Mr S Bates v Computershare Services Ltd: 1807421/2020
Employment Tribunal
Published on 24 March 2022, 09:10
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
disability-discrimination unlawful-deduction-from-wages
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2022-01-21
Change History
-
Reasons
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No: 1807421/2020(V)
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr S Bates
Respondent: Computershare Services Ltd
HELD at Sheffield by CVP ON: 14 January 2021
BEFORE: Employment Judge Brain
REPRESENTATION:
Claimant: In person assisted by Mr M Swan
Respondent: Miss L Usher, Solicitor
JUDGMENT AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING
The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that:
1. The claimant’s complaint that the respondent was in breach of the duty to make
reasonable adjustments was presented outside the limitation period in section 123
of the Equality Act 2010.
2. It is not just and equitable to extend time to vest the Tribunal with jurisdiction to
consider the claimant’s claim.
Employment Judge Brain
Date: 21 January 2022
Case Number: 1807421/2020
1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Mr S Bates
Respondent: Computershare Services Ltd
HELD at Sheffield by CVP ON: 14 January 2022
BEFORE: Employment Judge Brain
REPRESENTATION:
Claimant: In person assisted by Mr M Swan
Respondent: Miss L Usher, Solicitor
JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 21 January 2022 and written
reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 62(3) of the Employment
Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013, the following reasons are provided:
REASONS
1. These reasons are supplied at the request of the claimant.
2. At a case management preliminary hearing held on 27 August 2021
Employment Judge Jones directed there to be an open preliminary hearing in
order to determine:
(1) Whether the claimant was, at the material time, a disabled person for the
purposes of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010; and
(2) Whether it is just and equitable for the Tribunal to extend time in order to
vest the Tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s complaints, the
claimant’s complaint having been submitted outside the limitation period for
complaints to the Tribunal of workplace discrimination pursuant to section
123 of the 2010 Act.
Case Number: 1807421/2020
2
3. The respondent concedes that the claimant was, at the material time, a disabled
person for the purposes of section 6 of the 2010 Act. Accordingly, the focus of
today’s hearing was upon the jurisdictional issue which arises by operation of
section 123.
4. Employment Tribunal proceedings must be started within time limits set out
within the relevant statute. In this case, the claimant’s complaint is of disability
discrimination, in particular that the respondent failed to comply with the duty to
make reasonable adjustments. This is made unlawful in the workplace pursuant
to section 39(5) of the 2010 Act.
5. By section 123 of the 2010 Act proceedings upon such a complaint may not be
brought after the end of the period of three months starting with the date of the
acts to which the complaint relates or such other period as the Tribunal thinks
just and equitable. Conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at
the end of the period. Failure to do something is to be treated as occurring
when the person in question decided upon it. A person is taken to decide
something when they do an act inconsistent with the duty or, where they do no
inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which they might reasonably have
been expected to comply with the duty to make reasonable adjustments.
6. There is no dispute in this case that the claimant’s complaint was presented
outside of the primary three month limitation period provided for by section 123.
His claim form was presented to the Tribunal on 21 December 2020. In his
grounds of complaint, he opens by saying “I’m politely requesting the Tribunal
to consider extending the three month limitation period in order to submit a claim
for disability discrimination leading to summary dismissal from my
employment.”
7. The claimant’s claim form was rejected on 30 December 2020. This was
because the claimant failed to give an early conciliation number and that the
explanation given by him in the claim form for failing so to do was incorrect.
8. The claimant re-presented his complaint. He did so on 27 May 2021. The claim
form was rejected a second time. On 9 June 2021, the Tribunal wrote to the
claimant to say that the claim form was rejected because the name of the
prospective respondent in the ACAS early conciliation certificate (dated 6 May
2021 at page 17 of the bundle) differed from the names given by the claimant
upon the claim form.
9. The claimant re-presented the claim form again on 17 June 2021. On 25 June
2021 the Tribunal notified the claimant that the claim form was now accepted.
It was treated as having been received on 17 June 2021.
10. The claimant was employed by the respondent as a recovery forensic
consultant. It is agreed that he was employed between 17 December 2018 and
14 May 2020. The respondent took the decision to dismiss the claimant upon
the grounds that he was not capable of performing his role.
11. The claimant appealed against the respondent’s decision to dismiss him. There
was an appeal hearing on 10 July 2020. The claimant was notified of the
outcome of the appeal on 29 October 2020.
12. Upon a fair reading of his grounds of claim, the claimant complains both of the
decision to dismiss him and the decision to dismiss his appeal. On his case,
the decision to dismiss him and to dismiss his appeal constitute failures upon
Case Number: 1807421/2020
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the part of the respondent to comply with the duty to make reasonable
adjustments. They are both, on the claimant’s case, acts inconsistent with the
duty to make reasonable adjustments and therefore they are to be taken as
decisions not to comply with the duty. There was a failure to make reasonable
adjustments up to the point at which the respondent dismissed the claimant’s
appeal. In the circumstances therefore in my judgment time started to run from
the date upon which the claimant was notified that his appeal was unsuccessful.
This was 29 October 2020. The claimant therefore needed to bring
proceedings no later than 28 January 2021.
13. It was therefore incumbent upon the claimant to commence mandatory early
conciliation as required by the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 no later than
28 January 2021. It was then for him to present the complaint to the
Employment Tribunal within three months of 29 October 2020 plus the period
spent in early conciliation.
14. The claimant did not commence mandatory early conciliation on or before
28 January 2021. He did not contact ACAS until 2 May 2021 and even then,
the certificate was defective as it named an incorrect prospective respondent.
15. As the claimant himself acknowledged when presenting the claim form, it is
plain that on any view his claim has been presented outside the relevant
limitation period in section 123 of the 2010 Act. Therefore, it is for the claimant
to convince the Tribunal that time should be extended upon just and equitable
grounds in order to vest the Tribunal with jurisdiction to consider his claim.
16. In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan
[2018] EWCA Civ 640, Leggatt L J said (in paragraph 19) that, “the factors
which are almost always relevant to consider when exercising any discretion
whether to extend time are:
(1) The length of, and reasons for the delay; and
(2) Whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent (for example by
preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were
fresh).”
17. As was established in the case of Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a
Leisure Link [2003] IRLR 434, CA, the onus is upon the claimant to convince
the Employment Tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend the time limit.
Robertson establishes that the exercise of the discretion is not a foregone
conclusion. Indeed, to the contrary, there is no presumption that the
Employment Tribunal should exercise discretion in the claimant’s favour unless
he can justify a failure to present the complaint in time. The exercise of the
discretion is the exception rather than the rule. However, this does not mean
that exceptional circumstances are required before the time limit can be
extended on just and equitable grounds. The law simply requires that an
extension of time should be just and equitable.
18. In Abertawe, the Court of Appeal rejected the proposition that in the absence
of an explanation from the claimant as to why he did not bring the claim in time
and an evidential basis for that explanation, the Tribunal could not properly
conclude that it was just and equitable to extend time. The Court of Appeal
held that the discretion under section 123 of the 2010 Act for a Tribunal to
decide what it thinks to be just and equitable is clearly intended to be broad and
Case Number: 1807421/2020
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unfettered. There is no justification for reading into the statutory language any
requirement that the Tribunal must be satisfied that there was a good reason
for the delay, let alone that time cannot be extended in the absence of an
explanation for the delay from the claimant. The most that can be said is
whether there is any explanation or apparent reason for the delay and the
nature of any reason are relevant matters to which the Tribunal ought to have
regard. However, there is no requirement for a Tribunal to be satisfied that
there was a good reason for the delay before it can conclude that it is just and
equitable to extend time. However, as Robertson establishes, there needs to
be something to convince the Tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend
time.
19. The strength of the claim may be a relevant factor when deciding whether to
extend time. Tribunals may, if they think it necessary, consider the merits of
the claim.
20. It is necessary for the Tribunal to weigh the balance of prejudice between the
parties. A refusal to extend time will inevitably prejudice the claimant. However,
the claimant needs to show more than the loss of the claim through the
application of the relevant limitation period will prejudice him. If that were
sufficient, it would emasculate the limitation period. Plainly, Parliament has
legislated for relatively short limitation periods in employment cases. The
limitation period must be applied unless the claimant can convince the Tribunal
that time ought to be extended.
21. Some prejudice will of course be caused to the respondent if an extension of
time is granted given that the case would otherwise be dismissed. However,
the prejudice caused needs to amount to more than simply that. Otherwise
such would emasculate the discretion vested in Tribunals by Parliament to
consider a just and equitable extension of time.
22. In disability discrimination cases, there is an additional factor which is to be
taken into account. That is the disability itself. Tribunals may recognise that
disabled claimants may find it difficult to comply with the three months’ time
limit.
23. With these factors in mind, I turn to the facts of the case. The claimant was
signed off sick on 6 August 2019. The respondent operates an attendance at
work policy. Pursuant to that policy, welfare meetings were held on
11 September 2019, 11 October 2019 and 28 November 2019.
24. The claimant was referred for occupational health advice in December 2019.
The report dated 3 January 2020 noted that the claimant had been diagnosed
with depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. The report said
that the claimant was unfit for work and unlikely to be fit for work in the next
weeks due to his symptoms. There were no adjustments that the respondent
could put in place in order to facilitate a return to work.
25. A first capability meeting was held on 23 January 2020. The claimant said there
was no change to his condition and he was awaiting counselling sessions which
were to be put in place by his GP. The claimant agreed there were no
adjustments that the respondent could make to facilitate a return to work at that
stage.
Case Number: 1807421/2020
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26. A second capability meeting was held on 2 March 2020. The claimant said he
had not yet attended any counselling sessions. There was no indication of
when the sessions would take place.
27. The respondent decided to refer the claimant to occupational health again. The
second occupational health report is dated 6 April 2020. It is at pages 59 to 62
of the hearing bundle.
28. The report was authored by Ailsa Taylor, occupational health advisor. She
opined that the claimant, “is temporarily unfit for work and is likely to remain
unfit to return to work for the next three months if not longer. This is due to the
enduring nature of his symptoms substantially impacting on his ability to carry
out his everyday activities. I am unable to predict when he will be fit to return
to his full hours and duties at this time, this is dependent on his symptoms
improving with further treatment and it is unlikely this will commence until at
least July 2020. In my opinion, he is fit to participate in a conduct or disciplinary
process.”
29. Ailsa Taylor then made several recommendations for adjustments which the
respondent may make to assist with any “conduct or disciplinary process”.
However, she was unable to suggest a rehabilitation plan as a return to work
date had not yet been identified.
30. The claimant was invited to a further formal capability meeting. This was held
on 14 May 2020. It was chaired by Marc Dawson (SDR manager) with a note
taker in attendance.
31. No notes of that hearing were produced for the benefit of the Tribunal.
However, Mr Dawson sent a letter to the claimant on 22 May 2020. The letter
is at pages 63 and 64 of the bundle. It summarises the meeting.
32. It is unfortunate that Mr Dawson spoke in terms of a “disciplinary meeting.” This
is inapt. The claimant had done nothing wrong. The meeting held on 14 May
2020 was a capability meeting at which to discuss the claimant’s fitness for
work. It is most unfortunate that the respondent appears to have conflated
disciplinary and capability issues.
33. Mr Dawson noted that the claimant was signed off as unfit for work until 13 June
2020. He confirmed that he was still feeling the same “with your severe anxiety
and depression, PTSD, and are still awaiting counselling.”
34. In evidence given before the Tribunal, the claimant fairly accepted that in May
2020 he was unfit to carry out his substantive role. Indeed, he said that that
was the position when he lodged his appeal on 17 June 2020, when the appeal
was considered on 10 July 2020 and it remained the position when the appeal
was determined on 28 October 2020. The claimant added that he remains unfit
to carry out his substantive role even today.
35. That being the case, the matter essentially revolves around the ability of the
parties to identify any suitable alternative employment. Mr Dawson said in his
letter of 22 May 2020 that no suitable alternative roles were available.
36. The issue of alternative work was also considered at the appeal meeting. The
appeal meeting notes are at pages 70 to 74 of the bundle. The claimant told
the Appeals Officer, Gillian Brown, that he would not be able to work in his
substantive role. The claimant suggested that, as a reasonable adjustment, the
Case Number: 1807421/2020
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respondent may find him an alternative role. However, he said that such,
“would be very difficult … it would have to be very admin based.” The claimant
said that he would need to work from home. Of course, at this stage, many of
the respondent’s employees (and indeed the labour force in general) were
working from home due to the impact of the pandemic.
37. On 28 October 2020 Mrs Brown wrote to the claimant with her decision upon
his appeal. Her letter is at pages 96 to 101.
38. During the course of the appeal hearing, the claimant mentioned that he had
seen a role in Crossflatts checking mortgage applications. The claimant said
that this was a suitable alternative vacancy giving his experience of working
within the mortgage industry.
39. Mrs Brown checked the position and determined that there was no such role
available in May 2020. She concluded that no suitable alternative role was
available.
40. During the course of the hearing, the Tribunal explored with the claimant his
ability to do any work during the course of 2020. The claimant said that happily
he is now a lot better than he was at that time. He was asked whether he was
saying that between May and October 2020 he was unable to work in any
capacity. He replied that he, “had voices in my head to consider self-harm. If
they’d offered me an administrative job without the need for phone work I could
have done that, I could now. I couldn’t work in the office but I could work from
home.”
41. The claimant also accepted that the Crossflatts job to which he referred during
the course of the appeal hearing was through an agency. It was not a role
advertised by the respondent nor was it a vacancy within the respondent’s
organisation.
42. The claimant voiced scepticism as to the reason why it took Mrs Brown a period
of in excess of three months to deal with the claimant’s appeal. The Tribunal
did not have the benefit of hearing any evidence from her. There was no
explanation from the respondent (let alone a satisfactory explanation) for the
reason why the appeal took so long. The claimant therefore may be forgiven
for having some scepticism that the respondent acted in bad faith with one eye
upon the limitation period. In the final analysis however such avails the claimant
little because I have determined that the limitation period commenced only on
29 October 2020 when claimant was notified of the appeal outcome in any case.
43. The claimant has been supported throughout the internal process and in the
Tribunal proceedings by Michael Swan who is a close friend of the claimant. I
was told that Mr Swan has a “legal background” but is not a qualified solicitor
or barrister.
44. The claimant also informed the Tribunal that he had the assistance of the trade
union Aegis. He said that he approached them in March 2020 for assistance
with the case. The claimant’s account was that Aegis contacted ACAS. The
respondent showed no interest in conciliation. The claimant then obtained the
certificate dated 6 May 2021 that we see at page 17 of the bundle. The claimant
was unable to account for the delay between March and May 2021.
45. Towards the end of the bundle, there is a copy of correspondence passing
between Mr Swan and the claimant on the one hand and a solicitor on the other.
Case Number: 1807421/2020
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It appears that the solicitor was approached for legal advice after the appeal
outcome had been delivered.
46. On 11 November 2020, Mr Swan wrote to the solicitor to say, “it is clear to me
that his employers should have determined his appeal/grievance within the time
limit prescribed by their own policies and procedures. From what I recollect this
should have been four weeks. In the event, it took them so long that the three
month limitation to appeal to a Tribunal has expired. This appears to be
incredibly unfair.” Mr Swan then goes on to ask the solicitor whether he
considers there to be grounds for extending the limitation period. The solicitor
replied on 12 November 2020 (page 102). He advised that for the disability
discrimination claim, “the limit will be extended if Simon could show it was “just
and equitable.” Again illness may assist as a ground here but it is unlikely that
the internal appeals procedure will add much weight.” He goes on to advise
that, “now that Simon knows of his rights, speed is of the essence … further
delay in applying will severely prejudice the chances. “
47. The fact that a complainant has awaited the outcome of an internal procedure
before making a complaint is just one matter to be taken into account by a
Tribunal considering the late presentation of a discrimination claim. There is no
general principle that it will be just and equitable to extend the time limit where
the claimant was seeking redress through the employer’s grievance procedure
before embarking on legal proceedings. The general principle is that a delay
caused by a claimant awaiting completion of an internal procedure may justify
the extension of the time limit but it is only one factor to be considered in any
particular case.
48. Given my finding that the continuing course of conduct complained of ended
only when the claimant was notified of the internal appeal outcome anyway, this
is not a factor which needs to be taken into account. On my finding, time did
not start to run until 29 October 2020 in any case.
49. In a separate email dated 11 November 2020, the claimant’s solicitor told the
claimant that, “there is a strict three month time limit in applications for
compensation for unfair dismissal and disability discrimination.” We are not of
course concerned here with an unfair dismissal complaint. However, this was
sound and accurate advice upon the complaint of disability discrimination
brought by the claimant.
50. The claimant appeared to have acted reasonably quickly by submitting the
claim form on 21 December 2020. The difficulty for him is that no action was
taken between the date of rejection of that claim form on 30 December 2020
and 27 May 2021 when he re-presented the claim form. He was aware, having
been advised by his solicitor to this effect, that time was of the essence but
inexplicably delayed taking remedial action for five months.
51. The claimant said that at the material time his mental health was very poor. I
accept this to be the case. However, he had the support of Mr Swan and was
a member of a trade union (albeit that he did not avail himself of their support
until March 2021). Were the claimant to have had no help available, then I
would have been satisfied that his mental health issues presented a real
obstacle to him taking the necessary steps. However, given the support
available to the claimant I am not satisfied that there is a good explanation for
the delay.
Case Number: 1807421/2020
8
52. That said, per Abertawe, there is no requirement for me to be satisfied that
there was a good reason for the delay before I can conclude that it is just and
equitable to extend time. I do however weigh in the balance that the claimant
appears to have not paid sufficient heed to sound legal advice. I now turn to
several other factors.
53. Miss Usher informed me that Mr Dawson no longer works for the respondent.
It is unfortunate that she was unable to say whether the respondent is still in
touch with Mr Dawson. That said, there is plainly forensic prejudice to the
respondent. Had the claimant brought his claim in time, then steps could have
been taken by the respondent to obtain a statement from Mr Dawson and to
ensure his co-operation in giving evidence in any subsequent Tribunal
proceedings. The forensic prejudice to the respondent here goes beyond what
may be considered to be the usual plea of fading memory. There is here real
forensic prejudice as a key witness no longer works for them.
54. Further, I consider the claimant’s complaint to have little merit. He is right to
say that the respondent applied to him a disadvantaging provision, criterion or
practice. The relevant PCP, as identified by Employment Judge Jones, was
the requirement for the claimant to discharge his duties in accordance with his
contract of employment. I accept that the claimant was unable to comply with
that PCP because of his disability. The disability therefore created a substantial
disadvantage for him. Accordingly a duty arose to make reasonable
adjustments. Likewise, the respondent applied their absence management
policy to the claimant. Again, this created a substantial disadvantage because
of his disability as he fell foul of the attendance requirements which led to his
dismissal.
55. The question that arises is what steps the respondent could reasonably have
taken to avoid the disadvantage caused by the application to the claimant of
those two PCPs? Employment Judge Jones identified three possible
adjustments. The first of these was allowing the claimant further time to obtain
medical treatment to recover. The second was the redeployment of the
claimant. The third was allowing the claimant to do administrative duties from
home.
56. There are difficulties for the claimant upon all three proposed adjustments.
Allowing the claimant time to recover would not have alleviated the substantial
disadvantage caused by the requirement to carry out his substantive role given
that even by the time that the appeal was determined he was unfit to undertake
it. It is not reasonable for there to be an expectation that the employer shall
wait indefinitely for an employee to recover. There was no prospect, upon the
medical evidence, of the claimant recovering sufficiently to enable him to carry
out any part of his substantive role. Indeed, the claimant accepted that he
remains unable to undertake it.
57. The case therefore really turns upon the question of alternative employment.
There is no requirement, in order to fulfil the duty to make reasonable
adjustments, for an employer to create a role for a disabled employee. There
is simply no evidence that any suitable roles were available for the claimant
(whether working from home or otherwise). Regrettably, the claimant appeared
somewhat equivocal about his capacity to undertake any work when I asked
him about this. Concerningly, he said that at the material time he had “voices
in his head to consider self-harm.” In my judgment, there must be real doubt
Case Number: 1807421/2020
9
as to whether at any point during 2020 the claimant was fit to work in any
capacity. It is in my judgment significant that the claimant did not adduce any
medical evidence for the benefit of the respondent that he was fit to undertake
a role prior to Mrs Brown’s decision taken at the end of October 2020.
58. The evidence is that there were no alternative roles which the claimant could
undertake and even if there had been he was not fit to undertake them in any
case. There were no reasonable adjustments, in my judgment, which the
respondent could have undertaken to the substantive role or the attendance
management policy which would have the effect of alleviating the substantial
disadvantage caused to the claimant by reason of his disability. Regrettably,
the claimant was simply unfit to work in any capacity at the material time.
59. In my judgment, therefore, in summary the following factors tell against it being
just and equitable to extend time:
(1) The claimant is substantially out of time by around four and a half months.
This is significant in the context of the three months’ limitation period.
(2) He disregarded sound legal advice to deal with matters promptly.
(3) There is actual forensic prejudice to the respondent in that a key witness
has left their employment.
(4) The claimant is of little if not no merit.
60. I am unable to weigh in the balance in the claimant’s favour any satisfactory
explanation for the delay. No satisfactory explanation has been offered. The
claimant was well aware of the time limit issues through the good advice
proffered to him by his solicitor.
61. There is no good explanation to weigh in the balance in the claimant’s favour.
Against that, I do not weigh the absence of a good explanation in the balance
against him. Abertawe makes it clear that it is not the case that time cannot be
extended in the absence of any explanation for the delay.
62. Here, however, the delay has caused prejudice to the respondent. There will
therefore be significant prejudice to the respondent by extending time given the
apparent loss of a key witness attributable to the delay. That factor must be
weighed against the interests of the claimant. Refusing to extend time is of
course prejudicial to him. However, it is significant that the complaint is of little
merit in any case.
Case Number: 1807421/2020
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63. In this case therefore, the balance of prejudice favours the respondent. It
follows therefore that the complaint has been presented out of time in
circumstances in which it is not just and equitable to extend time. The Tribunal
therefore has no jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s complaint brought under
the 2010 Act.
_____________________________
Employment Judge Brain
Date: 3rd March 2022
Date: 7th March 2022
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