Ms A Robinson v Middlesex Learning Trust: 3322927/2021
Employment Tribunal
Published on 15 October 2025, 16:17
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
disability-discrimination
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2025-07-13
Change History
-
Remedy
-
Reserved Judgment
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No 3322927/2021
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant Respondent
v
Ms A Robinson Middlesex Learning Trust
Heard at: Watford (by CVP) On: 8 January 2024
Before: Employment Judge Cowen
Appearances
For the Claimant: Ms Robinson (in person)
For the Respondent: Mr Starceric (counsel)
RESERVED JUDGMENT
1. The Claimant was disabled by reason of back pain and migraines between
March 2020 and 31 August 2021.
2. No order for costs will be made in relation to the Claimant’s failure to
provide disclosure.
REASONS
Background
1. Apologies are provided to both parties with regard to the delay in providing
this decision.
2. The purpose of the Preliminary Hearing was to consider whether the Claimant
was disabled within s.6 Equality Act 2010 at the time of the alleged
discriminatory acts.
3. A further issue emerged at the hearing with regard to the fact that the
Claimant had been asked by the Respondent on 28 November 2023 and
ordered by the Tribunal on 3 January 2024 to provide clean copies of the
documents she relied upon. The Claimant had failed to do so. It transpired
that the bundle for this hearing had been sent to the Claimant only 1 working
day prior to the hearing, due to this problem with the documents.
Case No 3322927/2021
4. Although he initially raised the issue of postponement, the Respondent’s
counsel indicated that he was able to proceed with the hearing and did not
therefore press for a postponement. The Tribunal indicated it was content to
disregard any highlighting or comments on documents. The Respondent
asserted that it would be proper to mark the Claimant’s actions by a costs
order.
5. The postponement and costs applications were dealt with as a preliminary
issue to the hearing. Submissions from both sides were heard. It was decided
having taken into account the position of both sides, that the hearing would
not be postponed as it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, nor
would an ‘unless order’ be made as this would not be necessary or helpful.
The issue of whether to award the Respondent costs was left to the end of the
hearing, in order that the Tribunal could assess for itself whether the failure to
provide clean copies had been prejudicial to the fair hearing of this preliminary
hearing.
6. The parties discussed the period of disability which the claim refers to. They
agreed that the first act of discrimination referred to in the ET1 occurred in
November 2020 (rejection of UPR application). The last act is dismissal which
occurred on 31 August 2021. The material period is therefore Nov 2020 to 31
Augst 2021.
7. The Claimant asserted that she was disabled by way of her physical
impairments;
a. Migraines, and
b. Back pain.
8. The Claimant provided an impact statement dated 10 August 2022 and a
further statement dated 19 October 2023 which were both contained in the
bundle. The Claimant also gave oral evidence and was cross examined by Mr
Starceric.
9. The bundle was in two parts A and B and ran to over 700 pages in total.
The Facts
9. Having considered all the evidence, I find the following facts on a balance of
probabilities.
10. The parties will note that not all the matters that they told me about are recorded
in these findings of fact. That is because I have limited them to points that are
relevant to the legal issues.
Case No 3322927/2021
11. The Claimant worked for the Respondent as a teacher at their school known as
Southgate Academy between 1 September 2020 and 31 August 2021.
12. In preparation for the position as a teacher of Design Technology, the Claimant
filled in a pre-employment health questionnaire dated 6 June 2020. She indicated
on this form that she had had 33 days off sick in the last 12 months and that she
had been off work for more than a month for medical reasons. She provided the
detail that she was off work from 25 February 2019 to 19 July 2019 with “Chronic
Daily Migraine”. The Claimant also referenced this on a tick box list of ailments.
She indicated at that time that she had “currently no medication”. Amongst the
other conditions which the Claimant declared, she also indicated that she had
“recurring sciatica”. She provided the detail that she had been bedridden on 3
occasions with this.
Migraine
13. The Claimant suffers from chronic daily migraines. These are headaches which
are a dull, all-over throbbing pain in the head and stabbing pains through the
eyes, face and neck These fluctuate in intensity and the extent to which they
debilitate the Claimant varies. They interrupt her ability to look at screens, read
or even move around. Activities such as cooking, map and timetable reading are
difficult. The symptoms tend to respond to medication and the Claimant is then
able to continue with her day. If the Claimant did not take medication she would
be in pain throughout the day. She does not believe that she could have a period
of functioning without the medication.
14. She also suffers from episodic attacks, during which she has to lie down and
cannot proceed with her day at all.
15. The Claimant described that these migraines have a global impact on her life,
including her ability to look after her children, to socialise and to go on holiday.
The pain she suffers also has an impact on her mood and thus on her
relationships.
16. The medical evidence produced by the Claimant included a report written by her
consultant neurosurgeon Professor Goadsby at King’s College Hospital London,
dated 15 March 2023 indicates that the Claimant’s condition is within the most
disabled (for which I read effected) group of people. She had suffered from such
migraines from at least 10 December 2019 when she first was consulted at king’s
College Hospital.
17. His report was written retrospectively about the Claimant as she was in 2020-
2021, given that this was the relevant period of time for the claim. It is appropriate
that the report should reflect the Claimant’s status at that time.
18. The emails between the Claimant and Professor Goadsby in March 2020 with
regard to the trans cranial machine indicate that the Claimant had constant pain,
Case No 3322927/2021
every day at that time.
19. The Claimant also kept a migraine diary at that time, which indicated that she
was suffering on the majority of days in March and April 2021. Even on the days
she did not have a headache, she often felt washed out and hungover as a result
of a previous headache. She was having to take medication almost every day.
Back pain
20. The Claimant’s significant back pain started in March 2020 with severe sciatica.
She had previously had periods of pain, particularly after sports injuries. From
March 2020, the Claimant found that she was in pain but was able to move with
it. This deteriorated by June 2020 when she struggled to walk and to sit down
and was reliant on strong painkillers. She also suffered from a ‘drop foot’ which
caused her to trip over. She was not able to push a trolley in a supermarket and
struggled to lift her toddler son and to bend to change his nappy. The Claimant
became anxious and avoided going out. She was reliant on medications to be
able to move around, but these caused significant side effects.
21. This condition worsened by October/November 2020 she spent a period where
she could not leave the house, having to lie flat for most of the day. She was
unable to wash herself or look after her son.
22. After she underwent nerve decompression in November 2020 she had to lie flat
for a period of about 6 weeks. Thereafter she continued to have lower back pain,
loss of sensation in her foot and sciatica.
23. The report by Mr Michael Mokawem FRCS, a Consultant Spinal Surgeon dated
18 November 2021 indicates that the Claimant underwent discectomy on 4
November 2020 and again on 24 November 2020. He indicates that the Claimant
remains in pain and has problems standing up from a lying down position in
November 2021.
24. The Respondent’s Occupational Health report dated 5 October 2020 indicated
that the Claimant had problems with the activities of daily living being
‘substantially reduced’.
THE LAW
22. Disability
22.1. Section 6(1) Equality Act 2010 (EqA) states:
“A person (P) has a disability if—
P has a physical or mental impairment, and
the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on
P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.”
22.2. Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the EqA ;
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“Long-term effects
The effect of an impairment is long-term if—
a. it has lasted for at least 12 months,
b. it is likely to last for at least 12 months, or
c. it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected.
If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person's
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, it is to be treated as
continuing to have that effect if that effect is likely to recur.
…
Effect of medical treatment
An impairment is to be treated as having a substantial adverse effect on the
ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-to-day activities if—
a. measures are being taken to treat or correct it, and
b. but for that, it would be likely to have that effect.
“Measures” includes, in particular, medical treatment and the use of a
prosthesis or other aid.”
23. ‘Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating
to the definition of disability’ (2011) (‘the Guidance’) sets out:-
“that anything which occurs after the date of the discriminatory act will not be
relevant to the consideration of definition of disability.”
24. The time at which the Tribunal is to consider the disability is the date of the
alleged act of discrimination. This is also the relevant date when considering
whether any impact is long term. All Answers Ltd v W 2021 IRLR 612, CA, set
out that the Tribunal must look at the facts and circumstances existing at the date
of the discrimination and not to events which occurred subsequently.
25. The Tribunal must take into account Statutory Guidance on the definition of
Disability (2011) which stresses that it is important to consider the things that a
person cannot do, or can only do with difficulty (B9). This is not offset by things
that the person can do: Aderemi v London and South Eastern Railway Ltd
2013 ICR 391. Day to day activities are things people do on a regular or daily
basis such as shopping, reading, watching TV, getting washed and dressed,
preparing food, walking, travelling and social activities. This includes work related
activities such as interacting with colleagues, using a computer, driving, keeping
to a timetable etc ( Guidance D2 – D7)
26. In Paterson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] IRLR 763,
Elias J said:''… when assessing the effect, the comparison is not with the
population at large. As paragraphs A2 and A3 [of the then Guidance] make clear,
what is required is to compare the difference between the way in which the
individual in fact carries out the activity in question and how he would carry it out
Case No 3322927/2021
if not impaired.”
27. To consider whether a condition meets the definition in the Equality Act, it must
exist or be likely to exist for 12 months. The Tribunal should consider SCA
Packaging Limited v Boyle [2009] ICR 1056, HL; which says that whether
something is ‘likely’ is to be considered as to whether it could well happen.
Information known at the time can be taken into consideration, but hindsight
should not be used.
30. The burden of proving disability lies with the Claimant who must provide
evidence of circumstances which fall within s.6 Equality Act 2010. Each disability
must be considered independently.
Decision
31. The Claimant asserts that she has two separate impairments under s.6 Equality
Act 2010. The first is back pain. This is a physical pain which causes limitation of
the Claimant’s ability to carry out certain tasks, or to limit her ability to move
around. Pain also has a psychological impact in that the Claimant felt that she
could not go out of the house, socialise with others and was tired and irritable.
These are impairments in the sense that they impact on one’s ability to do
normal day to day activities.
32. Secondly, the Claimant asserts that she suffers from migraines. These are
severe headaches, which also cause an inability to carry on with normal day to
day activities, along with the pain which is suffered. This too would amount to an
impairment if the evidence supports that the criteria of s.6 EqA are met.
Back pain
33. The Claimant’s evidence shows that prior to March 2020 her back pain was
intermittent and mostly related to sports injuries. However, from approximately
March 2020 onwards she started to experience more significant and intrusive
pain. The Claimant was open and honest in her pre-employment questionnaire
In June 2020 about her previous back pain when she said she had ‘recurring
sciatica’.
34. Unfortunately, this condition deteriorated, due to its nature as a degenerative
condition. By October/November 2020 the Claimant was severely restricted by
her back pain. She was not able to leave the house, go shopping, push her
child’s pram, or lift him and needed help at home to deal with tasks there.
Despite surgery in November 2020, her restrictions continued to some degree up
to 31 August 2021 when her contract was terminated. At that time she still could
not carry or move shopping or her child and was not able to drive.
35. The tasks outlined above are all day to day activities. I am satisfied that the
Claimant has shown that she was substantially affected by her disability with
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regard to these activities.
36. With regard to the time period, I conclude that although she had suffered
intermittently prior to March 2020 from back pain, it was in March 2020 that the
pain related to the degenerative condition started to have a significant impact on
her life. The evidence shows that those restrictions continued, even after the
Claimant’s surgeries in November 2020. By March 2021 she continued to have
stiffness in her back and the restrictions on her ability to shop and to care for her
child and to drive remained. This was a period of 12 months from the first
indication of pain in the back which was disruptive to day to day activities.
37. Even if I am wrong on the Claimant having had 12 months of impairment as a
result of back pain by March 2021, it was clear that she continued to have
significant restriction on her day to day activities at that time. I am satisfied that
it was possible, on a balance of probabilities, to say that it was likely that her
pain and restriction would continue for a period of 12 months, or more. The result
of the surgery had not been to cure the pain and this is what led to the restriction
in activity.
38. I am therefore satisfied that the Claimant was disabled for the purposes of the
Equality Act with regard to her back pain between November 2020 and 31
August 2021.
Migraine
39. The Claimant has suffered with chronic daily migraines since childhood. They
involve a throbbing pain in the head and neck, stabbing pains in the eyes and a
sensitivity to light, sounds, smells and movement.
40. The Claimant described the activities which are affected by her migraines;
including looking at screens, reading, language processing, decision making,
map reading. She asserted that it affects her memory and concentration. It also
affects her ability to hold a conversation and causes brain fog. All of these are
daily activities. It would appear from the evidence given by the Claimant that the
adverse effect on her was severe. The Claimant was absent from work as a
result of the migraines.
41. In August 2019, the Claimant was suffering from headaches which were lasting
several days and described as severe exacerbations.
42. In March 2020 she was suffering from pain everyday which was affecting her
ability to carry out day to day tasks such as reading, cooking and screen work.
These are day to day activities and the repetitive nature of her pain indicates a
substantial affect. The Claimant referred to some episodes where she could not
continue to function and had to lie down.
43. In May 2021 the Claimant wrote that her headaches were “more broken up”,
indicating that the severity fluctuated throughout the day. The Claimant believed
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that this was due to the new medication she had been prescribed. She continued
to experience substantial effects on her day to day activities and requested that
the Respondent obtain a further Occupational health report about her. No such
report was made and therefore the evidence is not up to date on that basis.
44. I am satisfied that the effects of the migraines were substantial and effected the
Claimant on a regular basis throughout the relevant period of November 2020 to
31 August 2021.
45. I therefore conclude that the Claimant was disabled within the meaning of s.6
Equality Act 2010 with regard to both her back pain and her migraine, during the
relevant period.
46. The Claimant’s claims in respect of disability discrimination shall therefore be
allowed to proceed.
Costs
47. Having considered the evidence in the bundles provided to me, I do not consider
that the Tribunal’s ability to consider the issue of disability has been
compromised by the provision of documents which have been annotated.
48. The Respondent is correct to assert that the documents to be placed before the
Tribunal should be ‘clean copies’ unannotated and free from any comment.
However, I also take into account the fact that the Claimant is a litigant and
person and not familiar with the process of disclosure.
49. On this occasion, I do not consider it appropriate to make any costs order in
respect of the Claimant’s failure to provide ‘clean copies’ of documents.
However, she must be aware that in future, any documents provided to the
Tribunal must be free of any markings or writing.
Employment Judge Cowen
Date___4 April 2024_______
JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
5 April 2024
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Public access to employment tribunal decisions
Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at
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and respondent(s) in a case.
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Case Number: 3322927/2021
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Miss Annika Fay Robinson
Respondent: Middlesex Learning Trust
Heard at: Watford Employment Tribunal On: 7 July 2025 - 11 July 2025
Before: Employment Judge Partington, S Wellings, L Hoey.
Representation
Claimant: In person
Respondent: Mr Starcevic, Counsel
RESERVED JUDGMENT
1. The complaint that the Claimant’s employment contract was not renewed due
to sickness absence related to her back condition was presented within the
applicable time limit and will therefore proceed.
2. Save in relation to the complaints that:
a. the Respondent failed to notify the Claimant that her employment
contract was not being renewed,
b. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had “let [her] colleagues down and
[her] students down” by being absent from work, and
c. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had caused her colleagues “a lot of
stress”,
all of the other complaints brought by the Claimant are continuing acts of
discrimination culminating in the complaint that the Claimant’s contract was
not renewed and are therefore presented within the applicable time limit and
will therefore proceed.
3. The Claimant’s complaints that:
a. the Respondent failed to notify the Claimant that her employment
contract was not being renewed,
b. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had “let [her] colleagues down and
[her] students down” by being absent from work, and
c. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had caused her colleagues “a lot of
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stress”,
were not presented within the applicable time limit, but it is just and equitable
to extend the time limit. All of these complaints will therefore proceed.
4. The Claimant’s complaints of unfavourable treatment arising from disability
under s15 Equality Act 2010 are well-founded and succeed in respect of:
a. The Claimant’s complaint that her employment contract was not
renewed due to sickness absence related to her back condition;
b. The Claimant’s complaint that the Respondent failed to notify her that
her employment contract was not being renewed;
c. The Respondent failing to make an Occupational Health referral in
relation to the Claimant’s migraine when one was requested by the
Claimant on 24 June 2021.
5. The remainder of the Claimant’s complaints of unfavourable treatment arising
from disability under s15 Equality Act 2010 are not well-founded and are
dismissed.
6. The Claimant’s complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments under
s20 and s21 Equality Act 2010 are not well-founded and are dismissed.
7. The Claimant’s complaints of harassment related to disability under s26
Equality Act 2010 are well-founded and succeed in respect of:
a. Arranging for six people to be present at the 18 June 2021 meeting on
behalf of the respondent;
b. Paul Ferrie stating that the Claimant had “let [her] colleagues down and
[her] students down” by being absent from work.
c. Martin Lavelle stating in the meeting that it “would be easy to be
cynical in that [C’s] return to work from her back operation coincided
with when she was due to go to half pay and that she returned to work
for a few days before going off with ill health again”.
8. The remainder of C’s complaints of harassment are not well-founded and are
dismissed.
REASONS
Preliminary matters
9. The evidence before the Employment Tribunal (ET) comprised of a 730 page
bundle. At the start of the hearing the Claimant requested an additional 56
pages be added to the bundle to which Respondent’s Counsel (Counsel)
agreed, save for page 16 which related to ACAS discussions and was
therefore removed from the bundle on the grounds that it touched on ‘without
prejudice’ discussions.
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10. The Claimant also asked to submit a revised witness statement which she
said was only ready today because of delays in agreeing the bundle with the
Respondent’s solicitors. She said it built on the original impact statement
which, until that point, had served as her witness statement. Counsel
contended that the Claimant should be kept to her original statement and be
allowed to make an oral statement at the start of her cross examination. The
ET decided to allow the updated witness statement on the grounds the
original statement was an “impact statement” and the ET would need to see
the claimant’s witness statement and the Respondent would have 2 hours to
read it while the Tribunal panel read into the documents.
11. The parties confirmed the list of issues were agreed.
12. In addition to the claimant’s witness statement there were the following
witness statements for the Respondent:
- Jane Theobald (JT), PA to Headteacher, HR & office manager.
- James Broadwell (JB), Deputy Head.
- Pauline Parchment (PP), the Claimant’s line manager and Head of DT
department.
- Martin Lavelle (ML) - Headteacher.
- Paul Ferrie (PF) - Senior deputy Head.
Claims
13. The claimant brings the following claims against the Respondent;
a. Discrimination arising from disability (section 15, Equality Act 2010)
b. Reasonable Adjustments (sections 20 & 21, Equality Act 2010)
c. Harassment related to disability (section 26, Equality Act 2010)
Disabilities
14. At a preliminary hearing on 8 January 2024 the ET determined that the
Claimant was disabled by reason of back pain and migraines between March
2020 and 31 August 2021.
Issues
15. The agreed list of issues are as follows.
Time limits
16. Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early
conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 13 July
2021 may not have been brought in time.
17. Were the complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality
Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide:
a. Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early
conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?
b. If not, was there conduct extending over a period?
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c. If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus
early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?
d. If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal
thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:
i. Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?
ii. In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to
extend time?
Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)
18. Did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably by:
a. Failing to renew her employment contract (the contract came to an end
on 31 August 2021 – the claimant’s case is that the contract was not
renewed due to her sickness absence related to her back condition);
b. Failing to properly notify the claimant that her employment contract
was not being renewed (the claimant’s case is that an email was sent
to her work address that she did not pick up as she on sickness
absence and a letter was sent to her old address);
c. Rejecting her Upper Pay Range (‘UPR) application in November 2020
(the claimant’s case is that due to her sickness absence she was not
able to obtain documents that were required as part of the application –
in particular, she did not obtain a recommendation from her previous
employer);
d. Commencing a formal attendance management process (the
claimant’s case is that no formal process should have begun as her
absences were related to her disability);
e. Conducting a formal attendance management meeting on 18 June
2021 whilst the claimant was on long-term sick leave (the claimant’s
case is that if the policy applied at all there should have been an
informal meeting before the formal process commenced).
f. Failing to make an Occupational Health referral in relation to the
claimant’s migraine when one was requested by the claimant on 24
June 2021.
g. The manner in which the 18 June 2021 meeting was conducted as set
out at paragraph 6.1 below.
19. Did the following things arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability:
a. The need for the claimant to be absent from work (sickness absence)
b. The claimant’s need to have Occupational Health referral.
20. Was the unfavourable treatment because of any of those things?
21. Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The
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respondent says that its aims were:
a. Staff being capable of demonstrating satisfactory attendance;
b. Efficient use of resources.
22. The Tribunal will decide in particular:
a. was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to
achieve those aims;
b. could something less discriminatory have been done instead;
c. how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be
balanced?
23. Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know
that the claimant had the disability? From what date?
Reasonable Adjustments (Equality Act 2010 sections 20 & 21)
24. Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know
that the claimant had the disability? From what date?
25. A “PCP” is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the
following PCPs:
a. A policy of placing the onus on new employees to obtain
recommendations from previous employers as part of the process of
applying for a pay rise (a UPR application);
b. Not pausing the UPR application process if an employee is on sick
leave;
c. Conducting attendance management meetings when employees are
absent on sick leave.
d. Not making Occupational Health referrals when a request is made
close to the end of term.
26. Did the PCPs put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to
someone without the claimant’s disability, in that:
a. the claimant was more likely to be absent due to sickness than
someone who did not have her disabilities and so the claimant would
be less able to comply with the need to provide documentation as part
of the UPR application process;
b. for the same reason the claimant was at greater risk of being subject to
the attendance management procedures; and,
c. the claimant was more likely to need the assistance of Occupational
Health.
27. Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know
that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?
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28. What steps could have been taken to avoid the disadvantage? The claimant
suggests:
a. The respondent contacting her previous employer themselves to obtain
a recommendation as part of the UPR application process;
b. The respondent pausing the UPR process until the claimant was able
to obtain the recommendation herself;
c. Relaxing the requirements of the attendance management process in
relation to disability-related absences;
d. Not conducting attendance management meetings whilst the claimant
was absent on sick leave; and,
e. Making Occupational Health referrals irrespective of the proximity until
the end of term.
29. Was it reasonable for the respondent to have to take those steps and when?
30. Did the respondent fail to take those steps?
Harassment related to disability (Equality Act 2010 section 26)
31. Did the respondent do the following things:
a. Conducted an attendance management meeting on 18 June 2021
whilst the claimant was on long-term sickness absence;
b. Arranged for six people to be present at the 18 June 2021 meeting on
behalf of the respondent as opposed to only the Headteacher (Mr
Lavelle) being present as provided for by the respondent’s attendance
management policy.
c. Mr Ferrie stating that the claimant had “let [her] colleagues down and
[her] students down” by being absent from work”.
d. Mr Ferrie stating at the meeting that the claimant had caused her
colleagues “a lot of stress”.
e. Mr Lavelle stating in the meeting that he was “cynical” about the timing
of the claimant’s return to work in April 2021 and its link to her sick pay
being halved.
32. If so, was that unwanted conduct?
33. Did it relate to disability?
34. Law
35. I am grateful to Counsel for setting out relevant law in his submissions and
which I utilise below as appropriate, with additional references where relevant.
Time Limits
36. By s 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA” or “the Act”), claims to the ET
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under the Act may not be brought after the end of the period of 3 months
starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates or such other
period as the ET thinks just and equitable. That period of three months is
subject to provisions which extend it to take account of the mandatory early
conciliation involving ACAS. Also, s 123(3) of the Act provides that conduct
extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period.
37. The practical effect of all those provisions in this case is that any complaint
about an act done before 13 July 2021 would be out of time unless (i) it was
part of conduct extending over a period which ended on or after that date or
(ii) the ET thought it was just and equitable to extend time.
38. A distinction is drawn between a continuing act (i.e. a policy, rule, scheme,
regime or practice that continues to be applied) and a one-off act that has
merely continuing consequences. But in Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis v Hendricks 2003 ICR 530, the Court of Appeal said that ‘policy,
rule, scheme, regime or practice’ should not be treated as a complete
statement of what amounts to a continuing act; the focus should be on the
substance of the complaint. This was approved in Aziz v FDA 2010 EWCA
Civ 304, where the Court noted that, in considering whether separate
incidents form part of an act extending over a period, one relevant but not
conclusive factor is whether the same or different individuals were involved in
those incidents.
39. There is no requirement that the ‘conduct’ extending over a period for the
purpose of S.123(3) must all relate to the same protected characteristic.
Similarly, there is no reason why conduct extending over a period cannot
involve a number of different types of prohibited conduct, such as a mixture of
harassment and direct discrimination. It may be more difficult to establish that
there has been discriminatory conduct extending over a period where the acts
that are said to be linked relate to different protected characteristics and
different types of prohibited conduct, but there is no absolute bar.
(Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust v Allen [2024] EAT 40, para 13)
40. Unproven or non-discriminatory acts cannot be relied on as conduct
extending over a period (South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation
Trust v King 2020 IRLR 168; Lyfar-Cisse v Brighton and Sussex University
Hospitals NHS Trust and ors EAT 0100/19).
41. So far as the discretion to extend time is concerned, it has been said that the
exercise of the discretion is the exception not the rule (Robertson v Bexley
Community Centre t/a Leisure Link 2003 IRLR 434). But an extension does
not require exceptional circumstances. In exercising the discretion a Tribunal
may (not must) have regard to the checklist contained in S.33 of the Limitation
Act 1980, as modified by the EAT in British Coal Corporation v Keeble and
ors 1997 IRLR 336 which sets out the factors for the tribunal to weigh up
includes considering the prejudice that each party would suffer as a result of
the decision reached and have regard to all the circumstances of the case, in
particular: the length of, and reasons for, the delay; the extent to which the
cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; the extent to
which the respondent has cooperated with any requests for information; the
promptness with which the claimant acted once he or she knew of the facts
giving rise to the complaint; and the steps taken by the claimant to obtain
appropriate advice once he or she knew of the possibility of taking action.
8
Discrimination Arising from Disability
42. By s 15 EqA:
(1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if—
(a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's
disability, and
(b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a
legitimate aim.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not
reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.
43. As Langstaff J explained in Basildon and Thurrock NHS Foundation Trust v
Weerasinghe 2016 ICR 305, two separate causative steps need to be
established for a claim to succeed under s 15:
a. the disability had the consequence of “something”, and
b. the claimant was treated unfavourably because of that something.
44. Langstaff J said it did not matter in which order the tribunal approaches these
two steps.
45. In Pnaiser v NHS England and anor 2016 IRLR 170, EAT, Mrs Justice Simler
summarised a number of key points that govern the correct approach to a
S.15 claim:
a. The tribunal must first identify whether there was unfavourable
treatment and by whom.
b. It must then determine what caused the impugned treatment, or what
was the reason for it, focusing on the conscious or unconscious
thought processes of the alleged discriminator. There may be more
than one reason or cause for the impugned treatment and, as in a
direct discrimination case, the ‘something’ need not be the main or sole
reason for the unfavourable treatment but must have at least a
significant (or more than trivial) influence so as to amount to an
effective reason for or cause of it.
c. Motives are irrelevant. The focus of this part of the enquiry is on the
reason or cause of the impugned treatment and A's motive in acting as
he or she did is simply irrelevant: see Nagarajan v London Regional
Transport [1999] IRLR 572. A discriminatory motive is emphatically not
(and never has been) a core consideration before any prima facie case
of discrimination arises, contrary to Miss Jeram's submission (for
example at paragraph 17 of her Skeleton).
d. The Tribunal must determine whether the reason/cause (or, if more
than one), a reason or cause, is “something arising in consequence of
B's disability”. That expression ‘arising in consequence of’ could
describe a range of causal links. Having regard to the legislative history
of section 15 of the Act (described comprehensively by Elisabeth Laing
9
J in Hall ), the statutory 1 purpose which appears from the wording of
section 15 , namely to provide protection in cases where the
consequence or effects of a disability lead to unfavourable treatment,
and the availability of a justification defence, the causal link between
the something that causes unfavourable treatment and the disability
may include more than one link. In other words, more than one
relevant consequence of the disability may require consideration, and it
will be a question of fact assessed robustly in each case whether
something can properly be said to arise in consequence of disability.
e. For example, in Land Registry v Houghton UKEAT/0149/14 a bonus
payment was refused by A because B had a warning. The warning was
given for absence by a different manager. The absence arose from
disability. The Tribunal and HHJ Clark in the EAT had no difficulty in
concluding that the statutory test was met. However, the more links in
the chain there are between the disability and the reason for the
impugned treatment, the harder it is likely to be to establish the
requisite connection as a matter of fact.
f. This stage of the causation test involves an objective question and
does not depend on the thought processes of the alleged
discriminator.
g. Miss Jeram argued that “a subjective approach infects the whole of
section 15 ” by virtue of the requirement of knowledge in section 15(2)
so that there must be, as she put it, ‘discriminatory motivation’ and the
alleged discriminator must know that the ‘something’ that causes the
treatment arises in consequence of disability. She relied on paragraphs
26 to 34 of Weerasinghe as supporting this approach, but in my
judgment those paragraphs read properly do not support her
submission, and indeed paragraph 34 highlights the difference
between the two stages — the ‘because of’ stage involving A's
explanation for the treatment (and conscious or unconscious reasons
for it) and the ‘something arising in consequence’ stage involving
consideration of whether (as a matter of fact rather than belief) the
‘something’ was a consequence of the disability.
h. Moreover, the statutory language of section 15(2) makes clear (as Miss
Jeram accepts) that the knowledge required is of the disability only,
and does not extend to a requirement of knowledge that the
‘something’ leading to the unfavourable treatment is a consequence of
the disability. Had this been required the statute would have said so.
Moreover, the effect of section 15 would be substantially restricted on
Miss Jeram's construction, and there would be little or no difference
between a direct disability discrimination claim under section 13 and a
discrimination arising from disability claim under section 15 .
i. As Langstaff P held in Weerasinghe, it does not matter precisely in
which order these questions are addressed. Depending on the facts, a
Tribunal might ask why A treated the claimant in the unfavourable way
alleged in order to answer the question whether it was because of
“something arising in consequence of the claimant's disability”.
j. Alternatively, it might ask whether the disability has a particular
10
consequence for a claimant that leads to ‘something’ that caused the
unfavourable treatment.
46. The importance of looking into the mind of the putative discriminator when the
test is “because of” was emphasised by the CA in Dunn v Secretary of State
for Prisons [2018] EWCA Civ 1998 at para.18: “Because of”. It is a condition
of liability for disability discrimination both under section 13 and under section
15 that the complainant should have been treated in the manner complained
because of either (under section 13) his or her disability or (under section 15)
the “something” which arises in consequence of that disability. That will
typically, though not invariably, involve establishing (with the benefit of section
136 if required) that the disability, or the relevant related factor, operated on
the mind of the putative discriminator, as part of his or her conscious or
unconscious “mental processes”. Establishing an employer’s “motivation” (as
it is often put – NB that this is not in this context the same as “motive”) is of
course a familiar exercise in discrimination law generally. The most recent
authoritative exposition is in the judgments of the majority in the Supreme
Court in R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 AC 728:
see in particular per Lady Hale at paras. 62-64 (pp. 759-760).
47. Indeed, Mrs Justice Simler returned to the question of the causative link
required under S.15 in Sheikholeslami v University of Edinburgh 2018 IRLR
1090, EAT, where she stated that: ‘On causation, the approach to S.15… is
now well established... In short, this provision requires an investigation of two
distinct causative issues:
a. did A treat B unfavourably because of an (identified) something? and
b. did that something arise in consequence of B’s disability?
48. The first issue involves an examination of the putative discriminator’s state of
mind to determine what consciously or unconsciously was the reason for any
unfavourable treatment found.
49. If the “something” was a more than trivial part of the reason for unfavourable
treatment then stage (i) is satisfied.
50. The second issue is a question of objective fact for an employment tribunal to
decide in light of the evidence.’
51. The critical question is whether the ‘something’ arose “in ‘consequence of’
(rather than being caused by) the disability… This is a looser connection that
might involve more than one link in the chain of consequences.
52. The respondent will have a defence if it can show either of the things set out
in ss (1)(b) or (2).
53. To be proportionate the unfavourable treatment has to be both an appropriate
means of achieving the legitimate aim and a reasonably necessary means of
doing so, see Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2012] UKSC 15.
This is a balancing exercise for the ET of the reasonable needs of the
business against the discriminatory effect of R’s actions, see Department of
Work & Pensions v Boyers [2022] EAT 76. It is relevant to consider whether
or not a lesser measure could have achieved R’s legitimate aim (Naeem v
Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27). The ET should consider
11
whether the measure taken was proportionate by reference to the time the
unfavourable treatment was applied rather than in hindsight (Trustees of
Swansea University Pension Scheme v Williams UKEAT/0415/14 not
challenged in later CA and SC decisions in the case).
54. Cost alone will not provide a justification for discriminatory
treatment Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust 2011 ICR 143, EAT and
Heskett v Secretary of State for Justice 2021 ICR 110, CA, in which Lord
Justice Underhill stated that ‘the essential question is whether the employer’s
aim in acting in the way that gives rise to the discriminatory impact can fairly
be described as no more than a wish to save costs. If so, the defence of
justification cannot succeed. But, if not, it will be necessary to arrive at a fair
characterisation of the employer’s aim taken as a whole and decide whether
that aim is legitimate. The distinction involved may sometimes be subtle… but
it is real’.
55. An employer has a defence to a claim of discrimination arising from disability
if it did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that
the claimant had a disability – S.15(2) EqA.
56. Knowledge, both actual and constructive is knowledge of the facts that made
C disabled or which caused the substantial disadvantage, see Gallop v
Newport City Council [2014] IRLR 211 CA.
57. Counsel refers to the legal principles in relation to knowledge in a s.15 EqA
claim summarised by the EAT in A Ltd v Z [2020] ICR 199 para.23: “(1) There
need only be actual or constructive knowledge as to the disability itself, not
the causal link between the disability and its consequent effects which led to
the unfavourable treatment, see York City Council v Grosset [2018] ICR 1492
CA at paragraph 39.
58. The Respondent need not have constructive knowledge of the complainant's
diagnosis to satisfy the requirements of section 15(2); it is, however, for the
employer to show that it was unreasonable for it to be expected to know that a
person (a) suffered an impediment to his physical or mental health, or (b) that
that impairment had a substantial and (c) long-term effect, see Donelien v
Liberata UK Ltd UKEAT/0297/14 at paragraph 5, per Langstaff P, and also
see Pnaiser v NHS England & Anor [2016] IRLR 170 EAT at paragraph 69
per Simler J.
59. The question of reasonableness is one of fact and evaluation, see Donelien v
Liberata UK Ltd [2018] IRLR 535 CA at paragraph 27; nonetheless, such
assessments must be adequately and coherently reasoned and must take
into account all relevant factors and not take into account those that are
irrelevant.
60. When assessing the question of constructive knowledge, an employee's
representations as to the cause of absence or disability related symptoms can
be of importance: (i) because, in asking whether the employee has suffered
substantial adverse effect, a reaction to life events may fall short of the
definition of disability for EqA purposes (see Herry v Dudley Metropolitan
Council [2017] ICR 610, per His Honour Judge Richardson, citing J v DLA
Piper UK LLP [2010] ICR 1052, and (ii) because, without knowing the likely
cause of a given impairment, “it becomes much more difficult to know whether
12
it may well last for more than 12 months, if it is not [already done so]”, per
Langstaff P in Donelien EAT at paragraph 31.
61. The approach adopted to answering the question thus posed by section 15(2)
is to be informed by the Code [the Equality and Human Rights Commission
Employment Statutory Code of Practice], which (relevantly) provides as
follows: “5.14 It is not enough for the employer to show that they did not know
that the disabled person had the disability. They must also show that they
could not reasonably have been expected to know about it. Employers should
consider whether a worker has a disability even where one has not been
formally disclosed, as, for example, not all workers who meet the definition of
disability may think of themselves as a ‘disabled person’.
62. An employer must do all they can reasonably be expected to do to find out if
a worker has a disability. What is reasonable will depend on the
circumstances. This is an objective assessment. When making enquiries
about disability, employers should consider issues of dignity and privacy and
ensure that personal information is dealt with confidentially.”
63. It is not incumbent upon an employer to make every enquiry where there is
little or no basis for doing so (Ridout v TC Group [1998] IRLR 628; SoS for
Work and Pensions v Alam [2010] ICR 665).
64. Reasonableness, for the purposes of section 15(2), must entail a balance
between the strictures of making enquiries, the likelihood of such enquiries
yielding results and the dignity and privacy of the employee, as recognised by
the Code.”
65. The Code also suggests that ‘[e]mployers should consider whether a worker
has a disability even where one has not been formally disclosed, as, for
example, not all workers who meet the definition of disability may think of
themselves as a “disabled person”’ – para 5.14.
66. The Code also makes the important point that knowledge of a disability held
by an employer’s agent or employee – such as an occupational health
adviser, personnel officer or recruitment agent – will usually be imputed to the
employer (see para 5.17).
67. In Gallop v Newport City Council 2014 IRLR 211, CA the Court emphasised that
the issue is whether the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the
facts constituting the claimant’s disability: it does not matter whether the
employer comprehends that these facts amount, as a matter of law, to a
disability. The employer cannot, therefore, deny relevant knowledge by relying
on its unquestioning adoption of occupational health advice. Instead, it must
make its own factual judgement as to whether the employee is disabled.
Reasonable Adjustments
68. The requirements of the duty to make reasonable adjustments are set out in
s20 EqA and, by s 21, a failure to comply with the duty amounts to
discrimination.
69. The duty applies where a “provision, criterion or practice” (“PCP”) puts a
disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter
in comparison with persons who are not disabled.
13
70. The disadvantage must be linked to the disability.
71. The duty is to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the
disadvantage. “Substantial” means “more than minor or trivial” (s 212 EqA).
72. The employer is not subject to the duty if it shows that it did not know, and
could not reasonably be expected to know, that the person had a disability
and was likely to be placed at the relevant disadvantage (Sch 8 Para 20
EqA).
73. Counsel referred us to guidance on the approach to s.20 EqA that was given
by the EAT in Environment Agency v Rowan [2008] IRLR 20 and RBS v
Ashton [2011] ICR 632 in which Langstaff J said:
'[. . .] an Employment tribunal considering a claim that an employer has
discriminated against an employee pursuant to Section 3A(2) of the Act by
failing to comply with Section 4A duty must identify:
(a) the provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an
employer, or
(b) the physical feature of premises occupied by the employer . . . .
(c) the identity of non-disabled comparators (where appropriate) and
(d) the nature and extent of the substantial disadvantage suffered by
the Claimant.'
74. Later in the same paragraph the tribunal continues to say 'in our opinion an
Employment Tribunal cannot properly make findings of a failure to make
reasonable adjustments under Sections 3A(2) and 4A(1) without going
through that process. Unless the Employment Tribunal has identified the four
matters we have set out above . . .'.
We interpose to say that of course it is not in every case that all four matters
need to be identified but certainly what must be identified is (a) and (d).”
“…Thus, so far as reasonable adjustment is concerned, the focus of the
tribunal is, and both advocates before us agree, an objective one. The focus
is upon the practical result of the measures which can be taken. It is not – and
it is an error – for the focus to be upon the process of reasoning by which a
possible adjustment was considered. As the cases indicate, and as a careful
reading of the statute would show, it is irrelevant to consider the employer's
thought processes or other processes leading to the making or failure to make
a reasonable adjustment. It is an adjustment which objectively is reasonable,
not one for the making of which, or the failure to make which, the employer
had (or did not have) good reasons.”
75. The guidance was approved by the Court of Appeal in Newham Sixth Form
College v Sanders [2014] EWCA.
76. The concept of a “provision, criterion or practice” is not defined in the Act and
should be given a broad meaning and includes both formal and informal
practices (Lamb v The Business Academy Bexley UKEAT 2015), but is not
wide enough to include one off decisions which are not part of a usual or
14
informal practice (Ishola v TFL [2020] EWCA Civ 112).
77. C must be placed at a substantial disadvantage and “substantial” means
something more than minor or trivial (s.212(1) EqA). This is a comparative
exercise and C must be at a substantial disadvantage compared to others
who do not have the disability. This is not the same as the comparator in a
direct or indirect discrimination claim (Griffiths v Secretary of State for Work
and Pensions [2015] EWCA Civ 1265).
78. The reason for the substantial disadvantage from the PCP must be connected
with C’s disability (Hilaire v Luton BC [2022] EAT 166).
79. A failure to consider whether or what adjustments to make is not itself a
breach of the duty under s.20 (Tarbuck v Sainsbury Supermarkets
UKEAT/0136/06). Obtaining a medical report could not itself be a reasonable
adjustment because it simply assists in considering what adjustment if any to
make and will not itself alleviate any disadvantage (Spence v Intype Libra
UKEAT/0617/06).
80. The EHRC Code sets out factors that may be taken into account in deciding
whether an adjustment contended for is reasonable or not and the first factor
is whether the adjustment will be effective in preventing the disadvantage
(para.6.28 Code). It is not the case that the adjustment must be guaranteed or
reasonably certain to eliminate or reduce the disadvantage, but the prospect
of it doing so is a factor to be taken into account. Elias J said in Griffiths v
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] EWCA Civ 1265:
"... So far as efficacy is concerned, it may be that it is not clear whether the
step proposed will be effective or not. It may still be reasonable to take the
step notwithstanding that success is not guaranteed: the uncertainty is one of
the factors to weigh up when assessing the question of reasonableness"
Harrassment
81. S.39(2) EqA defines prohibited conduct that may be relied upon by
employees in bringing a claim in the ET and it includes “(d) subjecting B to
any other detriment”. The effect of s.212(1) EqA, which provides that
“detriment” does not include conduct that amounts to harassment is that if R’s
conduct in the meeting on 18.6.21 amounted to harassment it cannot also
amount to discrimination under s.15.
82. “Unwanted conduct” means unwelcome or uninvited, see Reed v Stedman
[1999] IRLR 299 and EHRC Code para.7.8.
83. The meaning of “related to” is wider than the concept of “because of” used
elsewhere in the EqA and the ET must make clear findings of the impugned
conduct and how it relates to the protected characteristic (Windsor Clive
Primary Achool v Forsbrook [2024] EAT 123.
84. The ET must consider whether the conduct has the purpose or effect of
violating C’s dignity etc. In this regard the EAT has stated that there are
boundaries to what may amount to harassment see Richmond Pharmacology
v Dhaliwal [2009] IRLR 316:
'We accept that not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may
15
constitute the violation of a person's dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated
by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should
have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important
that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by
racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on
other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred),
it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the
imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase. We accept
that the facts here may have been close to the borderline, as the Tribunal
indeed indicated by the size of its award.
85. Further, the section imports an objective test as to whether the impugned
conduct had the harassing effect and both subjective effect on C and the
objective test must be satisfied (Pemberton v Inwood [2018] EWCA Civ 564).
The ET in assessing the objective test should take into account the context,
see Greasley Adams v Royal Mail [2023] ICR 1031 e.g. where comments
came to light in the course of an investigation.
Facts
86. We find the following facts on the balance of probabilities. Where we have
needed to resolve disputed facts we make that clear. We have not made
findings on every fact presented to us, but merely on those which assist us to
come to a decision bearing in mind the list of issues. Page references are to
pages in the bundle unless prefixed by initials in which case they are
paragraph references in the relevant witness statement.
87. We refer to the Claimant as “C” and the Respondent as “R”. The other initials
are set out in the preliminary matters section above.
88. In the lead up to C’s employment by R, on 18 May 2020 JT wrote to C to
say:
“As we are in unprecedented times and we cannot see candidates teach, if
you are successful during the video interview you will in the first instance be
offered a fixed term contract of either 6 or 12 months dependent on how your
interview went. We will of course aim to see you teach as soon as possible
once we returned to school and would then be in a position subject to your
lesson to be able to offer you a permanent contract.”
89. On 21 May 2020 R sent C an offer letter for a 12 month fixed term contract
(FTC) starting 1 September 2020. That letter stated that “This is a temporary
appointment pending the recruitment of a permanent post holder... The
Academy does not guarantee any employment subsequent to the termination
of this appointment”.
90. On 1 September 2020 C’s employment began. She was employed in R’s
Design Technology department (DT) as Second in Charge. There is some
debate as to whether the contract was technically a FTC given it was
expressed to be terminable on notice, but the ET finding is that all parties
viewed the contract as for a fixed term between 1 September 2020 and 31
August 2021, and therefore C was considered by all involved to be in a
different category from permanent members of staff.
91. On 22 September 2020 C had her first referral to Occupational Health (OH)
16
due to sciatica (p227).
92. On 24 September 2020 C put in her Upper Pay Range (UPR) application
form (pp139 - 190) which, if successful would result in a pay rise.
93. On 5 October the OH report was sent (pp238 – 240).
94. On 6 October 2020 C took sickness absence due to Covid (p242).
95. On 15 October 2020 C provided a fit note to R for absence due to sciatica for
the period 15 October 2020 to 29 October 2020 (p252).
96. On 2 November 2020 R informed C by letter that she was unsuccessful in her
UPR application (p138 and 205).
97. C says the school should have obtained a recommendation from her previous
employer but did not.
98. We find as fact that JT did try to contact the Claimant’s previous employer by
phone on 2 occasions and left a message with the headteacher’s PA to call
back, as reflected in JT’s w/s (para 14) and bundle (pp195/196/197) and note
that C concedes this (C/30).
99. We also find as fact that the previous employer did not return the call and that
is not contested.
100. On 4 November 2020 C underwent surgical discectomy (405).
101. On 13 November 2020 C provided a fit note to R for absence for recovery
from spinal surgery (258).
102. On 31 December 2020 C provided a fit note to R for absence for recovery
from spinal surgery (p259).
103. On 18 January 2021 R undertook a curriculum review which was led by
JB (p207-208). At that meeting it was decided not to renew C’s contract of
employment when the FTC came to an end.
104. R says that the reason for the failure to renew the contract was a change
in curriculum reducing the teaching hours for DT (ML/56 - 58); (JB/11-13).
The decision was taken at a review meeting on 18 January 2021, which, says
ML (para 54) and JB (para 9) in their witness evidence, is when the
curriculum for the next academic year is usually planned and at a stage when
C had been absent only since October.
105. The meeting minutes at page 208 refer to this (‘replace the 2i/c element of
her role internally’), and confirm that R would not be recruiting for a new
teacher in place of the Claimant given the reduction in hours taught. This
decision to reduce the hours of teaching in Design and Technology was made
to allow for additional time for students in Maths and English, due to the
pressure to approve progress eight scores, as there is in all Schools.
106. Additionally, student numbers opting to study DT at GCSE level (Key
Stage Four) were relatively small. Alongside the reduction to Key Stage 3
hours, the Trust did not need more staff members in the department. (MB/57
17
and 58).
107. Any outstanding hours previously covered by the Claimant which
remained on the new timetable were to be absorbed by the existing staff
within the department and the Claimant’s Teaching and Learning
Responsibility (TLR) position as second in Technology, would be fulfilled by
an existing staff member. The TLR position involved no additional teaching
hours for the person who absorbed this aspect of her role (MB60; JB.15).
108. In cross examination JB further clarified that it was because C was still on
a fixed term contract that her contract was identified as the one that would not
be renewed. Those on permanent contracts were not in consideration for
possible termination of employment.
109. ML further confirmed in cross-examination that it would be too time
consuming to consider a redundancy exercise and that in effect it was most
logical not to renew C’s contract given that she was the only relevant member
of staff on a FTC.
110. R says that as a result it was decided C’s contract would not be renewed
and that it had always been clear that the Claimant’s appointment was a fixed
term contract, and there was no guarantee that a permanent position would
become available (MB/59).
111. We find as fact that ML, as headmaster, was the ultimate decision maker
regarding staffing requirements and the decision not to renew C’s contract,
notwithstanding R’s position that the decision was one made collectively by
the Senior Leadership Team in that meeting.
112. In cross-examination, C invited MB and JL to explain why a colleague of
hers, Alistair Williams, who was initially recruited by R as an agency worker,
had been put on a permanent contract. The explanation provided was that his
role was to replace a different member of staff (Donna Kenyon) from the staff
member C had been recruited to replace, he had started as a temp in April
2020, was considered to be a strong candidate, and had been offered a
permanent role in October 2020 to come into effect in September 2021. JT in
her cross-examination explained the reason for such a long lead time was
because it reduced the fee due to the agency if that person continued to be
employed by the agency before joining R as a permanent hire, which was
corroborated by ML.
113. C thought it suspicious that the temporary colleague had been offered a
permanent role so soon before the decision was taken not to renew her
contract and thought that his appointment had been orchestrated so that there
would not be a role left for her and that the non-renewal of her contract had
thereby been engineered.
114. We find R’s explanation as to why the temporary worker was recruited in
the way that he was to be plausible given that it reflects industry practice
regarding temp-to-perm fees and it is understandable that R would want to
retain the person they had brought into replace the member of staff who had
left by securing them onto a permanent contract but timed in a way to
minimise the agency fee.
115. However, we do not accept R’s contention that C was hired on the basis
18
that her permanent employment was subject to a further review in January
2021. It is clear from the email to her of 18 May 2020 that it was envisaged
that C was to be put onto a permanent contract if she succeeded in her
teaching observation. There was no suggestion in this email that her
permanent employment was to be the subject of an assessment in January
2021. If, as R says, this was the norm, then it could have made this clear in
the 18 May email, but it did not. Further we were not taken to any documents
that suggested C’s permanent appointment would be subject to the January
2021 review.
116. In addition, ML in cross-examination conceded that the increased focus
on English and Maths were not new pressures. In our view these pressures
would have been known at the point of recruiting R in May 2020.
117. R relies on the contract referred to above that such appointment carried
no guarantee of a permanent role because of the statement “The Academy
does not guarantee any employment subsequent to the termination of this
appointment”. However, these words are preceded by the statement “This is a
temporary appointment pending the recruitment of a permanent post
holder...”. When read with the email of 18 May 2020, the clear intention of R
was to recruit someone into a permanent role, subject to a successful
teaching observation, in line with R’s recruitment approach adopted during
Covid.
118. As already noted, C was then off work because of her back from 15
October 2021 to 31 March 2021. As a consequence there was no opportunity
for the teaching observation to occur which, in cross-examination, ML
confirmed could have taken place in that first term and that there was no
reason to think that C would have been unsuccessful in securing a permanent
contract. This is supported by the evidence of PP in cross-examination who
also attested to C’s competence in the time she had worked with C.
119. We note that ML in cross-examination stated that while this may have
been the case, any decision to offer a permanent role would have been
subject to the January 2021 review. However, as we have already noted
above, there was no documentary evidence provided to support this alleged
process and the statement is at odds with the written communications we
refer to above.
120. Therefore the ET finds as fact, that were it not for C’s sickness absence
due to her back pain, it is probable that she would have succeeded in
obtaining a permanent role, in which case she would not have been
automatically selected for termination of employment in January 2021 when
her role was identified as the one to be cut because she was the only
employee on a fixed term contract.
121. When ML was asked in cross-examination whether he had considered a
redundancy exercise to fairly identify which staff member should not be
retained, ML rejected that possibility out of hand as it involved far too much
time and effort as it would require additional work such as the creation of a
business plan and that he had not considered that to be an option.
122. We now deal with R’s factual contention that it did not have knowledge of
C’s disability. In support of this, R states that C’s fit note at p259 gave the
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reason for absence as recovering from surgery to 31 March 2021. The OH
report of 5 October 2020 at p238 does not contemplate surgery but does
prognose recovery with treatment. R says that as a result of this, at the time
of the decision on 18 January 2021 the information suggested that C’s
absence would be coming to an end. ML also points in his witness statement
to the pre-employment responses where C does not disclose disability as
further reasons not to suspect she was disabled.
123. C also pointed us to the OH report at p238 dated 5 October 2020 which
states:
“It is difficult to be clear whether Annika’s condition will fall under the remit of
the Act at present, if the pain and other symptoms were to continue until
February 2021 the condition would fall under the remit of the Act. My view is
that without treatment her condition could continue for that length of time.”
124. She also drew our attention to the fit note at p259 which states that C will
be off until 31 March 2021. This was forwarded to Martin Lavelle on 8 Jan
2021 (p264). She also cited her pre-employment questionnaire (p112) that
refers to recurring sciatica and three instances of being bed bound by back
injury.
125. Counsel states at para 7.5 of his closing submissions that:
Upon receipt of the OH report dated 5.10.20 R had knowledge of the
impairment of back pain and that it was having a substantial effect on her
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities but not that the condition was
long term. Even the OH clinician could not say as much in the report, only that
the without treatment condition “could” last until February 2021 in which case
it would fall under the EqA. The Fit Notes submitted by C disclose that she
was under treatment and recovering from surgery (p258-259). Such surgery
could alleviate the condition. It is submitted that R could not reasonably have
been expected to know that the condition was long term until it received the
Fit Note dated 31.12.20 stating that C will be unfit for work until 31.3.21
126. We agree. Mr Lavelle, saw from the OH report he received on 5 October
2020 (ML/39) that it stated “It is difficult to be clear whether Annika’s condition
will fall under the remit of the Act at present, if the pain and other symptoms
were to continue until February 2021 the condition would fall under the remit
of the Act”. Together with the fit note confirmation that he received on 8 Jan
2021, that C was going to be off until 31 March 2021 recovering from surgery,
it was likely that her “pain and other symptoms” would be continuing until
February 2021, and that therefore as stated in the report, “the condition would
fall under the remit of the Act”.
127. On 22 January 2021 C was sent an email informing her that her contract
would not be renewed after August 2021 (p209).
128. On 1 February 2021 C was sent a letter confirming that C’s appointment
will terminate on 31 August 2021 (p211).
129. In cross-examination C says that she did not receive this letter until 11
March 2021 because the school sent the letter to her work email address
rather than her personal email address, and she was not using her work email
address while off sick, and the hardcopy was sent to her old home address.
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130. JT says in her witness statement (JT/20) that throughout her period of
absence, when she received correspondence from the Claimant, she
communicated both from her work email address and also replying to emails
sent to her work email using her personal email address. She says the
Claimant did not direct her, nor the Trust, to use a specific email address,
such as her personal account, to correspond with her.
131. When JT was asked in cross-examination if she could have checked with
C the best email address to contact her during her sickness absence, JT
conceded she could have but did not.
132. JT went on to say that “The letter was sent to the address we had on file
for the Claimant, which was the only address that we had confirmed as her
current address at the time that the letter was sent [page 131]” (JT/24).
133. We find as fact that the home address on the school’s system was the
claimant’s old address and that the claimant did not specifically tell the school
her new address; rather, in her evidence, the Claimant relied on evidence that
the school should have inferred her new address from references such as
needing to update HMRC with her new address and the school should have
pro-actively checked the claimant’s updated address before sending her the
letter (C/37).
134. We find as fact that JT sent the letter to C’s work email address only,
given JT concedes this, and that C only became aware of the letter on 11
March 2021 as she conceded in cross-examination, when she logged into her
work email and as reflected in a WhatsApp message with PP (p730)
confirming she had just seen some emails from JT “about her contract sent in
January”. We do not find she would have seen this email sooner because the
email correspondence we were shown in the bundle was consistent with C’s
contention that she only responded to earlier emails from R that were sent
both to her work and personal email address.
135. On 23 February 2021 ML met with PP to discuss the curriculum change to
DT and related staffing changes (p212).
136. On 17 March 2021 there is a further OH referral (p271).
137. On 31 March 21 there is a further OH report (p278) stating:
“In my opinion, it is likely that [C’s]:
- Back Condition
- Migraines
- Anxiety and Depression
Are all likely to fall under the remit of the [Equality] Act [2010].”
138. On 19 April 2021 C was on a Return to Work (RTW) on a phased basis.
There was an informal RTW meeting with JT (JT/27; ML/87).
139. C contends no informal meeting took place before the formal absence
meeting took place, however we find that an informal meeting did take place
which was the meeting on 19 April 2021. The absence policy notes that
“informal attendance monitoring will take the form of return to work meetings”
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(p78).
140. On 4 May 2021 C started sickness absence due to migraines. C provided
a fit note for the period 4 May 2021 to 18 May 2021 (p295).
141. On 17 May 2021 C was sent a letter inviting her to stage 1 sickness
absence meeting on 27 May 2021, which was later postponed (p302).
142. On 25 May 2021 C provided another fit note due to migraine for the period
19 May 2021 to 20 July 2021.
143. On 18 June 2021 the Stage 1 sickness absence meeting took place
(p335) which was while the claimant was on long term sickness absence.
144. The claimant contends there were 6 people at the meeting which is not
contested. They were ML, PF, C, a union rep, John Sear (HR Business
Partner) and JT (minute taker). We find as fact that, save for ML, the claimant
was not told who would be at the meeting beforehand as the invitation to the
meeting did not explain that.
145. We find as fact that at the meeting PF stated to C that “Both students and
colleagues have suffered as a result of [C’s] absence.” That is stated in the
meeting minutes (335). We also find that PF stated that C had “let her
colleague and the students down” as the Claimant picked out this specific
phrase in her follow up email (p338) and it is similar in tone and expression to
the statement recorded in the minutes. We do not find that PF said C had
caused her colleagues “a lot of stress” as this was not picked up by C in her
follow up email and is only mentioned much later when formal proceedings
have started.
146. We find as fact that ML stated “that it would be easy to be cynical in that
[C’s] return to work from her back operation coincided with when she was due
to go to half pay and that she returned to work for a few days before going off
with ill health again” as that is stated in the minutes (p335) given that it closely
mirrors what is set out in paragraph 4.1.5 of the List of Issues (p45).
147. On 24 June 2021 C sought an OH referral regarding her migraines (p355
and 357). In the email from C to JT seeking the OH referral C stated “Dr Lubin
may have some suggestions about reasonable adjustments that could be
made”.
148. On 5 July 2021 R emailed C to say that it would not be facilitating an OH
assessment (p364) because the purpose of such report is to help R
understand what reasonable adjustments would be needed to help C return
but as a planned phased return was not possible the costs of the OH referral
could not be approved.
149. On 16 August 2021 C provided a further fit note for migraine, for the period
20 July 2021 to 31 August 2021.
150. On 23 August 2021 C put in a data subject access request (p372).
151. On 31 August 2021 C’s contract ended.
152. On 12 October 2021 ACAS conciliation began (6).
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153. On 22 October 2021 ACAS conciliation completed (6).
154. On 17 November 2021 C’s ET1 was submitted (7).
Application of the law to the facts
Time limits
155. The Tribunal finds that only in relation to the alleged failure to renew C’s
contract on 31 August 2021 was the claim made to the Tribunal within three
months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint
relates as all the other complaints occurred prior to 13 July 2021 and are out
of time.
156. In considering whether there was conduct extending over a period, the ET
notes the contentions in paragraph 10 of Counsel’s closing submissions, in
particular at para 11 where it is stated:
“The ET must decide whether any of these are conduct extending over a
period. The UPR application is entirely discrete and of a different type to the
others. The failure to notify is also historic and an act of an entirely different
character to later conduct.”
157. For her part, C said in cross examination that all of the treatment she
experienced came into focus following the stage 1 absence meeting on 18
June 2021 following which she saw all of the preceding acts as arising from
C’s discriminatory attitude towards her. Further, owing to her continuing ill
health, which is well evidenced in the bundle, she was unable to bring a claim
earlier than when she did.
158. We find that the overall theme of C’s complaints is that R did not recognise
her as disabled and therefore did not treat her in accordance with the Equality
Act and that looked at through that lens, and that the same individual, ML,
was the decision maker in relation to the UPR, the formal attendance
management process, the decision not to make an occupational health
referral, that there is a continuing act culminating in the non-renewal of the
claimant’s contract on 31 August 2021, in relation to which the claimant’s
claim was brought in time. We therefore find all of those claims to be in time
as the result of being a continuing act.
159. Those acts complained of in which ML did not play a decisive role, namely
the sending of the notification that the contract was not being renewed, which
was carried out by JT, and the allegations of harassment by PF, was not a
continuing act.
160. However, regarding all of the acts complained of, whether continuing or
not, we find that the reason C did not bring claims earlier is because she only
came to view her treatment as discriminatory following the stage 1 attendance
meeting on 18 June 2021 but owing to ongoing health issues that are well
documented in the bundle, whereby C was signed off as not fit for work with
migraines since that date until the end of her employment on 31 August 2021
(see p311 and 370), and continued after that date (p391, 397), could not start
proceedings earlier than when she did.
161. We have weighed the prejudice that each party would suffer and have had
23
regard to all the circumstances of the case. Were we not to exercise our
discretion to extend time it would clearly prejudice C’s ability to bring a
substantial number of her claims; in contrast, given the relatively short period
of time that the claimant was employed by R and the limited period of time
during which the ‘out of time’ acts complained of occurred, and that R has
access to relevant witnesses and documents throughout that period, the
relative prejudice to R in being able to respond to the claims is relatively
minor. Further, the reasons for the delay which include the claimant’s later
realisation that her treatment was potentially discriminatory and her ill health,
that posed an obstacle to her bringing a claim sooner than she did, means we
find that it is just and equitable in all of the circumstances to extend time.
Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)
Did R treat C unfavourably?
162. R concedes that the non-renewal of C’s employment contract can amount
to unfavourable treatment, and we agree given that it had the effect of
terminating C’s employment with R.
163. We find that failing to properly notify C that her contract was not being
renewed can amount to unfavourable treatment as an employee can expect
to be properly notified of such an event, and, as we have found as a matter of
fact, C was not properly notified at the time because R did not send the
relevant letter to her current address or personal email and therefore C did
not pick up the letter until 11 March 2021, some 2 months after the decision
had been taken.
164. We find that rejecting the Claimant’s UPR application can amount to
unfavourable treatment as it resulted in C not getting a pay increase.
165. We find that commencing a formal attendance management process does
not amount to unfavourable treatment as this was a legitimate option available
to R to attempt to manage C’s absence in the context of her significant
absence over the relevant school year.
166. We find conducting an informal management meeting that C had agreed
to attend, even when on long term sick leave, does not amount to unfavorable
treatment for the reasons above.
167. We find that failing to make an OH referral can amount to unfavourable
treatment because it is denying C access to a benefit in which she had a
legitimate interest given her disabilities. The OH referral C sought on 24 June
2021 related to her migraines.
168. In relation to the manner in which the 18 June 2021 meeting was
conducted as set out in the harassment section of the List of Issue (see
paragraph 31(b) to (e) above), as will be seen below, we find the issues at
paragraphs 31(b), (d) and (e) to be well founded as a result of which C is
precluded from advancing these claims under s15 Equality Act 2010 by virtue
of s212 Equality Act 2010 as an act of harassment cannot also be a detriment
and unfavourable treatment under s15 Equality Act is a detriment.
169. In relation to the complaint at paragraph 31(c) our finding of fact was that
this did not occur.
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Did the following things arise in consequence of C’s disability?
170. We find that both the need for C to be absent from work (sickness
absence) and C’s need to have an Occupational Health referral arose from
C’s disabilities. It is clear on the facts that C’s absences were caused by her
back pain and migraines as evidenced in her fit notes. Further, the OH
referrals were in relation to her disabilities. The OH referral C sought on 24
June 2021 related to her migraines.
Was the unfavourable treatment because of any of those things?
171. Regarding the non-renewal of C’s employment contract we find that this
was because of the claimant’s absence. That is because, as we have found
as fact, it was made clear to C that her permanent employment was subject to
a satisfactory teaching observation which was intended to take place soon
after she joined the school. It was not subject to any other conditions, in
particular, it was not subject to an assessment of staffing needs in January
2021. All of the evidence we saw suggested C would meet the requirements
of that observation and R conceded that it was probable she would. The only
reason that staffing observation did not happen was because C was absent
owing to her disability. We therefore find there to be a direct link between C’s
absence, which precluded the teaching observation, the consequence of
which resulted in C not being made a permanent member of staff before
January 2021.
172. In turn, the consequence of that was at the point staffing needs were
assessed in January 2021, C was the only relevant employee on a FTC and
therefore, as JB confirmed in his evidence, it was C’s employment that was
terminated at the end of the school year in light of the staffing requirements.
No other employees were considered for having their employment terminated
because they were permanent members of staff.
173. We do not find that failure to post the letter confirming the end of C’s
contract to C’s new address arose because of her absence or need for OH
referral. We find that arose because C did not expressly notify R of her new
address.
174. In contrast we do find that R’s failure to send the letter to her personal
email address was a result of her absence, because R knew that C was not in
work (whereas the correct home address of C was not made expressly clear
to R) and as a result this could prevent her from accessing her work emails,
particularly given that email correspondence from C to R during this period
was from C’s personal email address.
175. We do not find R’s rejection of C’s UPR application was because of her
absence or need for OH referral. The UPR rejection was because ML had
found, based on the evidence provided by C, that C had not demonstrated the
required standard for UPR. We find that it was open to ML to form this view
based on the evidence he had before him. We do not see that C’s absence
played a part here given C was able to provide the evidence she submitted,
which was duly considered by JT. Further, R had made attempts to obtain a
reference from C’s previous employer but the previous employer had not
provided that reference. That was not a result of C’s absence (or need for an
OH referral), rather it was an omission by her previous employer.
25
176. In relation to R’s decision to commence and conduct a formal attendance
management process, we have already found those not to be unfavourable
treatment for someone with high levels of absence. Though for completeness,
we note that those steps arose as a result of C’s absence.
177. In relation to failing to make an OH referral, R’s contention is that the OH
referral was not pursued because an OH appointment could not be obtained
before 12 July 2021 and C’s contract was expiring on 31 August 2021 and
was not going to be renewed and therefore there was no utility in obtaining an
OH referral which was for the purpose of assisting C’s return to work, and that
these reasons were not because of something arising from C’s
disabilities. However, as we have already found that C’s contract was
expiring on 31 August 2021 as a result of her absence, it follows that this
decision not to make the OH referral, was a result of her absence.
Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?
178. In relation to R’s decision not to renew C’s contract, we find that this was
not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim for the following
reasons. R says that it had to operate to a budget with efficient use of staff
and staff costs e.g. salaries and that given the genuine decision to increase
teaching in maths and English and reduce teaching in DT it was a
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim to decide not to renew C’s
contract or offer a permanent contract for September 2021.
179. R says that C’s salary was £47,611 (p117) plus the additional costs of
employer NICs and pension contributions. That was a significant amount of
R’s budget when the teaching requirement could be fulfilled by existing staff
on permanent contracts.
180. R says that disabled employees are not objects of charity to be retained
when their work is no longer required or necessary.
181. R contends that C has not put forward a case that another member of staff
in the DT department was a more natural choice for dismissal. R says that C
raised that Alistair Williams was taken on as permanent in October 2020 and
the evidence is that he was recruited to replace Donna Kenyon, who left in
December 2019 and he started work on an agency basis in April 2020 and
was offered a permanent contract, which was signed in October 2020. It is a
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim not to offer C a permanent
contract rather than breach the contract signed in October 2020 and terminate
the longer serving and known qualities of Alistair Williams.
182. We find that R, as a matter of law, cannot rely on cost alone as a
legitimate aim and that it seeks to do so here. Even if its legitimate aim is not
precluded on this basis, we disagree that the approach adopted was an
appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims. As we set
out further below, R was on notice that C was disabled and that her absence
was because of her disability. As we have already found above, the
consequence of that was that she had not been able to complete the teaching
observation that would have, in all likelihood, resulted in a permanent
position. Therefore, as a result of her disability, C was still on a fixed term
contract and therefore more vulnerable to dismissal at the point of R’s staffing
review. Had R taken this into account it could have considered a less
26
discriminatory alternative, such as carrying out a redundancy exercise, or
putting in place a set of temporary arrangements, which took account of C’s
disability and the support she might need to get her back into work in due
course. However as ML said in his evidence, no alternatives were considered
because of the time and effort involved in, e.g. putting together a business
case. Given the impact on C of her losing her employment, we find that it
would have been reasonable for R to take such steps, despite the extra work
involved.
183. In relation to not notifying C of the non-renewal of her contract, we find
that not using her personal email address to do this, and not checking that R
could use her personal email address because that was not normal practice,
which was the reason given by JT, was not a proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim as it had nothing to do with the stated legitimate
aims advanced by R, and even if it had, making no attempt to establish the
best way of communicating with C while on sickness absence, was not an
appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims given the
simplicity of taking such a step.
184. In relation to the failure to make an OH referral, we do not find in favour of
R’s contention that this was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate
aim. That is because, whilst we agree that the purpose of such OH referral
would be to find ways to help C back to work, and that the resulting OH report
would be ready only two weeks before C’s employment was due to end, the
decision to turn down the report was on the basis of cost alone, which cannot
justify discriminatory treatment.
Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that
the claimant had the disability? From what date?
185. We find that R could reasonably have been expected to know that C had
a disability, namely her back pain, from 8 January 2021. That is because of
our findings of fact that in the OH report ML received on 5 October 2020
(ML/39) it stated that “It is difficult to be clear whether Annika’s condition will
fall under the remit of the Act at present, if the pain and other symptoms were
to continue until February 2021 the condition would fall under the remit of the
Act” [our underlining]. Together with the fit note confirmation that ML received
on 8 January 2021, that C was going to be off until 31 March 2021 recovering
from surgery on her back, it was likely that her back pain would be continuing
until February 2021, and that therefore, as stated in the OH report, “the
condition would fall under the remit of the Act”. We note that JT had also
seen these documents at approximately the same time as ML.
186. As noted in the case law cited above, it does not matter whether the
employer comprehends that these facts amount, as a matter of law, to a
disability. Furthermore, in our view, R has not demonstrated that it was
unreasonable for it to have had knowledge of C’s disability. Any lack of clarity
about C’s disability in the pre-employment checks was superseded by the
information referred to above which ML and JT were aware of by 8 January
2021.
187. However we do not consider R knew, or could reasonable have known C
had a disability arising from her back pain before 8 January because the
explanation of C’s back pain in her self-assessment report (112) pointed away
27
from the seriousness of it because whilst there was a reference to having
back pain C stated that she was “sometimes limited by back issues but this is
infrequent”.
Reasonable Adjustments (Equality Act 2010 sections 20 & 21)
Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that
the claimant had the disability? From what date?
188. We find that R knew or could reasonably have been expected to know that
the claimant had the disability, in relation to back pain, from 8 January 2021,
but not before then, for the reasons given above.
189. In relation to migraines we find that in light of the OH report dated 31
March 2021 which stated that C’s migraines are likely to fall under the
Equality Act 2010, that R knew C had a disability relating to migraines from 31
March 2021. However we do not consider R knew C had a disability arising
from migraines before this because whilst C refers to having Chronic Daily
Migraine in her pre-employment questionnaire, she only specifies absence
arising from it between 25 February 2019 until 19 July 2019 which was over 2
years before her employment with R began, and in the OH report of 5 October
2010 migraine is not cited as causing substantial adverse effects on C at that
time. It was only in the OH report of 31 March 2021 that C’s migraine is noted
as likely to be a disability and it was only since 26 April 2021 (p291) that any
of C’s absence was due to her migraine.
190. As a result, C’s claims in relation to the UPR process must fail as the
alleged incidents occurred before R had knowledge of C’s disabilities.
What PCPs did R have?
191. In relation to the surviving claims, we find that R had the following PCP:
a. Conducting attendance management meetings when employees are
absent on sick leave. R has conceded this.
192. We find that in relation to not making an Occupational Health referral when
a request is made close to the end of term, that on the evidence before us,
this was a one-off decision; there was no evidence of a policy or practice in
this regard. And therefore we find that it cannot amount to a PCP following
Ishola v TFL [2020] EWCA Civ 112.
Did the PCPs put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to
someone without the claimant’s disability?
193. In relation to the surviving claim which at this point is that R conducted
attendance management meetings when employees are on sick leave, we
find that C was more likely to be absent due to sickness than someone who
did not have her disabilities given the weight of evidence showing the C’s
sickness absences being linked to her disabilities in the relevant fit notes and
therefore C was at greater risk of being subject to the attendance
management procedures, and therefore C was at substantial disadvantage
compared to someone without C’s disabilities who would be less likely to be
absent and therefore such to the absence management process.
28
Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that
the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?
194. As we have already stated above, R knew of C’s disabilities and that it
caused absences given the fit notes making express links to the disabilities as
causing the absences and therefore was more likely be subject to the
attendance management policy at the time the process was commenced in
relation to C.
What steps could have been taken to avoid the disadvantage? The claimant
suggests:
195. In relation to the surviving claim, C suggests R could have:
a. relaxed the requirements of the attendance management process in
relation to disability-related absences; and
b. not conducted attendance management meetings whilst the claimant
was absent on sick leave.
Was it reasonable for the respondent to have to take those steps and when?
196. We find that it was not reasonable for R to take those steps for the
following reasons. Following Bray v Camden LBC UKEAT/1162/01 to which
we were referred by Counsel:
“The logical consequences of the argument that an employer should exclude
from consideration the entire part of an employee's sickness absence related
to disability would be that an employee could be absent throughout the
working year without the employer being in a position to take any action in
relation to that absence. In our view, the tribunal was correct, as a matter of
good sense, to take the point that if any such absences were to fall outside
the sickness policy it would generate enormous ill-feeling and be a potential
for unauthorised absenteeism."
197. In our view, it would not be reasonable for R to be precluded from
addressing significant absence, even if that absence arose from disability, as
part of its absence management policy, as that would defeat the purpose of
the policy, which is to determine how best to deal with absence. Indeed, R
had only arranged a stage 1 review meeting which was required to investigate
and make decisions regarding absence management, going forward, and was
not threatening disciplinary action.
198. In relation to not conducting absence management meetings on sick
leave, given the amount of sickness absence taken by C during her
employment by R, it would have effectively precluded R from being able to
address C’s absence which would not be a reasonable step for R to taken,
particularly given C was able to attend the meeting in any event.
Did the respondent fail to take those steps?
199. This question becomes otiose in light of our findings that the steps were
not reasonable.
Harassment related to disability (Equality Act 2010 section 26)
29
200. Based on our findings of fact we find R did the following things:
a. Conducted an attendance management meeting on 18 June 2021
whilst the claimant was on long-term sickness absence.
b. Arranged for six people to be present at the 18 June 2021 meeting on
behalf of the respondent.
c. PF stated that the claimant had “let [her] colleagues down and [her]
students down” by being absent from work;
d. ML stating in the meeting that it “would be easy to be cynical in that
[C’s] return to work from her back operation coincided with when she
was due to go to half pay and that she returned to work for a few days
before going off with ill health again”.
201. We do not find R did the following things:
a. PF stating at the meeting that the claimant had caused her colleagues
“a lot of stress” given this was not in C’s follow up email and therefore
the contemporaneous note of C does not corroborate this.
If so, was that unwanted conduct?
202. We do not find the attendance management meeting on 18 June 2021 to
be unwanted conduct. We find that R called that meeting in accordance with
its attendance management policy and had valid grounds for so doing in light
of C’s absence and therefore we do not consider that the meeting per se had
the purpose or effect of violating C’s dignity or creating an intimidating,
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.
203. In relation to arranging 6 people to be present at the meeting without
telling C, we find that was unwanted conduct. The uncontested evidence was
that C was visibly distressed when she turned up to this meeting and there
was no evidence that C had been told in advance who would be there. C’s
evidence was that she was only expecting ML to be there. However in
addition to ML there was PF, JT and John Sear (HR Business Partner) in
attendance, as well as C and her union rep. The effect of this was to create
an intimidating environment for C. C’s account of her reaction at the time we
find to be genuine in light of the evidence of PF which noted C’s distress, and
that it was reasonable for C to have that perception given that no advance
warning of who was going to be present at the meeting had been provided to
her.
204. In relation to PF stating that the claimant had “let [her] colleagues down
and [her] students down” by being absent from work, we find this to be
unwanted conduct. We were not persuaded by PF’s evidence that saying this
provided a way into the conversation or was in some way to acknowledge the
guilt C might be feeling about her absence. We find this statement to be
unsympathetic and unnecessary and that it had the effect of violating C’s
dignity or creating a hostile, degrading or offensive environment for B. Again,
C’s account of her reaction at the time we find to be genuine in light of the
evidence of PF which noted C’s distress, and that it prompted C to follow up
in writing where she described the comments as “extremely disrespectful” and
“disgusting” (p338). We find that it was reasonable for C to have that
30
perception given the nature of the language used and the circumstances in
which it was used – namely C’s absence arising from her disabilities.
205. In relation to ML stating in the meeting that it “would be easy to be cynical
in that [C’s] return to work from her back operation coincided with when she
was due to go to half pay and that she returned to work for a few days before
going off with ill health again”, we find this to be unwanted conduct. We were
not persuaded by ML’s explanation that he was being careful to ensure that
the wrong inferences about C’s absence were not drawn. In light of the OH
reports and fit notes that had been provided to R we do not think this was in
any way necessary for ML to say and had the effect of violating C’s dignity or
creating a hostile, degrading or offensive environment for B. As above, C’s
account of her reaction at the time we find to be genuine in light of the
evidence of PF which noted C’s distress, and that it prompted C to follow up
in writing where she described the comments as “disgraceful” and “an attempt
at deformation of character” (p338). We find that it was reasonable for C to
have that perception given the nature of the language used and the
circumstances in which it was used – namely C’s absence arising from her
disabilities.
Did it relate to disability?
206. We find that all three instances of unwanted conduct were related to C’s
disability given the fact of the meeting and comments at the meeting all arose
from C’s absence caused by her disability.
Conclusion
207. In conclusion, therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the ET that:
a. The complaint that the Claimant’s employment contract was not
renewed due to sickness absence related to her back condition was
presented within the applicable time limit and will therefore proceed.
b. Save in relation to the complaints that:
i. the Respondent failed to notify the Claimant that her employment
contract was not being renewed,
ii. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had “let [her] colleagues down
and [her] students down” by being absent from work, and
iii. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had caused her colleagues “a
lot of stress”,
all of the other complaints brought by the Claimant are continuing acts
of discrimination culminating in the complaint that the Claimant’s
contract was not renewed and are therefore presented within the
applicable time limit and will therefore proceed.
c. The Claimant’s complaints that:
i. the Respondent failed to notify the Claimant that her employment
contract was not being renewed,
31
ii. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had “let [her] colleagues down
and [her] students down” by being absent from work, and
iii. Mr Ferrie stating that the Claimant had caused her colleagues “a
lot of stress”,
were not presented within the applicable time limit, but it is just and
equitable to extend the time limit. All of these complaints will therefore
proceed.
d. The Claimant’s complaints of unfavourable treatment arising from
disability under s15 Equality Act 2010 are well-founded and succeed in
respect of:
i. The Claimant’s complaint that her employment contract was not
renewed due to sickness absence related to her back condition;
ii. The Claimant’s complaint that the Respondent failed to notify
her that her employment contract was not being renewed;
iii. The Respondent failing to make an Occupational Health referral
in relation to the Claimant’s migraine when one was requested
by the Claimant on 24 June 2021.
e. The remainder of the Claimant’s complaints of unfavourable treatment
arising from disability under s15 Equality Act 2010 are not well-founded
and are dismissed.
f. The Claimant’s complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments
under s20 and s21 Equality Act 2010 are not well-founded and are
dismissed.
g. The Claimant’s complaints of harassment related to disability under
s26 Equality Act 2010 are well-founded and succeed in respect of:
i. Arranging for six people to be present at the 18 June 2021
meeting on behalf of the respondent;
ii. Paul Ferrie stating that the Claimant had “let [her] colleagues
down and [her] students down” by being absent from work.
iii. Martin Lavelle stating in the meeting that it “would be easy to be
cynical in that [C’s] return to work from her back operation
coincided with when she was due to go to half pay and that she
returned to work for a few days before going off with ill health
again”.
h. The remainder of C’s complaints of harassment are not well-founded
and are dismissed.
Remedy
208. Remedy will be dealt with at a separate remedy hearing.
32
Approved by:
Employment Judge Partington
13 July 2025
JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES
17 July 2025
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Notes
All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments
are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a
copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents.
If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are
exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral
judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge.
There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of
Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:
www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/
Case Number: 3322927/2021
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Miss A Robinson
Respondent: Middlesex Learning Trust
Heard at: Watford Employment Tribunal
On: 12 and 15 September 2025
Before: Employment Judge Partington, S Wellings, L Hoey
Representation
Claimant: In person
Respondent: Mr Starcevic, Counsel
REMEDY JUDGMENT
1.
The Tribunal makes the following recommendations:
a.
The Respondent implements disability awareness training for its management staff within 12 months of the date of this Judgment.
b.
The Respondent provides on request from any prospective employer of the Claimant, a factual reference, which includes only her dates of employment, job title, and the fact of there being no safeguarding concerns relating to the Claimant.
2.
With effect from 1 September 2023 the Claimant has not taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings. Therefore, the period of loss for which the claimant should be compensated is the period from her dismissal on 31 August 2021 up to 1 September 2023.
3.
There is no chance the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event and therefore the claimant’s compensation should not be reduced as a result.
4.
The ACAS code of practice is not applicable and therefore there is no uplift for failure to follow it.
5.
There is no award for loss of statutory rights.
6.
There is no award for costs.
7.
The claimant does not seek compensation for aggravated damages or personal injury.
8.
Interest for injury to feelings is to be calculated from the date the Claimant found out about the non-renewal of her fixed-term contract on 11 March 2021.
9.
Based on the above findings, the amount of compensation has been agreed by the parties as set out in an agreed schedule of loss provided to the Employment Tribunal on 19 September 2025, and pursuant to which the Respondent shall pay the Claimant the following sum:
a.
A compensation payment of £137,112 (less applicable deductions for tax and national insurance) comprising of:
i.
A net payment of £41,857 for loss of earnings plus interest calculated in accordance with the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 of £7,564;
ii.
A net payment of £26,284 for loss of pension;
iii.
An injury to feelings payment of £24,250 plus interest on compensation for injury to feelings calculated in accordance with the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 of £8,765;
Giving a sub-total of £108,720 which has been grossed up by £28,392.
Approved by:
Employment Judge Partington
20 September 2025
JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
8 October 2025
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Notes
Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online.
All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents.
If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:
www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/
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