Report 12/2026: Collision between a passenger train and a van at Bax level crossing

Report Overview

R122026_261109_Bax UWCDownload

Summary

At around 12:42 on 13 July 2025, a passenger train travelling from Ramsgate to London Victoria collided with a stationary delivery van on Bax user worked crossing near Teynham in Kent. The train was travelling at approximately 71 mph (114 km/h) when the accident occurred. The driver of the van was fatally injured.

Bax user worked crossing has outward opening gates to either side of the railway and is fitted with an overlay miniature stop light system, which shows a green light if no trains are approaching. This will change to show a red light, and an audible warning will sound, once a train is detected approaching the crossing. The correct operation of the crossing is described by signs. These instruct users to check that a green light is showing before opening both gates, before crossing with a vehicle, and again before closing both gates.

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Official Documents

R122026_261109_Bax UWC

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R122026_261109_Bax UWC

Report 12/2026 November 2026 Collision between a passenger train and a van at Bax level crossing 13 July 2025 Rail Accident Report This report is published by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Department for Transport. Email: enquiries@raib.gov.uk Telephone: 01332 253 300 Website: www.raib.gov.uk RAIB The Wharf Stores Road Derby UK DE21 4BA © Crown copyright 2026 You may reuse this document/publication (not including departmental or agency logos) free of charge in any format or medium. You must reuse it accurately and not in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and you must give the title of the source publication. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This document/publication is also available at www.gov.uk/raib. Any enquiries about this publication should be sent to: This investigation was carried out in accordance with: •the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/E C •the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 •the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005. Preface The purpose of a Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) investigation is to improve railway safety by preventing future railway accidents or by mitigating their consequences. It is not the purpose of such an investigation to establish blame or liability. Accordingly, it is inappropriate that RAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame, or determine liability, since neither the investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose. RAIB’s findings are based on its own evaluation of the evidence that was available at the time of the investigation and are intended to explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased manner. Where RAIB has described a factor as being linked to cause and the term is unqualified, this means that RAIB has satisfied itself that the evidence supports both the presence of the factor and its direct relevance to the causation of the accident or incident that is being investigated. However, where RAIB is less confident about the existence of a factor, or its role in the causation of the accident or incident, RAIB will qualify its findings by use of words such as ‘probable’ or ‘possible’, as appropriate. Where there is more than one potential explanation RAIB may describe one factor as being ‘more’ or ‘less’ likely than the other. In some cases factors are described as ‘underlying’. Such factors are also relevant to the causation of the accident or incident but are associated with the underlying management arrangements or organisational issues (such as working culture). Where necessary, words such as ‘probable’ or ‘possible’ can also be used to qualify ‘underlying factor’. Use of the word ‘probable’ means that, although it is considered highly likely that the factor applied, some small element of uncertainty remains. Use of the word ‘possible’ means that, although there is some evidence that supports this factor, there remains a more significant degree of uncertainty. An ‘observation’ is a safety issue discovered as part of the investigation that is not considered to be causal or underlying to the accident or incident being investigated, but does deserve scrutiny because of a perceived potential for safety learning. The above terms are intended to assist readers’ interpretation of the report, and to provide suitable explanations where uncertainty remains. The report should therefore be interpreted as the view of RAIB, expressed with the sole purpose of improving railway safety. Any information about casualties is based on figures provided to RAIB from various sources. Considerations of personal privacy may mean that not all of the actual effects of the event are recorded in the report. RAIB recognises that sudden unexpected events can have both short- and long-term consequences for the physical and/ or mental health of people who were involved, both directly and indirectly, in what happened. RAIB’s investigation (including its scope, methods, conclusions and recommendations) is independent of any inquest or fatal accident inquiry, and all other investigations, including those carried out by the safety authority, police or railway industry. Report 12/2026 Bax UWC November 2026 Preface Report 12/2026 Bax UWC 4November 2026 This page is intentionally left blank Report 12/2026 Bax UWC November 2026 Report 12/2026 Bax UWC 5November 2026 Collision between a passenger train and a van at Bax level crossing, 13 July 2025 Contents Preface3 Summary7 Introduction 8 Definitions 8 The accident9 Summary of the accident 9 Context9 The sequence of events 15 Events preceding the accident 15 Events during the accident 16 Events following the accident 20 Background information 21 The crossing 21 Analysis26 Identification of the immediate cause 26 Identification of causal factors 26 Identification of underlying factors 35 Observations41 Previous occurrences of a similar character 42 Summary of conclusions 46 Immediate cause 46 Causal factors 46 Underlying factors 46 Additional observations 46 Previous RAIB recommendations relevant to this investigation47 Previous recommendations that had the potential to address one or more factors identified in this report 47 Actions reported as already taken or in progress relevant to this report51 Actions reported that address factors which otherwise would have resulted in an RAIB recommendation 51 Other reported actions 51 Report 12/2026 Bax UWC 6November 2026 Recommendations54 Appendices 56 Appendix A - Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms 56 Appendix B - Investigation details 57 Report 12/2026 Bax UWC 7November 2026 Summary At around 12:42 on 13 July 2025, a passenger train travelling from Ramsgate to London Victoria collided with a stationary delivery van on Bax user worked crossing near Teynham in Kent. The train was travelling at approximately 71 mph (114 km/h) when the accident occurred. The driver of the van was fatally injured. Bax user worked crossing has outward opening gates to either side of the railway and is fitted with an overlay miniature stop light system, which shows a green light if no trains are approaching. This will change to show a red light, and an audible warning will sound, once a train is detected approaching the crossing. The correct operation of the crossing is described by signs. These instruct users to check that a green light is showing before opening both gates, before crossing with a vehicle, and again before closing both gates. RAIB’s investigation found that the van was stationary on the level crossing because the green light shown by the miniature stop light system when the delivery driver arrived almost certainly led them to believe that it was safe to enter the crossing once the entry gate had been opened, despite the exit gate still being closed. RAIB also found that the signage at the crossing and the lack of road markings did not effectively guide the delivery driver to use the correct crossing procedure. Underlying factors were that a project to develop and implement new signage for use at private crossings, such as Bax, did not sufficiently consider how diverse information sources may influence crossing user behaviour. In addition, RAIB found that, once Network Rail had fitted miniature stop lights at a crossing, it became unlikely that further upgrades would take place, and reliance on signs being understood and obeyed remained essential for safe crossing usage. RAIB also found that the training and guidance provided to the delivery driver, who was self-employed but working on behalf of a logistics company, had not prepared them to use the crossing safely. Although not linked to the accident on 13 July 2025, RAIB observed differing interpretations of the concept of an authorised user within railway processes for identif

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