMENT ON AN APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE
AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL
1. The dismissal of the claim for failure to comply with an order under Rule 38
is hereby set aside.
REASONS
2. The matter comes before me on an application for relief from sanction on
the claimant’s claim being dismissed on failure to comply with an Unless
Order under Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure.
3. The Order provided:
“A On or before 8/4/2019 the claimant shall send to the respondent:
1. a written statement of the remedy he asked the tribunal to award; and
2. any evidence and documents supporting what he claims and how it is
calculated, as already ordered on 21 November 2018.
B At the same time, he shall write to the tribunal and confirm that he has sent the
written remedy statement and evidence and documents to the respondent.
Case Number: 3334196/2018
2
If the claimant does not comply with this order, or any part of it, his claim shall be
dismissed without further order.”
4. The claimant is a litigant in person, albeit he has had assistance at various
times from the Citizen’s Advice Bureau, and a neighbour who specialises in
employment law.
5. By a claim form presented to the tribunal on 16 October 2018, the claimant
presented a complaint for an unlawful deduction from wages in respect of
one day’s pay.
6. By directions provided as part of a Notice of Hearing, sent to the parties on
21 November 2018, Case Management Orders were provided as follows:
“The claimant shall, by no later than 4 weeks from the date of this letter, set out in
writing to the respondent what remedy the tribunal is being asked to award. The
claimant shall include any evidence and documentation supporting what he has
claimed and how it is calculated. The claimant shall bring a copy of such evidence
and documentation to the tribunal.”
7. On 7 January 2019, on the claimant having failed to provide the particulars
so ordered, the respondent made an application for an Unless Order in
terms that:
“Unless the claimant provides the respondent with his Schedule of Loss with any
evidence and supporting documents within 7 days of this order that his claim be
struck out for his failure to comply with the order of 21 November 2018”.
8. On 26 January 2019, on the tribunal giving initial consideration to the
claimant’s claim under Rule 26, wrote to the claimant enquiring whether he
was presenting a claim for failure to allow time off to care for dependants,
stating:
“It is assumed that the claimant intends the claim to be one of failure to allow time
off to care for dependants under sections 55-57 Employment Rights Act 1996. Is that
correct?”
9. The claimant responded confirming that he was pursuing a complaint under
s.57A of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The claimant informed the
tribunal that he had sought the advice of his neighbour who specialised in
employment law, who advised of the wording for his reply.
10. In addressing this claim with the claimant, the claimant is unaware of what
such a claim involves and states that he is only claiming for the one day’s
pay that was deducted from his salary and seeks nothing further.
11. On 18 March 2019, the tribunal issued the Unless Order above referred.
12. On 28 March 2019, the claimant sought to comply with the tribunal’s order
stating: “The statement remedy I would like to put forward according to
advice from my solicitor and citizens advice is to ask Royal Mail to consider
early voluntary redundancy (E.V.R) for my 23 years’ service…”
Case Number: 3334196/2018
3
13. The claimant then sets out the reason why he is seeking early voluntary
redundancy.
14. The claimant furnished this correspondence to the tribunal which, on being
informed that it was to have been furnished to the respondent, he then
furnished a copy to the respondent on 9 April 2019, one day after the date
stipulated in the Order
15. It is not in dispute that, the Information provided was not that sought by the
Order, and accordingly, there has been a failure to comply, and that the
dismissal of the claim in those circumstances was in accordance with
procedure.
16. The claimant has argued before me that, he genuinely believed that the
information furnished was that required by the tribunal, in that, that was the
resolve that he required to his claim and that he had believed that in
furnishing it to the tribunal, he had then done that which he had been
required to do, stating that, on it being a genuine mistake he was willing to
furnish any documents requested of him.
17. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent that, on the claim form
having been presented on 6 October 2018, there was then ample time for
the claimant to seek and obtain legal advice to assist in the compliance with
the tribunal’s order and the preparation of his claim, and that his failure so to
do, giving rise to his misunderstanding and failing to comply with the order is
no excuse, where the respondent had sought compliance with the tribunal
orders from as far back as 7 January 2019, and which would have put the
claimant on notice of what he was being asked to do, which was then further
emphasised by the Unless Order, which again gave the claimant ample
opportunity to seek the necessary advice.
18. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent that, on the claimant
having satisfactorily followed directions in engaging ACAS in early
conciliation, and in presenting his complaint to the tribunal, this was clear
evidence of the claimant’s ability to follow directions, for which the Witness
Order being clear, there was then no scope for misunderstanding. It was
further emphasised that the respondent will suffer prejudice should relief
from sanction be granted, in that the respondent will now have to defend the
claim which it would otherwise not have to defend, and that there has now
been undue delay in the process, and that the respondent is still unaware of
the value of the claimant’s claim, which claim the respondent further submits
has little reasonable prospect of success.
The law
19. The law relevant to the issue for my determination is provided for by Rule
38(2) of the Employment Tribunal Constitution of Rules and Procedure
Regulations 2013, which provide:
“(2) A party whose claim or response has been dismissed, in whole or in part, as a
result of such an order may apply to the tribunal in writing, within 14 days of
Case Number: 3334196/2018
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the date that the notice was sent, to have the order set aside on the basis that it
is in the interests of justice to do so.”
20. I am assisted in my task by the authority in Thind v Salvesen Logistics
[2010] UK EAT/04874/09/DA per Underhill P (as he then was) that:
“14. The tribunal must decide whether it is right, in the interests of justice and the
overriding objective, to grant relief to the party in default notwithstanding the
breach of the Unless Order. That involves a broad assessment of what is in the
interests of justice, and the factors which may be material to that assessment
will vary considerably according to the circumstances of the case and cannot
be neatly categorised. They will generally include, but may not be limited to,
the reason for the default, and in particular whether it is deliberate; the
seriousness of the default; the prejudice to the other parties; and whether a fair
trial remains possible. The fact that an Unless Order has been made, which of
course puts the party in question squarely on notice of the importance of
complying with the Order and the consequences if he does not do so, will
always be an important consideration… no one factor is necessarily
determinative of the course which the tribunal should take. Each case will
depend on its own facts.”
21. I am also assisted in the task by the dicta of Her Honour Judge Edie QC in
Morgan Motor Company Ltd v Morgan UK EAT/0128/154/DM at paragraph
37 that:
“Does there have to be some compelling explanation in order to obtain the relief
from sanction? Does the Supreme Court’s judgment in Global Torch so prescribe? I
do not read it as doing so in terms. It is one thing to say that the court will not have
much sympathy who has failed to come up with a convincing explanation but yet
another to say that this will inevitably mean that he or she will fail to be afforded
relief from sanction. Can a court only be persuaded by “special factors”? I do not
read Global Torch as inserting this as a requirement above and beyond the interest of
justice. While enforcement of the sanction might be “almost inevitable” without
some compelling explanation or special factor, that again is not the same as being
inevitable…”
Conclusion
22. The claimant appearing before me has come across as having made a
genuine mistake holding the genuine belief that what he had furnished to
the tribunal was what was required by the Unless Order. Indeed, it was only
after I took the claimant through the Order identifying specifically what was
being sought that the claimant then understood that, what he had presented
was not in compliance; the claimant’s belief having been that the only
failings he had made, in doing that which he had done, was the fact that he
had furnished the order to the tribunal within the stipulated timeframe and
not the respondent, believing that for compliance, he was to furnish the
relevant information to the tribunal. He had not appreciated that the
information he had furnished was not the required information.
23. I find the claimant to have been nothing otherwise than totally sincere in his
account of his actions.
Case Number: 3334196/2018
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24. In my exercising the discretion and balancing the interests of justice, whilst
the respondent’s submissions have much merit, I am not however
persuaded that the interests of justice in this case require that the dismissal
be upheld, in that the claimant’s claim is for, and solely for, an unlawful
deduction from wage in respect of one day, 7 June. The claimant seeks no
other award. In respect hereof, the information sought by the Order is
information that at all material times has been within the respondent’s remit;
being the deduction of one day’s pay, and the material facts thereto have
also been fully particularised and fully appreciated by the respondent, as
evidenced by their response to the claim.
25. I am satisfied that, the failure of the claimant to comply with the Order has
not prejudiced the respondent, who at all times had the material information
in their possession.
26. In stating this, I do however have some sympathy for the respondent in
respect of the additional claim, that of “failure to allow time off to care for
dependants”. However, as made clear before the tribunal, this is not a claim
that the claimant pursues and indeed was not a claim that the claimant
understood, which was led by the correspondence of the tribunal on point,
such that were the claimant to have given full compliance with the Order, he
would merely have submitted the loss for one day’s pay, which as stated,
was information within the respondent’s possession.
27. This is not a case where there is any question of the claimant disregarding
an order of the tribunal, but to the contrary, the claimant has sought to give
compliance thereto, and that by his unfamiliarity with the law and process,
was genuinely mistaken in his efforts to comply.
28. There is no question of the issue, being for one day’s pay, in circumstances
as here have been fully pleaded, that the respondent would be prejudiced in
defending the claim beyond the fact of their having to defend the claim.
29. In these circumstances, I find that it would be in the interest of justice that
the dismissal be set aside.
30. I order that the dismissal be set aside, and the claim proceed to hearing.
_____________________________
Employment Judge Henry
Date: ………26/9/19
Sent to the parties on: ....31/10/19.
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For the Tribunal Office
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