Mr S Babaei v Final Post Ltd: 3200853/2020
Employment Tribunal
Published on 18 February 2021, 11:51
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
breach-of-contract contract-of-employment right-to-be-accompanied unfair-dismissal unlawful-deduction-from-wages working-time-regulations
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2020-12-15
Change History
-
Reasons Added
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr S Babaei
Respondent: Final Post Limited
Heard at: East London Hearing Centre (by Cloud Video Platform)
On: 11 December 2020
Before: Employment Judge Gardiner
Members: Ms M Long
Mr B Wakefield
Representation
Claimant: Mr Howard Lewis-Nunn, counsel
Respondent: Ms Theodora Hand, counsel
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Tribunal is that:-
1. The Claimant’s unfair dismissal claim under Section 94 Employment Rights Act 1996
is well founded and succeeds. There is to be no reduction in the remedy awarded for
contributory conduct or under the principle in Polkey v AE Dayton Services Limited.
2. The Claimant’s claim for notice pay is well founded. The Claimant is entitled to two
weeks’ notice pay.
3. The Claimant’s claim for unpaid overtime, by way of unauthorised deduction of
wages under Section 13 Employment Rights Act 1996 is not well founded and is
therefore dismissed.
4. The Respondent has failed to provide the Claimant with a statement of employment
particulars, as is required by Section 1 Employment Rights Act 1996. The Claimant’s
remedy for this failure, under Section 38 Employment Act 2002, is an award of four
weeks’ pay.
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
2
5. There has been a failure to comply with the ACAS Code of Practice in relation to
disciplinary procedures. The Tribunal will evaluate the extent of any increase in the
award on this basis at the remedy hearing.
6. The Claimant’s claim for refusal of the right to be accompanied at a disciplinary
hearing brought under Section 10 Employment Relations Act 1999 is not well
founded and is dismissed.
7. The Claimant’s claim for unpaid holiday pay under Regulation 30 of the Working
Time Regulations 1998 is dismissed upon withdrawal.
8. The Claimant’s claim for unpaid expenses, as a claim for breach of contract, is
dismissed upon withdrawal.
9. There will be a remedy hearing on 28 April 2021 with a time estimate of 1 day.
Employment Judge Gardiner
Date: 15 December 2020
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr S Babaei
Respondent: Final Post Limited
Heard at: East London Hearing Centre (by Cloud Video Platform)
On: 11 December 2020
Before: Employment Judge Gardiner
Members: Ms M Long
Mr B Wakefield
Representation
Claimant: Mr Howard Lewis-Nunn, counsel
Respondent: Ms Theodora Hand, counsel
JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 16 December 2020, the Respondent has
requested written reasons in an email dated 21 December 2020.
REASONS
1. This is a claim for unfair dismissal and for unpaid notice pay. There is also a claim
for unpaid overtime payments. Mr Babaei, the Claimant, worked for the
Respondent film production company as a Production Manager until his dismissal
with effect from 6 November 2019. There is a dispute as to the true reason for the
Claimant’s dismissal. The Respondent contends that it dismissed the Claimant on
the expiry of a six-month fixed term or alternatively for misconduct. The Claimant
considers he was not dismissed for either reason. Instead, he believes he was
dismissed in order to save money.
2. The Tribunal has heard evidence from Mr Bhattacharjee, who is Company Director
of the Respondent, and from the Claimant himself. Both witnesses were crossexamined.
In addition, the Claimant relies upon character evidence from Dominika
Besinska, who has not been called to give evidence. Because she has not been
called to give evidence, this inevitably affects the weight to which we can attach to
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
2
her evidence. In any event, the relevance of her evidence is limited to the issues
which were identified at the outset of the hearing.
3. We have also had regard to the evidence in an agreed bundle of 130 pages, to the
extent to which we have been specifically directed to particular pages in the course
of evidence.
4. Towards the end of his employment, the Claimant was earning just under £2000
per month in salary. Despite this, he had not been provided with any written
particulars recording the key terms of his employment as is required by Section 1
Employment Rights Act 1996. Whilst there are many factual disputes between the
two individuals who have given evidence, there are relatively few documents which
assist us in resolving those factual disputes. We have had to form a view on the
credibility of the evidence of Mr Bhattacharjee on the one hand, and the credibility
of the Claimant on the other.
5. So far as the credibility of Mr Bhattacharjee is concerned, we have concerns about
the credibility of parts of his evidence. He was vague as to dates of key events,
there were significant and important differences between his version in his witness
statement and the version in the Grounds of Resistance. At times in his evidence
he appeared reluctant to give a straight answer to a straight question.
6. By contrast, we found the Claimant to be a plausible witness who was, on
occasions, willing to make concessions which were against his own interest - such
as being willing to accept he had agreed that his overtime pay could be taken as
holiday and that it would subsequently be paid as time off in lieu.
7. The first issue that we need to resolve is the reason for the Claimant’s dismissal. It
is agreed that the Claimant was dismissed with effect from 6 November 2019. On
that date he was sent the following email from an email address named ‘Human
Resources’. It was copied to Mr Bhattacharjee and also to his wife, who apparently
had responsibility for payroll and related matters.
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
3
8. Mr Babaei’s case is that this email was the first he knew he was being dismissed.
He was not expecting his employment to end when it did. In fact, he says that he
had submitted leave requests in relation to leave over the Christmas period and
was waiting to hear back as to whether these requests had been approved.
9. Mr Bhattacharjee maintains that the reason the Claimant was dismissed when he
was is this - that this was the end of a six month period of notice that had been
agreed at a meeting back in May 2019. Despite the existence of an email from
‘Human Resources’, which might indicate that there was a dedicated HR function
within the Respondent, this alleged agreement was never recorded in writing. Nor
is it evidenced by any contemporaneous document. The only document relied up to
suggest that the Claimant had agreed to end his employment at an earlier stage is
the following email sent by Mr Bhattacharjee on 1 October 2019:
10. This is a curious email, not least that it appears that the content of the email is
incomplete - as Mr Bhattacharjee himself acknowledged. He may have decided that
the Claimant’s employment was coming to an end, but the email does not clearly
evidence an earlier agreement to that effect, nor the basis on which such an
agreement would have been reached. We do not read the reference to “your last
payments with us” as necessarily a reference to his last payslip at the point at
which his employment terminated, because of the timing. If the employment was to
end at some point in November 2019, it would be expected that there would be two
further payslips – one for October and one for November. No good reason has
been provided as to why this payment would have to wait until the final payslip,
rather than the next payslip at the end of October.
11. The other curiosity, in relation to the Respondent’s case, is that on the
Respondent’s evidence it only discovered the existence of the Claimant’s company
after May 2019. The reason, on the Respondent’s case, why the Claimant had
been put on a six-month fixed term contract in May 2019 was the purported
concerns about his performance and behaviour over the past year. Yet these
concerns are not referred to in the dismissal email, nor does the email state that
employment will end as previously agreed when the six months comes to an end.
In fact, the last date of employment appears to pre-date the end of the six-month
period, even on the Respondent’s own case. That is because the meeting at which
the Respondent alleges that six months’ notice was given was in mid May. Mr
Bhattacharjee in his witness statement puts it as occurring after 14 May 2019
(paragraphs 14 and 15). If he had been acting consistently with six months’ notice
given at such a meeting, then the employment would have continued until at least
14 November 2019.
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
4
12. Therefore, we reject the Respondent’s primary contention that the reason for
dismissal was expiry of a fixed term notice period. The Respondent’s secondary
contention is that the reason was misconduct. In particular, two aspects are relied
upon. The first alleged act of misconduct is the discovery that the Claimant was a
director of a company which also was involved in film production. The second is the
suspicion that the Claimant had been working for that company during working
hours when he was being paid by the Respondent.
13. So far as the first is concerned, it is at least supported by the email on 6 November
2019. However, there is a dispute as to when the Respondent first discovered that
the Claimant had his own company. The Respondent accepts that the Claimant
was doing his own freelance work at weekends, which he was entitled to perform.
On the Respondent’s own case, it discovered that the Claimant had significant
involvement in a film production company in July 2019 and yet continued his
employment for over three months thereafter without issuing him with any
disciplinary sanction at the time or even any written request that he choose to work
for one company rather than both. It is the Tribunal’s experience that within the
media world generally, it is quite common for those who are in employment to also
be involved in freelance work. It appears to us that the important issue is not
whether the Claimant was the director of a company but whether the Respondent
believed that the work that the Claimant was performing through that company was
in conflict with the Claimant’s responsibilities to the Respondent.
14. The Respondent’s evidence has been vague on this point. Mr Bahattacharjee has
not clearly pointed to any specific act by the Claimant that amounts to a competitive
act in taking business that might otherwise be won by the Respondent. We reject
the evidence that the Respondent genuinely considered that the Claimant’s
conduct in starting this company amounted to gross misconduct.
15. The second alleged misconduct in relation to this other work was carrying out this
work during time when he was being paid by the Respondent. There was no clear
evidence available to Mr Bhattacharjee that the Claimant had been engaged in his
own work during working hours other than the fact that he was seen to have been
speaking in Farsi. However, the contents of the conversation were not understood
by the person who had heard it. At its highest, the Respondent’s evidence was that
a conversation in Farsi during the working day led to a genuine suspicion the
Claimant was engaged in other work when being paid by the Respondent.
However, this suspicion was not referred to in the termination email. We think it
inherently unlikely that such a conversation alone, without any further insight into
the nature of the conversation, would be the basis for a genuine suspicion that the
Claimant was engaged in competitive activity. We reject the Respondent’s
contention it was the reason, or the principal reason, for the Claimant’s dismissal.
16. Therefore we reject the alternative reason advanced by the Respondent for
dismissal. We feel that the likelihood is that the principal reason the Claimant was
dismissed, as the Claimant alleges, was in order to save money. That is why the
Respondent was still willing to engage him on a freelance basis, which would be
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
5
potentially cheaper in that it would not have to guarantee the Claimant a minimum
amount of pay, as it would if he had continued as an employee.
17. Having so found, the issue of Polkey does not arise for consideration. This was a
cost saving decision, not a case of a potentially justified dismissal for conduct
where there has been a failure to follow a fair procedure.
18. For the same reason, the issue of contributory conduct does not arise. We do not
consider that the Claimant’s conduct was a causal factor in his dismissal, which
was taken for cost cutting reasons.
19. The Claimant is entitled to two weeks’ notice pay. There is as yet no agreement as
to his level of earnings at the point of dismissal so this will have to be determined at
a remedy hearing unless it can be dealt with by way of agreement.
20. As to the overtime claim, we do not consider that the Claimant has proved he is
entitled to be paid for a further 31 hours work. The likelihood is that he was paid for
these hours in his final payslip when he was paid £376.79 as TOIL.
21. We consider that there has been a complete and total failure to comply with the
ACAS Code of Conduct on Disciplinary Procedures. The Claimant is therefore
entitled to an uplift in terms of the compensation he is to be awarded. It would not
be appropriate to put a percentage figure on the uplift at this point because the
caselaw stipulates that we are to have regard to the total size of the award when
assessing the amount of the uplift. However, our starting point is likely to be at the
top or close to the top of the available band given the extent to which there has
been a failure to comply.
22. We do not consider that there is a viable claim under Section 10 Employment
Relations Act 1999 for refusal of the right to be accompanied. The Claimant never
requested that he be accompanied at any hearing and therefore there has been no
refusal by the Respondent. There is therefore no compensation due under this
head of loss.
23. So far as the claim for failure to provide a statement of employment particulars is
concerned, this failure has been conceded. The issue we have to decide is what
remedy to award for this failure. We consider that the appropriate award is one of
four weeks’ pay. We do so because there was a total failure to provide any written
particulars of employment. This ought to have been done within three months of the
start of employment and this failure continued despite changes in the Claimant’s
pay and despite the passage of over two years since the date on which his
employment started. As a result, the maximum award is appropriate.
Case Number: 3200853/2020 V
6
24. We fix a remedy hearing for 28 April 2021 with a time estimate of 1 day. We make
case management directions which are detailed in a separate case management
order.
Employment Judge Gardiner
Date: 4 February 2021
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