Employment Tribunals

Case Number: 6000038/2025 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Respondents: Heard at: On: Before: Representation Claimant: Respondent: Mr S Barrett (1) Keith Rowley KC (2) Radcliffe Chambers Services Limited (3) Fiona Fitzgerald London Central via CVP 27 March 2026 Employment Judge Bartlett Mr Holbrook Mr Reade KC RESERVED JUDGMENT The following claims are dismissed by consent as they are no longer pursued by the claimant: 1. The claimant’s claims for constructive unfair dismissal are dismissed by consent. 2. The clam of a failure to make a reasonable adjustment claim at para 53 of the Grounds of Claim. 3. The claims at paragraph 21(b) of the statement of claim of a failure to investigate, report or action following Mr Flavin’s email of 27 April 2018. Deposit Orders 4. I have decided to make a deposit order of £50 in relation to the 2018 act which is said to be “In April 2018 Marcus Flavin described C as a cunt” [20] Grounds of claim. I consider the time lapse between this and the other acts/omissions is so large that there are no reasonable prospects of success that this would be found to be part of a continuing act. 5. I have decided to make a deposit order in the amount of £50 in relation to the allegation at paragraph 38 and 39 of the statement of claim that “The respondents arranged for the claimant's e-mail account to send an out of office to his e-mail correspondents” which is pleaded as a direct discrimination claim, the claims relating to harassment and victimization are not subject to deposit orders. 6. See separate Deposit Orders. Amendment Applications 7. The claimant’s amendment application dated 14 April 2025 is granted in its entirety. 8. The claimant’s application dated 5 September 2025 has been treated as withdrawn by consent. Reasons Background 9. This case came before me for a one day public preliminary hearing. The issues to be decided were set down at the case management hearing which took place on 15 December 2025 and were as follows: 10. Given that oral submissions concluded at 3:30 PM and it took a further 30 minutes to list the final hearing, it was not possible to decide all these issues. I reserved judgement in relation to issues a, b and c. I listed a final hearing and ½ day further open preliminary hearing to deal with matters relating to case management and anything else arising or outstanding from this hearing and judgment. Given that the final hearing was scheduled for April 2028, I considered that it was in the interests of the overriding objective to list the final hearing despite the outcome of this hearing being uncertain. The parties agreed that if I granted the claimant’s applications it would be unlikely to substantially increase the final hearing and if my decision had the effect of substantially decreasing the final hearing then the hearing could be shortened. At the time of listing, a five-day hearing could only have been listed approximately three months earlier than April 2028. Therefore, it was appropriate to list the final hearing. 11. Prior to this hearing the parties sent the tribunal a list of issues which it was said was agreed dependent on the outcome of this hearing. 12. Though I am required to decide the claimant’s two amendment applications, Mr Holbrook stated that he only pursued the second amendment application in respect of amending the respondent’s names if the respondents’ strike out or deposit order applications had merit. During submissions it became evident that the applications of the claimant and the applications of the respondents are interlinked. 13. I heard the claimant’s submissions on both the claimant’s applications and then heard the respondent’s submissions on the claimant’s applications and their application. Each party was given the opportunity to respond to the other. I was provided with a bundle for this hearing, a separate authorities bundle and in addition several other documents were sent to me during the hearing which included Stop Huntingdon Cruelty [2009] EWHC 148 QB, and Unite the Union v Nailard [2018] EWCA Civ 1203. 14. At the start of the hearing, I confirmed that no witnesses were being called. Mr Holbrook confirmed that the claimant was not attending the hearing and there would be no witness evidence. This means that there was no evidence before me in relation to time limits issues such as on the reasonably practical or just and equitable test or about means so far as it relates to deposit orders. 15. In the briefest of terms, the claimant’s claim is that he, a barrister, alleges that members of his former Chambers, Radcliffe Chambers, conducted a course of conduct that amounted to unlawful discrimination on the basis of belief and/or harassment. He also claims to have suffered disability discrimination. It is asserted that this conduct started around April 2018 and continued until around September 2024/January 2025. The law relating to amendment applications 16. In Selkent Bus Company Limited v Moore [1996] ICR 836 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) set out the test to be applied by a Tribunal in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant an amendment. It said the Tribunal should take into account all the circumstances and should balance the injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. The EAT in Selkent also set out a list of factors which a tribunal will usually consider. These are: (1) The nature of the amendment i.e. whether the amendment sought is one of the minor matters or is a substantive alteration pleading a new cause of action; (2) The applicability of time limits. If a new complaint or cause of action is proposed to be added by way of amendment it is essential for the Tribunal to consider whether that complaint is out of time and if so whether the time limit should be extended; and (3) The timing and manner of the application. An application should not be refused solely because there has been a delay in making it. There are no time limits laid down in the rules for making amendments, but delay is a discretionary factor. It is relevant to consider why the application was not made earlier and why it is now being made (for example the discovery of new facts or new information). 17. I have given consideration to the Court of Appeal decision in Abercrombie and ors v Aga Rangemaster Ltd 2014 ICR 209, CA which said that the tribunal should focus “not on questions of formal classification but on the extent to which the new pleading is likely to involve substantially different areas of enquiry than the old: the greater the difference between the factual and legal issues raised by the new claim and by the old, the less likely it is that it will be permitted.” 18. Further, in Vaughan v Modality Partnership UKEAT/0147/20/BA the EAT repeated that the core test in considering applications to amend is the balance of injustice and hardship in allowing or refusing the application. The exercise starts with the parties making submissions on the specific practical consequences of allowing or refusing the amendment. That balancing exercise is fundamental. 19. As case law sets out and as repeated in The Presidential Guidance on General Case Management for England and Wales, the Selkent factors are not intended to be an exhaustive list and they should not be treated as a list to be checked off. The law relating to strike out orders 20. Under r.38 of the ET Rules of Procedure 2024 the Employment Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim or response: a. If the claim or response is scandalous, or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; b. If the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of a claimant or respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; c. If a party has not complied with an order of the Tribunal or one of the Rules of Procedure 2013; d. If the claim has not been actively pursued; e. If it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim or response (or relevant part of it)... 21. Strike out at a hearing is a summary determination of the claim or a response (more usually the claim) based on an assessment of the case advanced taken at its highest. 22. As Allan v Wandsworth LBC UKEAT/0049/13 EAT sets out, I must adopt a two stage process: first are the grounds made out and second should the claim or response be struck out. 23. In the case of Anyanwu v South Bank University [2001] I .R .L .R . 305 HL, the House of Lords emphasised that, in discrimination claims, the power to strike out should only be used in the plainest and most obvious of cases. “… vagaries in discrimination jurisprudence underline the importance of not striking out such claims as an abuse of process except in the most obvious and plainest cases. Discrimination cases are generally fact-sensitive, and their proper determination is always vital in our pluralistic society. In this field perhaps more than any other the bias in favour of a claim being examined on the merits or demerits of its particular facts is a matter of high public interest.” 24. Maurice Kay LJ in Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2007] I.C.R. 1126 CA accepted reasonable prospects of success as meaning that the claim had “a realistic as opposed to merely a fanciful prospect of success”. He went on to add in para.29: “It would only be in an exceptional case that an application to an employment tribunal will be struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success when the central facts are in dispute. An example might be where the facts sought to be established by the claimant were totally and inexplicably inconsistent with the undisputed contemporaneous documentation. The present case does not approach that level.” The law relating to deposit orders 25. The applicable test for deposit orders is set out in r40(1): “40.—(1) Where at a preliminary hearing the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument in a claim or response has little reasonable prospect of success, it may make an order requiring a party (“the depositor”) to pay a deposit not exceeding £1,000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument (“a deposit order”).” 26. This test of “little prospects of success” is a less rigorous test than “no reasonable prospects of success” but the test must still be satisfied. 27. Amber v West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service [2024] EAT 146 confirmed that the guidance in Cox v Adecco [2021] ICR 130 applies to a consideration of making a deposit order as it does where consideration is given to striking out a clam. In summary: (a) Where the prospects of success turn on disputed factual issues, it is highly unlikely that a deposit order will be appropriate. (b) The party's case must ordinarily be taken at its highest. (c) The tribunal should not hear evidence at the hearing of a deposit order application but contemporaneous documents may be considered. (d) It is necessary to determine what the claim and issues are. It is not possible to determine whether it has reasonable prospects of success without doing so. (e) Where one party is a litigant in person, their case should not be solely ascertained from the explanation they give at the hearing. The pleadings and any key documents should be considered. Legally represented parties should not take procedural advantage of litigants in person and should assist the tribunal in identifying the relevant documents. (f) If the case would have had reasonable prospects of success if it had been properly pleaded, consideration should be given to the possibility of an amendment, subject to the usual test. 28. Lord Hope in Anyanwu v South Bank Student Union [2001] UKHL 14, said that 'discrimination issues…should, as a general rule, be decided only after hearing the evidence.' A deposit order may, or a strike out order would, at summary stage have the effect of ending the case and deposit or strike out orders are only appropriate in clear cases. If there is a core factual dispute, it should properly be resolved at a hearing. 29. In Hemdan v Ishmail [2017] IRLR 228, Simler J, noted that the purpose of a deposit order “is to identify at an early stage claims with little prospect of success and to discourage the pursuit of those claims by requiring a sum to be paid and by creating a risk of costs ultimately if the claim fails.” Burden of Proof in discrimination cases 30. S136 of the Equality Act 2010 sets out the burden of proof which applies to discrimination issues: “(1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.” 31. In Igen Ltd v Wong the Court of Appeal approved the guidance given in Barton v Investec Securities Ltd [2003] IRLR 332 concerning the burden of proof in discrimination cases which is that: ''(1) Pursuant to s 63A of the SDA 1975, it is for the claimant who complains of sex discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the respondent has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant which is unlawful by virtue of Part II or which by virtue of s 41 or s 42 of the SDA 1975 is to be treated as having been committed against the claimant. These are referred to below as “such facts”. (2) If the claimant does not prove such facts he or she will fail…. (9) Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the respondent. (10) It is then for the respondent to prove that he did not commit, or as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act. (11) To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex, since “no discrimination whatsoever” is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive.” 32. In Madarassy v Nomura International plc 2007 ICR 867, CA Lord Justice Mummery stated: “The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.” 33. s47 EqA sets out the following: “Barristers (1)A barrister (A) must not discriminate against a person (B)— (a)in the arrangements A makes for deciding to whom to offer a pupillage or tenancy; (b)as to the terms on which A offers B a pupillage or tenancy; (c)by not offering B a pupillage or tenancy. (2)A barrister (A) must not discriminate against a person (B) who is a pupil or tenant— (a)as to the terms on which B is a pupil or tenant; (b)in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for training or gaining experience or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service; (c)by terminating the pupillage; (d)by subjecting B to pressure to leave chambers; (e)by subjecting B to any other detriment. (3)A barrister must not, in relation to a pupillage or tenancy, harass— (a)the pupil or tenant; (b)a person who has applied for the pupillage or tenancy. (4)A barrister (A) must not victimise a person (B)— (a)in the arrangements A makes for deciding to whom to offer a pupillage or tenancy; (b)as to the terms on which A offers B a pupillage or tenancy; (c)by not offering B a pupillage or tenancy. (5)A barrister (A) must not victimise a person (B) who is a pupil or tenant— (a)as to the terms on which B is a pupil or tenant; (b)in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for training or gaining experience or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service; (c)by terminating the pupillage; (d)by subjecting B to pressure to leave chambers; (e)by subjecting B to any other detriment. (6)A person must not, in relation to instructing a barrister— (a)discriminate against a barrister by subjecting the barrister to a detriment; (b)harass the barrister; (c)victimise the barrister. (7)A duty to make reasonable adjustments applies to a barrister. (8)The preceding provisions of this section (apart from subsection (6)) apply in relation to a barrister's clerk as they apply in relation to a barrister; and for that purpose the reference to a barrister's clerk includes a reference to a person who carries out the functions of a barrister's clerk. (9)A reference to a tenant includes a reference to a barrister who is permitted to work in chambers (including as a squatter or door tenant); and a reference to a tenancy is to be construed accordingly.” The claimant’s first application to amend dated 14 April 2025 34. The application to amend sets out the following amendments: a. the addition of two new protected acts: 1. Submitting the data subject access request on 6 December 2024 and 2. Bringing the employment tribunal claim on 1 January 2025; b. the addition of an act alleged to be discriminatory in that Mr Josh Lewison joined the claimant’s substack live stream on 17 January 2025; and c. the addition of Mr Josh Lewison as the 4th respondent. 35. The claimant submits that the claims are in time and could not have been made earlier because they did not occur until after the submission of the ET1. In addition, it is in the interest of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to determine the claims against Mr Lewison in these proceedings to avoid disproportionate use of time and costs. Further, the balance of prejudice weighs in favour of the claimant as he would be out of time to bring a separate claim against Mr Lewison. 36. I have applied the Selkent factors: The nature of the amendment 37. The amendments related to Mr Lewison joining the live stream and his addition as a respondent are a substantial addition to the existing claims. Even leaving aside the addition of a respondent, the addition of the claim is a new factual matrix which has not previously been pleaded (I note that it occurred after the submission of the claim form). I recognise that there is some overlap between the existing claims because his claim is based on a hostile environment created by members of Radcliffe Chambers. The addition of the amendments would require some additional evidence but this case is at an early stage and this would have limited practical impact. In relation to the protected acts, the claimant has already brought claims of victimisation. The amendment protected acts are only relevant to the amendment detriment. Therefore, the amendments are interdependent. The amendments are not clerical or typographical in nature and they are not a minor change. Applicability of time limits 38. Mr Reade KC’s submissions referred to the principle of relation back and that this principle did not apply in the employment tribunal. I agree that relation back does not apply in the employment tribunal and what I need to consider is the date when the application was made. Mr Reade KC submitted that if the application was granted the claim would have been brought on the date of this hearing, 27 March 2026 which would be nearly a year out of time. I did not consider there was merit in that submission: it would lead to the bizarre and unworkable situation where the date of an application to amend would depend upon when a preliminary hearing could be scheduled by the tribunal to decide that issue rather than the date when it was made. It does not seem just that parties could face very different outcomes depending on the listing schedule of the employment tribunal in which any particular claim was brought. 39. Therefore, I consider that the appropriate date to consider is the date of the application which was 14 April 2025. The live stream took place on 17 January 2025 and that is the first date on which a claim about that event could have been brought. I consider that notionally the amendment application has been brought within three months of the detriment alleged. The timing and manner of the application 40. An application should not be refused only because there has been a delay in making it and it is recognised that amendments may be made at any stage in the proceedings. However, it is relevant to consider the timing of the application, why it was not made earlier and why it was made when it was. 41. The data subject access request was submitted on 6 December 2024. This claim was brought on 1 January 2025 and a notice of claim was sent to the original respondent on 15 January 2025. The amendment application was made on 14 April 2025. The alleged detriment was on 17 January 2025. A case management hearing had been scheduled for the summer of 2025 but took place on 15 December 2025 and due to the issues in this case a further one day preliminary hearing was listed to deal with the various applications. 42. I find that it cannot be said that there was delay in making the first application. It was made within three months of the alleged detriment occurring. It could be said that the claimant should have instead submitted a new and separate claim e.g. an ET1 against the fourth respondent. However, it is the case that the employment tribunal rules provide for amendment. I do not consider that choosing to make an amendment rather than submitting a new ET1 is fatal to the application. The balance of hardship and prejudice 43. Mr Reade KC submitted that the proposed amendments are the addition of a single act of victimisation against a single new respondent, this is not a particularly valuable claim and it is a minor and discreet complaint when set against the case as a whole. It is also possible that the claimant could raise evidence that Mr Lewison attended his live stream event to add weight to his case about hostility to him by means of a further amendment application. 44. I note that it is not evident on the face of it that the amendments make out a strong case on behalf of the claimant. Mr Lewison joining a live streaming event after the claimant’s relationship with Radcliffe Chambers had ended some months previously has some obvious difficulties. That is not to say it could not amount to such. On the face of it, there would seem to be some difficulties with establishing that a DASR was a protected act without more, though it depends on its exact wording and I am not aware of what that is. 45. There is obvious prejudice to Mr Lewison as he would be named as 4th respondent and he would be required to give evidence on this issue and attend the tribunal. 46. Overall, I consider that there is some prejudice to the respondents and Mr Lewison but that this is not significant because it is a discrete issue and there would be some prejudice to the claimant because he would not be able to bring this particular claim which is one part of a wider claim. I consider that the amendment discloses a prima facie discrimination claim but it has some weaknesses. 47. Weighing the balance of injustice and hardship, I have decided to grant the amendment application in favour of the claimant as losing the opportunity to pursue his claim at all outweighs the prejudice to the respondent. The amendments set out in the claimant’s application dated 14 April 2025 are allowed and are not out of time. The claimant’s application to amend dated 5 September 2025 48. The claimant’s primary position was that the amendments set out in this second application were not necessary because the claim has been effectively pleaded against the three original respondents and the application has already been made to add the 4th respondent. Therefore, this application is only pursued if I grant the respondents’ application for strike out/deposit orders. I shall therefore decide the respondent’s application for strike out and deposit before this application. The respondents’ application for strike out and/or deposit orders 49. The respondents’ submissions were that I first needed to identify who the claimant is entitled to bring which claims against and then assess the prospects of the claimant being able to persuade an employment tribunal to extend time in relation to each respondent. 50. The respondents’ submission was also based on the argument that the claimant can only sue barristers and those barristers that he sues can only be liable for the things that they had done individually. In response to my question, Mr Reade KC accepted that there could be representative respondents in Employment Tribunal claims and he identified that an old-fashioned partnership would be such a case. 51. The claimant’s submissions were that unincorporated associations do not have a legal identity and liability must attach to individual members. Case law in the Employment Tribunals has established that this has frequently been via the executive committee as a representative respondent. Mr Holbrook referred me to Stewart on Unincorporated Associations. I consider that it is established that unincorporated associations do not have a legal identity and so liability attaches to individual members. 52. It is important to note that these issues were argued before me on the basis of strikeout/deposit applications and resistance to such. I have reminded myself of rule 35 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 which sets out the following: “35.—(1) The Tribunal may on its own initiative, or on the application of a party or any other person wishing to become a party, add any person as a party, by way of substitution or otherwise, if it appears that there are issues between that person and any of the existing parties falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which it is in the interests of justice to have determined in the proceedings. (2) The Tribunal may on its own initiative, or on the application of a party, remove any party that appears to have been wrongly included.” 53. This is a power exercisable at any time during the proceedings. The purpose of the rule is to ensure that the proceedings involve the correct parties. This highlights that claims do not fail automatically because the wrong respondent has been named. 54. Both parties relied on Affleck v Newcastle Mind (1999) IRLR 405 and Nazir and Aslam v. Asim UKEAT/0332/09. 55. I find that Affleck v Newcastle Mind (1999) IRLR 405 is of some assistance but this is limited as the decision relied heavily on The Charities Act 1993 in reaching its decision. However, it does set out the following: “It may not make any difference in this case, but, if it became necessary to choose between the two, we have to say that we would prefer the formulation which we put forward, namely that people who are employed by an unincorporated association are employed by the relevant management committee as from time to time composed. The reason why we take that view is because it seems to us to accord entirely with reality. Employees of a charity such as this would know when they were taken on that the management committee was not going to remain the same throughout the course of their employment. They would anticipate their employment would be continuous without any break in continuity as a result of an anticipated change in the composition of the committee…. The first thing to draw attention to is that, having identified the committee members as being the people who are the employers throughout the course of the employment, the target is well identified for the purposes of who should be sued. Under rule 17(3) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 1993 (S.I. 1993 No. 2687), it is quite possible for there to be a representative respondent and, in such a case as this, it would be desirable if this were possible for that to be done: namely, one person would be named as the respondent sued on his own behalf and on behalf of all other members of the executive committee at the relevant time.”[emphasis added] 56. In Nazir and Aslam v. Asim UKEAT/0332/09 the EAT held “that an unincorporated association was a group of individuals linked together by contract which had no legal identity separate from its members; that the claimant was employed by the members of the board, who were liable in their capacity as employers; that, however, it was permissible for an employee of an unincorporated association to bring a claim in the employment tribunal in the name of the association, or in the name of a representative respondent, provided, inter alia, that the members of the board or management committee were actually aware of the proceedings and that where allegations of misconduct were made against a specific member that member was joined; and that, as the claimant had named the association as a respondent together with many members of the board and the specific criticisms of the two appellants had been set out with sufficient clarity to put them on notice of the case they had to meet, as employers, the claim had been properly constituted.” 57. It is instructive to consider the full reasoning of the EAT starting at [42]: “To our mind it remains good practice for a claimant employee to name a representative respondent who was a member of the management committee at the relevant time and state that he is sued on his own behalf and on behalf of all other members of the executive committee at the relevant time. [43] The Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2004 (Schedule 1 to the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1861)) do not contain a provision equivalent to rule 17(3), quoted in Affleck; but we do not think this is an insuperable obstacle. The employment tribunals now have wide case management powers under rule 10 of the Rules. We will say more about these in a moment. 44 In ordinary civil proceedings, in the absence of specific statutory authority, an unincorporated association can neither sue nor be sued in its own name: see Halsburys Laws of England, 5th ed, vol 11, para 227 and for a more detailed treatment Ashton and Reid on Club Law (2005), para 18-14. Unless representative proceedings are brought (see rule 19.6 of the Civil Procedure Rules) a claimant must make the members parties if they are to be bound by the result. 45 We must say, however, that it is in our experience common in employment tribunals for an employee to bring a claim naming an unincorporated association as respondent. This is hardly surprising: many employees will complete their own claim forms; they will be likely to give the name of the unincorporated association as their employer (indeed often their statements of terms and conditions of employment will name the unincorporated association rather than the management committee); and they cannot be expected to know about the legal status of an unincorporated association, still less about the practice advocated in Affleck. Indeed it is in our experience not unusual for the whole proceedings in such a case to be conducted without any individual being named. 46 There are reasons why the practice in employment tribunals ought to differ from the practice before civil courts. We have the following points particularly in mind. Firstly, employment tribunals are to a large extent concerned with claims by employees against their employers. As we have said, the management committee of the unincorporated association will generally have engaged an employee in the name of the association. Whether or not this is the case, we do not think a management committee has any cause for complaint if an employee brings proceedings in the name of the association. Secondly, in tribunal proceedings the time limits for commencement of proceedings are generally strict: if proceedings started in the name of an unincorporated association were liable to be dismissed, there would be potential for procedural delay if not injustice. Thirdly, undue formality is to be avoided in tribunal proceedings: see for example rule 14(2) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2004. Fourthly, as we have said, employees generally cannot be expected to know about the special legal position of unincorporated associations. These matters are relevant to the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly; and therefore to be taken into account in construing the Rules: see regulation 3 of the 2004 Regulations. 47 We therefore consider that it is permissible for an employee to bring a claim against an employer who is the management committee of an unincorporated association by using the name of the association. Such a claim is not irregular. It will not (for example) be liable to be struck out, leaving an employee with a time limit problem. It follows that we reject Mr Crow’s submissions on these points. 48 Whether a claim is brought in the name of the unincorporated association, or in the name of a representative respondent in accordance with the practice in Affleck, there are questions which may need attention by case management. (1) Do the members of the management committee actually know of the proceedings? (2) Is there any objection (either from the association or from any representative respondent) to the proceedings continuing as they have begun? (3) Is there any conflict of interest or disagreement between committee members which may require one or more to be added as respondent? (4) Is there any likely problem of enforcement unless all or most members of the committee of the unincorporated association are made respondents?” 58. Affleck and Nazir involved claims in which the claimant was an employee whereas in this case the claimant does not claim to be an employee of the unincorporated association rather he was a member of the unincorporated association and his claim is said to arise under s47 EqA. However, I find that those cases do establish that representative respondents are permissible in the employment tribunal and that a representative respondent can represent an unincorporated association in the employment tribunal. 59. Mr Reade KC submitted that “barrister” in s47 EqA can only be read as referring to one individual barrister and “barrister” could not encompass a representative of chambers as an unincorporated association of individual barristers. 60. Mr Holbrook’s submissions are that R1 is a barrister and a representative of the unincorporated association made up of individual barristers at Radcliffe Chambers. 61. I was referred to Bailey v Stonewall Equality Ltd & Ors ET/2202172/2020, 25 July 2022. I accept that the judgment in Bailey did not address the issues before me. I understand that there were preliminary hearings in that case which amongst other things addressed deposit and strike out orders however neither party had included that judgment in the bundle. Bailey sets out the following: 62. It is clear from that part of the judgement that the case proceeded on the basis that the heads of Chambers were a representative respondent for the barristers at the chambers. 63. The authorities bundle included 1 Pump Court Chambers v Horton UKEAT/0775/03MH and from the title it can be seen that the appellant was a barristers’ chambers (and an unincorporated association). This case related to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 which has been superseded by the EqA and so has limited relevance though I note that the case decided that chambers were a trade union and the DDA liability provisions for Trade Unions applied to barristers’ chambers. The claimant has not cited s57 EqA the trade union liability section of the EqA despite its potential applicability given 1 Pump Court Chambers v Horton. 64. The claim form sets out: “The 1st respondent is Head of Chambers of Radcliffe and this claim is brought against him as a representative of all members of Radcliffe (an unincorporated association) apart from the Claimant…” The 2nd respondent is a service company which employs Radcliffe‘s staff and is sued as vicariously liable for the actions of its agents and employees. The 3rd respondent is and was at all material times Radcliffe’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and is sued in her personal capacity and as an agent or employee of the 1st and 2nd respondents.” 65. Mr Reade KC submits that the claims have no/little reasonable prospect of success because the claimant has (1) failed to identify in respect of many claims the individual who carried out the alleged acts; (2) R1 and R2 are not alleged to have carried out any alleged acts/omissions and have no liability beyond that for their own personal actions; and (3) any claims that do not personally identify R3 have no/little reasonable prospects of success. Failure to identify in respect of many claims the individual who carried out the alleged acts 66. Firstly, I accept the principle, at least in relation to victimisation, direct discrimination and harassment (and possible for a failure to make reasonable adjustments), that liability must be established by way of identifying an individual who carried out those acts. 67. This case has had limited case management with one case management hearing being held which made limited progress. The parties have relatively recently agreed a list of issues and no substantive case preparation has taken place. 68. The claimant has submitted he was not able to identify all of the individuals who carried out acts at this stage but he has where he can and expects to be able to do so after disclosure. 69. I find that the respondent has made much of the submission that individuals have not been identified. A review of the list of issues identifies a number of individuals but has not identified individuals who drafted a social media policy, did not carry out a proper investigation, report and action, failed to investigate a complaint, ratified a social media policy, attempted to enforce a disclaimer provision of the social media policy, established/failed to stop an anti-Barrett whatsapp group, etc. 70. I do not consider that the failure at this stage to identify all the individuals by name means there are no or little reasonable prospects of success. It is not uncommon for claims not to identify an individual, for example a claim that a failure to carry out an investigation is frequently pleaded against the employer entity not an individual employee because the claimant does not know and cannot reasonably be expected to know, at least before disclosure, who was responsible for the act/omission. In this case chambers will have acted through members of whose identity the claimant does not and could not, at this stage, know. I consider that it is reasonable that at this stage the claimant has not been able to identify who he says should have acted but did not. He will have to identify these people as the claim progresses but I do not consider that his failure to do so at this stage establishes that there are no or little reasonable prospects of success. Can R1 be sued as a representative of other members of Radcliffe Chambers (such that liability attaches to him beyond that of his own individual actions)? 71. Mr Holbrook referred me to various civil authorities including EMO Records Ltd v Kudhail [1985] and Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Ltd [2019] UKSC 6 in which Lord Sumption set out the following: “9. When the Civil Procedure Rules were introduced in 1999, the function of prescribing the manner in which proceedings should be commenced was taken over by CPR Part 7. The general rule remains that proceedings may not be brought against unnamed parties. This is implicit in the limited exceptions contemplated by the Rules. CPR 8.2A provides that a practice direction “may set out circumstances in which a claim form may be issued under this Part without naming a defendant.” It is envisaged that permission will be required, but that the notice of application for permission “need not be served on any other person”. However, no such practice direction has been made. The only express provision made for proceedings against an unnamed defendant, other than representative actions, is CPR 55.3(4), which permits a claim for possession of property to be brought against trespassers whose names are unknown… [10] English judges have allowed some exceptions. They have permitted representative actions where the representative can be named but some or all of the class cannot. They have allowed actions and orders against unnamed wrongdoers where some of the wrongdoers were known so they could be sued both personally Page 6 and as representing their unidentified associates. This technique has been used, for example, in actions against copyright pirates: see EMI Records Ltd v Kudhail [1985] FSR 35. But the possibility of a much wider jurisdiction was first opened up by the decision of Sir Andrew Morritt V-C in Bloomsbury Publishing Group Plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] 1 WLR 1633.” 72. I found those authorities of limited use as they are focused on the Civil Procedure Rules and the civil jurisdiction which is not directly applicable to Employment Tribunal proceedings. 73. I find that R1 can be sued as a representative of other members of Radcliffe Chambers. As set out above the claim form makes the claimant’s position clear “The 1st respondent is Head of Chambers of Radcliffe and this claim is brought against him as a representative of all members of Radcliffe (an unincorporated association) apart from the Claimant…” 74. I consider that the case law cited above establishes that that an individual respondent can act a representative of an unincorporated association and, as chambers are an unincorporated association. It seems to me that s57 EqA may be the correct provision under which liability attaches to chambers and Mark Rowley KC as head of chambers. I consider that simply because the claimant has not referred to this section it does not mean his claim cannot proceed under s57 EqA. I consider it would merely be a re-labelling exercise or putting the claim, as already pleaded, into the correct legal category as Employment Tribunals frequently do in relation to discrimination and whistleblowing claims. I do not consider this requires an amendment but it is open to the claimant to make an amendment application if the parties consider it is required. 75. I consider that this means that Mark Rowley KC as head of chambers is an appropriate individual to be named as a representative respondent for the members of Radcliffe Chambers excluding the claimant. 76. Mr Reade KC’s submitted that “The ET will search in vain in the ET Rules of EqA for anything permitting Person A to be liable for the actions of Person B outside the specific provisions of EqQ 2010, ss109 and 110. Those provisions are not relevant to barristers”. I consider that this fails to consider s57 EqA which encompasses the actions of barristers and chambers and the ability to bring a claim against an individual as a representative respondent of an unincorporated association. Liability can attach to barrister’s chambers via s57 if not s47 and through s109 and s110. 77. Strike out and deposit orders are not a substitute for case management. The overriding objective includes obligations of the parties, namely “The parties and their representatives must— (a)assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b)co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.” 78. The overriding objective includes “avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings”. 79. I do not consider that I can only consider the wording in the ET1 rather than the submissions made and deposit orders should not be used instead of case management. Taking all the circumstances into account, I consider that simply because the claimant has not cited s57 EqA it is not the case that there are no prospects of success in his claims against R1 as a representative respondent of all the members of chambers except himself. The wording of the claim form is sufficiently wide enough to encompass this interpretation and I consider that the respondents’ duties under the overriding objective include agreeing the correct basis of potential liability even if it has not been directly pleaded. The Tribunal rules and particular rule 35 are concerned with ensuring claims involve the correct parties. For these reasons, I also consider that it cannot be said there are no or little reasonable prospects of success on the basis that R1 cannot be a representative respondent. Can claims be brought against R2 as a respondent? 80. The respondents’ submission is that R2 and R3 are not barristers and not barristers’ clerks and therefore the claimant cannot sue them under s47EqA. 81. The respondents accept that the claimant’s response to the strike out/deposit order application sets out that R2 and R3 are barrister’s clerks, within the meaning of section 47(8) EqA. Mr Reade KC submits that this position differs from the grounds of claim which instead set out that R2 is sued as vicariously liable for the actions of its agents and employees. 82. I find that the claimant’s response to the strikeout/deposit order dated June 2025 sets out that R2 is sued as a barrister’s clerk or as being vicariously liable for the clerks who are employees. This is the position set out in the agreed list of issues. I consider that this a clarification of the basis of claim and so far as it is necessary, I would grant an application to amend. This would be an appropriate case management order and deposit orders should not be used in the place of appropriate case management. 83. The respondents further submit that R2 is an inappropriate respondent because the claimant does not identify actions of any of Radcliffe’s clerks which are said to be discriminatory. 84. In relation to the barrister’s clerk issue, there is no definition of “barrister’s clerk” in the EqA. S47(8) sets out the following: “The preceding provisions of this section (apart from subsection (6)) apply in relation to a barrister's clerk as they apply in relation to a barrister; and for that purpose the reference to a barrister's clerk includes a reference to a person who carries out the functions of a barrister's clerk.” 85. I accept Mr Holbrook submission that the definition of barristers’ clerk cannot be limited to simply carrying out diary functions. S47(8) refers to a “person” and “person” includes a legal entity such as a limited company and R2 is a limited company. 86. I do not accept that the definition of barrister’s clerk is so limited that it could not encompass R2 as R2, through its employees, can and does carry out the “functions of a barrister’s clerk” and through s109/110 EqA liability for the acts of its agents can attach to it. 87. For these reasons, I find that there are not no reasonable prospects of success of a claim succeeding against R2 and that there are not little reasonable prospects of success of claims succeeding against R2 on this basis. 88. However, the respondents’ submissions go further and submit that the claimant does not identify any acts carried out by barrister’s clerks and this makes R2 an incorrect respondent. 89. I find that the claim form refers to the respondents failing to carry out a proper investigation, report or action, drafting and ratifying a social media policy and causing a loss of income to the claimant. I consider that these could fall within s47(2). 90. I consider that there are considerable factual issues in dispute and at this stage it cannot be said that there are no reasonable prospects of success as much will depend upon the evidence from the parties. I have carefully considered if there are little reasonable prospects of success and I have concluded there are not. Claims about policies when it is unclear which individuals wrote, applied or implemented the policy are common in Employment Tribunals. It is not unusual for only the employing entity (here R2) to be identified as the responsible person at an early stage in proceedings when the claimant is not likely to be able to identify who is responsible. I consider that the claimant’s claims fall into such a category, he will need to further particularise his claims but at this stage not identifying a responsible person does not meant that there are no or little reasonable prospects of success. Is R3 an appropriate respondent? 91. The claimant’s submission is that the “3rd respondent is and was at all material times Radcliffe’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and is sued in her personal capacity and as an agent or employee of the 1st and 2nd respondents”. 92. The respondents accept that there is a claim against R3 as an individual in the claim form. The respondent’s position is that there is no route by which she can be sued in her personal capacity under EqA because she is not a barrister or a barrister clerk. 93. I accept that R3 is not a barrister however I consider that the definition of barristers’ clerk is wide enough to include R3. She was the chief executive of chambers and was carrying out duties which would not have been diary management but would have related to the organisation and running of barristers’ chambers. I consider that the wording of barrister’s clerk is sufficiently wide enough to encompass these duties. Therefore, I find that it cannot be said there is no reasonable prospects of success nor little reasonable prospects of success of those claims. 94. In relation to the claim that she is sued as an agent or employee of R1 and R2, the claimant has not expanded on this claim. I consider it is accepted that R3 was an employee of R2 and so liability could potential attach to either of them for her acts/omissions. I find that given my finding above, it is not necessary to make further findings on this issue. 95. In relation to R3 the grounds of claim identify a number of acts which it is said R3 carried out both personally and in her role as CEO of Radcliffe Chambers. This is an early stage of proceedings and I consider that it cannot be said at this stage that there are little prospects of success as much will depend upon the evidence. 96. Further, even if I had found that there were little prospects of success, I would have declined to exercise my discretion in this case. This is because all the respondents are represented by the same legal team. There is an obvious disadvantage to individuals such as R3 being named as an individual respondent. However, I consider that given that these are allegations of discrimination it is in the public interest in such claims being heard by the employment tribunal. It is for R2 to decide if it accepts liability for R3 so that an agreement could be reached with the claimant to remove R3 from the claim. 97. To summarise, in relation to the strikeout/deposit application of any and all of R1, R2 and R3, I do not make a strikeout or deposit order. 98. The respondent has also made an application for strikeout/deposit orders on the basis that identified claims have no or little prospect of success. I shall take each of these in turn. Time Limits 99. The respondents submit that many of the claims are out of time and this is based on the respondents’ position that there is no continuing course of conduct and that what has been pleaded by the claimant are discreet events. It is also based on the submission that Mr Rowley KC cannot be a representative for chambers and/or barristers at chambers which I have rejected above. 100. I find that the respondent’s submission is without merit in respect of R1, as set out above all the claims against R1 are proceeding in R1’s representative capacity. 101. The claimant’s claim is that he is relying on a course of conduct which comprised a number of acts or omissions over some years. A continuing course of conduct does not require the act/omission to occur every day, every week or even every month, it is fact specific. The list of issues identifies a considerable number of acts/omissions which it is said took place in 2024, a smaller number of events at times during 2023, in relation to 2022 the events including omissions or failures to act are from the start of 2022 until around June 2022. The gap between the June 2022 omission and the first 2023 act was 8 to 9 months which is a considerable time. There are some acts around the end of 2021 which are reasonably close to the early 2022 acts. The outlier act is April 2018 which precedes the other acts by almost 3 years. 102. I have decided to make a deposit order in relation to the 2018 act which is said to be “In April 2018 Marcus Flavin described C as a cunt” [20] Grounds of claim. I consider the time lapse between this and the other acts/omissions is so large that there are little reasonable prospects of success that this would be found to be part of a continuing act. 103. However, I decline to make a deposit or strikeout order on the basis of time limits in respect of any other claims against R1 because I do not consider that it can be said that there were little or no prospects of success on a time limit point. Further, the consideration of these issues is more suited to determination at a substantive hearing that will consider evidence on the allegations and be able to determine the scope of the claims and defence fully. 104. The respondent’s submissions are that in respect of R2, any act before 16 September 2024 is out of time and any act before 15 September 2024 in respect of R3 is out of time. The claimant’s submissions are that these were a continuing course of conduct or in the alternative that earlier incidents will be raised as evidence of Radcliffe’s animus towards the claimant’s belief which culminated in its response to his tweet of 29 July 2024. In relation to the latter ground, it would seem that the claimant would be relying on matters as background. In relation to the claimant’s first submission of the continuing course of conduct, I have given consideration to the limits of this hearing which is that I have not had the time or evidence to consider the merits of such matters. Having a preliminary hearing to decide time limit points, considering the evidence and the connection between all the events would be an extensive task that would take several day and step into the realm of the final hearing. It is not in the interests of justice in this case, it would lead to delay and expense. I consider that it is appropriate that the issue of whether there was a continuing discriminatory state of affairs or continuing acts/omissions is determined at a final hearing after all the evidence has been heard. I take into account that even if some of the claims were struck out as being out of time others may need to be heard in any event. This means that only limited time and resource would be saved. 105. In relation to time limits and claims against R2, I again consider that these claims are argued on the basis that they are part of a continuing course of conduct. The determination of this issue is best made after a full consideration of the evidence at a substantive hearing and I do not find that there are no or little reasonable prospects of success at this stage of proceedings. 106. In relation to R3 and time limits, R3 is identified in the list of issues in relation to acts/omissions from winter 2021 to the last act on 17 September 2024. The claimant claims this is a continuing course of conduct and I again consider that the determination of this issue is best made after a full consideration of the evidence at a substantive hearing. Within the confines of this preliminary hearing, I cannot carry out that assessment in a meaningful way and I do not find that there are no or little reasonable prospects of success at this stage of proceedings. 107. The respondent submits that the claimant has no meaningful prospect of demonstrating to the Employment Tribunal that applying the out of office message in September 2024 was an act of unlawful discrimination. This is the thread on which it is said that the continuing course of conduct being in time hangs. The out of office message stated “Steven Barrett no longer practices at Radcliffe Chambers. If you require further assistance, then please contact the clerking team on 0207 831 0081”. 108. The claim form states “until the claimant’s notice period expired on 8 November 2024 the use of this out of office was an unlawful treatment of the claimant because it was his right to respond to email correspondence and without these correspondents being encouraged to contact Radcliffe’s clerking team.” 109. It is difficult to identify from the claim form on what basis this is alleged or could be said to be discriminatory. In the list of issues, it is alleged to be direct discrimination which means that the claim is that they would not have sent this out of office to somebody who did not share the claimant’s beliefs. I consider that this, on the face of it, is a weak claim. It cannot be said that it has no reasonable prospects of success because this is an evidential matter as to how comparators would have been treated. I consider that it does have little reasonable prospects of success because the claimant has not referred to any evidence of others being treated in a different manner and there was nothing on the face of it discriminatory. 110. I have considered whether to exercise my discretion to make a deposit order. I have decided to make a deposit order in the amount of £50. 111. If this claim did not succeed, it would be harder for the claimant to establish that the rest of the direct discrimination claims were in time. Other claims relating to the policies such as the failure to make reasonable adjustments and indirect discrimination are less contingent on this allegation being in time. I have decided that my findings on this claim does not mean that I should make a deposit order in respect of each direct discrimination allegation. This is because even if this claim is out of time and unsuccessful there will need to be consideration of all the issues relating to time limits of the other claims and if all or some are part of a continuing act. This sort of consideration is ill suited to the limits of a preliminary hearing such as this at this stage. I do not consider it in the interests of justice to make deposit orders in respect of the other direct discrimination claims on this basis. I also do not find that there are no or little reasonable prospects of success of the other direct discrimination claims. Consideration of Strike Out/Deposit Orders of Individual claims The claimant was subject to detriment because no effective conclusion was reached or action taken in respect of a complaint he made against Ms Ovey on 10 October 2023 112. The respondents’ submissions are that the claimant expressly withdrew that complaint on the day he raised it and that that was the only reason why the investigation did not proceed. Therefore, there is no prospect of establishing that this was a discriminatory act/omission. 113. The claimant’s submissions on this are detailed but included that there are a number of reasons why complaints are withdrawn not least because the complaint may be used against him, are not taken seriously by the organisation and the claimant claims that he was victimised because of making the complaint. It is his case that there was no action or conclusion in respect of his complaint because of a wider discriminatory approach to someone holding his views. The assessment of this claim requires a holistic assessment of all the evidence on wider matters than consideration of this one issue in isolation. Such consideration is not well suited to be decided in a preliminary hearing such as this. 114. In these circumstances, I find that there is a dispute about the facts and it cannot be said that there are no prospects of success of that claim succeeding. Complaints can be withdrawn because of fears from complainants and some complaints are so serious that they may need pursuing even if they are withdrawn. I do not say that any of those situations apply in this case but they demonstrate that the case will turn on the evidence in front of the tribunal. I consider that it cannot be said that there are no or little reasonable prospects of success as much will turn on the evidence. 115. I do not order a strikeout or deposit order in relation to this claim. Breaches of duty to prevent discrimination/tolerating discrimination 116. The respondent submits that the claimant’s claim includes that the respondent acted unlawfully by breaching purported positive duties to prevent discrimination or harassment. This has the fatal flaw that no such duties exist under the EqA. The respondents also submit that the claimant has now moved to a position, not pleaded in his grounds of claim, that failures to take action were acts of discrimination themselves. 117. The respondents identify the particular claims which they assert fall foul of the error identified and these are as follows: a. [37(a)-(b)] - all respondents treated the claimant detrimentally by failing to respond to messages from members of the public and the lawyer magazine b. [34] – R3 failed to intervene in a WhatsApp group in which some respondents allegedly shared anti-claimant views c. [21(b)] - all respondents acted unlawfully by failing to undertake a proper investigation, report and action following Mr Fleming’s 2018 email - this is also criticised as being impermissibly vague and not identifying what the respondent was supposedly required to do d. [25(d)] - committed acts of discrimination or harassment by failing to undertake a proper investigation, report and action e. [27] - following a meeting with Howard Smith all respondents acted unlawfully by failing to undertake a proper investigation, report and action. 118. The claimant disputes that any of these are framed as positive duties and submits that a failure to act can be unlawful and that the question is one of comparison: would the respondents have acted or failed to act as they did because of the claimant’s protected beliefs. 119. I have considered each of the claims identified by the respondent and listed the above. These claims are (except 21(b)) set out in the list of issues as direct discrimination. 21(b) is not identified in the list of issues. I can only assume that it is not pursued by the claimant as the list was confirmed as agreed and this claim is struck out by consent. 120. In relation to the other claims, these have been pleaded as discriminatory conduct and the conduct is identified as not conducting an investigation, report or action. It is established that omissions may be discriminatory and I consider that it cannot be said there are no reasonable prospects of success in relation to these claims. 121. In relation to deposit orders, I have given careful consideration as to whether it can be said that these claims have little prospects of success. Overall I do not find that there are no or little reasonable prospects of success. They are discrimination claims and there is some merit in them being heard, it is not correct to identify these as imposing a positive duty and therefore doomed to failure. Omissions can be discriminatory, this case will turn on the evidence as to what occurred or did not occur and the treatment will be assessed by reference to the comparators. These are issues that are suited to determination at a substantive hearing. Indirect discrimination 122. The respondents submit that the indirect discrimination claim fails because the claimant cannot coherently define the group to which the group disadvantage attaches, and even if he could, the claim has no reasonable prospects of success because the claimant cannot establish that he or anyone else in the group was subject to the alleged disadvantage. The latter is because the claimant has not pleaded that anyone who disliked the claimant’s beliefs was encouraged to complain about or challenge his right to express them. Further, the Radcliffe Chambers social media policy directly contradicts the claimant’s case making it clear that members are free to express personal views provided that they express them as personal. 123. The claimant’s submissions are that these are a matter for evidence and therefore the substantive hearing and clarifies that his claim that putting a disclaimer would encourage complaints/challenge his right to express his views not that there was encouragement. 124. I find that the respondent’s submission does not accurately articulate the claimant’s indirect discrimination claim as set out in the grounds of claim. The claimant has identified the group in his grounds of claim and more clearly in the list of issues. As set out above it is the claimant’s position that the social media policy including the disclaimer resulted in the identified disadvantage to the group. The disadvantage being the greater likelihood of complaints about social media being made to the respondent and/or being considered and acted on by the respondents. The respondent has identified legitimate aims. 125. I do not find that there are no reasonable prospects of success given the above. I have given careful consideration as to whether there are little reasonable prospects of success. The respondent has identified legitimate aims which appear to be arguable. It is unclear to me how the claimant will establish that the disadvantage occurred against the group rather than just himself. The respondents assert that the claimant was involved in developing the social media policy and the claimant, whilst not disputing it, relies on the social media policy relying on withdrawn BSB guidance. I consider that this is a complex issue however it seems to me that there may be significant difficulties in establishing the alleged disadvantage occurred to the group. As a result of all these factors, I consider that there are little reasonable prospects of success of these claims. 126. I have gone to consider whether or not to exercise my discretion to order a deposit order. The claimant has not submitted any evidence about his means and I assume that he would be able to pay even a significant order. The respondents were clear that they were not concerned about the level of the deposit as they were more interested in the costs consequences which attach to a deposit order. I must exercise my discretion in accordance with the overriding objective which includes dealing with cases fairly and justly having regard to all the circumstances of the case. It is important that the parties focus on the real issues in the case and it is evident that the claimant considers that the social media policy is an important part of his case. There is a public interest in discrimination cases being heard and there may be a wider public interest in relation to social media policies and the ability of individuals to express their views. I have also given consideration as to the impact of this part of the claims on the wider use of tribunal resources and, though I recognise it would save perhaps a day of hearing time, I do not consider that it would substantially reduce the hearing time if these claims did not proceed to a hearing. Therefore, taking these factors into account, I have decided not to make a deposit order. Reasonable Adjustments 127. The respondent’s application refers to the PCPs identified in the claim form and submits the following: a. [51] the respondents submit that the allegation is circular and that the application of the alleged PCP at the end of July post-dates almost all alleged detriments and therefore could not have put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage in relation to them. It also submits that the essence of the claimant’s case is that the course of conduct disadvantaged him not the alleged PCP; b. [52] the respondents submit that the claimant does not articulate any basis on which it can be said that he and others were subject to an ostensibly neutral policy that put him and others with his alleged disability at a disadvantage and that his real concern is that he did not like the fact others had made complaints about him and the respondent should have taken positive steps to stop others making such allegations. c. [53] identifies a PCP along the lines that the respondents failed to raise matters with the claimant in a less stressful way. However, this is not referred to in the list of issues and I consider that this has therefore been abandoned by the claimant. 128. 129. The list of issues sets out that the following are PCPs: “forwarding complaints from third parties to C (SoC, §51); raising complaints from members of Chambers (SoC, §52).” The list of issues sets out that the following are the substantial disadvantage: a. “trigger and/or increase C’s anxiety and PTSD? b. make it harder for C to respond to complaints given his difficulty in typing, particularly when under the hardship noted above in point (a)?” 130. As I have set out above it is appropriate to consider not just the claim form but the other documents in the case including but not limited to evidence. This is part of understanding what the claims are about which is necessary to make decisions on strikeout/deposit orders. I consider that the list of issues has clarified some of the PCPs and the reasonable adjustment claims and to some extent some of the criticisms of the respondents’ have been addressed. I recognise the time limit issue but as set out above, I consider that this should be considered at the substantive hearing. 131. I consider that the PCP and substantial disadvantage have been identified and are in terms that can be pleaded. I am also aware from my experience sitting in the Employment Tribunal that the phrasing of this type of claim (a failure to make reasonable adjustments to a PCP relating to communicating with an employee has disadvantaged that employee because they suffer from anxiety or another disability) is not uncommon. 132. The respondent does not dispute that complaints were forwarded or raised with the claimant. The issue is the legal analysis of the facts. I have concluded that it cannot be said that there are no reasonable prospects of success of these claims. I have considered whether it can be said that there are little reasonable prospects of success. Whilst I consider that there are some weaknesses in these claims, I do not consider that it can be said that there are little reasonable prospects of success of the claims at [51] and [52]. Therefore, the respondents’ application for a deposit order is refused. The claimant’s second application to amend 133. In light of my findings above on the respondents, I consider that the claimant would not wish to pursue this application and as there is not benefit to the claimant in pursuing it, I shall reject it. Direction 134. I consider that as the claims are proceeding against R1 as a representative respondent it is appropriate for the claimant and respondent to agree a list of names of barrister members of Radcliffe Chambers which can be an appendix to the claim so that all individuals are identified. 135. Mr Josh Lewison is added as a fourth respondent. Approved by: Employment Judge Bartlett 1 May 2026 JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 17.5.2026 ...................................................................... ...................................................................... FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE