Mr R Marsh v First 4 Direct Mail Ltd: 2402759/2017
Employment Tribunal
Published on 01 February 2018, 15:07
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
breach-of-contract unfair-dismissal
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2017-12-29
Official Documents
-
Mr R Marsh v First 4 Direct Mail Ltd: 2402759/2017 - Final
Change History
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr R Marsh
Respondent: First 4 Direct Mail Limited
HELD AT:
Manchester ON: 26 & 27 November 2017
29 December 2017 (In Chambers)
BEFORE: Employment Judge Holmes
REPRESENTATION:
Claimant:
Respondent:
Ms R Eeley, Counsel
Mr J Searle, Counsel
RESERVED JUDGMENT
It is the Judgment of the Tribunal that:
1. The claimant was unfairly dismissed.
2. The claimant is entitled to nil compensation by way of basic award for
unfair dismissal, by reason of his conduct before the dismissal, pursuant to
s.122(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
3. The claimant entitled to nil compensation by of any compensatory award,
having contributed to his own dismissal to the extent of 100%, pursuant to
s.123(6) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
4. The claimant was not wrongfully dismissed, in breach of contract, and this
claim is dismissed.
REASONS
1. The claimant was employed as a Head of Operations by the respondent
until his dismissal on 9 February 2017. He complains of unfair dismissal, and also
breach of contract, his dismissal being summary. The respondent admits the
claimant was dismissed, and contends that it had a fair reason for dismissal, namely
the claimant’s conduct. It was, however, conceded that the dismissal was unfair, in
that no procedure was followed, the claimant not being invited to any meeting to
discuss the allegations, of which he was given no advance notice, and was not
afforded the right to be accompanied. The respondent, however, denied wrongful
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
2
dismissal, contending that the claimant was guilty of conduct which entitled it to
dismiss the claimant without notice. Further, whilst the respondent conceded unfair
dismissal, it argued that the claimant should be awarded no compensation, whether
by way of basic award or compensatory award, on the grounds that the claimant ad
in fact committed the misconduct with which he was accused, and it would not be
just and equitable to award any compensation. Alternatively it is argued that a fair
procedure would have made no, or no more than minimal, difference, and the
compensatory award should be reduced by 100%, or some other very substantial
proportion, pursuant to the Polkey principle.
2. Other clams made by the claimant in the claim form had been disposed of
before the hearing. The hearing was held on 26 and 27 November 2017, the
evidence was concluded, and closing submissions were made. There being
insufficient time to deliberate and give judgment, judgement was reserved. The
tribunal has deliberated in chambers on 29 December 2017, and now promulgates
this judgment.
4. The respondent called Rob Porter , David Nestor, Martin Nestor, and Lorenzo
Fardella. The claimant gave evidence, and called Mark Lawrence as his witness.
There was an agreed Bundles. There was a statement of agreed facts, and an
agreed List of Issues. Having heard and read the evidence, and considered the
documents in the agreed Bundle, and having considered the submissions of both
parties, the tribunal finds the following relevant facts:
4.1 The respondent company carries on a distribution business, delivering
promotional catalogues, leaflets and similar material for its customers. The
claimant was employed at the Preston site, which had previously been operated
by Vitesse Mailing (Preston) Limited, of which Hafsah Raje was the Director and
shareholder. The claimant’s employment had originally, from 2010, been with
that company, but in or about April 2016 negotiations were held between the
respondent and that company for the respondent to acquire the business and the
Preston site.
4.2 The respondent company at that time, and thereafter, operated a similar business
from its Blackburn site, where its Directors were mainly based.
4.3 Whilst the claimant’s continuity of service was disputed in the response, it has
since been conceded, and it is conceded that his employment was transferred to
the respondent in or about July 2016, when the respondent acquired the
business carried on at the Preston site.
4.4 Upon acquisition of the business the respondent made some changes to the
manner in which it was run, but it continued to be known as Vitesse Mailing.
4.5 As a by – product of the business the operation would require surplus
promotional materials , which then were waste, to be removed from its Preston
site. Whilst this was still at that point strictly the property of the respondent’s
customers, they would give instructions as to how it was to be disposed off,
usually by it being treated as waste. It was not usual practice for the customers to
be paid any sums for this waste. Up until the transfer to the respondent two waste
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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contractors , S D Waste Paper Recycling Centre Limited, and Rishtons, were
involved in removal of such waste from the Preston site. Such waste has a
commercial value, and the previous practice had been that cash payments would
be made by these contractors for the removal of the waste. No invoices were
raised, no records were kept of such payments, and there was a lack of
transparency and audit trail in relation to these transactions , which was of
concern to the respondent. Upon transfer, therefore, the respondent reviewed
these arrangements. It was decided that such practices would cease, and that
only one contractor D S Smith , would be authorised to collect such waste, and
that invoices would be raised for the sale of the waste to that firm. The claimant
was aware of this change of policy, and that only D S Smith were authorised to
collect such waste from then Preston site.
4.6 Consequently no S D Waste collection of such waste from the Preston site had
occurred since around July 2016, and only D S Smith had carried out this
exercise, in respect of which invoices had been duly raised by the respondent
and paid by that company, the respondent thereby effectively selling the waste
material to that contractor.
4.7 One of the respondent’s major customers was Express Gifts Limited. In January
2017 there was quite an amount of surplus stock from promotions which had
finished, or had not required the anticipated volume of product to be delivered,
and this surplus stock was located at the respondent’s Preston site.
4.8 By e-mail of 27 January 2017 (page 69 of the Bundle) addressed to Mark
Lawrence who was a Senior Account manager, responsible for the Express Gifts
account, copied to the claimant, Wasyl Gelyczak the Mailings Manager of
Express Gifts , gave instructions to Mark Lawrence as to what to do with various
items of Express Gifts stock at the Preston site. In that e-mail Express Gifts
confirmed that certain items of stock could now be “recycled\scrapped”. There
were different instructions for other items, such as polythene wrapping, and
cartons.
4.9 On 7 February 2017 the claimant asked Rob Porter , warehouse manager, to
help him load an S D Waste vehicle which would be coming in . He asked him to
do this early on Friday 10 February 2017, before the start of Rob Porter’s usual
shift at around 7.00 a.m. Rob Porter declined, saying that he was unable to do so
because of the need to drop his partner off at work, and he could not get in that
early. The claimant told him not to say anything to anyone at Blackburn, the Head
Office.
4.10 Rob Porter was suspicious that the claimant may be planning to arrange a
collection of waste for cash, and he telephoned David Nestor, a Director, at
Blackburn to tell him about this. He initially called on 7 February 2017, but it was
not until 8 February 2017 that he was able to speak to David Nestor. He told him
that the collection was on Friday 10 February 2017, and that he had been asked
not to say anything. David Nestor said that he would monitor the situation, and
planed to visit the Preston site on 10 February 2017.
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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4.11 On 9 February 2017 at 6.28 a.m. a S D Waste vehicle arrived at the Preston
site. The claimant loaded it with a quantity of waste surplus product from the
Express Gifts material on site. No record was made of this collection and
removal, and no paperwork was created in connection with it. The claimant did
not receive any payment at that time for the waste.
4.12 Rob Porter arrived at work that morning to find that the S D Waste vehicle
was on site, and the claimant was loading it with waste. He telephoned David
Nestor to inform that the date had changed as the vehicle was on site.
4.13 David Nestor, his co – Director Lorenzo Fardella, and his father, Martin
Nestor, who was not a Director, but assisted in the management of the business,
were all at the Blackburn site. They met to discuss this information, and
telephoned a solicitor for advice.
4.14 They then went to the Preston site, where the CCTV footage for that morning
was viewed, and Rob Porter was spoken to.
4.15 At approximately 2.30 p.m., the claimant was calling into a meeting with David
Nestor, Lorenzo Fardella and Martin Nestor. He was not told in advance what the
meeting was about, not given any paperwork, or told that he could be
accompanied in the meeting.
4.16 He was asked what the S D Waste vehicle was doing on site that morning and
he said that it was collecting waste. He admitted that he was to receive cash for
the waste. When pressed as to how much he was to get he said around £700.
Martin Nestor commented that he thought that was very low. The three members
of the respondent’s management were shocked at what they heard. David Nestor
asked who else knew about the arrangement, and the claimant said that Mark
Lawrence did.
4.17 Mark Lawrence was accordingly also brought into the meeting. He admitted
that he knew about the collection by S D Waste that the claimant had arranged.
The tribunal does not find that he also expressly admitted that he was to receive
a share of the cash payment to be made to the claimant, but finds that the
respondent took his admission of involvement to amount to this.
4.18 David Nestor told the claimant and Mark Lawrence that they were sacked. He
told them to get their belongings and leave.
4.19 The claimant pleaded with the management not to dismiss Mark Lawrence, as
he was not the instigator of the arrangement. Mark Lawrence, however, was also
dismissed at that point.
4.20 Mark Lawrence, as he was collecting his belongings asked for a private word
with David Nestor and Lorenzo Fardella. He apologised and said he had made a
grave error of judgment. He said that his current financial position had led t him
getting involved. He was sincerely sorry, and asked for a second chance.
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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4.21 Mark Lawrence also sent text to David Nestor later the same day (not in the
Bundle) in which he again apologised, and said that he had spoken to the
claimant who had offered to sign anything for the decision to dismiss Mark
Lawrence to be changed. He went on to refer to his “naivety” getting the better of
him. David Nestor did not reply.
4.22 The following day, 10 February 2017, David Nestor telephoned Wayne
Dinning at S D Waste, who was reluctant to speak to him, and wished to speak
with the claimant. David Nestor made mention of cash being involved, and
Wayne became concerned. In due course, however, in this conversation he did
confirm that an arrangement had been made with the claimant to collect waste
and pay the claimant the cash sum of £700. David Nestor told him that the
company would raise an invoice in that sum , and in due course did so (not
included in the Bundle, but not challenged).
4.23 By letter of 17 February 2017 David Nestor wrote to the claimant (pages 70
to 73 of the Bundle) confirming his summary dismissal. He set out his reasons,
and what evidence he had taken into account in reaching the decision to dismiss.
The first item of evidence referred to (page 71 of the Bundle) was the claimant’s
admission in the meeting on 9 February 2017. The second is CCTV footage ,
which was referred to as having shown the claimant driving a fork lift truck and
loading the S D Waste vehicle. In fact the CCTV footage does not show that, but
the claimant admits that he did so. The third was the conversation that David
Nestor had had with Rob Porter on 8 February 2017 in which he said the claimant
was intending to sell company property. The fourth was David Nestor’s
conversation with Wayne Dinning at S D Waste , in which the arrangement to pay
the claimant £700 in cash for the waste was confirmed.
4.24 The letter goes on to refer to the fact that the claimant was informed, after
acquisition of the company by the respondent, that all proceeds of sale from
company property must be paid to the company, and only approved and
reputable customers and suppliers should be dealt with. Reference was also
made to the claimant having been caught doing a similar act, and warned that
similar practices would not be permitted in the future.
4.25 David Nestor went on to say how he had reasonable grounds to believe that
there had been gross misconduct on the part of the claimant, and the appropriate
sanction was dismissal with immediate effect.
4.26 He went on to inform the claimant of his right of appeal, and told him how to
exercise that right he said the appeal would be heard, where possible, by
someone other than “the person who heard the original hearing”, a reference
presumably to himself and Lorenzo Fardella.
4.27 The claimant instructed solicitors, who wrote on 2 March 2017 (pages 80 to
82 of the Bundle), alleging that their client had been unfairly and wrongfully
dismissed, and stating that their client denied the allegations , and denied that he
had admitted them in the meeting on 9 February 2017. They also enclosed a
letter dated 20 February 2017 (page 74 of the Bundle) from Wayne Dinning of S
D Waste written “to whom it may concern” in these terms:
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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“Dear Sir/Madam,
We received a phone call on Tuesday the February 2017 from Rodger Marsh at
Vitesse Mailing in Preston asking us to collect some pallets of waste paper on
behalf of Express Gifts. This collection was arranged for 6.30 a.m. on Thursday
9th February 2017 . We were told that payment for the waste paper was to be
made directly to Express Gifts.
At no time during any conversation with David Nestor from Vitesse Mailing did I
say that a cash deal had been arranged between Rodger Marsh and SD Waste
Paper for the sum of £700.00 and that Rodger Marsh was the recipient.
Rodger Marsh phoned me to say that Express Gifts had authorised payment for
the waste paper to be made directly to Vitesse Mailing in order to put an end to
the threats that were being made.”
4.28 This latter sentence was a reference to David Nestor having threatened to
report the matter to the Police.
4.29 The solicitors continued in that letter to argue that the waste that was sold
was not the property of the respondent, but of Express Gifts. The letter concluded
with a section headed “without prejudice and subject to contract” to the effect that
the claimant was willing to reach an amicable settlement and sign a Settlement
Agreement . This has not been redacted, and presumably the claimant has
waived any privilege that would attach to this portion of the letter.
4.30 The respondent’s solicitors replied by letter of 8 March 2017 (pages 83 to 84
of the Bundle) , in which they stated that the letter from the claimant’s solicitors
would be treated as a appeal, and afforded the claimant a further 14 days in
which to advance any further evidence or grounds of appeal. The letter goes on
to set out what process would be followed for the appeal.
4.31 By letter of 9 March 2017 the claimant’s solicitors replied that the claimant did
not intend to appeal the decision. The offer to explore a settlement was repeated.
4.32 David Nestor met with Express Gifts to discuss this matter , though precisely
when is unclear. As a result a letter , undated, was provided by Express Gifts
(page 68 of the Bundle) . In that letter Express Gifts confirmed that the
instruction had been given in the e-mail of 27 January 2017 (page 69 of the
Bundle) for the waste to be scrapped or recycled, and that they had had no
dealings with SD Waste, directly or indirectly. They also confirmed that they had
never previously asked for, or invoiced for any monetary return for scrappage or
waste from either the respondent or any other mailing houses.
5. Those, then are the relevant facts. The tribunal has had to determine, and has
determined, not merely what the respondent believed the claimant had done, and the
reasonableness of that belief, but also what he had actually done. In terms of
credibility, the tribunal has found that the claimant’s account of both the alleged
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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conduct, and his reaction upon being confronted about it, is not credible. Whilst the
respondent cannot give, and did not seek to give any direct evidence about the
incident itself, the basic facts of it were admitted, and were undeniable . In the
ensuing meeting there were differing accounts of what was said, and in particular
whether the claimant did or did not admit his wrongdoing, and this has been the main
factual dispute between the parties.
6. As this is such a fact sensitive case, the tribunal will set out in some detail its
reasons for its findings of fact and why the claimant’s evidence in many respects has
not been accepted.
7. The starting point is what could be termed the incontrovertible basic facts,
which the claimant agreed, and has done throughout, which are:
a) Once the respondent took over the running of the business and the site at
Preston, no S D Waste collections had been made from mid 2016;
b) Since then , all waste collections had been by D S Smith, and invoices raised
for the sale of waste to that firm;
c) Neither Express Gifts, nor any other customer had, prior to February 2017,
ever received any payment from any waste collector, or the respondent , for waste
collected by waste contactors;
d) S D Waste operated as a cash business and had not previously issued
paperwork for waste collected from the Preston site;
e) The claimant told no one in management about his arrangement.
f) The claimant told no one at Express Gifts about this arrangement, or his
alleged proposal that Express Gifts would receive any payment for the waste.
8. Those are the bare, admitted facts. Of the remaining contentious facts, there
are two of particular significance. The first is that the claimant, when asking Rob
Porter to come in early and assist him, also told him to tell no one at head office
(which was of course, at Blackburn) about the arrangement, and the second is that
when confronted by the Directors and Martin Nestor, the claimant admitted that he
was going to receive a cash payment.
9. The claimant has denied that evidence, of course. In the case of Rob Porter,
he has alleged that he has lied , and has done so because he has a grudge against
the claimant who had denied him a new hi – viz jacket when he had asked for one.
He also suggested that Rob Porter himself had in the past received cash payment,
though this was before the respondent took over the business. The tribunal accepts
Rob Porter’s evidence. The claimant does not seek to deny that he spoke to him,
and asked him to come in early to assist in the waste collection. The only disputed
aspects of the conversation are when the claimant said the collection would be
(Friday 10 or Thursday 9 February) and whether the claimant told him not to tell
anyone from head office. The tribunal does not consider that Rob Porter made that
up, and deliberately added those details to what was otherwise accepted to be a true
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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account by the claimant. The claimant asked him to participate, and when he said he
was unable to do so, the claimant, the tribunal finds, understandably was then
concerned that he may share this information with others, as indeed, he did. Even if
he was motivated by any grudge, a person can of course be as much so motivated
to tell the truth as to tell a lie. The tribunal does not find that Rob Porter was lying,
and accepts his account that he was told the collection was going to be on Friday ,
and to tell no one from head office.
10. The second issue is the alleged admission. Her there is a straight conflict
between the claimant and the three witnesses for the respondent, Martin and David
Nestor, and Lorenzo Fardella. Whilst the claimant’s witness Mark Lawrence gave
evidence, he was not present in the initial stages of the meeting when the claimant
allegedly made his admission. The tribunal takes the point that superior numbers do
not necessarily mean superior credibility, but to find that the claimant did not make
the alleged admission would require the tribunal to find that all three of the
respondent’s witnesses were lying in their evidence to the tribunal. The tribunal does
not so find. What came across in the evidence of these three witnesses was the
shock and surprise they felt when the claimant did admit what he had done. Their
actions at the time, and indeed, subsequently, were consistent with the claimant
immediately admitting his wrongdoing. These were experienced businessmen, with
disciplinary procedures in place. They had met before going over to Preston to see
the claimant. They had taken advice. Had he not admitted what he had done, the
tribunal is quite satisfied that the claimant would have been suspended and an
investigation started . Enquiries with Express Gifts and S D Waste would have been
made. That the claimant, and indeed Mark Lawrence, was summarily dismissed at
that stage is entirely consistent with the claimant having admitted what he had done.
Further, the claimant’s actions in pleading for leniency for Mark Lawrence, but not
himself, again are redolent of someone who had “held his hands up”, but was
seeking to save the job of another person whom he had involved in his wrongdoing.
11. Finally, the tribunal has come to this conclusion because it too has considered
the claimant’s own account, and has found it lacking in credibility. On his account,
without telling anyone apart from Rob Porter, or even discussing it with Express
Gifts, or the Directors , for the first time in months, the claimant arranged, at a time of
day when there would not be likely to be any Directors from Blackburn on site, a
collection of waste by an unauthorised contractor, who had previously dealt in cash ,
of which there was, and would be, no paper trail or other documentary evidence
whatsoever, on the basis that the following day, when the Express Gifts mailing
manager was due to attend, he would then tell him about this, and what sum
Express Gifts would be likely to receive. No such payment had ever been made to
Express Gifts or any other customer in the past, nor was it clear precisely how S D
Waste , who had no contractual relationship with Express Gifts, were to make the
payment to them. No record of what amount of waste had been received by S D
Waste would be available, and the claimant, and presumably Express Gifts, would
be wholly dependent upon that firm telling them correctly what weight had been
received, and what they were to pay for it . Even then, on the claimant’s account ,
the tribunal wonders whether there was the possibility of the claimant negotiating a
“cut”, as this would be, on his account, a completely unexpected windfall for Express
Gifts, for which he may have expected to get some reward. Whilst he maintained in
his evidence that this was an initiative of his own to enhance the business
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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relationship with Express Gifts, he did not discuss this highly unusual and less than
transparent proposal with anyone else in management at either company. Further,
whilst the claimant had obtained a further letter from SD Waste dated 23 May 2017
in which David Nestor’s account of the telephone call that he had with Wayne
Dinning on 10 February 2017, in which he contends that he confirmed the
arrangement to pay the claimant £700 in cash, is disputed, the claimant has not
called him to give evidence before the tribunal. Whilst the burden of proof of these
matters rests upon the respondents, if the claimant seeks to challenge their evidence
on this issue, one would have expected him to call the person who could challenge
David Nestor’s account of this conversation.
12. The tribunal applies the civil burden of proof, and has to decide whether, on
the balance of probabilities the claimant’s account is true. The claimant’s account
alone is implausible, and when added to the account of Rob Porter, becomes literally
incredible. The tribunal does indeed consider that the claimant changed the day for
collection for fear that Rob Porter may “shop” him. The tribunal finds that the
claimant’s account is not true, he did admit what he had done, for the simple reason
that he had in fact done it, and could not, when put on the spot, come up with any
alternative account. The tribunal therefore finds that he did indeed arrange a waste
collection, from which he intended to benefit by the receipt of a cash payment.
13. Finally, the tribunal has taken account of the valid points raised by Miss Eeley
about the respondent’s evidence. True it is that the dismissal letter from David
Nestor makes reference (point 2 at the middle of page 71 of the Bundle) to the
CCTV footage showing the claimant driving a fork lift truck , when it is an agreed fact
that it does not. Whilst that has become immaterial, as the claimant admits that he
did so, questions are understandably raised as to why the respondent should have
made this assertion. It is the tribunal accepts of concern, and may be attributable to
a fear that the claimant may (as he did, of course, in some respects) go back on his
admission, to suggest that the evidence against him was stronger than it was. It may
just be a mistake – not all the Directors viewed the CCTV. The tribunal has not been
shown the CCTV so it cannot comment upon how such a mistake may have been
made. Overall, however, the tribunal does to consider that this so significantly dents
the credibility of the respondent that the tribunal should reject the evidence of all
three of its witnesses that the claimant made the admission that they all say he did.
The position of Mark Lawrence in all this does not advance the claimant’s case much
either. He accepts that he was not present in the part of the meeting when the
claimant is alleged to made his admission, i.e right at the start. His statement at page
85A , given to the respondent, merely says that when the claimant was asked by
Martin Nestor whether he had received a cash payment that morning, he replied no.
That was, of course, correct as no payment was made at the time. The issue was
whether there was going to be a cash payment. Mark Lawrence’s statement does
not go on to say that there was any discussion as to whether there was to be a cash
payment, nor does he say the claimant rejected any such allegation.
14. Again, there is also some issue as to whether Mark Lawrence himself
admitted that he was going to receive cash payment. The respondent contends that
he too admitted he was going to get a cash payment. No notes or record of any
interviews were kept. Mark Lawrence certainly admitted being aware of the
arrangement made by the claimant, but denies that he was going to, or that he
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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admitted he was going to, receive any cash. The tribunal agrees that there is some
discrepancy here as well. The tribunal accepts that the respondent’s witnesses
believed that Mark Lawrence had made this admission, probably without examining
in detail exactly what he was admitting,, and taking his admission of “involvement” as
being an admission of greater participation. Ultimately, the respondent did agree to
treat Mark Lawrence more leniently, as indeed the claimant had asked it to. To some
extent, that perhaps removed the need for his case to be considered and
documented as carefully, but at the end of the day the tribunal’s view is that the
doubts that all this may cast on the respondents evidence are not sufficient for the
tribunal not to accept it, when compared with the claimant’s account upon the central
issues of factual dispute.
15. Another issue raised by the claimant is that the respondent allegedly wanted
to dismiss him as there was someone else whom the respondent wished to employ
in his place. It is alleged that this was more or less said to him. The tribunal does not
so find. The tribunal finds that the claimant was probably told that there were plenty
of people who wanted to work for the respondent, but not that he was told that there
was someone waiting for his job. The evidence was that no replacement employee
started work for some weeks after the claimant’s dismissal. The tribunal has no
hesitation in accepting that the reason for the claimant’s dismissal, fair or otherwise,
was his conduct, and no other ulterior motive.
The Submissions.
16. The parties made submissions. As the issues were almost completely factual,
it is not intended to rehearse them here. The law was not in dispute, and the only
issues were credibility, and what the claimant had , on the evidence actually done.
The Law.
17. The relevant statutory provisions are in the Annexe to this judgment. The
most pertinent are those relating to reductions in the basic and compensatory
awards. The law upon wrongful dismissal was not disputed by counsel, and the
principles of how a court or tribunal should determine when an employer is entitled to
dismiss an employee without notice are contained in the cases referred to in para. 31
below.
Discussion and findings: Unfair Dismissal – Polkey and contribution.
18. The respondent having conceded unfair dismissal , and the tribunal having
accepted the respondent’s reasons for his dismissal, the tribunal’s next task is to
establish whether there should be any reduction in the awards for contribution , or on
the basis of Polkey. In terms of the order of deductions from the compensatory
award , Rao v Civil Aviation Authority [1004] ICR 495 held that the tribunal should
apply the Polkey reduction first.
19. Further, in addition to making a reduction from the compensatory award for
contribution, the tribunal has a similar, but not identical power, to reduce the basic
award on the grounds of the claimant’s conduct under s.122(2). The difference
between the provisions of s.122(2) in relation to the basic award , and s.123(6) in
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
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relation to the compensatory award, is that for the latter, the conduct must have
contributed to the dismissal, whereas for the former, it need not have done so. That
said, as the EAT held in RSPCA v. Cruden [1986] ICR 205, whilst the two
provisions are differently worded, it would only be in exceptional circumstances that
the deductions from the basic award and from the compensatory award would differ.
(i)Polkey
20. Whilst pertinent to the compensatory award only (the received wisdom is that
Polkey deductions cannot be made from a basic award) the tribunal will first
consider whether to make any such deduction. The law on Polkey reductions is well
established, and was comprehensively reviewed by the judgment of the EAT in
Software 2000 Ltd v Andrews [2007]IRLR 568. That judgment has more recently
been reviewed by the EAT in Grayson v Paycare (A Company Ltd by Guarantee)
UKEAT/0248/15/DA .In his judgment Kerr J., reviewed the judgment of Elias J (as
he then was) in that case, and (stripping it of its now redundant references to the
repealed Dispute Resolution regulations and associated legislation), he summarises
the principles to be applied when considering whether to make a Polkey reduction,
as follows, at para. 21 of his judgment:
“21. Elias J's summary provides a useful reminder that Tribunals need to
disentangle in their minds distinct questions that may need to be addressed in
particular cases. The following are possible formulations of the questions that may
arise in particular cases:
(1) How long the employee would have continued working for the employer, but
for the dismissal; this is the question that in ordinary cases must be answered on
the balance of probabilities, to assess loss;
(2) Whether either party has adduced evidence entitling the Tribunal to conclude
(the burden of satisfying the Tribunal being on the employer) that the employee
would or might have ceased to be employed in any event had fair procedures
been followed;
(3) Is the evidence relied on to support a Polkey reduction in compensation too
unreliable or vague to be useful, and is the exercise of seeking to reconstruct
what would have happened too uncertain to ground any sensible prediction based
on it?
(4) If not, what is the chance - not the probability or likelihood - that that would
have happened at a time in the future, and if so at what point in the future might
that chance have produced the relevant event, namely the end of the
employment?
(5) Has the employer satisfied the Tribunal that there was a chance of the
employment terminating in the future, and if so how great or small was that
chance? This is commonly expressed as a percentage.
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
12
(6) Has the employer satisfied the Tribunal that employment would have
continued, but only for a limited fixed period, whether or not for reasons wholly
unrelated to the circumstances relating to the dismissal itself?
The respondent’s position is that 100 deduction should be made, on the basis that a
fair procedure would have made no difference at all. The claimant’s position is , as
one would expect, that there should be no, or only a modest deduction, or at the very
least, a deduction to allow for the time that a fair procedure of suspension,
investigation, and convening of a fair disciplinary hearing would take.
21. In assessing whether to make any such reduction, the tribunal inevitably
refers to the facts as found. It is a fact found by the tribunal that the claimant
admitted , when confronted with the allegations, that he had made an arrangement
to receive a cash payment from a waste collector. Having made such an admission,
and the offence being so obviously serious, in terms of unjust enrichment of the
claimant at the expense of his employer, that a fair procedure would indeed have
made no difference. Once there was an admission, what further investigation was
required, and what could the claimant have said that may have avoided his
dismissal? He has not, subsequently maintained his admission, but advanced
mitigating circumstances which might have avoided dismissal, he has merely
retracted his admission, and denied the offence.
22. The point is validly made that a fair procedure and investigation would have
produced the evidence from SD Waste, at page 74, in which the claimant’s account
would have been supported, and the alleged admission by Wayne Dinning to David
Nestor would have been challenged. That may be so, but the outcome would have
been the same. David Nestor would have rejected any such evidence from SD
Waste, and would have been entitled to do so, regarding them as complicit in what
they knew was an unauthorised transaction.
23. Enquiries of Express Gifts would have been futile, as the claimant says that
they were unaware of the arrangement he had made, as he was only going to tell
them of it the day afterwards, on 10 February 2017, when the Mailing Manager was
to visit the respondent.
24. Accordingly , this is, the tribunal finds, one of those, admittedly rare, cases
where to follow a fair procedure in the face of an immediate and unqualified
admission, even to allow time for an investigation and a disciplinary hearing, with
accompaniment, to be convened, would have been futile, and made no difference.
Summary dismissal, the same day, would have been inevitable. The tribunal makes
a 100% deduction from any compensatory award. If, however, the tribunal were
wrong in that view, at the very most a fair procedure allowing for an investigation and
a disciplinary hearing, would have delayed the dismissal by no more than one week.
(ii)Conduct and contribution – basic award and compensatory award.
25. In the alternative, a reduction in any compensatory award on the basis that
the claimant contributed to his own dismissal, by as much as 100%, or, if the tribunal
does not so find, some lesser per centage , is sought. The test in s. 123(6) of the
ERA is whether it would be “just and equitable” to make any reduction, where the
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
13
tribunal is satisfied that the claimant’s conduct has contributed to the dismissal. The
test in s.122(2) is whether the conduct of the claimant before the dismissal was such
that it would be just and equitable to reduce or further reduce the basic award. In
each instance, the tribunal must make its own findings of the alleged conduct on the
part of the claimant.
26. Again, the tribunal bases its decision on its findings of fact, which are that the
claimant indeed had made an arrangement with S D Waste to collect waste which
was the respondent’s to dispose of, and for which it would expect to be paid , for his
own benefit. The tribunal so finds as a fact, irrespective of the belief or
reasonableness of any belief that the respondent may have had , or been entitled to
have in those circumstances,
27. Whilst appreciating that a 100% reduction in the basic award is rare, but there
may be cases where the conduct is “so egregious that that is the case” (see
Lemonious v Church Commissioners EAT 0253/12 ) , this is one of them, and the
tribunal is satisfied that the claimant’s conduct in arranging for the removal of the
respondent’s property for personal gain , which was then admitted, is such that this
is a case in which it would not be just and equitable to make any basic award.
28. Given the RSPCA v. Cruden [1986] ICR 205 principle, and how the
claimant’s conduct clearly contributed to his dismissal, the tribunal can see no
reason to apply a different reduction in the compensatory award, which is similarly
reduced by 100%, to nil.. Further, applying Rao v Civil Aviation Authority [1994]
ICR 495 , the order of reductions would be for the Polkey reduction to be made first,
and then that for contribution. Had the tribunal, therefore made an award of one
week’s pay applying Polkey , that would then have been subject to 100% reduction
for contribution in any event.
Breach of Contract – the notice pay claim.
29. The tribunal turns now to the breach of contract claim. The claimant was
dismissed without notice, so the burden is upon the respondent to prove, on the
balance of probabilities, as a matter of fact, that the claimant was guilty of conduct
which was of such a nature that it entitled the respondent to dismiss the claimant for
that conduct, that it do so, and that it did not lose its entitlement to do so.
30. The central issue, then, is a factual one – what did the claimant do? This of
course, again, requires the tribunal to make its own findings, and not to examine the
reasonableness of the belief on the part of the employer. There has been no real
argument advanced that the claimant’s conduct, if proven, would not amount to
gross misconduct (although the epithet “gross” is not actually necessary) so as to
justify summary dismissal. The claimant’s, and Miss Eeley’s, energies have been
focused on challenging the conduct alleged, and the alleged confession of it by the
claimant.
31. The exercise, in short, is identical to that which the tribunal has had to perform
in determining contribution above – to the same burden and standard of proof. The
tribunal’s findings are that the claimant did indeed arrange the disposal of waste from
his employers for potential personal gain. That cannot be, regardless of any express
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
14
terms of the contract, anything other than conduct of such seriousness that it
satisfies the tests laid down in cases such as Briscoe v Lubrizol Ltd. [2002] IRLR
607 and Neary and Neary v Dean of Westminster [1999] IRLR 288 .
32. The claimant has raised an argument that the waste was not in fact the
property of the respondent, in that Express Gifts owned it, and therefore it was not
the respondent’s to sell. That is, with respect, a specious argument. Firstly, the email
from Express Gifts of 27 January 2017 expressly authorises the respondent to
dispose of the material. Secondly, even if the waste was not , strictly in law, the
property of the respondent, it was not the property of the claimant either. On his own
evidence, the claimant had not informed Express Gifts of his intention allegedly to
dispose of their goods for their benefit in this way before he did so, so he could have
had no authority whatsoever, to make the arrangement that he did. Thirdly, even if
he was not, ultimately, to benefit personally (which the tribunal does not find, but in
the alternative) at the very least disposing of the waste in this manner was going to
deprive the respondent of the payment that it would otherwise have received for that
waste when disposed of through its usual and proper channels, by D S Smith. On
any view that is serious conduct on the part of a senior employee, meriting summary
dismissal.
33. In conclusion, therefore, whilst the claimant was unfairly dismissed, the
tribunal makes a nil award in respect of the basic award and the compensatory
award. The claimant was guilty of conduct for which the respondent was entitled to
dismiss him without notice, and did so. He was not, therefore, wrongfully dismissed.
Employment Judge Holmes
Dated: 29 December 2017
RESERVED JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
8 January 2018
FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TRIBUNALS
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
15
ANNEXE
THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
s. 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996:
(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair
or unfair, it is for the employer to show–
(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and
(b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of
a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the
employee held.
(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it–
(a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind
which he was employed by the employer to do,
(b) relates to the conduct of the employee,
(c) is that the employee was redundant, or
(d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without
contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed
by or under an enactment.
(3) In subsection (2)(a)—
(a) 'capability', in relation to an employee, means his capability assessed by reference
to skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality, and
(b) 'qualifications', in relation to an employee, means any degree, diploma or other
academic, technical or professional qualification relevant to the position which he held.
(4) In any other case where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection
(1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having
regard to the reason shown by the employer)—
(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative
resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or
unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and
(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the
case.
122 Basic award: reductions
(1) Where the tribunal finds that the complainant has unreasonably refused an offer by
the employer which (if accepted) would have the effect of reinstating the complainant in
his employment in all respects as if he had not been dismissed, the tribunal shall reduce
RESERVED JUDGMENT Case No. 2402759/2017
16
or further reduce the amount of the basic award to such extent as it considers just and
equitable having regard to that finding.
(2) Where the tribunal considers that any conduct of the complainant before the
dismissal (or, where the dismissal was with notice, before the notice was given) was
such that it would be just and equitable to reduce or further reduce the amount of the
basic award to any extent, the tribunal shall reduce or further reduce that amount
accordingly.
s.123 Compensatory award
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and sections 124, 124A and 126, the
amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the tribunal considers just
and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the
complainant in consequence of the dismissal in so far as that loss is attributable to action
taken by the employer.
and, in particular:
[(1) to (5) N/a]
(6) Where the tribunal finds that the dismissal was to any extent caused or contributed
to by any action of the complainant, it shall reduce the amount of the compensatory
award by such proportion as it considers just and equitable having regard to that finding.
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