Employment Tribunals

1 Case Number: 3303588/2024 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Mrs Harmander Wasu Respondent: (1) First Choice Medical Care (2) Azeem Nizamuddin Heard at: Watford Employment Tribunal On: 13, 14 and 15 July, and 20, 21 and 23 October 2026 (23 October being a deliberation day) Before: Employment Judge Partington, G Bhatt and M Bhatti Representation Claimant: In person Respondent: Katherine Anderson, Counsel RESERVED JUDGMENT 1. The claimant’s claim that she suffered a detriment for making a protected disclosure was presented out of time and is therefore dismissed. 2. The claimant’s claim for age discrimination was presented out of time and is therefore dismissed. 3. The claimant’s claim for sex discrimination was presented out of time and is therefore dismissed. 4. The claimant’s complaint of constructive unfair dismissal is well founded and succeeds. FULL REASONS Preliminary matters 5. The evidence before the Employment Tribunal (ET) comprised of an 870 page bundle. 6. At the start of the hearing the Claimant (C) sought permission to add her own bundle of documents alongside the agreed bundle. The ET noted from the Case Management Order of Employment Judge Armstrong dated 2 2 October 2024 that disclosure should have taken place by 4 December 2024 with the bundle agreed by 18 December 2024. 7. Counsel for the Respondents opposed the application on the basis that it did not comply with the Order and would prejudice the Respondents because of the last minute disclosure of documents C now wanted to include. 8. C produced no evidence to explain why the documents she was now seeking to introduce had not been previously disclosed to the Respondents and included in the agreed bundle, pursuant to the Order. 9. The ET considered that such late disclosure and addition of a new bundle so long after the original date by which this should have happened could not be justified in the absence of compelling evidence that would explain such significant delay and to do so would prejudice the Respondents and likely lead to additional delay given the probable need to adjourn the hearing to enable the Respondents to consider the additional documents. The ET therefore refused C’s application. 10. In addition to the hearing bundle, there was a witness statement bundle which included C’s witness statement and documents in support of her witness statement; a further witness statement from C and documents in support; and then two additional witness statements from C. It also included a witness statement for the 2nd respondent and a witness statement for Dr Dinesh Jayesinghe. 11. C and the 2nd Respondent attended the hearing and were cross-examined. 12. Counsel for the Respondents wanted to pursue a strike out application prior to the start of the hearing but abandoned the application when it became apparent the ET would require more detailed interrogation of the issues. 13. The hearing went part-heard because of a family emergency affecting EJ Partington on 15 July and the parties returned to complete the hearing on 20 October with C re-starting her cross examination of the 2nd Respondent. 14. At the time of adjournment on 15 July, EJ Partington directed C to produce evidence to support her reasons for her delay in bringing her age and sex discrimination claims and to provide copies to the Respondents ahead of the resumed hearing. These documents were provided by C and included in an Additional Correspondence Bundle produced by the Respondents. 15. Prior to the beginning of the resumed hearing C had sought permission in writing from the ET to introduce new documents to the hearing which the Respondents had opposed in writing. At the start of the resumed hearing, the ET refused this application for the same reasons given for its first refusal of C’s application to add documents to the hearing bundle. 3 Claims 16. Claimant brings the following claims against the Respondents: a. Unfair constructive dismissal; b. Protected Disclosure detriment. c. Direct age discrimination; d. Direct sex discrimination; 17. C had also brought claims for redundancy pay, notice pay and harassment which had been dismissed following withdrawal by C pursuant to a Judgment dated 2 October 2024, as well as a claim for holiday pay which had been dismissed following withdrawal by the claimant pursuant to a Judgment dated 20 November 2025. The Issues 18. The issues the ET will decide are set out below. Time limits 19. Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, some of the complaints may not have been brought in time. 20. Were the discrimination complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide: a. Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates? b. If not, was there conduct extending over a period? c. If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period? d. If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide: i. Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time? ii. In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time? 21. Was the protected disclosure detriment claim made within the time limit in section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide: a. Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act complained of ? b. If not, was there a series of similar acts or failures and was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the last one? 4 c. If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit? d. If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period? Unfair constructive dismissal 22. Was the claimant dismissed? 23. Did the respondents do the following things: a. Practise without having a leasehold to the premises; b. During a meeting on 17 August 2023, the Claimant was referred to as being a ‘liar and dishonest’ and was accused of not managing the Practice professionally; c. The Respondents appointed an external personal assistant, Anita Kumar, who gradually took the Claimant’s duties from her (finance, ordering stock, recruitment, setting up appointment sessions and training); d. Staff HR folders were locked away from the Claimant and her access to PCSE financial statements was blocked; e. On 4 December 2023, the Second Respondent emailed the Claimant asking her to remove herself from the premises otherwise he would suspend her; f. During a staff meeting in November 2023, the Second Respondent accused the Claimant of not releasing funds to pay staff; g. The Claimant was not paid her salary by the First Respondent, rather she was asked to take her pay from her husband’s account 24. Did that breach the implied term of trust and confidence? The Tribunal will need to decide: a. whether the respondent behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent; and b. whether it had reasonable and proper cause for doing so. 25. Did the claimant resign in response to the breach? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach of contract was a reason for the claimant’s resignation. 26. Did the claimant affirm the contract before resigning? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the claimant’s words or actions showed that they 5 chose to keep the contract alive even after the breach. 27. If the claimant was dismissed, what was the reason or principal reason for dismissal - i.e. what was the reason for the breach of contract? 28. Was it a potentially fair reason? 29. Did the respondent act reasonably or unreasonably in all the circumstances, including the respondent’s size and administrative resources, in treating that reason as a sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant? 30. The Tribunal’s determination whether the dismissal was fair or unfair must be in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. Remedy for unfair dismissal 31. Does the claimant wish to be reinstated to their previous employment? 32. Does the claimant wish to be re-engaged to comparable employment or other suitable employment? 33. Should the Tribunal order reinstatement? The Tribunal will consider in particular whether reinstatement is practicable and, if the claimant caused or contributed to dismissal, whether it would be just. 34. Should the Tribunal order re-engagement? The Tribunal will consider in particular whether re-engagement is practicable and, if the claimant caused or contributed to dismissal, whether it would be just. 35. What should the terms of the re-engagement order be? 36. If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide: a. What financial losses has the dismissal caused the claimant? b. Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? c. If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated? d. Is there a chance that the claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason? e. If so, should the claimant’s compensation be reduced? By how much? f. Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply? g. Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with 6 it? h. If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%? i. If the claimant was unfairly dismissed, did they cause or contribute to dismissal by blameworthy conduct? j. If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensatory award? By what proportion? k. Does the statutory cap apply? 37. What basic award is payable to the claimant, if any? 38. Would it be just and equitable to reduce the basic award because of any conduct of the claimant before the dismissal? If so, to what extent? Protected disclosure 39. Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide: a. What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant says they made disclosures on these occasions: i. On 26 September 2023 the Claimant e-mailed Ankita Kumar raising concerns regarding incoming blood reports not being viewed and filed which, if not resolved, the Claimant stated she would report to NHS England and CQC. b. Did they disclose information? c. Did they believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest? d. Was that belief reasonable? e. Did they believe it tended to show that: i. a criminal offence had been, was being or was likely to be committed; ii. a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation; iii. a miscarriage of justice had occurred, was occurring or was likely to occur; iv. the health or safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered; 7 v. the environment had been, was being or was likely to be damaged; or vi. information tending to show any of these things had been, was being or was likely to be deliberately concealed. f. Was that belief reasonable? g. If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure: i. Was it made to the claimant’s employer? ii. Did it fall within section 43C, 43D, 43E, 43F, 43G, or 43H ERA 1996? If so, it was a protected disclosure. Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 48) 40. Did the respondent do the following things: a. The Claimant claims, on 28 September 2023 the Second and Third Respondent entered the Claimant’s office, unannounced, and attempted to convene a conduct and capability meeting with, which included references to her credibility, and used an aggressive tone with her. 41. By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment? 42. If so, was it done on the ground that she made a protected disclosure? Remedy for Protected Disclosure Detriment 43. What financial losses has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant? 44. Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? 45. If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated? 46. What injury to feelings has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 47. Has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 48. Is it just and equitable to award the claimant other compensation? 49. Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply? 50. Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it? 8 51. If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%? 52. Did the claimant cause or contribute to the detrimental treatment by their own actions and if so would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensation? By what proportion? 53. Was the protected disclosure made in good faith? 54. If not, is it just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensation? By what proportion, up to 25%? Direct age discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13) 55. Did the respondent do the following things: a. In or around November 2022, following a meeting with all GP’s, the Claimant was asked to stay behind and a further discussion took place between the Claimant, Dr Jayasinghe and the Second Respondent and Dr Shazae during they asked the Claimant how old she was and when she was thinking of retiring. b. In September 2023, during a staff meeting in reception when new GP’s were introduced to staff, the Second Respondent asked each of the reception staff how old they were, but ignored the Claimant and did not engage with her. 56. Was that less favourable treatment? The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. The claimant says she was treated worse than Helen Siva-Kumar and Ishika De-Silva Kiran Nagpal. 57. If so, was it because of age? 58. Did the respondent’s treatment amount to a detriment? 59. Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? 60. The Tribunal will decide in particular: a. was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims; b. could something less discriminatory have been done instead; c. how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced? Direct sex discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13) 9 61. Did the respondent do the following things: a. Towards the beginning of 2023, during a PCN meeting at which the Claimant was the only female member of staff, Dr Shazad, Clinical Director, asked the Claimant to leave the meeting. Dr Jayasinghe and the second respondent were present during that meeting; 62. Was that less favourable treatment? 63. The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. The claimant relies on a hypothetical comparator 64. If so, was it because of sex? Remedy for discrimination 65. Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondent take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the claimant? What should it recommend? 66. What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant? 67. Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? 68. If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated? 69. What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 70. Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 71. Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result? 72. Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply? 73. Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it by [specify breach]? 74. If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? 75. By what proportion, up to 25%? 76. Should interest be awarded? How much? 10 The Law Time Limits 77. By section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA” or “the Act”), discrimination claims to the ET under the Act may not be brought after the end of the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates or such other period as the ET thinks just and equitable. That period of three months is subject to provisions which extend it to take account of the mandatory early conciliation involving ACAS. Also, section 123(3) of the Act provides that conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period. 78. So far as the discretion to extend time is concerned, it has been said that the exercise of the discretion is the exception not the rule (Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link 2003 IRLR 434). But an extension does not require exceptional circumstances. In exercising the discretion a Tribunal may (not must) have regard to the checklist contained in S.33 of the Limitation Act 1980, as modified by the EAT in British Coal Corporation v Keeble and ors 1997 IRLR 336 which sets out the factors for the tribunal to weigh up includes considering the prejudice that each party would suffer as a result of the decision reached and have regard to all the circumstances of the case, in particular: the length of, and reasons for, the delay; the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; the extent to which the respondent has cooperated with any requests for information; the promptness with which the claimant acted once he or she knew of the facts giving rise to the complaint; and the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate advice once he or she knew of the possibility of taking action. 79. The tribunal can extend time for submitting a whistleblowing detriment claim and unfair dismissal claim where it is satisfied that it was "not reasonably practicable" for the claim to be presented in time (section 48(3)(b) and s111(2)(b) ERA 1996). Such claims must still have been presented "within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable". Unfair Constructive Dismissal 80. Section 95(1)(c) ERA refers to something commonly known as “constructive dismissal”. 81. In order to prove constructive dismissal the employee must prove that the employer has committed a serious breach of contract and that the employee resigned because of that breach (or at least partly because of that breach; it does not necessarily have to be the only reason) and that the employee must also prove they have not waived the breach by affirming the contract. 82. As set out in London Borough of Waltham Forest v Omilaju [2004] EWCA Civ 1493, the following basic propositions of law can be derived from the authorities: a. The test for constructive dismissal is whether the employer's 11 actions or conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment: Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] 1 QB 761. b. It is an implied term of any contract of employment that the employer shall not without reasonable and proper cause conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee: see, for example, Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20, 34H–35D (Lord Nicholls) and 45C 46E (Lord Steyn). We refer to this as “the implied term of trust and confidence”. c. Any breach of the implied term of trust and confidence will amount to a repudiation of the contract see, for example, per Browne-Wilkinson J in Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666, 672A. The very essence of the breach of the implied term is that it is calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship (emphasis added). d. The test of whether there has been a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence is objective. As Lord Nicholls said in Malik at page 35C, the conduct relied on as constituting the breach must “impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at objectively , it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer” (emphasis added). e. A relatively minor act may be sufficient to entitle the employee to resign and leave his employment if it is the last straw in a series of incidents. As set out at paragraph [480] of Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law: “[480] Many of the constructive dismissal cases which arise from the undermining of trust and confidence will involve the employee leaving in response to a course of conduct carried on over a period of time. The particular incident which causes the employee to leave may in itself be insufficient to justify his taking that action, but when viewed against a background of such incidents it may be considered sufficient by the courts to warrant their treating the resignation as a constructive dismissal. It may be the ‘last straw’ which causes the employee to terminate a deteriorating relationship.” 83. Where an employee succeeds in the argument that there was a constructive dismissal, then the dismissal “reason” is the employer’s reason for the conduct which caused the employee to treat themselves as dismissed. 84. It is open to an employer to argue that the dismissal was for a potentially fair reason and was, in all the circumstances, a fair dismissal. 85. Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) deals with fairness. 12 Protected disclosure detriment 86. The law provides certain protections for people, commonly described as whistleblowers, who make “protected disclosures”. By s 43A ERA, a protected disclosure means a qualifying disclosure made by a worker (which includes an employee) in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H. A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with sections 43C to 43H if made, amongst other ways, to an employer (s 43C(1)(a)). 87. By section 43B, a qualifying disclosure means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the person making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of a number of things. One of those things (section 43B(a)) is that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed. Another (section 43B(b)) is that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject. 88. In the case of a disclosure directly to an employer, the Tribunal will consider the following: a. First, was there a disclosure of information? b. Second, did the claimant reasonably believe two things: i. that the information tended to show the relevant wrongdoing and ii. that the disclosure was in the public interest. 89. Under section 47B of the ERA a worker has the right not to be subject to any detriment by “any act, or any deliberate failure to act” by an employer done on the grounds that he had made a protected disclosure. Detriment means some form of disadvantage, to be assessed from the viewpoint of a reasonable worker in all the circumstances: Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] ICR 337 (HL). An unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to a detriment. 90. Section 47B is infringed if the protected disclosure materially (i.e. more than trivially) influences the employer’s treatment of the worker: Fecitt and Ors v NHS Manchester (Public Concern at Work intervening) [2012] ICR 372 (CA). 91. The burden of proof is on the employee to show that they made a protected disclosure and suffered a detriment. The employer then has the burden of proving the reason for the treatment: section 48(2) of the ERA. Direct discrimination contrary to section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 92. It is for the claimant to demonstrate that: a. she was treated less favourably than others were or would have been treated; b. there must be no material differences between her circumstances and those “others” to whom she compares her treatment; 13 c. a significant reason for the difference in treatment is the protected characteristic. 93. It is for the claimant to prove facts from which the tribunal could reasonably find there was a breach of section 13, Equality Act 2010. If so, the burden passes to the respondent to disprove. 94. In Field v Steve Pye and Co (KL) Ltd [2022 EAT 68], the EAT restated the approach the tribunal should take to the burden of proof. We do not set out all of the steps now but, in summary, there is a two-stage test. At stage 1 there must be primary facts from which the tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that discrimination took place. At this stage, all that is needed are facts from which an inference of discrimination is possible. Primary facts are sufficient to shift the burden if a reasonable tribunal could properly conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that there was discrimination. At Stage 1 the burden of proof is on the claimant. The employer’s explanation is disregarded and it is therefore impermissible to use an inadequate explanation from the respondent as a primary fact. Unfair or unreasonable treatment on its own is not enough. Something more is required as set out in Madarassy v Nomura International Plc [2007 EWCA Civ 33]. 95. If the burden of proof does shift, at stage 2 under the Igen guidance, the employer must prove that the less favourable treatment was in no sense whatsoever because of the protected characteristic. Because the evidence in support of the explanation would usually be in the possession of the employer, tribunals should expect “cogent evidence” for the employer’s burden to be discharged. The facts and their application to the law 96. We make findings of fact on the balance of probabilities where those facts are disputed. We have not made findings on every fact presented to us, but merely on those which assist us to come to a decision bearing in mind the list of issues. Page references are to pages in the bundle unless otherwise stated. 97. We refer to the Claimant as “C” and the Second Respondent, Azeem Nizamuddin, as “AN”. 98. The first respondent is a GP practice partnership. AN is one of two partners in the partnership. C was employed by the respondents as practice manager. Her continuous employment commenced in 1999 and her employment transferred to the first respondent in August 2023, preserving her continuous employment when AN and his practice partner, Dr Dinesh Jayesinghe, acquired the GP practice from C’s husband, Mr Wasu. 99. She gave notice of resignation which she says amounted to constructive dismissal on 8 December 2023 and the effective date of termination was 6 January 2024. 100. C initially presented a claim on 29 December 2023 which has now 14 been withdrawn. 101. She presented a further claim on 30 March 2024 which is the live claim which is the subject of these proceedings and in relation to which time limits have been assessed by the ET. Early conciliation in respect of this claim commenced on 24 March 2024 and the EC certificate was issued on 26 March 2024. The discrimination and protected disclosure claims 102. The acts of age discrimination alleged by the claimant occurred in or around November 2022 and September 2023. Taking account of the period of extension afforded by ACAS early conciliation, the time limit for bringing a claim in relation to the alleged November 2022 incident expired in February 2023; and in relation to the September 2023 incident expired in December 2023. No continuing act is alleged. 103. Regarding the act of alleged sex discrimination which is said to have occurred towards the beginning of 2023, the time limit for bringing that claim would be at some point in or around mid-2023. 104. The alleged act of protected disclosure detriment occurred on 28 September 2023 and the time limit for that would be 29 December 2023. 105. C gave only vague reasons for not having brought the claims in time, including that she had personal issues, namely that she had nowhere to live, everything had been taken from her, and her home was vacated. Before the end of the adjourned hearing the ET asked C to provide evidence to support these reasons. At the recommenced hearing she produced that evidence being a summary of medical issues (p7 and 8 of the Additional correspondence bundle) and a Notice under section 12 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1997 (p9 of the same bundle). 106. The Notice is dated after she submitted the 2nd ET1 and is therefore of no relevance. The summary of medical issues describes ongoing medical conditions and refers to a neck injury causing ongoing neck pain, reduced mobility and difficulty concentrating, but none of this explains why C could not bring the claim in time, nor the delay once time had expired, in bringing the claim. 107. We note there are different legal tests for extending time for discrimination claims and whistleblowing claims. 108. Taking the discrimination claims first, C has not provided evidenced reasons for bringing the claims out of time, and in all the circumstances the ET does not consider it just and equitable to extend time given the absence of any compelling reasons for the delay and because of the prejudice to the Respondents were we to allow these out of time claims to proceed. Clearly the passing of time affects the ability of witnesses to recall events; indeed, C has not been able to provide precise dates for the allegations of discrimination which has made it difficult for the Respondents to respond to these allegations. 15 109. The ET therefore does not consider it just and equitable to extend time and finds these claims to have been brought out of time. 110. Even if we allowed the discrimination claims to proceed they would fail because we were not shown any evidence that the alleged incidents of age discrimination in November 2022 and September 2023 occurred insofar as questions relating to C’s age, or the ages of reception staff, were asked. The ET could not make any findings of primary fact that would shift the burden of proof to the Respondents. 111. Further, the allegation of age discrimination in November 2022 is something purportedly said by Dr Shahzad who was not her employer, nor an employee of her employer, at the material time. 112. Similarly, in relation to the allegation of sex discrimination, no evidence was presented to us to evidence this allegation. Again, the ET could not make any findings of primary fact that would shift the burden of proof to the Respondents. And, further, the allegation of sex discrimination is something purportedly said by Dr Shahzad who was not her employer, nor an employee of her employer, at the material time. 113. In relation to the whistleblowing claim, C has not provided any evidence to explain why it was "not reasonably practicable" for the claim to be presented in time, nor why the claim was not presented within such further reasonable period. The ET therefore does not consider there to be a basis to allow the claims to be brought out of time. 114. Even if the ET had allowed the whistleblowing claim to proceed it would have failed because C provided no evidence of the alleged protected disclosure, being an alleged email from C to Ankita Kumar dated 26 September 2023. Further, she gave inconsistent reasons for not being able to produce a copy, including that she could not locate it in her papers and that the email was deleted at the time it was sent. The ET was not persuaded by these explanations that the email existed and therefore did not consider that there had been a protected disclosure. The constructive unfair dismissal claim 115. Of the remaining claim for constructive unfair dismissal, no time points were raised by the Respondents and the ET saw no time issues so this claim proceeded. 116. We set out our findings in relation to the constructive unfair dismissal claim as follows. 117. Regarding the issue at paragraph 23(a) above, the allegation of the practice not having a leasehold to the premises, the Respondents acknowledge that when the practice transferred to them on 15 August 2023, the lease was not yet assigned. The Respondents’ explanation is that it was agreed in principle that they would take the lease but negotiations over the lease had not concluded when C resigned. 16 118. We find this to be the most plausible explanation given that the practice was able to operate from the premises and there was no evidence before us that this presented any issue with the landlord. Indeed we struggled to understand the relevance of this issue to C’s claim, which seemed to the ET only to be relevant to C as the wife of the former owner of the GP practice, but not as an employee of the Respondent, and therefore irrelevant to the term of trust and confidence as between employer and employee. Even if there was relevance, we do not see how this could amount to a breach of the implied term as we did not consider there to be anything untoward in the delay in resolving the lease assignment as the delay arose from ongoing negotiations. 119. Regarding the issue at paragraph 23 (b) above, the allegation of C being referred to as a “liar and dishonest” and being accused of not managing the practice professionally, AN says he was relaying concerns raised by a Primary Care Nurse (PCN) who had worked at the Respondent. Those concerns were then set out in an email from Jenny Gorasia from the Integrated Care Board on 18 August 2023 (p619) following a meeting on 17 August 2023. We were shown an explanation given by AN to the Claimant by email dated 18 September 2023 (p650) which supports AN’s explanation. 120. We therefore find as fact that AN did relate concerns that had been raised by a PCN that called into question C’s honesty and management of the practice, but we do not find that AN accused C of being a liar and dishonest or of not managing the practice professionally. Furthermore, we consider that AN had reasonable and proper cause for sharing these concerns with C given their seriousness and that they could lead to a CQC inspection in the near future (p632) and that steps needed to be taken to rectify the identified issues, in conjunction with C. 121. Regarding the issue at paragraph 23 (c) above, the appointment of Ankita Kumar, AN said he needed to hire her as a financial controller and care coordinator (p13 of his witness statement) to help address concerns raised in the ICB meeting on 17 August 2023. Indeed C at the time thought this was a good idea - p650 email dated 18 September 2023 between AN and C: We have agreed that the best way forward would be for Ankita to deal with external agencies and the finances of the practice. This is to help protect you and to help reduce your workload. Ankita will also be helping to prepare the practice for its next CQC inspection”. The Claimant wrote next to this: “I totally agree with you”. 122. Given the concerns about the running of the practice we consider the Respondents had reasonable and proper cause for hiring Ankita Kumar, and furthermore, did so with the agreement of C at the time. We do not therefore consider this to have breached the implied term of trust and confidence. 123. Regarding the issue at paragraph 23 (d) above, the allegation that staff HR folders were locked away from C and access to PCSE financial 17 statements were blocked, AN said in his witness statement at pages 17-19, and confirmed in oral evidence, that access to the HR folders and PCSE access was restricted in relation to C and other members’ of staff at the same time. 124. He said that the HR folders needed to be relocated from C’s room as that was a locked room and the partners needed access to them to review them. He said that staff members were also patients, creating a conflict of interest between management, staff and patients, and that the HR files needed to be audited by new hires who were not patients and therefore conflicted. The audit was needed because there were insufficient records of staff having had the correct training which the ICB said needed to be dealt with urgently and the partners needed access to the folders to ensure the deficiencies were addressed. 125. In relation to the PCSE access, AN’s evidence was that multiple staff members had access but without evidence they had completed the necessary NHS Information Governance Framework training which is a mandatory requirement. We were told that there was also no coherent or organized approach to the management of confidential information so access had to be blocked to ensure the practice was complying with the law. Access was suspended for all staff at the same time. 126. We were shown no evidence by C to undermine these explanations and considered the Respondents to have reasonable and proper cause for taking these steps. We do not therefore consider this to have breached the implied term of trust and confidence. 127. Regarding the issue at paragraph 23 (e) above, the allegation that AN on 4 December 2023, emailed the Claimant asking her to remove herself from the premises otherwise he would suspend her, in cross examination C clarified that the date of the email was in fact 8 December 2023 at 14.14 (772). 128. We do not consider that this clarification alters the fundamental issue which was the allegation that AN was refusing to allow C to return to work until she had an adequate fit note from the doctor and all of the arguments put forward by the Respondents contend with this issue. 129. Indeed, this issue is well set out in the pleadings and referred to in Cs witness statement. Looking at C's further and better particulars of claim, paragraph 35 on page 113, C wrote “On 4 December 2023, the Claimant returned to work following sickness absence. The Second Respondent saw the Claimant at reception and consequently emailed the Claimant stating she should remain unfit for work indefinitely and on that basis she should remove herself from the premises immediately, and not to return to work or undertake any work-related activities otherwise he would seek to block her access to the practice's EMIS (healthcare computers). He requested that the client [sic] gain a note from her GP to confirm that he [sic] was fit to work. ” 130. C’s Final Amended WS dated 2 April 2026 at paragraphs 30 and 31 states “I was signed off sick from 24 November 2023 to 4 December 2023 18 due to work-related stress. Upon my return the Respondent questioned my presence at work and sent emails instructing me to leave the premises, despite my GP confirming I was fit to return.” 131. AN’s evidence was that prior to this email, C had been signed off sick for work a number of times in September to December 2023 and AN said despite this she had attended work with AN having to ask C to stay at home if she was unwell (p668 and 699). 132. We were taken to a number of fit notes leading up to the 8 December email which recorded as follows: a. A note dated 10 October 2023 records stress at work, that the claimant may be able to work taking account of the following advice: “altered hours – cannot work evening”. This would be the case “indefinitely”. b. A note dated 15 November 2023 stating work related stress, not fit for work for two weeks from 15 November 2023 to 28 November 2023. c. A note dated 24 November 2023 stating work related stress, not fit for work for 11 days from 24 November 2023 to 4 December 2023. 133. We note here that the ‘not fit for work’ period ended on 4 December 2023 meaning that on expiry of that period C was fit to work. 134. On 7 December 2023 at 3.37pm AN emailed C asking her to stay off work until she had a letter from her GP saying she was fit to return to work. 135. Later that same day C emailed AN back at 5:23pm stating that she did not need a fit note as she was only signed off until 4 December 2023. We note that C was correct in this regard given the document referred to at 132(c) above. 136. At 9.22am on 8 December 2023, AN replied stating: “Yes if you can obtain a letter or note from the GP to confirm that they are happy to say that you are fit for work. Until you have this then please assume that you should not be on site and should not undertake any work”. 137. At 11:18am that day C provided a further fit note. The note in question appears at p4 of tab 2.6 of the witness statement bundle. It states that: “work related stress resolved” you may be fit for work taking account of the following advice: “was able to resume work from 4th of December”. This will be the case “indefinitely”. 19 138. AN replied at 14:14 that same day (p773) stating: “Dear Mrs Wasu Thank you for the note. The note is not clear. It could mean that you were fit to work on the 4th December but after that date you remain unfit for work. You remain unfit to work ‘indefinitely’. On the [sic] basis, you should leave the building immediately and go home. You must not return to work or undertake any work related activity. If this is correct then I will seek to suspend your access to EMIS and the practice. If this is not correct then your GP will need to provide a separate letter to confirm that in their opinion you are fit to work. Until we have the later [sic] you must stop all work and stay at home.” 139. We do not accept AN’s explanation at the time, as set out in his email, or in the hearing when he reiterated this explanation. In our view the fit note was clear in stating that the work related stress had resolved and that C was fit to work from 4 December. 140. Nonetheless, in the event C obtained a further note from her doctor (p482), dated 8 December 2023 which stated: “She had a telephone consultation with me on 1st of December 2023 and as per my consultation, Mrs Wasu was advised to resume her work duties should she feels [sic] better by 4 December 2023. Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me”. 141. When Mrs Wasu provided this to AN by email dated 8 December 2023, at 14:43, he replied at 15:04: “Dear Mrs Wasu Thank you for your email. I am seeking to look after you which is the reason and discharge my duty of care towards you and that was why I trying to see if your GP thinks you are in good health to work. I noted that your GP has not said that you were fit to work. Are you able to ask your GP to prepare a letter to simply confirm that you fit to remain to continue work in your current role. This should not be a complicated or difficult process. However, if your GP is resistant to confirming that you are fit to work then please let me know.” 142. Mrs Wasu replied later that day by email at 16:13 (p774): “Dear Dr Nizamuddin My doctor’s note state clearly that in his opinion I am fit for work if I feel fine, which I do. It seems to me, that you are clutching at strasw and I suggest you refer your concerns directly to my GP, as he would confirm you requests. I can assure you that I am fine provided I receive no more harassment from you such as removing more of my access and telling me 20 you will suspend me if I don’t leave the premises. How on earth is this trying to help me?...” 143. Having considered this exchange we are not persuaded by the witness evidence of AN that he was unclear whether C had been confirmed as fit to return to work. We consider that objectively it was clear that C’s doctor had confirmed her as fit to return to work and that, even with AN’s purported duty of care in mind and C’s past history of coming into work when unwell, it was unreasonable for AN not to accept the evidence C had provided and to continue insisting on further evidence. The Respondents therefore lacked reasonable and proper cause to continue to insist on the provision of fit notes before C could return to work. 144. We consider that this insistence and refusal to accept the medical evidence provided by C and not to allow her to return to work was likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between C and the Respondents, given that being able to attend work goes to the heart of the employment relationship. 145. It is clear from the subsequent resignation letter that C resigned in response to this breach given that her resignation occurred the same day as the provision of fit notes set out above, and because C expressly referred to the fit note issue in her resignation letter (p481): “With regards to my fit note you have been emailing me since 09:22 until last email at 15:04 which is classified as harassment. I am also officially giving you my resignation as Practice Manager and giving the notice required of one month starting 11th December 2023. I feel obliged to let you know that during the time of being in your employment, I have been bullied and harassed by you, both at work and at home with constant emails giving me tasks to complete even whilst on sick leave…” 146. Whilst there are numerous other reasons given in the resignation for her letter, the proximity of the letter to the fit note issue and the express reference to the fit note issue as “harassment” leads us to conclude the resignation was in response to the fit note issue. 147. It is our finding that C did not affirm the contract before resigning which took place immediately following the breach and no arguments were put forward by Counsel in this regard. We further note that for the purpose of constructive dismissal under s95(1) that an employee is entitled to terminate the employment with or without notice in circumstances in which the employee is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct. We therefore do not consider that C giving 1 month’s notice of the termination of her employment, affects our conclusion that C did not affirm the contract. 148. The respondents have referred to “misconduct” as the potentially fair reason for dismissal in their amended response (p132) but we do not 21 consider the circumstances of the repudiatory breach can sustain this; misconduct was simply not something raised by the respondents in the email exchanges concerning fit notes which led up to C’s resignation, and no arguments were put forward by counsel at the hearing to advance this position. 149. As such we do not consider there was a potentially fair reason, nor that the Respondents acted reasonably in all the circumstances, and therefore we find that the dismissal was unfair. 150. Regarding the issue at paragraph 23 (f) above, the allegation that the Second Respondent accused C of not releasing funds to pay staff, our finding is that AN did raise this issue with C because a member of staff had raised a concern with him that she was not going to get paid. However, we note that C accepted in cross examination that she was in control of the bank account out of which salaries were being paid and considered that she only needed to pay her “own staff” (i.e. those she had employed before the practice was acquired by AN and his practice partner). As such we consider AN had reasonable and proper cause to articulate his concern about funds being released by C to pay staff. We do not therefore consider this to have breached the implied term of trust and confidence. 151. Finally, regarding the issue at paragraph 23 (g) above, the allegation the Claimant was not paid her salary by the First Respondent, rather she was asked to take her pay from her husband’s bank account, C confirmed in her witness evidence (paragraph 35 of her 2 April 2026 witness statement) that she was in control of the bank account into which funds were paid by the NHS to the surgery following its acquisition by AN and his practice partner. We were also shown bank statements that set out the payments C made to herself from her husband’s bank account. So whilst we accept that C was not paid her salary by the First Respondent and that she was asked to take her pay from her husband’s bank account, such request had reasonable and proper cause given the financial arrangements in place at the time. We do not therefore consider this to have breached the implied term of trust and confidence. Conclusion 152. The claimant’s claim that she suffered a detriment for making a protected disclosure was presented out of time and is therefore dismissed. 153. The claimant’s claim for age discrimination was presented out of time and is therefore dismissed. 154. The claimant’s claim for sex discrimination was presented out of time and is therefore dismissed. 155. The claimant’s complaint of constructive unfair dismissal is well founded and succeeds. Remedy 156. Remedy will be dealt with at a separate remedy hearing. 22 Approved by: Employment Judge Partington 26 October 2026 JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 28 October 2026 FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written full reasons for judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s). If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be foundhere: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/