Mr S Ashmore v Dibco Precision Engineering Ltd: 1800402/2020
Employment Tribunal
Published on 22 October 2020, 11:40
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
breach-of-contract contract-of-employment unfair-dismissal unlawful-deduction-from-wages
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2020-09-17
Change History
-
Reasons Added
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case: 1800402/2020 (V)
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr S Ashmore
Respondent: Dibco Precision Engineering Limited
AT A HEARING
Heard at: Leeds by CVP video link On: 3rd and 4th September 2020
Before: Employment Judge Lancaster
Representation
Claimant: Mr P Sangha, counsel
Respondent: Mr D Bunting, counsel
This has been a remote hearing on the papers which has been consented to by the parties.
The form of remote hearing was CVP video platform (V). A face to face hearing was not held
because it was not practicable and all issues could be determined in a remote hearing
JUDGMENT
1. The complaints of unfair dismissal and of an unauthorised deduction from wages for
21st October 2019 succeed.
2. The complaint of a further unauthorised deduction from wages in respect of an alleged
“week in hand” is dismissed.
3. The complaint of wrongful dismissal (breach of contract) is dismissed.
4. The Claimant’s conduct before termination was such that it is just and equitable to
reduce the basic award for unfair dismissal by 100 per cent.
5. It is just and equitable to limit the amount of compensation for unfair dismissal to the
period it would have taken to conclude a fair procedure, namely 1 week, but not to
reduce it further by reason of any contributory conduct.
Case: 1800402/2020 (V)
2
6. The Respondent unreasonably failed to comply with the ACAS Code of Practice on
Disciplinary Procedures and the compensatory award for unfair dismissal is increased
by 20 percent under section 207(A) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992.
7. The Respondent failed to provide a written statement of terms and conditions and the
Claimant is awarded an addiitonal 2 weeks’ pay under section 38 of the Employment
Act 2002
8. The Respondent is ordered to pay compensation to the Claimant as follows:
7.1 Compensatory award for unfair dismissal (limited to 1 week’s net pay) £323.21
7.2 A 20 per cent uplift on that award, £64.64
7.3 Gross wages for 21st October 2019, £78.80
7.4 Additional award 2 weeks’ pay at £394 per week, £788.00
EMPLOYMENT JU DGE LANCASTER
DATE 17th September 2020
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr S Ashmore
Respondent: Dibco Precision Engineering Limited
HELD AT: Leeds by CVP video link ON: 3 and 4 September 2020
BEFORE: Employment Judge Lancaster
REPRESENTATION:
Claimant: Mr P Sangha, Counsel
Respondent: Mr D Bunting, Counsel
JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 21 September 2020 and written
reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 62(3) of the Employment
Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013, the following reasons are provided, taken from
the transcript of the decision given orally upon the conclusion of the hearing:
REASONS
1. This is a claim primarily for unfair dismissal, but also for wrongful dismissal. It
is accepted that Mr Ashmore was summarily dismissed on the morning of 21
October of last year 2019 even though subsequently, by agreement, the parties
treated this as a resignation effective from the 18th.
Unauthorised deduction from wages; section 13 Employment Rights Act
1996
2. There is however a subsidiary complaint of a failure to pay wages. I shall deal
with that briefly. I consider that claim as presented, I am afraid, to be
misconceived. It is a claim that Mr Ashmore was not paid his “week in hand”.
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
2
3. He started this period of employment with the respondent company, I accept,
sometime in 2008. There are records of him having been issued with a P60 for
years subsequent to that and therefore the entry of the date of 2011 on the
claim form (ET1) is a mistake.
4. The claimant appears to believe that because he was paid “a week in hand” he
somehow never caught up. However I look at the end of employment and it is
abundantly clear to me that he has been paid at least up until 18 October which
was the last full day that he worked.
5. Pay day was clearly on a Thursday. I have seen the respondent’s bank details
which show that the claimant, and indeed other employees, were paid on 24
October. That payment quite clearly relates to the week before up to Friday 18
October. There is a handwritten note prepared by Mrs Dibble - who carried out
basic administrative and pay role functions for the respondent company - and
that shows with an entry for 24 October, which is the pay date: the relevant
calculations are of a weeks’ pay at £381.69 together with five days accrued
holiday £394, a total of £775.69 gross equating therefore to the £570.50 that
was paid into the claimant’s bank account on that date.
6. I can see from the clock cards produced also in the bundle that that calculation
is clearly relating to the week ending the 18 October. So he was paid for the
final week that he worked. There is absolutely no reason to suppose that
somehow he has still carried over an unpaid week from the start of his
employment in 2008. It is abundantly clear that if he is paid a week in hand on
the following Thursday, whenever he started in 2008 he would have worked for
that week, been paid for it the following Thursday and for each subsequent
week he worked again paid a week in arrears on the next Thursday right up
until the 24 October 2019.
7. The only part of this claim that does however succeed, although not specifically
particularised in this way in the claim form, is the fact that he did not receive
any payment at all for the final day that he went into work which was 21 October.
And of course he is entitled to be paid for the entirety of that one day.
Dismissal
Background
8. Dealing with the more substantive complaints, as I have said I am satisfied that
the claimant began this period of employment in around 2008. He had worked
for a short time for the respondent as a teenager but then left to pursue other
employment and I find his narrative account of those early working years to be
plausible.
9. However throughout the course of his employment I am satisfied that there
were a number of issues that led to the institution of disciplinary procedures.
These are scantily recorded by the respondent but I accept that there must have
been some written record, and from that Mrs Dibble has now produced a
typewritten account at page 76 in the agreed bundle.
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
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10. This therefore shows that the claimant received a verbal warning in November
2008, a written warning in December 2008, a written warning in November 2016
together with a verbal warning in June 2017 and again in March 2018. And
there is produced within the bundle a copy of that first written warning going
back to the very start of employment or thereabouts, 22 December 2008. I do
not accept there is any evidence to substantiate the suggestion to put to Mr
Dibble that that is a later fabrication. I am quite satisfied that this is genuinely
a document prepared at the time and which still remains on the employee’s file.
I actually find corroboration from that in the fact that the second recorded written
warning from November 2016 has not been found. If there were any evidence
of a fraudulent attempt to bolster the case I would expect a similar document to
be produced, and its absence indicates to my mind the genuineness of the
admittedly incomplete records.
11. I also attach no importance whatsoever to the fact that subsequently that
Mrs Dibble has recorded within the work’s diary the dates of these purported
issues of verbal or written warnings. It strikes me as entirely plausible that
working from her scanty list of dates she has indeed, as is alleged by the
respondent, then gone back and inserted details within the work’s diary to
correspondent to those dates. I do not accept that that is any evidence of an
attempt fraudulently to bolster the claim by creating evidence. It is a genuine,
though perhaps misguided, attempt to record the matters that are scantily
reported elsewhere in the company documentation.
Facts
12. So that is the general history but I am, of course, particularly concerned with
the events of 17 and 18 October 2019.
13. On 17 October there was an altercation between Mr Ashmore and Mr Dibble.
In the course of that it is accepted, and I find of course therefore, that the
claimant was what I can only properly describe as being abusive to Mr Dibble.
He called him a “shit boss”, “the worse boss ever2, he said he had “an
enormous ego” and he made gratuitous references to a former partner of Mr
Dibble who left the business many years before suggesting that that person, Mr
Robinson, was in fact responsible for the successful obtaining of contracts and
that it had nothing to do with subsequent work within that business of Mr Dibble.
14. And indeed as that altercation became heated it is now accepted that Mr Dibble
indicated that he would issue a final written warning, the last in that series of
warnings that I have already referred to. I accept the submissions of Mr Bunting
on behalf of the respondent that it was that threat of the issue of the final
warning that in fact prompted the claimant to offer an apology, which he did.
15. But even though he had apologised and thought he may have averted any
disciplinary sanction, that conduct towards his employer on the 17th was clearly
such that merited the issue of a warning of some nature. And on 18 October
the following day the Friday, sometime in the afternoon, Mr Dibble did hand to
the claimant a letter drafted on his instructions by his wife which contained the
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
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form of a final written warning. That clearly related to the conduct on the
previous day and it also made reference to at least one issue of a previous
warning, even though that would have expired by effluxion of time at this stage.
16. There is no dispute that the claimant did not read the content of that final written
warning. At most, and I cannot determine with certainty whether he did or did
not do this, he opened it and saw the heading “final written warning”. So either
he saw that or he knew from the context when the envelope was handed over
that that was what it contained. But he did not read the substance and, as I
have said, because that related to the events of the previous day which certainly
did warrant some disciplinary action his next behaviour is in my view wholly
inappropriate. He simply tore that letter up and said words to the effect - as
reported by Mr Dibble and corroborated by another witness - “that’s what I think
of your letter.” And I have no doubt that may have been accompanied by an
expletive as well. I find as a fact, because I accept the evidence of the
respondent as being the more credible on this account, that on that occasion
he also repeated the abusive comments about Mr Dibble being “a shit boss”.
17. He then threw that letter into the bin and there was a further heated exchange
before Mr Dibble left because he had a business appointment to attend to.
18. I am satisfied that that sequence of events over the 17 and 18 did indeed cause
considerable distress to Mr Dibble such he considered that he had reached the
end of his patience with Mr Ashmore. Whether or not the history as now
recounted by the respondent’ of abusive behaviour over a lengthy period is an
exaggeration with hindsight or not, I do not need to say.
19. But I am satisfied and accept Mr Dibble’s evidence that he himself was tearful
when he thought he had reached the end of this relationship: and that is
corroborated by the witness Mr Bates. I appreciate that Mr Bates is a relative
of the Dibble family, the brother-in-law of Mr Dibble. But that of itself provides
a good reason why I should accept the account that Mr Dibble went round to
his house on the Friday because they had family business and work business
to attend to. And Mr Bates corroborates the upset that he saw on the part of his
brother-in-law. His evidence is therefore that he was told that the matter would
be reviewed over the weekend and clearly that is what Mr Dibble did. Having
reviewed it he formed certainly a provisional view that that behaviour was
insupportable, and so on the morning of Monday 21 October - the next working
day when Mr Ashmore was due to return to work - he certainly had in mind the
distinct probability that he would then be dismissed.
20. On that occasion Mr Ashmore covertly recorded the conversation. Whether he
caught the very start of it or not is unclear, but the first thing that was said to
him when he arrived at work that day, by Mr Dibble, was “have you got owt to
say about Friday”. I accept that that is not an express invitation to apologise
for the events of Friday, that is the tearing up of the final written warning letter
with the expression that “that’s what I think of your letter” and some associated
offensive language.
21. The recorded response of the claimant to that general enquiry “have you got
owt to say about Friday” was “no not a word, I don’t want to say anything to you
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
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no more” at which point Mr Dibble immediately said “you’re sacked” and that
therefore is effecting the dismissal.
The reason for dismissal: section 98 (1) and (2) Employment Rights Act
1996
22. I am satisfied therefore that the reason for termination was a potentially fair one
relating to conduct. In January of this year written reasons for termination were
given. The reason for that delay was largely as I have said that Mr Ashmore
was allowed to put in a letter of resignation and it was treated as if he had left
voluntarily. But subsequently he did request reasons and they were then
provided, though in the event not until some three months after the actual
dismissal.
23. Within those written reasons and within the factual matrix that I can establish
from the evidence, I am quite satisfied that the reason for termination was
principally the response to the issue of a written warning.
24. Of course it is correct that there was no procedure followed in issuing that
warning as indeed there had not been on any previous occasion when warnings
were issued in the course of employment. And that is a flaw on the part of the
respondent, but it does not necessarily mean that that warning is as Mr
Ashmore seemed to contend worth nothing, again using more colloquial
language saying “your warning is worth shit”. As I say it clearly related to
inappropriate conduct and behaviour towards his employer on 17th.
25. And further it appears to me quite clear that although he had formed a very
strong provisional view that that conduct warranted dismissal, Mr Dibble was at
least potentially prepared again to be lenient, as he claimed he had been lenient
over the course of many years employment when faced with insubordination
and abuse in the past of the claimant. That is that if an apology had been
tendered he may well have stepped back from that ultimate sanction.
26. That is supported by a comment he made later in the course of the conversation
that was covertly recorded: when another employee Mr Needham came on the
scene, Mr Dibble said “I’m sacking him because he won’t apologise for what he
did on Friday”. So clearly Mr Dibble understood that his initial invite to say
anything was expecting some form of apology even if he did not say so in terms.
So the failure to respond appropriately and indeed to have said “no I don’t want
to say anything to you anymore” was then also part of the rationale for his
decision to confirm the dismissal that he had been thinking about all weekend.
27. I am quite satisfied that this set of facts which I have recounted was the reason
for dismissal. Mr Dibble of course had been actively involved in all incidents so
he had his own evidence as to what had happened. This is a small family
business. There is Mr Dibble, his wife dealing with administration, his son
involved in the business, his brother-in-law Mr Bates and I think presently only
two other employees and previously just one other employee, Mr Ashmore.
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
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The fairness of the decision: section 98 (4) Employment Rights Act 1996
28. So within that contact having regard of course, as I must do on any unfair
dismissal case to the size and administrative resources of the respondent
employer, I consider that there was no necessary further investigation by Mr
Dibble the owner of the business who had been actively involved.
29. But nonetheless he followed no procedure: he had not followed a procedure in
issuing the final warning nor before issuing the notice of dismissal on the
morning of the 21st. And for that reason, I do consider that it fell outside the
range of reasonable responses open to a reasonable employee. Ordinarily a
complete failure to follow any procedure - certainly when contemplating
termination of someone who has worked for a significant period - would render
the behaviour unreasonable, and on that ground I do make a declaration that
this dismissal was unfair.
Contributory fault: section 122 (2) Employment Rights Act 1996
30. However the consequences of that unfairness are severely limited. I am quite
satisfied that the claimant’s behaviour prior to termination was both
blameworthy and culpable such that there should be 100% reduction in the
amount of the basic award. That is his abusive comments about his employer
on the 17th, but more particularly, whatever he may have thought about the
failure of procedure, the gross insubordination on the 18th in ripping up a
document that purported to take him to task about inappropriate words (for
which he had already accepted that he was required to issue an apology), and
again the repeated abuse then directed towards his employer. This is coupled
also with the fact that he was given the opportunity to say something about
those events he instead then indicated “I don’t want to say anything to you no
more”. That initial act of insubordination together with the blockading response
to any invitation to discuss matters again is in my view culpable conduct
exacerbating a situation. It is certainly conduct that is calculated or likely to
seriously undermine the relationship of trust and confidence with his employer
when he declares in express terms “I don’t want to say anything to you at all”.
31. That also answers the question of whether or not this dismissal was wrongful
or not. I consider that that catalogue of behaviours over a short period cannot
be described as anything other than gross misconduct justifying instant
termination.
“Just and equitable” compensation sections 123 (1) and (5) Employment
Rights Act 1996 (“Polkey”) and uplifts: section 207A Trade Union &
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and section 38 Employment
Act 2002
32. Had there been a proper procedure, with the claimant being allowed to at least
make representations before a final decision was taken, I consider however, on
the evidence I have heard, that that would only have delayed the matter by a
very short period. As I have said there is no reason at all why the person directly
involved in this enquiry, the owner of the business, should not have conducted
matters. Had he adjourned and given the claimant a warning and conducted a
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
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meeting, at least the parties might have had time to reflect. I concur with Mr
Sangha’s description of the encounter on 21st as being more a confrontation
than a meeting, but the fact remains that there was no other evidence to collat.
The two people actually involved in the original altercation were both present,
there was no further enquiry that was necessary and doing the best I can as a
matter of impression on the evidence I am satisfied that it will indeed have made
no difference in this case had that meeting then been convened after an
appropriate short period.
33. The facts of what Mr Ashmore had done would have been the same and I have
categorised those as gross misconduct. The effect upon his employer would
have remained the same and I have recorded the distress witnessed by Mr
Bates and reported by Mr Dibble immediately upon this incident, and indeed Mr
Ashmore himself now concedes that effectively the trust and confidence within
that relationship have come to an end, and I am also satisfied on balance that
the claimant would not in fact have tendered any such adequate apology as
would have enabled Mr Dibble to draw back from his initial conclusions that this
relationship had reached the end of its life.
34. Even if not expressly invited to apologise to the outset of the interaction on the
21st, it was apparent subsequently that Mr Dibble was interested in a possible
apology and the failure to tender any such was part of his reason for the
claimant having been dismissed. Furthermore, there was then contact between
Mr Ashmore and Mr Lee Dibble where Mr Lee Dibble has suggested that an
apology may persuade his father to change his mind: and even if it is right that
subsequently Lee Dibble then contacted the claimant and said you need not
bother coming into work, that would still have not precluded him from making
approaches to apologise. And of course in the course of this hearing he still
accepts no responsibility for his inappropriate actions in seeking to undermine
the authority of an employer trying to impose a warning for inappropriate
conduct, and instead reasserts his reliance of the fact that a failure to follow a
procedure justifies him in ignoring the content of that purported warning
altogether.
35. So within this small business I consider that that further process would only
have delayed matters by a week and that is the limit of the compensatory award
that is appropriate.
36. Of course it is common ground that there was no issue of written terms of
conditions of employment and the consequence of my rulings is that the
claimant is entitled to an uplift on that award. However in the circumstances I
am not minded to increase that above the mandatory two weeks. All parties
have lived with the absence of written terms and conditions for some 11 years
without any apparent problem and I see no reason therefore why I should make
it four weeks rather than two.
37. So on that basis having considered at this liability stage issues of Polkey
whether it is just and equitable to award an amount and contributory conduct, I
conclude that I declare this dismissal to be unfair but there is no basic award
because of the contributory conduct reducing that to zero. There is a limit on
the extent of the compensatory award, following similar principles to those
Case Number: 1800402/2020 (V)
8
outlined in Software 2000 Ltd. v Andrews [2007] ICR 825 so that is limited to
a very short period of one week. But that one week’s additional pay is subject
to an uplift initially in my view of two weeks’ pay. Also, I consider that that
award is liable to an uplift before applying that two weeks’ pay because of the
failure to comply with the ACAS Code of Practice I do consider that such a
complete failure even for a small company is unreasonable. There has been
no attempt to comply with any appropriate procedures and because the failure
is so all encompassing I therefore consider that the appropriate uplift is not the
maximum 25% but it is high it is 20%. So I will award an uplift of 20% on the
week’s net pay which is agreed to be £323.21.
38. I am not persuaded that I should also make an award for the loss of statutory
rights: in circumstances where I consider the claimant’s conduct has been
entirely culpable he would therefore be liable to fair dismissal in any event.
Similarly, I do not however reduce the compensatory award by reason of this
contributory conduct, because that is already factored into the decision that he
would still have been dismissed had a proper process been followed.
39. The other amounts therefore are the two weeks’ award for failure to provide
particulars two weeks at £394 so £788, and the one days’ pay for 21 October
is £78.80 gross.
Employment Judge Lancaster
Date 15th October 2020
REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
Date 16th October 2020.
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