Bocarr Jamanka v Deltaform Ltd: 2423870/2017
Employment Tribunal
Published on 04 March 2019, 08:50
- Summary
- Employment Tribunal decision.
- categories
-
sex-discrimination unfair-dismissal
- country
- england-and-wales
- decision date
- 2019-02-22
Official Documents
-
Bocarr Jamanka v Deltaform Ltd: 2423870/2017 - Dismissal
Change History
-
First published.
Full Decision Text
Raw text extracted from the official documents.
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 1
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Bocarr Jamanka
Respondent: Deltaform Ltd
Heard at: Bristol On: 18-22 February 2019
Before: Employment Judge Housego
Ms Y Ramsaran and
Ms S Maidment
Representation
Claimant: In person
Respondent: Ms T Hand of Counsel instructed by DLA Piper UK LLP
JUDGMENT
____________
The claims are dismissed.
_________________________
REASONS
---------------------------------
Background
1. As this decision is placed on a public record we refer to individuals by a schedule of anonymity, as Colleagues 1-6, to accord with the numbers of their respective witness statements in the bundle of witness statements provided, and A-F in accordance with a schedule of anonymity.
2. The claimant was dismissed by the respondent. They say this was for gross misconduct, being the way that the claimant acted on 3 night shifts, 10-13 July 2017, inclusive. The claimant says that he was the victim of an orchestrated plan to get him dismissed, the prime mover being his former superviser, Colleague 6, who was the duty manager on those shifts. He says none of what was alleged was true, and his former superviser was
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 2
motivated to do so to try to subdue him into a sexual relationship, so that
this was sexual harassment. He says his former superviser suborned
others to provide statements that led to his dismissal.
Law
3. The claimant claims unfair dismissal and sexual harassment. (The
claim was originally framed differently, but it was agreed in a case
management hearing that this was the reality of the claim.)
4. Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA), relevant parts emboldened:
“26 Harassment
(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if—
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic,
and
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of—
(i) violating B's dignity, or
(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive
environment for B.
(2) A also harasses B if—
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, and
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b).
(3) A also harasses B if—
(a) A or another person engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or that is
related to gender reassignment or sex,
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), and
(c) because of B's rejection of or submission to the conduct, A treats B less
favourably than A would treat B if B had not rejected or submitted to the conduct.
(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the
following must be taken into account—
(a) the perception of B;
(b) the other circumstances of the case;
(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.”
5. There is no complaint of victimisation contrary to S27, but it is set out
to show the difference between it and S26, and because the claimant
referred to it in the hearing:
“27 Victimisation
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 3
(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because—
(a) B does a protected act, or
(b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.
(2) Each of the following is a protected act—
(a) bringing proceedings under this Act;
(b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act;
(c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act;
(d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has
contravened this Act.”
6. In respect of a claim for unfair dismissal, the respondent has to show
that the dismissal was for a potentially fair reason1. The respondent says
this was misconduct which is one of the categories that can be fair2. It has
to show that the dismissal was fair3. This means that it must show that it
had genuine belief that the claimant was guilty of the misconduct alleged,
that it had reasonable grounds for that belief, and formed that view after
proper investigation4. It must follow a fair procedure throughout5, and
dismissal must fall within the range of responses of a reasonable
employer6. It is not for the Tribunal to substitute its own view of what
should have happened, for it is judging whether the actions of the
employer were fair, and not deciding what it would have done.
7. The burden of proof as to the reason for dismissal is on the employer,
on the balance of probabilities. There is no burden or standard of proof for
the Tribunal’s assessment of whether it was fair to dismiss7. If the
dismissal was procedurally unfair the Tribunal has to assess what would
have happened if a fair procedure had been followed8, and lastly to
consider whether the claimant’s conduct caused or contributed to his
dismissal9. While gross misconduct usually leads to dismissal, it is unfair
to dismiss somebody without consideration of whether another sanction
might be appropriate10. If a fair procedure is followed and the decision
maker genuinely believes on reasonable grounds after proper
investigation that there has been gross misconduct, then there is a fair
dismissal even if another employee who did not have the responsibility for
the dismissal or appeal engineered that outcome11.
8. As it is asserted that the dismissal was by reason of unlawful
discrimination the Tribunal must be satisfied that in no sense whatsoever
was the dismissal tainted by such discrimination. For the discrimination
1 S98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996
2 Also S98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996
3 S98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996
4 British Home Stores Limited v Burchell [1980] ICR 303 EAT;
5 Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Hitt [2003] IRLR 23 CA
6 Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones [1982] UKEAT 62_82_2907
7 Section 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996
8 Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1987] UKHL 8
9 S122(6) and 123(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996
10 Brito-Bapabulle v Ealing NHS Trust UKEAT0358/12/1406
11 Para 61 Royal Mail Ltd v Jhuti [2017] EWCA Civ 1632
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10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 4
claim, it is for the claimant to show reason why there might be
discrimination12, and if he does so then it is for the employer to show that it
was not.
Issues
9. There have been two case management hearings in this case, on 16
March 2018 and on 14 August 2018. The issues were set out in the first
case management order, and altered in the second. The order does not
deal with the issues for the unfair dismissal claim, as these are standard
and the law is set out above. It set out the allegations made in the sexual
harassment claim. It should be borne in mind that this schedule was
arrived at in the context of an application by the respondent to strike out
the claim by reason of vagueness of allegations and inconsistency
between the allegations set out in a Scott schedule subsequent to those
identified in the previous case management hearing. The issues set out in
the case management hearing are reproduced below. They are at
paragraph 7.6 of that case management order. Paragraph 7.9 stated “For
the avoidance of doubt no other claims or complaints will now be
considered by the Tribunal".
10. The issues are:
a. on 17 February 2015 Colleague 6 changed the materials the
claimant was working on with the TFT machine;
b. on 01 June 2015 Colleague 6 gave the claimant a machine that
was not working properly and tried to hug him when he struggled to
operate it;
c. on 04 June 2015 Colleague 6 again altered the settings on the
claimant's TFT machine;
d. on 30 May 2016 Colleagues 6 failed to set the claimant's TFT
machine properly;
e. on 29 June 2016 at approximately 6:00 am during Ramadan
and when the claimant was fasting Colleague 6 gave him work on a
machine which was usually a two-man operation but he was
required to undertake it alone;
f. on 28 September 2016 6 days were improperly deducted from
the claimant's holiday;
g. on 16 February 2017 Colleague 6 altered the settings to the
claimant’s GN machine;
h. on 06 April 2017 the claimant raised a complaint about the loss
of 6 days holiday;
12 Igen v Wong [2005] ICR 931, Madarassy v Nomura International plc [2007] EWCA Civ 33, Laing v Manchester City Council [2006] I.C.R.
159, and most recently Ayodele v Citylink Ltd & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 1913
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 5
i. on 24 April 2017 the claimant spoke to Colleague 6 again about
his holiday entitlement and his manager's alleged sexual advances
but was laughed at by his colleagues because Colleague 6 had
made his complaints public;
j. on 28 May 2017 Colleague 6 again deliberately altered the
settings of the claimant's GN machine.
11. In arriving at its conclusions the Tribunal has needed to stick to these
issues, as they were arrived at arduously, after 2 case management
hearings and a Scott schedule, and the version above differs from a
grievance lodged on 20 February 201713, the claim form14, the Scott
schedule15, and in the first case management hearing16.
12. Case law indicates that a list of issues is not a pleading, but a tool to
facilitate a hearing, and could not be approached with the formality one
might approach a commercial contract or pleading17. Nor must a Tribunal
stick slavishly to them18. Nevertheless the respondent has to know the
case it has to meet, and the Tribunal did not feel able to accept other
allegations made by the claimant for the first time in cross examination,
particularly bearing in mind the specific statement in the case
management order.
13. This was the more difficult as the claimant did not provide a detailed
witness statement, and nor did he give oral evidence or cross examine the
witnesses about many of the issues in the list. The Tribunal did all that it
could to try to ensure that there was a fair hearing, but this could not
extend to cross examination of the respondent’s witnesses.
Uncontentious facts
14. The claimant was a production operative. The respondent makes plastic
trays for food products. There are 3 shifts, each with its own manager. The
claimant started in 2014 in Colleague 6’s shift. He moved in 2016 to
another shift, the shift manager being Colleague 2. There he worked until
10-13 July 2017. This was at his request, as he was unhappy about
working for Colleague 6.
15. On 20 February 2017 the claimant lodged a grievance. He wanted
Colleague 6 to stop harassing him. He did not say in what way he was
being harassed. He did not wish to engage in any form of conversation
with him other than job-related matters. He was not a homosexual; he
wrote that he "do not stick it up the ass". He said that 6 days had wrongly
been taken out of his holiday entitlement.
16. Colleague 5 dealt with the grievance hearing. Later he also dealt with the
claimant's appeal against dismissal. The claimant considers him to be a
good man, and has no complaint against him personally. On 24 March
13 Page 164
14 Box 8.2, page 8
15 Page 38
16 Page 31
17 Leslie Millin v Capsticks Solicitors LLP and Others: UKEAT/0093/14/RN
18 Saha v Capita UKEAT/0080/18/DM
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 6
2017 Colleague 5 dismissed the grievance19. He found that Colleague 6
operated normal working practices on machine settings and adjustment.
Although he had asked for details of what was said to have happened,
with dates, times there had been no specific evidence nor witnesses, even
though the claimant said there were others in the car at the time. For
these reasons he was not able to uphold the complaint. It had been said
that he was homosexual (but there was no complaint of inappropriate
conduct towards him). The holiday entitlement claim was not upheld.
Copies of all the investigator's notes were sent to the claimant.
17. On 24 April 2017 the claimant appealed this decision to Colleague F20. He
referred to “homosexual advances towards me” and that holiday had been
taken from him “due to homosexual advances at me”. No details were
provided.
18. On 09 May 2017 the decision was upheld21 by Colleague F. As to the
homosexuality concern the letter stated that this was removed from the
appeal as the claimant had said "forget about it as it is not an issue… any
more". The claimant accepts that this is what he said to Colleague F.
There had been a review of the holiday entitlement and the days taken
and that was no evidence that he lost any holiday entitlement, or not been
paid for holiday taken.
19. The claimant worked under Colleague 2 without serious issue (although
he was said to have been somewhat disruptive, and pushed the
boundaries on tea breaks, as everyone did), until his manager, Colleague
2, was away and then Colleague 6 was duty manager for 3 successive
nights, 10/11, 11/12 and 12/13 July 2017.
20. On the 3rd night Colleague 6 sent for the human resources manager,
Colleague 3, at 05:30, and she attended swiftly. Her normal hours are 9-5.
After a meeting with both the claimant and Colleague 6 she suspended the
claimant. A letter was sent to him22 stating that this was for breaching
company rules and inappropriate behaviour towards a manager
(Colleague 6).
21. There was a full investigation by a manager, Colleague A. He interviewed
members of staff, Colleagues B-E. The claimant said that the allegations
were fabricated. It was all choreographed by Colleague 6. Everything was
twisted and distorted. Colleague A explored this with all the people he
interviewed and they all denied that they said anything other than what
they saw.
22. While there is no document setting out what the allegations were, this was
made clear by Colleague A in his interview of the claimant on 20 July
201723. It was taking breaks of up to 17 minutes when these should have
been 10 minutes, ripping off his beard snood and refusing to put it back on
for some time and only after argument, stopping his machine without good
reason, and on other occasions leaving it running unattended, and gross
19 Page 191-192
20 Page 207
21 Page 216
22 Page 231, dated 13 July 2017
23 Page 238-245
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10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 7
insubordination towards his manager (Colleague 6) detailed in the
interview.
23. On 11 August 2017 a letter was sent by the human resources manager to
the claimant24. He was required to attend a disciplinary hearing on 15
August 2017. All the notes of interviews were provided.
24. There was a disciplinary hearing on 21 August 2017 taken by Colleague
125. The claimant has no issue with Colleague 1, whom he regards as he
does Colleague 5 (disciplinary appeal and grievance hearings). In it the
claimant accepted that he had left his machine running unattended on one
occasion, but that was because it was running so slowly26. He denied
everything else, saying that it was all fabricated. The outcome was
summary dismissal. The letter of dismissal27 did not mention the breaks
but found the other matters proved, set out as 3 things, removal of the
beard snood, leaving the machine running and failing to communicate with
his manager to the extent of gross insubordination.
25. On 08 September 2017 the claimant appealed28. All the statements had
been choreographed. Colleague 6 had changed his account. The
allegations were false and baseless. Before he moved shift he had never
had any disciplinary matter with Colleague 6. It was all planned and
directed at him as systematic harassment and discrimination as happened
when he had worked in Colleague 6’s shift. He denied taking off his snood,
or leaving the machine running and unattended. His version of events was
not properly understood.
26. On 18 September 2017 there was an appeal hearing taken by Colleague
529. The claimant said that Colleague 6 had persuaded Colleagues B-F to
lie. He could not say why. His relationship with Colleague 6 was such that
he would speak to him only about work matters.
27. On 25 September 2017 Colleague 5 dismissed the appeal30. He upheld
the dismissal for the same reasons.
The claimant’s case
28. The dismissal was the culmination of Colleague 6’s sexual harassment of
him. The respondent fabricated documents. There was an induction note
with yes/no boxes, none of which were ticked. This was a fabricated
document. There was a letter from Universal Credit after his dismissal
dated 02 November 2017 saying that he would not suffer a deduction as
his employer had not responded to a questionnaire asking about reasons
for dismissal, but in the bundle was a document dated 31st October 2017
saying that he had been dismissed for misconduct. He said that the
company document was therefore a forgery because of the universal
credit letter. This meant that nothing produced by the respondent could be
24 Page 267-268
25 Page 273-277
26 Page 276
27 21 August 2017, page 278-279
28 Page 280-282
29 Notes pages 287-292
30 Page 294
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 8
relied on. He had written many times, but conveniently they were no
longer in his human resources file.
29. He had only withdrawn allegations of inappropriate behaviour outside work
because a judge had told him to do that in a case management hearing.
30. He had been deprived of 6 days holiday when he wanted to go to the
Gambia (and this was the focus of much of his cross-examination of
witnesses), but Colleague E had 28 days holiday that year, and he only
had 23½ days even though they had started work on the same day. This
was all part of the harassment he had suffered from Colleague 6, who was
responsible for approving his holiday.
31. There had been a sustained campaign of calling him homosexual.
Everything about the dismissal was unfair, because Colleague 6 had
orchestrated the whole thing when he had covered his new manager’s
absence.
32. When he first arrived he had been at work and bent over, and Colleague 6
had said “I’ll have a bit of that”. He had also asked about the claimant’s
sisters, saying they must be beautiful as he was so handsome.
33. There were various inconsistencies in witness statements.
Submissions
34. I made a detailed typed record of proceedings and the submissions, which
were of 1½ hours for each party, and which can be read if required by a
higher Court.
35. Counsel for the respondent pointed out that the claim was exclusively
under S26 of the EqA. There was no harassment claim. Most of the
matters in the list of issues, as described in the evidence and as
challenged in cross examination had no sexual element at all. Of the 2 that
did, (b) and (i) the claimant had given no oral evidence, had provided only
a 2 page witness statement which contained nothing about these
allegations, and he had not cross examined about them.
36. The allegations had not been the same – they had changed at every
stage, even to making new allegations in oral evidence (as above).
37. For the claimant’s case to be found to be proved there had to be a
conspiracy of Colleague 6 and Colleagues B-F inclusive. This was not
credible.
38. There was nothing in the holiday point – the claimant had simply failed to
appreciate that the holiday year had changed, so that the 23½ days was
his correct entitlement for the period March to December 2016. It had
been explained to him in the grievance hearing. There had been no
deduction from his entitlement. That of Colleague E might be because she
had carried some forward from the last period, but in any event if she had
more than she was entitled to that was unconnected with the claimant.
Colleague 6 could not have reduced the holiday entitlement of the
claimant as human resources were the only people who could input that.
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 9
39. As to unfair dismissal, the procedure could not be faulted and the claimant
went out of his way to say that he regarded those who had conducted the
grievance hearing and the dismissal and appeal hearings as fair. He had
been provided with all the evidence, and had every opportunity to make
his case.
40. There had been no presumption that the outcome had to be dismissal, but
thought given to whether there was an alternative. It had weighed with the
decision maker in the appeal that despite his denials the claimant had
accepted in his disciplinary hearing that he had left his machine running.
41. The claimant spoke from the heart. He was particularly exercised about
the holiday, as in 2016 he had been planning to go to the Gambia (where
he was born: he came in 2001 and is now a British citizen) in order to
marry his fiancée. This had its cultural complexities and he had not been
able to go: the wedding had not happened. He objected to the way
Colleague 6 had conducted himself. All he wanted was to go to work and
earn to support himself and his family back in Gambia. He felt that he had
not done himself justice in the hearing though inexperience in how to
handle a case but he was telling the truth. It was all twisted as a device to
get rid of him. He provided a schedule of what he felt were inconsistencies
in the evidence of those interviewed. He felt that the whole process was a
mocking exercise by his colleagues. All he had wanted was to get away
from Colleague 6, and had done so, but when his new manager was
away, and Colleague 6 stood in, pretexts were found to get him dismissed.
His address can be read by a higher Court if required.
Findings of fact
Discrimination claim
42. The claimant presents as someone with a genuine sense of grievance, but
there is not the evidence for his claims to succeed.
43. The claim is predicated on there being a large scale conspiracy to get him
dismissed for sexual harassment reasons. There are several difficulties
with that assertion and the claim.
a. First it requires Colleagues B-E and 3 to be complicit in it.
Colleague 6 was not their manager, and there is no reason for them
to do so.
b. The claimant did not say that he was friendless, but could find
no one to support what he said, either on the 3 shifts, or as to
adverse treatment before. He said they were afraid to do so, and
we take account of that possibility.
c. There is the moving nature of the allegations, which differed
every time he set them out, with further allegations raised for the
first time at the hearing.
d. The assertions are not particularised save (b) which referred to
a “hug” on 01 June 2015.
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 10
e. There was no oral evidence or cross examination about the
matters in the list of issues.
f. Most of them cannot have any sexual element and that is an
essential component of a S26(b) claim. There is no S27
harassment claim.
g. The claimant asserts that there were sexual advances by
Colleague 6, but save for 2 matters that were in the list for the first
case management hearing (and which were left out of the second)
there is only the one specific, over 2 years earlier. We did not find
credible that the Judge at the case management hearing directed
that anything outside work could not be relied on.
h. The claimant accepted in his disciplinary hearing that he had left
his machine running, and this was regarded as one of the most
serious matters (the respondent produces food trays and there is
no production process between the product leaving the factory and
being used for food for supermarket customers so oversight is
crucial – the beard snood is important for the same reason). It is not
consistent with a sexual harassment reason. The claimant’s
assertion that everything was made up is, in this important
particular it was not, by his own admission. In the disciplinary
hearing the claimant accepted that it was so, and offered the
mitigation that it was slow, and that a colleague was coming to
attend it. The colleague (B) said that she went to the machine only
because the claimant left it running unattended.
44. The claimant’s assertion that the form sent to the universal credit
department was a forgery is not credible. The letter requesting the form
asked for a reply in 7 days: the form was sent in 10, and the UC letter was
dated a few days after that. The UC letter was very probably prepared
before the form reached the department and the file. This was to the
advantage of the claimant as he was not sanctioned by the UC
department. That a form had not got the yes/no sections circled was
undoubtedly human error. Since the form was to sign him off for a pay
increment and he was sent a letter congratulating him passing the training
there is nothing in this point.
45. The claimant spent a long time seeking to show that there were
inconsistencies in the evidence put before the disciplinary hearing. There
was certainly one, which was that there were two different accounts as to
who it was that eventually persuaded the claimant to leave the shop floor
and discuss matters in the training room. That misses the point, for the
claimant accepts that he was highly agitated then, and refused to speak
to, or even look at, his manager that evening. The detail of who persuaded
him to go up to the training room is inconsequential and does not bear on
the facts considered by those dealing with disciplinary and appeal
hearings. Other differences are in reality not: Colleague 6 came on duty at
2am and used the date applicable from midnight. Those starting work at
10pm (Colleagues A-E) used the date they started work – one earlier. We
resolved this by going through all the documents and annotating them as
shift 1, 2 or 3. The table provided by the claimant does not give any cause
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10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 11
to doubt the essential credibility of the evidence provided to the person
dismissing the claimant. Even if they made mistakes about exactly what
happened when, it is clear that they were telling of things that happened,
and whether it was shift 1, 2 or 3 is not particularly important. Colleague 6
was able to give a clear account of what happened on each shift, and we
accept that evidence as factually correct.
46. The allegations do not fit within S26(1)(b), save for one which was not
established. We considered that it could be argued that the other
allegations could be argued to fall within S26(1)(a) as related to a
protected characteristic. The difficulty with that argument is that a shift
manager routinely adjusts the machines of those he manages. It is part of
his job. There is nothing to indicate that anything done to the machines
operated by the claimant was out of the ordinary.
47. The claimant feels (such was his evidence) that Colleague 6 wants a
sexual relationship with him. There is no evidence that could lead to such
a finding. An issue not before us was of an asserted touching on the leg in
a car. However we refer to it. The claimant spoke in his submissions of his
distress (even now) – at the very least great discomfort – at attending a
cremation for the first time instead of a burial. While Colleague 6 denied it
occurred, if it did it is equally consistent with reassurance. There were
others in the car, but no allegation was made at the time. The claimant
asserted that years later Colleague 6 was suborning him by ill treatment at
work to induce him into a sexual relationship: but while complaining of ill
treatment he makes no allegation of any such approach in parallel with the
asserted ill treatment. The human resources experience was of frequent
visits complaining of many things. These are just more complaints from
the claimant unconnected with sexuality.
48. On the evidence before us the claimant has not met the burden of proof
upon him. We have borne in mind the shifting burden of proof in
discrimination claims. We conclude that that on the evidence before us the
burden of proof does not shift to the respondent. If it had the respondent
has discharged it
49. For all these reasons the claim for sexual harassment does not succeed.
50. We observe that even if there was a heading of harassment contrary to
S27 it would not, on our findings of fact, succeed. It is plain that the
claimant has an antipathy towards Colleague 6. He would not even look at
him on the night: that was the evidence of the human resources manager,
Colleague 3. She was new to the company and there is no reason why
she might be part of a conspiracy. It was her clear evidence that when she
was called to the place of work at about 5am (and she works normal office
hours so it was plainly regarded as important) the claimant would not
speak to anyone but her – not Colleague 6 or Colleagues A-E who were
all present. That could be because he was so angry at being “framed”, but
as he accepted that he had left his machine running unattended that
cannot be the entirety of the case. We accept that the evidence of
Colleague 3 and of A-E was what they saw. It was of a man who was very
agitated every time his manager approached his machine and refusing to
engage with him, walking off when he approached, usually switching off
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10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 12
the machine he was working on, and on the 3rd shift storming off throwing
down his beard snood.
51. The claimant said in his oral evidence that everything happened on that 3rd
shift and the other 2 were uneventful. However Colleague 6 had emailed
Colleague 3 on the first shift as Colleague 6 had emailed her about it that
night31. It is unlikely that a plot would be laid so deep as to email and then
wait 2 days.
52. It is highly unlikely that the asserted conspiracy extended to the human
resources department filleting the file to excise the written complaints he
said he had made. Either Colleague 3 would have had to have done it, her
predecessor or Colleague 6 get access to the file to do so. There is no
reason to think a departing human resources person would have any
reason to do so. Colleague 3 was new and was not said to be hostile to
the claimant, and it is not likely that Colleague 6 got access to the file, or
got Colleague 3 to remove papers from it.
53. The evidence of the claimant varied in this regard, being first of letters
then of verbal complaints. The evidence of the human resources person
(Colleague 3) was that the claimant would often attend their office often to
complain about one thing or another. The claimant has an excellent
command of the English language, but he tends to speak quickly and
quietly about things he finds important and has an accent at times hard to
understand. With these factors in addition to the way the matters he
complained about varied, and the lack of any particularity (the allegations
made in these proceedings being an exemplar) it is entirely
understandable that matters really of concern to the claimant were not
understood.
54. The claimant seems to assert both that he was mocked by Colleague 6 for
being homosexual (and Colleague 6 knowing that he is not) and that he
was being ill treated to attempt to get him to submit to a same sex sexual
relationship. This is an inherently unlikely combination. With all the other
difficulties with the claimant’s case we find that neither is the case.
55. On the balance of probabilities we find that the position is that at some
point early on in the claimant’s employment there was, from unidentified
colleagues, some “banter” – in an Employment Tribunal always something
the speaker finds amusing and the hearer finds insulting – to the effect
that the claimant is gay. He finds that very insulting. Coupled with his
upset over not being allowed holiday to go to the Gambia, this infected his
perception of the working environment to the extent that the claimant
sought to be moved from Colleague 6’s team, and he was. He was left
with a deep antipathy towards, and suspicion of, Colleague 6 that has no
evidential basis, and which manifested itself in his actions towards
Colleague 6 on the three shifts in July 2017.
56. It must be a matter of regret that the claimant never told anyone in the
respondent WHY his “lost” 6 days were so important to him. Perhaps he
could then have taken an advance on his accrued leave. That did not
emerge (we think) until this hearing. The effect on him of not being able to
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10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 13
go to Gambia then has, we consider from the way he presented his case.
It was the starting point for his cross examinations and he spent a lot of
time on the point. It has impacted hugely on his approach to the
respondent and those with whom he worked. In particular he blames
Colleague 6 for denying him that holiday (entirely erroneously) and so he
blames Colleague 6 for the consequences (for which it seems to us
Colleague 6 is not responsible in any way, and of which he was probably
unaware). This has been a causative factor in the events of 10-13 July
2017 leading to the dismissal of the claimant.
57. Put shortly, the claimant had a genuine but misplaced resentment
against Colleague 6 that boiled over in the 3 night shifts when
Colleague 6 was deputising as manager of the claimant’s new shift,
and which led him to unwise actions, which came to a culmination
towards the end of the 3rd such shift, leading to his suspension and
dismissal.
58. We raised the possibility of there being a jurisdictional problem with time
limits. This is set out in section 8 of the second case management order.
This was not a matter addressed in Counsel’s submissions before we
raised it at the end of the hearing. Because the claims fail on the merits it
is not necessary to consider striking out the claims for a jurisdictional
reason. As the claimant asserts that his dismissal was the culmination of
a campaign of harassment it is arguable that this is a series of asserted
events, and so in time. If it were not then given that the unfair dismissal
claim is agreed to be in time and was said to be motivated by a
background of asserted sexual harassment we would probably have
considered it just and equitable to allow it to continue, if it were out of time.
However this is academic given that the discrimination claim fails on the
merits.
Unfair dismissal claim
59. The Claim for unfair dismissal also fails. We consider that the guidance of
the Court of Appeal in Jhuti means that it could not possibly succeed. That
claim was about an asserted public interest disclosure, but it was a S103A
unfair dismissal claim and applies equally here. (There are different
burden of proof criteria for a S103A claim, but that is not relevant to this
point.) The claimant accepted that the person dismissing him and the
person taking the appeal were both entirely genuine. He accepted that if
he had done the things that he was accused of doing this was gross
misconduct. He accepted that dismissal for such gross misconduct would
not be unfair. The investigator expressly asked Colleagues B-E about the
possibility of fabricated statements. It is apparent that the ACAS Code was
followed.
60. Given the evidence in front of them both the witnesses who dismissed the
claimant and rejected his appeal have established that they had genuine
belief on reasonable grounds after proper investigation in gross
misconduct. The dismissing officer did consider whether anything else was
appropriate and concluded not. He gave sound reasons. Given that the
matters were of attitude towards management, and health and safety
matters in a factory where these are critical for product delivery it could not
Case No: 2423870/2017
10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62 14
be said that dismissal for this gross misconduct was outside the range of
responses of the reasonable employer.
61. That means that even if the claimant was right, and it was all orchestrated
by Colleague 6 it would still be a fair dismissal. The claimant would think
that a harsh and unfair outcome if that were the reason we dismissed his
claim. While that means the claim cannot succeed we also find, as a fact,
that it was not so orchestrated. We have no doubt that the claimant
genuinely believes that it was, but after looking carefully at all the
evidence, assertions and submissions (and making full allowance for the
difficulties faced by a litigant in person) we find that he is mistaken. It
would have needed to be a large conspiracy, and Colleague 6 was not the
usual manager of Colleagues B-E, and nor would it account for Colleague
3 being complicit. There was no evidence on which we could so find.
62. Colleague 6 did not harass the claimant sexually or otherwise. He did not
tamper with the claimant’s holiday entitlement or prevent him going to the
Gambia in 2016. The claimant just did not have enough holiday
entitlement at the time. Colleague 6 did not invent allegations. He did not
get the others to lie.
63. Accordingly the unfair dismissal claim is also dismissed.
64. We record that we considered all the evidence put before us before
arriving at any conclusions, and did not deal with the discrimination claim
in isolation. To some extent the factual matrix is applicable to both claims,
but we have set them out separately as legally they are distinct claims.
Employment Judge Housego
_________________________________________
Date 22 February 2019
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