Ms Ruth Seymour v Lochinvar Developments Ltd: 4102665/2018
Employment Tribunal
Published on 23 January 2019, 15:14
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
breach-of-contract disability-discrimination unfair-dismissal
- country
- scotland
- decision date
- 2018-12-31
Official Documents
-
Ms Ruth Seymour v Lochinvar Developments Ltd: 4102665/2018 - Judgment
Decision Content
Read the decision in full .
Change History
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First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
ETZ4(WR)
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
5
Case No: 4102665/2018
Employment Judge: M A Macleod (sitting alone)
10
Ms Ruth Seymour Claimant
Represented by
Ms M Porteous
CAB Volunteer
15
Lochinvar Developments Ltd Respondent
Represented by
Ms D Robertson
Solicitor
20
JUDGMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL
The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the respondent’s application for 25 strike out of the direct discrimination claim is refused; and that the claimant’s application for strike out of the response is refused.
REASONS
30
1. Following a Preliminary Hearing before Employment Judge Buzzard on 28 June 2018, the Tribunal issued Orders requiring both parties to provide information to the Tribunal and to each other by certain dates set out clearly in the Orders. 35
2. On 9 August 2018, the respondent’s agent submitted an application for strike out of the claim of direct discrimination on the grounds of disability
S/4 102665/18 Page 2
under Rule 37(1) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013, on
the grounds that:
1. “The claimant has still not described a relevant hypothetical comparator;
2. The claimant’s direct discrimination claim remains unspecified and
5 irrelevant, as previously narrated, and as such, has little or no
reasonable prospect of success.”
3. In the alternative, the respondent sought a deposit order under Rule 39(1).
4. On 23 August 2018, the respondent’s agent requested that the application
for strike out or deposit order be dealt with by the Tribunal by way of written
10 submissions.
5. On 2 September 2018, Ms Porteous, for the claimant, asserted that the
claim for direct discrimination was not ill-founded and sought that the
Tribunal allow a preliminary hearing before deciding whether to grant such
an Order.
15 6. On the same date, the claimant’s representative intimated an application for
strike out of the respondent’s response under Rule 18(7)(c) (a reference to
the 2004 Rules of Procedure) on the grounds of a representative’s
“scandalous and unreasonable conduct”. She attached a complaint about
the representative’s conduct during the course of a visit to the respondent’s
20 premises undertaken by the claimant and her representative.
7. Ms Porteous then wrote to the Tribunal on 6 September to confirm that the
claimant was content that the respondent’s application for strike out should
be dealt with by way of written submissions.
8. Accordingly, the Tribunal considers the terms of each application.
25
Respondent’s Application
S/4 102665/18 Page 3
9. In the course of the Note following the Preliminary Hearing of 28 June 2018,
the Order set out at paragraph 1 read as follows:
“By no later than 12 July 2018 the claimant shall confirm to the respondent
and the Tribunal whether the claimant wishes to withdraw her claim of direct
5 disability discrimination. In the event that the claimant elects to continue this
claim, the claimant shall send to the respondent only the following specific
information:
a. A full description of the hypothetical comparator which the claimant will
construct to support her claim of direct discrimination; and
10 b. A list of each act, or omission, which the claimant will contend amounted
to less favourable treatment than the hypothetical comparator would
have been subjected to.”
10. The respondent’s solicitor made the application for strike out on 9 August,
no description of the hypothetical comparator having been provided by the
15 claimant to that date. The application was made under Rule 37(1), though
no further specification of which sub-paragraph of 37(1) was relied on was
provided. However, it appears that the application was made under Rule
37(1)(a), “that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect
of success”, and in particular that it had no reasonable prospect of success.
20 11. It is noted, at this stage, that the application was not made on the grounds
that the claimant had failed to comply with an Order of the Tribunal
(37(1)(c)).
12. The application is confined to the direct discrimination claim.
13. On 2 September Ms Porteous, for the claimant, confirmed that she opposed
25 the application for strike out, and denied that the claim for direct
discrimination was ill-founded or vexatious. She then went on to refer to
evidence upon which the claimant would rely in support of her assertions
about the removal of 2 metal sills and the hazardous conditions in which the
claimant was required to work.
S/4 102665/18 Page 4
14. She also said that the claimant did not have the ability to pay costs at that
time as she was suffering financial hardship. This appears to be a
reference to the deposit order applied for in the alternative by the
respondent, as there is no application for costs or expenses before the
5 Tribunal in relation to this aspect of the case.
15. Parties were then invited to provide to the Tribunal any further submissions
which they wished to make, but from a review of the correspondence,
nothing seems to have been added. It may be that the claimant’s
application for strike out superseded this application in the parties’ minds
10 but the submissions are, as I understand it, to be taken from the letters
referred to above.
Decision
16. Strike out of a claim is a draconian sanction, only to be taken in the most
extreme of circumstances.
15 17. The basis upon which the application is sought here is that in the absence
of the detailed description of a hypothetical comparator, the claim for direct
discrimination has no reasonable prospects of success.
18. The respondent does not make the application on the basis that the
claimant has failed to comply with the Tribunal’s Order. As it turns out, the
20 claimant has indeed failed to comply with the Tribunal’s Order. Even since
the application for strike out was made there has been no attempt by the
claimant to define the hypothetical comparator which the Tribunal ordered
her to describe in its Order.
19. Essentially, the application proceeds on the basis that without that further
25 specification of the claim, it lacks any reasonable prospect of success.
20. A party may not simply disregard a Tribunal’s Order with impunity. It may
well be that the claimant’s representative has misunderstood the nature of
the application by the respondent for strike out, though it is understandable
that she has made reference to vexatious conduct as that is contained
30 within Rule 37(1). However, she has not provided to the Tribunal the
S/4 102665/18 Page 5
information which she was ordered to produce by the Tribunal’s Order of 19
July 2018. She has not provided any reason why she has not supplied that
information, other than to argue that the claim does have good prospects of
success.
5 21. Having reflected upon this matter, it is my conclusion that it would not be in
the interests of justice to strike out the claim of direct discrimination at this
stage on the basis that it has no reasonable prospects of success. The
issue here is fundamentally the failure of the claimant to comply with the
Tribunal’s Order of 19 July 2018, at paragraph 1.
10 22. However, notwithstanding that I have decided to refuse the respondent’s
application for strike out of that part of the claim, I am not prepared to
absolve the claimant of responsibility to provide the further specification
required of her in that Order.
23. As a result, I have concluded that the most appropriate course of action is to
15 reissue the Order (paragraph 1 only), by way of an Unless Order, with a
timescale for compliance, taking account of the imminent Christmas and
New Year holidays, of Friday 25 January 2019. The claimant should be well
aware that if she fails to comply with that order the direct discrimination
claim will be struck out without further consideration. The consequences of
20 non-compliance are therefore now entirely clear and the claimant must
comply with the Order by that date.
24. The Unless Order is set out in a separate Order to be issued with this
Judgment.
The Claimant’s Application
25 25. Ms Porteous applied for the response to be struck out. Her reference to
Rule 18(7)(c) is taken to be a reference to Rule 37(1)(b), that the claim or
response may be struck out on the grounds that “the manner in which the
proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the
respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or
30 vexatious”.
S/4 102665/18 Page 6
26. In advancing her application, she attached a letter of complaint to the
respondent’s agent dated 9 August 2018 setting out her serious concerns
about the manner in which she had conducted proceedings during the
claimant’s visit to the respondent’s premises on 7 August. Having not
5 received a response, she considered that the respondent had not
addressed her complaint. She also wished to advise the Tribunal that the
respondent’s representative “adopted an unnecessarily rude and
condescending tone when questioning the claimant and instead of acting
with the integrity expected of a legal representative she merely seized the
10 opportunity to unfairly question the claimant.”
27. She went on to summarise the main concerns. She complained that during
the site visit the claimant was not granted any privacy as members of staff
were present during the visit. No attempt was made by the respondent’s
representative to maintain confidentiality, and she allowed a potential
15 witness, Charles McAleavy, to be present while continually and aggressively
questioning the claimant on crucial points related to the failure to make
reasonable adjustments.
28. Ms Porteous further alleged that the respondent’s representative interrupted
conversations between the claimant and her representative in a humiliating
20 and rude manner.
29. She sought, finally, to suggest that due to the scandalous, harassing and
unreasonable conduct of the respondent’s representative it is no longer
possible to have a fair hearing.
30. Ms Robertson, the respondent’s solicitor, set out her response, and
25 opposition, to this application in her letter of 13 September 2018.
31. She submitted that the site visit meeting was not a part of the proceedings
before the Tribunal, but simply an informal meeting. She argued that
“proceedings” means what goes on in the confines of the Tribunal process
itself. The application was therefore unfounded and should be refused.
S/4 102665/18 Page 7
32. However, she went on to say that if the Tribunal were prepared to consider
the application, there were no grounds for granting it. She observed that the
site visit was unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, including the
claimant’s representative “making a spectacle” of the visit, loudly making
5 inflammatory remarks” both about the respondent and their premises. She
alleged that the claimant’s representative sought to put words in the
claimant’s mouth by pointing out physical changes to her, and made a show
of taking photographs and video of absent physical features and decried the
respondent for having removed them.
10 33. Ms Robertson went on to suggest that when she sought to “keep matters in
hand” – the claimant’s conduct itself being entirely appropriate – she sought
to check where exactly the claimant alleged the physical features to have
been. She did not observe the claimant having suffered any distress or
upset at the time.
15 34. It was not accepted that the conduct of Ms Robertson was scandalous,
harassing or unreasonable nor that it is no longer possible to have a fair
hearing before the Tribunal.
35. Ms Robertson then addressed the legal tests for scandalous, unreasonable
or vexatious conduct by referring to the well-known authorities on the
20 matter.
Decision
36. The first issue for the Tribunal to address relates to whether the alleged
conduct of the respondent’s representative amounted to “the manner in
which the proceedings have been conducted”. The complaint concerns a
25 site visit which related to the proceedings. It amounted, it appears (on the
information available to me), to an opportunity for Ms Porteous and Ms
Robertson to attend at the respondent’s premises together, presumably on
an agreed basis, to gather information and understanding about the locus
within which the claimant worked.
S/4 102665/18 Page 8
37. As such the site visit formed part of the preparations for the proceedings. In
one sense, it had nothing to do with the Tribunal at all. It was simply a visit
to the premises. In another sense, “proceedings” being undefined within the
Rules of Procedure, it seems to me that it is as much part of the
5 proceedings as a meeting between a representative and a witness to take a
statement. If an allegation were made that during the course of such a
meeting a representative were, say, to threaten a witness, or act abusively
or insultingly towards them, it is my conclusion that that would be conduct of
the proceedings, since it is so fundamentally linked to the proceedings that it
10 must have an impact upon them.
38. However, in my judgment, what has happened here is that two versions of
the same, unsatisfactory, meeting have been presented to the Tribunal,
without any way of my resolving them. What is apparent is that a degree of
animosity has developed between the parties, and possibly more
15 significantly the representatives, and that manifested itself during the course
of that meeting and the subsequent correspondence.
39. I do not find that this amounted to scandalous, harassing or unreasonable
conduct on the part of Ms Robertson (though, interestingly, she is not
mentioned by name in the application). As a result, I am not prepared to
20 take any draconian step resulting in the strike out of the response.
40. There is no basis, further, for me to conclude that a fair trial is not possible
in this case. Robust and sometimes hostile confrontations between
representatives are not unknown in cases before the Tribunal. Parties and
their representatives are reminded that the Tribunal expects them to
25 conduct themselves in a professional and respectful manner, but it is
recognised that there is a dispute between the parties here, both factual and
legal, and therefore conflict within acceptable boundaries is inevitable.
41. Accordingly, it is my conclusion that I cannot properly make any findings
about what happened during the site visit on the basis of what has been
30 provided to me; that I cannot therefore conclude that there has been
unreasonable or scandalous behaviour on the part of the respondent’s
S/4 102665/18 Page 9
representative; and that there is no reason before me to believe that a fair
trial of this case is no longer possible.
42. The claimant’s application for strike out of the response is therefore refused.
Employment Judge: Macleod
5 Date of Judgment: 31 December 2018
Entered into the Register: 03 January 2019
And Copied to Parties
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